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LINCOLN ROOM

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
LIBRARY

MEMORIAL

the Class of 1901

founded by

HARLAN HOYT HORNER

and
HENRIETTA CALHOUN HORNER

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOLUME I

;ii ;. YH / .a > /, .

Published October tqn

PREFACE

IT was the custom of my father all his life to keep a diary.
He was a prolific writer on political subjects and his even-
ings were generally spent with his pen in his hand. When
in Washington, it was his habit in the evening, after the
family had retired, to devote his time to writing in the
diary. His public duties at that period gave him no time
to devote to the miscellaneous writings to which he had
been accustomed. But in the diary are expressed his views
on public men and measures, not only of the day but also
those gathered throughout his public life. It was a relaxa-
tion to him to write ; in fact, being thoroughly accustomed
to it, it was a pleasure.

The question of the publication of this diary has caused
me much serious reflection. It is an unreserved expres-
sion of what was from day to day in the mind of the writer.
He probably thought that it would be useful as a record
of the events of the time. Certainly he did not think it
would be wholly unheeded.

But his expressions were not shaped by the considera-
tion that it would be given to the world or would not be;
the decision of that question he left to me. Accordingly, I
have taken the advice of those in whom I know my father
would have the most implicit confidence, submitting the
material for consideration and review. Without exception,
I believe, the decision has been that duty requires of me
the publication, and the truth of history demands that
under no circumstances must I fail to make this record
public. It had seemed to me that the free criticism and
personal allusions should have been hi some degree elim-

vi PREFACE

inated, but the advice of the most eminent authorities has
been adverse to any omission. I should have much pre-
ferred it otherwise, but have yielded to those to whose
judgment I should defer. A few strong expressions, purely
personal and private, have been omitted, but the omis-
sion has always been indicated and the reader may have
full confidence that the text of the diary has been hi no
way mutilated or revised.

I desire to express my obligations to the publishers for
their careful and painstaking work. Too much credit can-
not be given them for their labors and the result.

EDGAR T. WELLES.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION JOHN T. MORSE xvli

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference
— Porter and Barren — The Relief of Fort Pickens — Conversation
with Senator Douglas — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the
Norfolk Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of
War — The Relations of Seward and Stanton — Fear of the Merri-
mac in Washington — " Stanton's Navy " 3

JULY AND AUGUST, 1862

The President broaches the Subject of Emancipation — Navy Depart-
ment Worries — Commodore Wilkes — Disappointed Officers —
Seward's Assumption of Authority — How Lincoln chose his Cabi-
net — The Army's Failure to cooperate — The Military Theory of
Frontiers — Promotion of W. D. Porter — Proposed Line of Gun-
boats on the Ohio — The Cabal against McClellan — Stanton on
McClellan — The Need of Better Generals 70

III

SEPTEMBER, 1862

After the Second Battle of Bull Run — Another Anti-McClellan Paper

— The Opinion about General Pope — Wilkes and McClellan —
McClellan's Remarks about South Carolina and Massachusetts

— The Bickerings of the Generals — The President's Opinion of
McClellan and Pope — Rumors of a Proposed Revolution — An
Estimate of Halleck — Panic-Stricken New York — A Scheme to de-
port Slaves to Chiriqui — The " West Point " Policy — An Estimate
of Stanton — Lincoln's Deference to Seward — The Administration of
the Departments — The Want of a Military Policy — Lincoln and
Seward — How Cabinet-Meetings were conducted — The Rivalry
of Seward and Chase — News of Antietam — Dismissal of Com-
mander Preble — The Emancipation Proclamation read to the
Cabinet — Senator John P. Hale — Chase's Financial Policy —

viii CONTENTS

Chase's Opinion of Stanton — The Chiriqui Scheme — New York
Politics — European Efforts to break the Blockade 100

OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1862

D. D. Porter appointed to the Western Flotilla — Porter, Davis, and
Dahlgren — The Cabinet on Emancipation — Admiral Du Pont —
Stanton's Threat to resign — Dahlgren's Ambitions — The Norfolk
Blockade — The Currency Question — Stuart's Raid — Spanish
Claims as to Maritime Jurisdiction — The Case of the Steamer
Bermuda — General Scott's Influence at the Beginning of the War
— The Question of raising the Norfolk Blockade — A Hoax on
Seward — Transfer of the Mississippi Fleet to the Navy — Seward
and the Mails captured on Blockade-Runners 157

DECEMBER, 1862

A Private Grief — Burnside succeeds McClellan in Command of the
Army of the Potomac — The Modification of the Norfolk Blockade

— The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy — The Question
of New Navy Yards — Count Gurowski and his Book — Com-
mander Preble's Case — The Division of Virginia — A Roundabout
Proceeding of Seward's — Seward's Resignation and the Discussion
in Regard to it — Chase tenders his Resignation and the President
sees a Way out — Cabinet Rivalries — Seward and Chase requested
to withdraw their Resignations — Depredations of the Alabama —
Cabinet Discussion of the West Virginia Question — Butler super-
seded by Banks at New Orleans — The Party Spirit 182

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1863

The Emancipation Proclamation — The Battle of Murfreesborough —
Loss of the Monitor — Criticisms of the Navy Department — Hal-
leek's Deficiencies — The Employment of the Contrabands — John
Covode's Gubernatorial Aspirations — The Pernicious Party Spirit

— McClernand and Vicksburg — The Court Martial on Fitz John
Porter — The New London Navy Yard Question — Confederate
Letters — Fitz John Porter's Conviction — A Call from F. A.
Conkling — The Gauge of the Pacific Railroad — Hooker placed in
Command of the Army of the Potomac — An Estimate of Farragut —
"Weed is Seward, and Seward is Weed " — Governor Morgan elected
Senator from New York — Reported Pressure for Mediation on the

CONTENTS ix

Part of the French Government — Proposed Attack on Charleston

— Chase's Bank Bill — The Senate rejects the Reappointment of
Collector Howard — Irregular Acts of the President — Scene be-
tween Scott, McClellan, and Seward 212

VII

MARCH AND APRIL, 1863

— The Peterhoff 's Mails — Commander Rhind and the Ironclads
at Charleston — The Elletts and the Ram Fleet — Du Font's Fail-
ure at Charleston — The President takes a Hand in the Peterhoff
Contention — Blockade-Runners on the Rio Grande — Du Pont's
Vanity and Weakness — Sumner's Conversation with Lord Lyons

on the Peterhoff Matter 244

VIII

MAY, 1863

Conversation with Attorney-General Bates on the Captured Mails —
John Laird's Statement in Parliament — Waiting for News from
Hooker — Rumors of the Battle of Chancellorsville — Disappoint-
ment at the News — Stonewall Jackson's Death — Recall of Wilkes
from the West India Squadron — Earl Russell's Speech on Ameri-
can Affairs — Sumner's Talk with Seward about Mr. Adams and
the Secretary of Legation at London — Conversation with the Pre-
sident on the Subject of Captured Mails — Du Pont's Charges
against Chief Engineer Stimers — Du Pont before Charleston —
His Shortcomings and the Question of superseding him — Deplor-
able Conditions in the South — Foote succeeds Du Pont in Com-
mand of the South Atlantic Squadron — Dahlgren declines to be
Second in Command 290

JUNE, 1863

The Arrest of Vallandigham and the Case of the Chicago Times — The
Removal of Wilkes — Count Gurowski on Welles's Appointment

CONTENTS

to the Cabinet — General Milroy at Winchester — The President
and the Cabinet kept in Ignorance of Army Movements — Lack of
Confidence in Hooker — Alarm at Rumors of Confederate Advance
into Pennsylvania — The President calls for 100,000 Volunteers —
The President's Opinion of " Orpheus C. Kerr" — Illness of Admiral
Foote — The Secretary of State and the Matamoras Situation —
Sumner's Opinion of Hooker — Appointment of Dahlgren to the
South Atlantic Squadron in Foote's Place — The French Tobacco
in Richmond — Estimate of Dahlgren — The Monitors and the
Fifteen-Inch Guns — Founding of the Army and Navy Gazette —
— Congratulations to Commodore Rodgers on the Capture of the
Fingal — The President betrays Doubts of Hooker — Blair on
the Presidential Aspirations of Chase and McClellan — Death of
Admiral Foote — His Lifelong Friendship with Welles — Needless
Alarm for the Safety of New York — Meade succeeds Hooker —
Rumors of Confederate Raids near Washington — Lee's Advance
into Pennsylvania . . . 319

JULY, 1863

First Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg — Stanton accused by McClel-
lan of sacrificing the Army — F. P. Blair on Stanton's Early Seces-
sionist Sympathies — Stanton's Treachery toward the Buchanan
Administration — Seward's Intrigues — His Misconception of the
War — Later News from Gettysburg — Vice-President Stephens's
Proposed Mission to Washington — Intercepted Confederate Dis-
patches — Cabinet-Meeting on Stephens's Mission — Meade linger-
ing at Gettysburg — The Fall of Vicksburg — Lincoln's Receipt of
the News — Rejoicings over Gettysburg and Vicksburg — Vice-
President Hamlin's Request for a Prize Court at Portland — Some
of the Generals Content to have the War continue — Draft Riots —
The President's Dejection at the Failure of Meade to capture Lee's
Army — The Draft Riots in New York — Lee recrosses the Poto-
mac — Prospects of an Early Ending to the War — An Estimate
of Jefferson Davis — Calhoun and Nullification — Senator Hale's
Hostility — Downfall of the Mexican Republic — Impressions of
Colonel Rawlins of Grant's Staff — Grant's Dissatisfaction with
McClernand . 354

AUGUST, 1863

Refutation of Laird's Statement as to an Application from the Navy
Department — The President refuses to postpone the Draft —
Connection of Howard of Brooklyn with the Laird Matter — The

CONTENTS xi

Provisions of the Draft Act discussed in Cabinet — General Halleck
and the Almaden Mines — The President adopts Seward's Views
as to Instructions to Naval Officers — The President's Letter- Writ-
ing — The Ironclads not to leave England — A Confidential Com-
munication from Seward — Assistant-Secretary Fox and the
Howard Affair — Conversation with Chase on the Subject of
Slavery — General Meade meets the Cabinet — Suggestions from
Boston — General F. P. Blair's Account of the Vicksburg Campaign
— Injustice of the Draft Act — A Letter from North Carolina —
Solicitor Whiting's Schemes for dealing with Slavery — Death of
Governor Gurley of Arizona — Conversation with Chase on the
Reconstruction of the Union — Secession of the States not to be
recognized — Death of Commander George W. Rodgers — The Case
of the Mont Blanc — Toombs on Southern Conditions — The Sec-
i retary of the Navy placed by Seward in a False Position as to Move-
ments against the English Cruisers — The Subject of Reunion . . 393

XII

SEPTEMBER, 1863

Return from a Tour among the Navy Yards — Abuse of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Connection with the Draft — The President sus-
pends the Writ on Military Questions — Newspaper Alarm over
the Ironclads building in England — Seward communicates the
Assurances of the British Ministry in regard to the Rams — The
News of Chickamauga — The President laments the Inefficiency of
the Generals — The President's Opinion of Farragut — The Fail-
ure at Sabine Pass — The English Government prevents the Laird
Ram from coming out — The Russian Fleet arrives at New York —
Reinforcing Rosecrans — An Irregular Proceeding of Seward's —
The Conduct of the Generals at Chickamauga — A Report about
the Laird Ram . . 431

xin

OCTOBER, 1863

Slow Progress at Charleston — Letter to the President in Reference to
Instructions to Naval Officers — Seward refers the Spanish Claim
of Maritime Jurisdiction to the King of Belgium — Conversation
with Admiral Milne of the British Navy — A Political Letter of
McClellan's — The Ohio and Pennsylvania Elections — Lincoln's
Magnanimity to Meade — General Sickles's Account of Gettysburg
— Meade's "Strategy" — The Unaccredited Minister from Vene-
zuela desires to purchase a Naval Vessel — General Terry and
Colonel Hawley on Dahlgren — An Unjust Complaint from Admiral
Du Pont . . 449

xii CONTENTS

XIV

DECEMBER, 1863

The Writing of the Secretary's Annual Report — The Russian Fleets
sent into American Waters for the Winter — Entertaining the Rus-
sian Officers — Colfax elected Speaker of the House over Wash-
burne — Senatorial Opposition to John P. Hale as Chairman of the
Naval Committee — Brandegee's Appointment to the House Naval
Committee — Plain Speech with Senator Hale — Insubordination
of Commodore Wilkes — Rebel Letters captured on Board the
Ceres — The Plot of Trowbridge, Briggs, Lamar, and Cavnach —
Louis Napoleon's Attitude — The Turret Vessels gaining Friends —
The Department's Policy in Regard to Ships — Conversation with
Senator Doolittle on Trade-Permits and Presidential Candidates —
Sailors enticed into the Army — The Year closes more satisfactorily
than it began 479

JANUARY, 1864

An Estimate of Sumner — The Charges against Engineer-in-Chief
Isherwood — Lincoln and Seward on Clay and Webster — Conver-
sation with the Elder Blair and Governor Dennison — Discussion
in the Cabinet as to opening Additional Ports in the South — Criti-
cism of the Navy Department — Moses H. Grinnell and his Rela-
tions with the Department — The Finding of the Court of In-
quiry on Wilkes's Letter — John P. Hale tells of Charges of Mis-
management in Connection with the Cherokee and R. B. Forbes . 501

XVI

FEBRUARY, 1864

Donald McKay compliments the Navy Department — The War De-
partment suspected of instigating Attacks on the Navy Department
— The President on the Dominican Question — A Talk with Chase
on Financial Matters and the Charleston Situation — The Pre-
sident as a Politician — A Pleasant Half -Hour with Preston King —
An Estimate of the Man — Chase's Use of the Treasury Machinery
to further his Presidential Aspirations — The Departmental Char-
acter of the Administration — Carpenter's Picture of President
Lincoln and his Cabinet — The President greets an Admirer —
Chase's Electioneering — A Secret Expedition to Florida — Move-
ment on Behalf of Retired Naval Officers 518

CONTENTS xiii

XVII

MARCH, 1864

General Blair attacks Chase in the House — Solicitation for Political
Subscriptions — Urging the Promotion of Colonel Hawley — Good
News of Colonel Dahlgren — Chase's Attitude as to Permits and
Trade Regulations — News of Ulric Dahlgren's Death — Grant at
the President's Reception — Grant receives his Commission as
Lieutenant-General — An Impression of Grant — The Exposure of
Contract Frauds — The New Draft for 200,000 Men discussed in
the Cabinet — A Call from Solicitor Whiting — The Scarcity of
Seamen for the Navy — Conversation with Admiral Dahlgren on
General Gillmore — Conversation between Seward and the Artist
Carpenter on the Great Events of the Administration .... 533

ILLUSTRATIONS

GIDEON WELLES Photogravure frontispiece

WILLIAM H. SEWARD 8

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN 94

HENRY W. HALLECK 120

PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND CABINET AT THE SIGNING OF THE EMAN-
CIPATION PROCLAMATION 142

From the Painting by Francis Bicknell Carpenter.

JOHN A. DAHLGREN 164

EDWIN D. MORGAN 232

CHARLES SUMNER 286

ANDREW HULL FOOTE 346

HANNIBAL HAMLIN 366

GEORGE G. MEADE 404

CHARLES WILKES . 490

INTRODUCTION

MR. WELLES was in his fifty-eighth year at the time of
his entry into the Cabinet of President Lincoln, at which
point these volumes take up the story of his life. A brief
account of what he had done during these preceding years
will have at least the interest of displaying what prepara-
tion and equipment he brought to the important office
which he was called upon to fill.

His earliest American ancestor escaped the distinction
of being one of the Mayflower band by only a very few
years; he arrived, however, in time to take part in the
settling of Hartford, becoming " identified with its fortunes
as early as 1636"; and serving as Treasurer, and later as
Governor, of the Colony. Upon an estate in Glastonbury,
bought by this ancestor from the Indians, Gideon Welles
was born July 1, 1802. He was educated at the Protestant
Episcopal Academy at Cheshire, and at Norwich Univers-
ity. Afterward he studied law, and the mental influence
of this training was plainly perceptible throughout his
active life, though he left the profession so early as Janu-
ary, 1826. He then took charge of the Hartford Times, a
Democratic sheet, which soon afterward gave its influence
in behalf of Andrew Jackson for the Presidency. This act
of political friendship, and the prominence of Mr. Welles
in party politics in Connecticut naturally led to his becom-
ing Jackson's chief adviser in the local affairs of that State.
He continued his editorial labors so long as his leader
remained in the White House; also occupying collater-
ally the position of Representative from Glastonbury in
the State legislature from 1827 to 1835. We are told that
in matters political his "sagacity seemed to be almost
unfailing." Certainly his views were liberal and progress-
ive, in evidence whereof is the fact that, when the Supreme

xviii INTRODUCTION

Court of the State held that a disbeliever in a future state
of rewards and punishments was incompetent as a witness,
Mr. Welles led a persistent and at last successful struggle
for legislation which reduced this requirement of faith in
heaven and hell as a basis of credibility to the more mod-
erate dimension of belief in a God. He further aided in
effecting the abolition of imprisonment for mere debt.
Under Van Buren, from 1836 to 1841, he was Postmaster
at Hartford, which was then the central office for the dis-
tribution of the mail throughout New England. In 1842,
he was elected by popular vote to the office of State Comp-
troller, and in 1843 was reflected. In 1846 he was ap-
pointed by Polk to be Chief of the Bureau of Provisions
and Clothing for the Navy, and held the place till the sum-
mer of 1849.

With the administration of Polk and the annexation
of territory as a result of the Mexican War, the slavery
question became predominant in national politics. Thus
far Mr. Welles had been a Democrat and a democrat, alike
with the capital D and with the small letter. There is
a very material difference between these two words, Demo-
crat and democrat, though proof-readers have not always
been awake to the important distinction. The party of
that name has adopted President Jefferson as at least the
most distinguished expounder, if not the founder of the
American variety of their political creed. Yet Jefferson
was democratic only with very large reservations; he
excited Hamilton to frenzy by his extravagant preach-
ments about the rule of the masses, but in fact he never
had a suspicion that the ruling masses could be so wrong-
headed as not to take their doctrines from gentlemen of
intelligence like himself, and he assumed as basic matter
of course that the common people would have the common
sense to select presidents, governors, and rulers generally
from that class of the community whose superior fitness
for these functions Mr. Jefferson regarded as a postulate.
Genuine democracy found its way into the Presidency with

INTRODUCTION xix

Andrew Jackson. But when, later on, the Democracy, as
a political party, became the party of the Southern slavo-
cracy, it certainly had no longer any right to use the adjec-
tive with the little d; on the contrary it had the honesty,
or the pride, to boast itself to be the party of aristocracy.
At the same time, however, it retained, because it found
very useful, the old Democratic doctrines of State rights
and of strict construction of the Constitution. A practical
concrete problem, however, was now coming into entire
possession of men's minds to the exclusion of all else.
There were no survivals of old questions, and political
theories and principles had either to prove themselves
malleable or to be rejected by their old-time followers,
when the perpetuation and therefore the extension of
Slavery came to the front. There was a new alignment
throughout the Northern half of the country, and at once
multitudes of independent men, refusing to be controlled
by a political misnomer, crossed over from the slavocratic
and aristocratic Democracy to the new, humanitarian, and
democratic Republicanism. There was no use in raising
the cry of apostasy; for the apostates were too numerous
and too respectable to be described by so discreditable a
name; and, moreover, it was quite obvious that no political
consistency compelled a Democrat under Jackson and Van
Buren to remain a Democrat under Pierce or Buchanan.
There was certainly no continuity or succession between
the destruction of the Bank of the United States, for ex-
ample, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

The infusion of a great moral issue into politics, which
ordinarily have little enough to do with the moralities,
inevitably changed the point of view for any man who felt
the old Puritan conscience strong within him. In the cus-
tomary run of public business, the average man embarks
on board his party as on board a ship for a long voyage,
and does not get off at the first port because he has not
always been entirely delighted with all the arrangements;
if, however, he wants to go north and he finds that the

xx INTRODUCTION

captain is sailing south, he is likely to take the first oppor-
tunity of parting company. Thus it very naturally came
about that the democratic Gideon Welles, being a clear-
headed, independent, and conscientious person, ceased to
be a Democrat, and became a Republican. Moreover, in a
certain way it might be argued that consistency itself led
him to this action, for the theory of State rights, always
advocated by him, involved the repudiation of the Demo-
cratic move for the establishment of slavery in the Terri-
tories under cover of the national authority, this being the
sure basis and pre judgment for its establishment in the
later development of the State.

The change of political allegiance induced no change of
occupation, and Mr. Welles now became a contributor to
the Hartford Evening Press, which was designed to be the
organ of Republicanism in the State. In 1856 he had the
courage, as Republican candidate for Governor, to face
sure defeat in a cause in which he believed. About the
same time, by choice of the Republican Convention which
assembled in Philadelphia, he entered upon what proved
to be an eight years' term of service as a member of the
Republican National Committee; also he was chairman
of the delegation from his State to the Convention at
Chicago which nominated Abraham Lincoln.

President Lincoln's courteous patience in listening to
advice, and his desire always by consultation to get the
benefit of suggestions, obscured for a while in the public
eye his underlying self-reliance and the independence of his
ultimate judgment. The suspicion that his course was
often steered by another hand than his own has only died
slowly, as careful study of his career and the accumulation
of much evidence have enforced quite the contrary convic-
tion. Yet a shrewd observer might have forecast the truth
at the outset, from the formation of his Cabinet ; for in no
other matter are political bargaining, wire-pulling, and
pressure more vigorously exercised than in Cabinet-mak-
ing ; yet of the seven men who constituted his ministry, his

INTRODUCTION xxi

hand was forced only in the selection of Cameron, and even
there the forcing was perhaps not oppressive. Certainly
the other six represented his personal choice, and no other
among them represented it more than did Mr. Welles,
whose career up to this point had given him no controlling
prestige such as that which would have made the omission
of Seward or Chase a matter of criticism. So far as is
known, no pressure, either political or personal, was
brought to bear; and it was Mr. Welles's record, as it has
been narrated above, which led Mr. Lincoln to invite him
into the Cabinet. The Diary has the story of the selection
in conclusive shape. Wanting a man from New England,
Lincoln took an ex-Democrat, trained in public business,
who had manifested his courage and the earnestness of his
conviction by casting loose from his old associates on the
question of slavery; and who also, it maybe noted, had
shown a natural aptitude for politics, a quality which
Mr. Lincoln, possessing it himself in a high degree, did
not undervalue hi others.

Precisely why the Navy Department was allotted to
Mr. Welles is not clear. Perhaps the citizen of an inland
State, who probably enough had never seen an ocean-going
ship, was influenced by the flavor of maritime commerce
and prowess which still in 1860 hung faintly about the
wharves of New England, and Mr. Lincoln may have
thought that any New Englander must be amphibious ;
or he may have been affected by memory of the office
held by Mr. Welles under Mr. Polk, slight as had been the
nautical flavor of those commercial functions. When, how-
ever, Mr. Welles suggests that Secretary Chase, though
having a "good deal of ability," yet "has never made fin-
ance his study," and again when he shoots at his favorite
target, Senator Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee,
the slurring words "embarrassed by no military or naval
teaching," the reader may smile at the obvious "tu quo-
que" retort, which certainly lay ready at the hand of
each of these gentlemen. Neither of them used it, for

xxii INTRODUCTION

neither of them had the privilege of looking over Mr.
Welles's shoulder as he poured his feelings over the confi-
dential pages of his Diary. But when, later on in his ad-
ministration, other persons, sundry "disappointed men,"
suggested that some one with more real salt-sea experience
than Mr. Welles had would fill the place better, Mr. Welles
writes that there "is a set of factious fools who think it
wise to be censorious, and it is almost as amusing as it is
vexatious to hear and read the remarks of these Solomons,"
these "officious blockheads," who have the simplicity to
allege that the Secretary of the Navy should have had per-
sonal experience on shipboard. One of these critics, he
records, has been a shipowner, another has been a ship-
master; "successful business men, but egotistical and
vainly weak. Neither is competent to administer the Navy
Department." Comforting reflections, and very possibly
altogether true, yet it may be permitted to remark, obiter,
that the layman does not, by familiarity with the spectacle,
cease to feel bewilderment at the utter indifference nearly
always shown as to preparatory training or specialist
knowledge in the allotment of cabinet places. It is sur-
prising to see that a system which might a priori be re-
garded as of dubious promise has so often worked fairly
well. At the same time, one cannot but wish that on some
occasion, when there is one of those temporary lulls which
occur from tune to time in party struggles, when partisan
considerations might without grave peril give good sense a
passing chance, an incoming President would have the orig-
inality and courage to compose a Cabinet of men able and
thoroughly versed in the Departments which they are
called to administer. It is possible that the results might
be very satisfactory; at least, the experiment would be
interesting and instructive. Of course it was not tried by
Mr. Lincoln anymore than it has been by other Presidents,
his predecessors and successors. He made a journalist
Secretary of the Navy, and let us admit that the journalist
proved to be a very good Secretary and rejoice that he

INTRODUCTION xxiii

approved himself also a first-rate Diarist. In fact, if he had
been a much worse Secretary, we should readily have par-
doned his shortcomings on the ground of his eminent suc-
cess in a matter which now and for us is of much more
interest.

Certain it is that in this Diary we have the best "Cabi-
net Interior" which hangs upon the walls of the American
room in the world's Gallery of History. It at once recalls
and provokes comparison with that other famous and
more bulky diary in which John Quincy Adams confided
to posterity his appreciation of his own good qualities and
the failings of his contemporaries. Between the two there
are interesting points, both of resemblance and of contrast.
Both diarists were fine examples of the moral and intel-
lectual civilization of the New England of their times.
Though not quite contemporaries, they were types of a ra-
cial development which became complete during the period
of their joint lifetimes. They were intelligent descendants
of the old Pilgrim stock, untiring seekers of knowledge, clear
thinkers amid their surroundings, with little wit or humor
and no imagination. They had the solid moralities, but
were somewhat deficient in the gentler ones. They estab-
lished high standards as much for themselves as for others;
and to ordinary mortals, who seemed to fall below these
standards they doled out Christian charity with much
economy; yet the reflection that the delinquents, thus
scored by our diarists, were largely professional politicians
may lead us to a like economy of sympathy for them. Both
men manifest a consciousness of perfect rectitude of inten-
tion, which undoubtedly they both had; for more upright
men never lived; neither could have been induced by any
possible temptation to do a selfish or mean or in any way
unworthy act. It should be said, however, that Mr. Welles
is not beset by that self-admiration which from matins to
vespers ceaselessly worried Mr. Adams, so that he seems
forever sitting to himself for his own portrait, whereas Mr.
Welles's portrayal of himself , such as it is, was made with-

xxiv INTRODUCTION

out intention; for which reason his pages are not rendered
wearisome by vanity, or by disingenuous depreciation of
his own merit. Both men are censorious, but Mr. Welles
is almost never acrid; his judgments are severe, but not
unfair, not malicious, not often ill-tempered and perhaps
never really vindictive. They would seem less scathing at
times, if they were tempered with humor; but, in the ab-
sence of this, we have the next most enlivening quality on
the occasions when he indulges in honest and hearty sar-
casm. This he could do very well, as, for example, when he
speaks of one Alden as " patriotic when there was no dan-
ger," actually, though erroneously, believing himself to be
courageous, and " really anxious to do something without
encountering enemies." When he cuts, he does it trench-
antly, and when he abuses, he strikes hard and straight.
He is a fair fighter, and does not grumble too much at the
like treatment when dealt to himself, although it must
seem to him undeserved and at tunes proceeding from un-
worthy motives. If he is not witty, he has more really valu-
able merits: he is very fair and just; he is frank and manly;
he is intelligent, alert, and well-informed, with the result
that no more trustworthy material than his pages can come
to the table of the historian or the hands of the reader.

It is of some interest to establish what is the correct
value of diaries in historical literature. When a politician
sees to his dismay that a fickle and ill-advised public is
giving itself over to be led astray by his perfidious oppon-
ent, he is prone to seek somewhat juiceless consolation in
references to the " verdict of history" or the "verdict of
posterity." Both verdicts are much the same, for both dig-
nified phrases signify only that vague general impression
which has been sent filtering through the public mind by
those historians who can write sufficiently pleasingly to
secure readers. These writers are really counsel, or advo-
cates, unpaid for the most part, and therefore reasonably
honest; and who generally mean to examine the evidence
with an open mind, and to take their volunteer brief for the

INTRODUCTION xxv

man or cause whom or which, upon that evidence, they
believe to be right. Not long ago, the task of editing the
private writings of any deceased public man was taken to
imply the duty of excision and amendment so as to bring
the printed pages into accord with supposed proprieties.
It was not unlike grooming a horse for exhibition. Now,
however, it is understood that such editorial action is in
point of morality much the same thing as tampering with a
witness or perverting his testimony. Suppress diaries or
letters if you cannot print them as they were written; but
know that you are dishonest if, without avowal, you pub-
lish under a man's name mutilated excerpts of what he
really wrote. No other evidence can be more sacred than a
diary, which the world accepts as confidential truth. Be-
fore a judge or jurors the viva voce testimony of a witness in
presence outweighs in real influence a dozen depositions
of absent deponents, and for the historian a diary or a
letter takes the place of this best and most trustworthy
of all possible evidence, and is to be respected accord-
ingly. In this point of view, this Diary of Mr. Welles is
among the most valuable documents within reach of our
historical writers. As between the two, a diary should be
accorded greater value than letters, for it is apt to be
more ingenuous, more honest. Thus it is not possible to
imagine that any historian can possibly have access to
better evidence than this Diary of Mr. Welles. Of course,
either letters or diaries, if written with an eye to post-
humous publication, may be intentionally miscolored; but
it is much harder to be consistently disingenuous in a diary
than in correspondence; the diary written hi the evening is
united to the day as a limb to the body; the same life-blood
gives the vital heat and spirit to both; the palpitation of the
day's actings and talkings still throbs in the evening's ac-
count of them. It is almost a part of the res gestos. The diary
is written to one's self ; the letter is written to a person whose
own individuality of character, opinions, and temper often
unconsciously react upon the writer; the letter may have

xxvi INTRODUCTION

an exterior object, which the diary never can have, since it
can have no other value for its writer than that of a correct
record. The " personal equation, "as it is called, signifying
the moral, mental, and temperamental qualities and idiosyn-
cracies of the diarist, must of course be studied and allowed
for, just as the navigator must study the dip and variation
of the compass; otherwise historian and navigator may
both go wrong. But the observant reader cannot long rest
in the intimacy of the diarist without getting at least what
may be called a good average knowledge of his character. If
these views as to diaries are correct, it is certainly difficult
to exaggerate the value and interest which attach to this
Diary of Mr. Welles; that he wrote it is most fortunate; its
suppression would properly have been regarded as a national
disaster, as its faithful presentation is of inestimable ad-
vantage.

The true function of the diary is to talk to us about
individuals, not to instruct us as to events, — and how
much more interesting this is! In fact, the historian may
well be better informed as to events and facts than the
diarist can be, for the historian has access to immense ac-
cumulations of evidence which the diarist never knew, but
which through the long years have come slowly leaking into
light from desks and attics and hiding-places innumerable.
On the other hand, history is comparatively weak in the
matter of individual character, which posterity can rarely
know as contemporaries do. They see and hear the living
man; they know not only his conspicuous acts but also all
the little ones; they hear of him from the men who deal
with him, and they know more or less of those men also;
they get and sift the gossip, good and bad. If a man's con-
temporaries fail to find out what he is, posterity rarely will
do better; though this latter case may befall through
strange belated discoveries, and, in fact, has befallen pre-
cisely within the region of this Welles Diary; for President
Lincoln is unquestionably better estimated to-day than he
was during his lifetime, and is in some respects more ac-

INTRODUCTION xxvii

curately known to us than he was to his own Ministers.
The patience with which he could wait while causes slowly
produced results, his remarkable combination of respect
for the opinion of others with absolute reliance upon his
own opinion, his forbearance, tact, shrewdness, foresight,
and fairness, are all qualities which could not be fairly seen
at short range and as they were at work, but which, by
reason of careful study and the ever-growing accumulation
of facts, we have come to know as our fathers could not
know them. Generally, however, more is lost than gained
by distance in the estimation of character, and the most
vivid and attractive biographies are probably far from
photographic. We may read lives of Washington till our
eyes ache, but are they all worth a few hours of chat about
him with Lafayette, or Hamilton, or even with Jefferson?
These are the witnesses we want to hear, and the nearest
approach to such witnesses, where all are silent in death,
we find in the diarist.

As, therefore, was naturally to be expected, this Diary
contributes little new knowledge concerning events, and
settles few of those many discussions to which the Civil
War gave rise. On the other hand, it presents an invaluable
row of portraits ; so that there are indeed no other records
which can at all be brought into even remote comparison
with it for that interesting period. Mr. Welles had ex-
traordinary insight into men, and a very happy skill in
depicting them; at least we are bound to think so, for there
is a remarkable agreement between what he wrote in those
days when our past was his present, and what our histo-
rians and biographers are now setting forth as the dispas-
sionate valuations of posterity. Such harmony is agreeably
reassuring as to the accuracy of the judgments which we are
to-day accepting. So far as Mr. Welles is concerned, his even-
mindedness is a very unique quality; as a rule, the climate
of the contemporary writings during our Civil War had no
temperate zone; whether beneath the sunshine of hero-
worship or amid cyclones of denunciation, there was always

xxviii INTRODUCTION

equatorial fervor. It is only Mr. Welles who, so far as we
know, was at once shrewd and judicial. Perhaps he was
a little Rhadamanthine. If, however, there seems a ten-
dency to severity, it is not due to unkindness of dispo-
sition, but rather to the intensity of the times and the tre-
mendous stress of feeling. Those were not ordinary days
when selfish ambition and incompetence could be passed
over as ordinary sins; the men who were guilty of them
were to be branded, and Mr. Welles branded them; it was
a tune for Hebraic wrath rather than for Christian charity;
moreover, Mr. Welles was as exacting towards himself as
towards others, and gave a devotion as unselfish as that
which he demanded. Be this as it may, whether he was
severe or not, how strong and vivid is his portraiture even
in his minor characters! Thus a page or two depicts Banks
with perfect accuracy; a few scattered paragraphs present
Du Pont to the life; and so on through many instances.
Herein is proof of the real artist; this making every minor
character as lifelike an individuality as are the leaders is
the Shakespearian quality. Naturally, however, it is the
sketches of the leaders which have the most interest, and
which best illustrate the shrewd and just perception of
Mr. Welles. Take, for example, McClellan. In the proces-
sion of admirers which heralded the advent of this military
savior none blew a more confident trumpet than did Secre-
tary Chase. Later when the savior had lamentably failed
to save, Mr. Chase not less vehemently denounced him,
calling him "an imbecile, a coward, and a traitor," and
summoning Mr. Welles to cry Amen. But that gentleman
recalled that he had set an interrogation mark against the
name of the hero at the time of his first introduction, and
said that, having afterward avoided the error of exaltation,
he would not now fall into the injustice of damnation.
During the time when Chase was lauding McClellan, nine-
teen out of every twenty loyal Northerners were of the like
mind; later at least seventeen out of every twenty sympa-
thized in some measure with the condemnation. All the

INTRODUCTION xxix

while Mr. Welles is from time to time setting down in his
Diary such an average and temperate valuation as may be
found in almost any modern history.

But the name of McClellan has become wearisome, and
most readers will get more entertainment in Mr. Welles's
picture of another of the failures, a picture which is aston-
ishingly lifelike, considering how little life there was in the
subject. One may read much about the Civil War without
often happening upon the name of Halleck, yet for a very
long while that harmless professor of the arts of slaughter
and destruction was showing how peacefully he could con-
duct these processes, as he sat, obscurely sluggish and
silent, at his desk in Washington, officially superintending
the entire strategy of all the Northern forces, chewing his
cigar, and rubbing his elbows. How that habitual gesture
of his exasperated Mr. Welles ! When the rubbing began,
the friction seemed to spread from the Halleck coat-sleeve
to the whole Welles system. All that Mr. Welles says
about Halleck is at once amusing, severe, and just; and to
the irritating influence which the General exercised upon
the Secretary we owe some lively pictures, among pages
whereon picturesque liveliness yields somewhat too much
room to careful accuracy. "Called this morning," says the
Diary in one instance, "on General Halleck, who had for-
gotten, or was not aware, there was a naval force in the
James River, cooperating with the army!" Mr. Welles
assured the great chieftain that such was indeed the fact;
then the General, perplexed as to whether the vessels
should be retained or withdrawn, went to work upon his
elbows, and rubbed out the conclusion that they might as
well be withdrawn. Then Mr. Welles suggested that they
might as well stay, and the General immediately thought
so too. It was a fair specimen of Halleck's inefficiency,
and in those critical days inefficiency might be as harmful
as treason. Mr. Welles chafed impatiently, while others
tardily learned what he so well knew; and meantime he
confided to his Diary that Halleck "is heavy-headed,"

xxx INTRODUCTION

"may have some talent as a writer or critic," but "in all
military matters seems destitute of resources, skill, or
capacity," is "more tardy and irresolute than McClellan,"
with much more to the like disrespectful purport. It is
all just what any writer would say to-day; Mr. Welles was
only writing the "verdict of history" in advance.

Another victim furnished for the especial gratification of
those imperfect Christians who derive a pleasurable sensa-
tion at the spectacle of a sound drubbing administered with
whole-hearted thoroughness, is the Honorable John P.
Hale, of the Senate, Chairman of the Naval Committee.
For a while, Mr. Hale was mistaken for a man of some con-
sequence on the alleged ground of character and ability,
and before this view had been fully corrected he was able
to make trouble for the Secretary, with the amusing result
of calling forth many vivacious comments. Thus, Mr.
Welles tells us that Hale, having at the outset defied,
scorned, and derided secession, "was one of the first to flee
from Washington when the storm was about to burst";
but later, the Capital being "garrisoned and shielded by a
large army, this burning and eloquent patriot returned,
overflowing with courage," and "in the exuberance of his
zeal" set on foot an inquiry as to the loss of the Norfolk
Navy Yard. In a "patronizing way" he offered to hear
any explanation which the Secretary of the Navy might
offer concerning this painful incident. If he could have
read what the world can now read, he would have neglected
the defense of Norfolk for the defense of Hale! Later we
learn and sympathetically believe that he was "lazy,
noisy," a "harlequin" and "demagogue," a "Senatorial
buffoon," without "application or fidelity," who is "nei-
ther honest nor sincere"; and in later pages the charges
become even more serious. In the improbable event that
there are any persons who will care to object to the erasure
of Mr. Hale's name from the roll of the country's great
men, certainly ample provocation is now given to them for
making themselves heard.

INTRODUCTION xxxi

Of course, not many pages can be turned without en-
countering the names of Seward, Chase, and Stanton. Of
these, Stanton, the friendless one, evidently affected Mr.
Welles as he affected pretty much everyone else who came
much into contact with him. No one liked him living;
scarcely anyone has wished to say much for him dead. An
advocate biographer has indeed presented a sort of brief
for him, and Mr. Rhodes, kindliest of historians, has men-
tioned his virtues; for, in fact, he had virtues, — devotion
to the cause, a very greed for hard work, financial integ-
rity, and merciless energy against the rascal contractors.
But it cannot be forgotten that he had the odious faults of
a bully; he was violent and insolent, but only when violence
and insolence were safe; he was supposed to be personally
timid; he could be mean and unjust; above all he repeat-
edly outraged the magnanimous forbearance of Mr. Lin-
coln in a way which no American can forgive. Substan-
tially every writer's pen is against him; or, at least, no
writer's pen is for him. Mr. Welles rends him and tears
him without mercy and returns to mangle and to toss
again, nor even so provokes the reader to interfere to
save the prey; we can all read the sentences with equa-
nimity; many of us will read them with cheerful sym-
pathy. The two men, after a few tentative feints and
clashes, had inevitably to try out their comparative
strength in a conclusive bout. It took place, and there-
after Mr. Stanton rarely ventured into Mr. Welles's path.
He had learned that the Navy Department was not a
province or subdivision of the War Department and that
cooperation of vessels with land forces did not imply subor-
dination of the Navy to the Army. Delightfully spirited
and vivid perhaps beyond all others in the Diary are the
pages which narrate the conferences of President and Min-
isters when first the startling foray of the Merrimac car-
ried consternation, and then very soon the achievement of
the beslurred Monitor, the "cheese-box" of the sarcastic
critics, restored triumphant cheerfulness at the North.

xxxii INTRODUCTION

There are few such sketches in history as that which Mr.
Welles furnishes upon this occasion, availing splendidly
of a splendid opportunity. Alas, poor Yorick! If Mr.
Stanton could only have known that Mr. Welles was
keeping a diary, and therein depicting this scene in vivid,
undying colors, would not he at once have set about keep-
ing one also? And how posterity might then have been
entertained! At present it is too much like sitting at the
prize-ring and seeing only one pugilist.

It is an odd fact that Mr. C. F. Adams was beset by an
incapacity for appreciating Mr. Lincoln, which at once
calls to mind the like incapacity of his grandfather for
appreciating Washington. John Adams lived and died
under the firm conviction that Washington was a vexa-
tiously over-rated man; Mr. C. F. Adams carried to his
grave a like certainty concerning Lincoln. He even had the
imprudence to make public declaration of his unfortun-
ate views, by delivering in 1873 a memorial address on
Mr. Seward, wherein he said that from the birth of our
government no other " experiment so rash had ever been
made as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man
with so little previous preparation for his task" as Mr.
Lincoln had. Now it may be admitted that this allegation,
construed with such literal narrowness as Jeffersonians
would have used for construing the Constitution, was not
grossly extravagant. The fact that the " experiment"
turned out so wonderfully well that many devout persons
have even seen hi it the direct hand of God, of course does
not prove that in the outset it was not "rash." It was only
needlessly unkind on Mr. Adams's part to say that it was
more "rash" than had been the selection of certain other
persons who had been elevated to the same office, not only
in spite of the fact that they had had little "previous prepa-
ration," but in spite of the even more disqualifying fact
that they had given no reason for a belief in their fitness,
and some reason to fear their unfitness. Apart from his
then unproved qualities of combined character and intel-

INTRODUCTION xxxiii

lect, Mr. Lincoln's " preparation" had certainly been con-
fined to a thorough study of the problem presented by
slavery. It so happened, however, that slavery was at this
critical moment so all-important as to be practically the
only problem, and it also so happened that Mr. Lincoln
understood it far better than any other man then living,
not excepting Jefferson Davis, or Charles Sumner, or Mr.
Adams himself. But though the above cited assertion,
literally taken, was not so very depreciatory to Mr. Lin-
coln, the same could not be said of the general tone of the
address, which stripped President Lincoln of credit and
praise and conferred generously upon Mr. Seward all that
was thus filched from his chief. If Mr. Adams's view of the
situation was correct, the nation had been burning incense
before the wrong altar.

Mr. Welles was stirred with indignation, so stirred that
he came to the rescue of his great leader's reputation by
writing and publishing a loyal little volume, which he
called " Lincoln and Seward." What he said in this book
has, in substance, been absorbed into our history, which has
accepted Mr. Welles's views and has rejected, forgotten,
and forever buried the contrary opinions of Mr. Adams.
For this reason, because it has done its work, the book is
not now very familiar to ordinary readers ; but one finds a
certain entertainment in comparing it with the Diary, and
the comparison plainly indicates the superior value of an
intimate daily outpouring of feelings, fresh and hot, as
against the later expression of those feelings cooled and
prepared for publication. In the book Mr. Welles civilly
writes that he "enjoyed uninterruptedly pleasant social
and official intercourse" with Mr. Seward. If the signifi-
cation of these words be not trimmed to close literalness,
they are likely to convey an impression of friendly har-
mony between the two men which is quite astonishing to
the reader of the Diary. Further, the book alleges a rela-
tionship of "confidence and mutual frankness on public
affairs . . . among all the members " of the Cabinet, sub-

xxxiv INTRODUCTION

ject only to such occasional interruptions of perfect cordial-
ity as might be provoked by Mr. Seward's pretensions to
superiority. Amid the many interpretations which may
possibly be put upon the word " confidence" in this pass-
age there can perhaps be suggested some one which may
justify its use. Neither are there wanting sporadic in-
stances of the presence of " frankness," that most ticklish
of good qualities, the porcupine in the menagerie of virtues.
For example, when Seward humbly admitted to Mr.
Welles that he had learned that for the future he had
"better attend to his own business," Mr. Welles hastened
to meet him with a " cordial assent." No one will deny
that on this occasion Mr. Welles evinced frankness. There
are other cases also of plain speaking; yet the fact remains
that he who reads the Diary will not be able to accept some
of the statements which in later years found utterance
in the book save as conventionalities or as spoken "in a
Pickwickian sense," or perhaps in that spirit of serene
magnanimity which is supposed to prevail hi making
preparation for a Christian death-bed. As matter of
plain fact, the Diary is thickly sprinkled with criticisms
of Mr. Seward because of his pretentious bearing, his
assumption of the r61e of a premier in the Cabinet, his airs
of mystery and his affectation of special information and of
private knowledge in affairs, above all else by reason of his
passion for meddling and his irritating forays into the inde-
pendent Departments of ,his associates. The most note-
worthy instance of this was the disastrous occult interfer-
ence of Mr. Seward in the matter of relieving Fort Sumter.
The error had to be admitted by him and ostensibly forgiven
by Mr. Welles, but it was never forgotten and never ceased
to rankle. Soon afterward came the long and serious dispute
as to the disposition to be made of foreign mails captured on
blockade-runners. Here again Seward undertook to settle
the whole business autocratically in his own office. Mr.
Welles resented and resisted, and was clearly in the right;
but Mr. Seward had committed himself to the English gov-

INTRODUCTION xxxv

ernment and the embarrassment was grave. All the strict-
ures made by Mr. Welles concerning Seward have been
made by others, and none of them lacks foundation; yet it
must be said that of all the pictures in these volumes that of
Seward is the most open to the criticism of doing scant jus-
tice, if not actual injustice, to the subject. Probably Mr.
Seward was rated more highly by his own generation than
he will be by posterity; but probably also he will beheld in
better esteem than would be possible if there were no other
evidence concerning him than what could be drawn from
this Diary. He was at once an able man and a frequent
blunderer. On the whole, one feels that when speaking of
him Mr. Welles is certainly less well balanced than usual.
Possibly this is due to the fact that they clashed frequently,
since maritime matters and foreign relations inevitably
crossed in many complications. In such Mr. Welles was
more apt to have sound as well as courageous views than
was his associate minister.

While thus, day by day, Mr. Welles is consciously draw-
ing for us the portraits of his colleagues, he is also day by
day, but quite unconsciously, giving us the lines, the lights,
and the shadows for his own portrait. While we are learn-
ing what he thinks of others and why, we are likewise
deciding what we think of him upon evidence of a kind that
is next best to personal acquaintance. In the main, the
conclusions are much to his credit. When we see that all
his brains, his heart, his strength were strenuously engaged
in the cause, we know that the same can be said of many
others; when we see that he was more than respectfully
obedient, that he was always nobly loyal and wisely sus-
taining towards his chief, we admit that some others were
the same; but when we see that he was absolutely devoid
of any ulterior ambition or personal motives or any form
of self-seeking, that he was almost indifferent concerning
his own reputation so long as he was conscious of having
done his duty with all his might and all his intelligence,
then at length we say that in some respects he was very

xxxvi INTRODUCTION

near to being singular. He had strong opinions as to men
as well as measures, and expressed them; but he was a clear
thinker, and, being by nature fair-minded, he further took
pains not to permit either passion or prejudice to divert
the movement of his reasoning. When his mind was made
up, however, he did not easily change his opinion; and one
would not be surprised if it should appear that Seward
and Stanton thought him obstinate, or opinionated, or
even contentious. Yet he made fewer errors than they did.
He made some, of course, and if this Diary had been ex-
purgated with a view to exhibiting him as infallible, a few
passages which appear therein would have been suppressed.
For example, he was one of those who deprecated the
difficult task of blockading the Southern ports, on the
ground that it was a needless recognition of belligerency
involving injurious consequences; nor does it seem that
he ever came to see how academic and impracticable would
have been a closure by proclamation. Again he had a dis-,
trust of "the West Point idea," as it was called, which
would have been unfortunate if his Department had been
concerned with operations on the land instead of on the
water. He shared the too prevalent faith in the possibility
of making generals out of any sort of civilian material, just
as it was assumed that military coats might be made at
any mill. It took a sad amount of experience and many
poor soldiers had to shiver before it was well recognized
that a shoddy mill turned out poor stuff for hard service,
and that extemporized commanders, made out of politi-
cians or lawyers, were generally out of place at the top,
however well they might do halfway up. He protested
much against the establishment of a "military frontier,"
with the general grouping of all residents south of it as
Rebels. He said that this was the fallacious notion of
technical military theorists; whereas the truth was that
the shifting line of the frontier was simply the expression
in military phraseology of an actual condition; not a
manoeuvre was ever affected by the language; and the

INTRODUCTION xxxvii

attribution of rebellion to the Southern population en
bloc was simply a necessity and was not far wrong either.
Disaffection was a germ disease which rapidly spread
among residents in the unwholesome district. Another
matter concerning which Mr. Welles expressed disappro-
bation was the issue of legal-tender notes. This affected
him personally, or rather the administration of his Depart-
ment, in a very embarrassing manner; for the sums at his
disposal, voted in dollars but obtained sometimes by bills
of exchange, were subject to large discount. Thus the
shoe pinched. But while this was vexatious, it was not the
fundamental cause of his criticism of the policy recom-
mended by the Treasury Department and adopted by
Congress, and which he conceived to be unnecessary and
mischievous. Whether or not he was right no one can say;
for while we know that the country struggled along under
the incubus of those financial measures, we can only specu-
late as to whether or not it could have fared better or even
at all without them. Suffice it to say that some students
of the subject have very stoutly maintained the same
opinion which Mr. Welles expressed.

These views relating to matters outside Mr. Welles's
own Department, and so finding no expression in action,
did not diminish his reputation. Nearly or quite every
great reputation gained at that period survived as many
or more, as bad or worse, misconceptions; and inevitably
so, for amid such novel problems and unprecedented
events the lamp of experience burned very dim and no
man could walk always wisely amid strange surroundings.
The only criticism of Mr. Welles which has retained some
vitality is to the general effect that he showed some lack
of what we have lately been taught to call the strenuous
quality. Certainly he came less before the public than did
the Secretary of State who aspired to be the power behind
the President, or than the Secretary of the Treasury who
desired to succeed the President, or than the Secretary of
War whose functions as well as his methods of performing

xxxviii INTRODUCTION

them were almost preposterously spectacular and despotic.
Mr. Welles had no political aspirations, was not courting
popularity with any eye to the future, and made no effort
to render his Department conspicuous or to have his admin-
istration of it lauded. Yet a comparison of the achieve-
ments of the Navy Department with the achievements of
other departments is greatly in its favor. Neither Mr.
Stanton in arming, clothing, and feeding the men gathered
by the President's calls, nor Mr. Chase in printing green-
backs and selling bonds at the buyer's price, encountered
a more novel task or found less material ready at hand for
it than Mr. Welles met when he had rapidly to create
a great blockading fleet, an efficient fighting fleet, and a
fleet adapted for the peculiar service on the great rivers.
It is a matter of regret that the Diary does not contain
more on the subject of the Navy; and if this is due to lack
of egotism, we would rather that he had not been so free
from that rather petty blemish. Judgment of his admin-
istrative efficiency must still be made up about as it would
have been before the publication of these volumes. For
some reason, or without reason, people generally have paid
insufficient attention to the naval side of the civil conflict,
and are still slow to appreciate the fact which our historical
writers begin of late to insist upon, that it was because the
blockade strangled the Confederacy that the armies were
able to slay it; nor is there even now, and perhaps there
never will be, any adequate appreciation of the magnitude
of that great enterprise or of the infinite difficulty in the
details of its prolonged and perilous maintenance. A
steady pressure to weaken its effectiveness came not only
from selfish or knavish traders anxious to make money and
backed by politicians, but also too often from the Foreign
Department. Mr. Welles had to take a resolute stand not
only against the ignoble money power with its political
"pull," but occasionally even against Seward himself. It
was Seward's inclination and to some extent his duty to
regard conciliation somewhat more highly than firmness,

INTRODUCTION xxxix

whereas Mr. Welles had to set achievement far above con-
cession. Mr. Welles, early in his experience, noted irrit-
ably that Mr. Seward would probably get the better in a
dispute of this kind because he would alarm the President
by the " bugaboo" of a foreign war. It soon appeared,
however, that Mr. Lincoln was little disturbed by buga-
boos, and as force is the naturally powerful element in
times of war, Mr. Welles was generally able to prevail over
the more pacific and temporizing Secretary.

If the blockade lacked somewhat in the spectacular
quality and in the condensation of the single great event,
one need only turn to New Orleans and Vicksburg and
above all to Mobile Bay, to have these defects abundantly
supplied. Military strategy encountered no such novelty
as the Merrimac, nor devised any such greater novelty as
the Monitor, revolutionizing the practice of the world.
Mr. Welles, of course, did not invent the Monitor, but he
gave it a trial in spite of strenuous opposition on the part
of " practical seamen." He did not command at Mobile
Bay or elsewhere, any more than Mr. Stanton commanded
at Gettysburg. It was not the business of these gentle-
men to command; but it was their business to choose
commanders, and in this Mr. Welles showed an ability
in which the rival Department was sadly lacking; for,
in the language of the turf, he was apt to "pick the win-
ner," the most useful faculty which a Secretary of War or
a Secretary of the Navy can have in tune of war. He had
singular sagacity in judging men; for he was observant,
and could see the moral, mental, and temperamental ma-
terial which lay stored away in one man or another. He
had a like shrewdness in estimating situations, and in
sifting the news and rumors of events; so that his forecasts
were singularly accurate. For these reasons it was natural
that, while the War Department was painfully learning
on many a lost and bloody battlefield who could not com-
mand victory, the Navy Department sent well chosen
captains from one success to another. For this it would be

xl INTRODUCTION

unfair not to give the credit to Mr. Welles; and his Diary,
without self-praise, indicates that he deserved it.

Like silver streaks through the somewhat rumpled and
disordered surface of this Cabinet story run the reminis-
cences of Lincoln. Written of events presently occurring,
or repeating words just spoken, the Diary tells such truth
as the instantaneous photograph would tell before any re-
touching had been done by the artful photographer. There-
fore no allowance has to be made for the influence of a pres-
tige which was then only in the making and indeed was as
yet somewhat dubious. Mr. Lincoln's ministers had no idea
that he towered above them, and no one of them was at all
overawed by him in those days. Presiding over them at the
Cabinet, casually meeting them, chatting with them or
lounging as was his habit in Stanton's room, Mr. Lincoln
seemed only officially superior to them. One of them had
expected to be President, and another meant to be, a third
dared to be insolent and unruly; it seemed to be only by a
chance of politics that these men stood to him as j unior part-
ners to a senior, or like a board of directors to the president
of a corporation. Apotheosis had not taken place; Lincoln
was not yet the victim of the commonplace orator, the favor-
ite model for the Sunday-school teacher. Deification is a
post-mortuary process, and efforts to bring it about prema-
turely are ill advised; a dead idol may be made secure upon
a pedestal, but a living one is sure to slip off, lucky if it escapes
with mutilation only, and not irreparable breakage. At the
time of the writing of this Diary, Lincoln was not yet dims;
when Mr. Chase said that to argue with him was as useless
as to pour water on a duck's back, it was not blasphemy,
as it would be to-day. When Mr. Seward posed as his
tutor, it seemed to many persons not so much presumptu-
ous as possibly fortunate; when Mr. Stanton was defiant,
not a few were ready to say that it was lucky for the coun-
try that a too easy-going President had a masterful Secre-
tary. The council of state was at least a heterogeneous,
if not quite an ill-assorted, assemblage. Mr. Seward pro-

INTRODUCTION xli

nounced it a "compound Cabinet," and did not mean to
imply commendation. This Diary presents almost glar-
ingly the wide difference between the conduct of public
business and that of private business. A partnership
wherein the partners should sustain to each other such re-
lations as did these members of the national administra-
tion, a corporation with a board of directors so discordant
and so jealous, would be in the bankruptcy court within a
year or two. But in these vast competitions of the coun-
tries, results come slowly; nations have no relief in bank-
ruptcy; their managers may snatch and squabble and
blunder, according to their measure of brains and charac-
ter, but all the while the people must keep on doing each
day its daily business for its daily bread as best it can,
paying the bills and facing the consequences, sure that it
must always be governed somehow, and not over confident
that a change would install a better set of governors. No
one who has studied the history of our Civil War, and who
is willing to speak plain truth will pretend that high and
generous cooperation, honest dealing, and economic effi-
ciency reached an epidemic prevalence. The splendid skill
with which Lincoln held together and made useful the
members of this " compound Cabinet" ought to be better
appreciated hereafter, by reason of the divulgements by
Mr. Welles. Washington tried the like experiment, but was
not able to make it work permanently. He could not han-
dle Hamilton and Jefferson in double harness. Lincoln,
having a much harder task, succeeded with it. In a meas-
ure his success was due to the different character of the
subordinate material; for of course there was not in Lin-
coln's Cabinet anyone approaching the ability of Hamilton
as a statesman or that of Jefferson as a politician. It was,
however, much more due to a difference between the chiefs
themselves, between Washington and Lincoln. Washing-
ton's power lay in a certain high and dignified attitude of
supremacy; Lincoln's influence lay in patience, sagacity,
tact, knowledge of human nature, and skill with the indi-

xlii INTRODUCTION

vidual. For example, history has no instance of a situation
more difficult or of an extrication more brilliant than was
presented when, in December, 1862, the committee of
Republican Senators waited upon Mr. Lincoln with a
demand for Mr. Seward's removal. Seward, forewarned,
had already hastened to resign; a day or two later Lincoln,
with a deftness like the feat of a juggler, secured Chase's
resignation also. "Now I can ride," said the President;
and he did ride. It was characteristic that in this critical
hour Stanton, unhampered by loyalty, was on the point of
making the confusion worse by adding his resignation; but
Mr. Welles rebuked him and stood gallantly by the Pre-
sident. Nor was it the only instance when, in tune of stress,
the Secretary of the Navy was found a clear-headed, firm,
and trustworthy supporter of his harassed principal. He
played a like part in the matter of the occult move for dis-
placing McClellan, when what was perhaps the right thing
was undertaken in what was certainly the wrong way. At
that tune it was largely by reason of the refusal of Mr.
Welles to participate that the President was saved from
being placed in a very annoying position. This loyalty and
trustworthiness of the Secretary Mr. Lincoln well appre-
ciated, and in his turn upheld Mr. Welles in times of need
or controversy; notably when Mr. Stanton arrogantly
claimed the right to dominate the Navy Department and
insisted that commanders of vessels on the rivers should
take orders from commanders of the army on land. Mr.
Lincoln made short work of this theory. It is reassuring to
find these two shrewd judges of character entertaining such
reciprocal esteem; and the opinion of each was a compli*
ment to the other.

If this Diary had not covered the period of the Civil
War, it would probably never have been published. Yet so
far as furnishing valuable matter for the historian goes, it
is even more useful for the four succeeding years; and the
reason is not far to seek. From the exciting times of war

INTRODUCTION xliii

under Mr. Lincoln, to the wearisome days of Reconstruc-
tion under Mr. Johnson, was a transition at once swift and
striking. If no other administration since the birth of the
United States has made history which has been read with
such absorbing interest as that of the earlier of these two
administrations, so probably no other period has been so
shunned as has the second by all readers who are not quite
students; and there is abundant explanation why this
should be so. Wranglings carried on by politicians in Con-
gress, sometimes with legal arguments and always with
extravagant abuse, were not very exhilarating after the
intense days of mortal conflict by land and sea. The new
scene seemed rather ignoble by contrast with that which
had passed. During the War there had been certainly a
painful display of corruption, self-seeking, inefficiency, and
disloyalty on the part of a much too numerous minority;
but these were faults in the superstructure; the basic mul-
titude of the people, and a large proportion of their civilian
leaders, had made a very fine and inspiring exhibition of
enduring resolution and honest patriotism. To what
events and to how many persons can one turn, during
Johnson's regime, with any other feelings than dismay,
humiliation, and disgust? To no events, and to only a few
persons, in good truth !

For a little while after Mr. Johnson became President
there was promise of reasonably harmonious, intelligent, and
even creditable action in the matter of Reconstruction.
But differences of opinion and purpose, which were pro-
found, soon developed, and thereupon the outcry of dis-
pute, which was not prevented from being tedious because
it was acrimonious, became such that for the American of
to-day the narration of those angry discussions seems the
arid Sahara in our national history. A condition never
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution had to be
disposed of in pretended accordance with an instrument
which had not a word to say concerning such problems. It
followed that every one was at liberty to assert the law in

xliv INTRODUCTION

the premises according to his own view of what was de-
sirable ; and advantage of this privilege was liberally taken.
On the one hand there was the theory that the Southern
area was no longer an aggregation of sovereign States, but
had become conquered territory to be reorganized, geo-
graphically and politically, as the victors might choose. On
the other hand, it seemed severely logical to say that the
North had fought to prove, and by success had proved,
that States could never withdraw from the Union ; where-
fore they continued to be States after Lee's surrender just
as much as they had been before invalid votes had under-
taken to effect an unlawful secession. Upon these trunk
views there sprouted many variations, big and little, like
branches and twigs upon two great trees. The unfortunate
part of it was the influence upon popular feeling, in some
degree at the North, and in a greater degree at the South.
For the contestants worked themselves into a mad fury
about the business; and many who had remained at a safe
distance from battlefields now indulged a rage which made
up in savageness of feeling for the absence of danger. Ev-
idently men could become much more excited when they
were shouting adjectives than when they were shooting
bullets, and Congress, impelled by the demagogues, took
action which brought law-making into temporary dis-
repute.

Apart from the technical disputations of would-be jur-
ists, really important considerations were advanced upon
both sides. Arguments for rubbing out the old State lines,
with their dangerous allegiances, faced arguments for re-
taining traditional sentiment and familiar obligations;
demands, too natural to be called vindictive, for requiring
formal avowals of error and penitence were met by sugges-
tions of the wisdom as well as the generosity of concilia-
tion. Who could say which would prove the better way in
the greater number of cases, when treatment which would
be effective with one individual would be ineffective with
his neighbor? One thing only can now be surely alleged,

INTRODUCTION xlv

and that is that a prompt and decisive adoption of any
plan would have been better than the prolonged wrang-
lings which wearied, discouraged, and above all embittered
nearly every man in the land.

President Johnson and Mr. Welles were naturally led
by both intellectual and temperamental influences to re-
solve in much the same way those political questions
which had now to be answered. So far as there is mate-
rial for inferring what would have been Mr. Lincoln's posi-
tion, there seems a strong probability that he would have
ranged himself with them, or at least not far apart from
them. Of late, also, as passion has very slowly cooled
and personal prejudices have at last almost ceased to con-
trol judgment, students of a later generation are finding
much to commend in the policy of Andrew Johnson. Com-
mendation of his policy, however, is not apt to be accom-
panied with any moderation of the condemnatory attitude
towards himself. On the contrary, his personal unpopu-
larity and his abundant indiscretions are charged with the
responsibility of aggravating the seriousness of the situa-
tion far beyond what was necessary. Yet, in fact, the clash
was inevitable, the opposite opinions had their foundation
in the two great divisions which send one half of mankind
into the radical camp and the other half into the conserv-
ative; and in the situation and the problem then at hand
there were present in an exceptional degree precisely those
elements which rouse into activity alike the radical and
the conservative spirit. In fact the conflict of parties at
the North after the War could have been just as surely
predicted as the preliminary conflict between the North
and the South.

In Mr. Welles there was nothing of the radical; his sound
good sense held him at a safe distance from extremism;
therefore, so soon as we find him applying the word "rad-
ical" to a section of the Republican Party, we know that a
schism betwixt them and him is at hand. Such was the
case, and when Mr. Welles, like all the rest of the coun-

xlvi INTRODUCTION

try, was swept into the fray, he no longer found at his
side many with whom during recent years he had main-
tained a hearty political alliance. What had happened
before the War was about to happen after it; that is to say,
new questions were bringing about a new alignment. The
Republican Party could not keep the allegiance of all those
who had adhered to it faithfully during and even before
the War. But the prestige of the party name was so great
that whichever section could hold possession of that name
and preserve an appearance of political continuity was sure
to prevail. As was altogether natural in days of such ex-
citement, this advantage fell into the scale of the extrem-
ists, who conducted their campaign with a violence that
has never been surpassed, rarely has been equalled, in
political struggles. Erelong the situation was that Thad-
deus Stevens and Benjamin F. Butler gave orders to the
Radicals, that the Radicals controlled the Republican
Party, and the Republican Party governed the country.
Against these forces a President and Cabinet, Republican
also, but outnumbered and outshouted in their own camp,
were reduced to obstructing, thwarting, and delaying
measures which were sure ultimately to be carried. By
all precedents such a conflict in the political family was
sure to be most bitter, and such it soon became, and the
spirit which thus painfully characterized it soon makes
itself felt hi the changed note of the Diary. Thus far
there has been strong, pungent, decisive writing, but never
immoderate; now we drift into that somewhat rotund and
dignified style of denunciation, which already in those days
was getting the flavor known as "of the old school."
With alarming adjectives and damnatory phraseology the
most villainous motives are suggested, wicked schemes
are shadowed forth, and awful consequences are foretold.
Reading these things, we should despair of the Republic,
did we not happily know that it is still doing quite well,
though how it escaped from such a pirates' cave we can-
not quite see. Since, however, we have the comforting

INTRODUCTION xlvii

knowledge that the escape has been successfully effected,
we feel free to give a large measure of approval and sym-
pathy, at least to the substance of what we read. When
Mr. Welles assumed the role of a constitutional jurist he
was far sounder than were his antagonists; it is true that
the practical efficiency of the policies which he would have
approved was not brought to the test of trial, but on the
other hand it is certain that the policies which he disap-
proved made no gratifying record; moreover, the lash of
his castigation fell generally upon backs which we are
willing to see wince.

It has been remarked that it is especially the light thrown
by this Diary upon individuals which we find interesting,
and in this respect this second part, so to designate it, is
even better than the first. The picture of Andrew John-
son is altogether the most favorable which has ever been
given, at least with any authority, of that unfortunate
man. It deserves to be studied with great interest, for, as
has been said, Mr. Welles was a very shrewd and very fair
judge of men. He had a high esteem for Johnson, which
was not only the loyalty of an office-holder towards his
chief, but was also a sincere esteem and genuine personal
liking. It is safe to assume that the excited partisanship
of the times somewhat stimulated these sentiments; yet
he was not thus prevented from often criticizing his leader,
and he seems in the main even-minded and judicious. It
may be that the publication of these volumes will lead to
at least a partial revision of popular opinion concerning
our only impeached President.

Very much is said of General Grant and this also will be
read eagerly, and is of the greatest value. Not often is any
one man great in war and great in peace, and the reader
of these pages will see plainly enough that there was no
real reason for expecting General Grant to achieve better
than the imperfect success which he did in the Presidency.
Nowhere else has it been more clearly shown how little
there was of the politician in his nature, and how easily he

xlviii INTRODUCTION

could be ensnarled by unworthy schemers. The incidents
narrated in the Diary, while showing many of his fine
qualities, also betray his limitations and his failings; and
there is one scene, between Grant and Johnson, which cer-
tainly ought not to have been suppressed, yet which can-
not be read without great regret and pain. On the whole,
it is probable that most readers will find Grant not much
fallen in their esteem, though he was far from conducting
himself to Mr. Welles's satisfaction. It is only statues
which are made wholly of marble; the original hero is usu-
ally more or less patched with clay.

Charles Sumner and Mr. Welles, honest and earnest
men of New England, coevals, and accustomed alike to
the conflicts and to the self-control of public life, were able
to meet, seem indeed to have liked to meet, in these anxious
days, and discuss their widely divergent views. The Diary
contains some very interesting reports of their talkings
hi the earlier stages when the different positions were being
established. Agreeing hi little, they came most directly
into opposition upon the matter of giving to ex-slaves the
right of suffrage. History would have no higher function
than the mere gratification of curiosity if it did not show
to us the more remote as well as the proximate results of
human action, and so enable us to draw those far-reaching
conclusions which are as oil for the lamp of experience.
Now by what history shows as resulting from the gift of
the suffrage made to the negro after the War, it would
appear that no more evil donation was ever made by men.
A useless teaching this, it may be said, since it cannot be
imagined that any question at all resembling that one will
ever again demand settlement. Perhaps this is true; but
a far broader lesson, which is very old yet not antiquated,
very familiar yet not needless, receives hereby a striking
illustration, to wit: that when short-sighted mortals un-
dertake to bring about a good thing by doing a wrong
one, they easily make sure of the wrong, and very often
lose the good. If a negro leader could then have arisen

INTRODUCTION xlix

to speak for his race and say: "No, we decline this tempt-
ing, dangerous gift until we shall be able to use it wisely
and hold it firmly, " he would have been the most far-
seeing mortal of whom we have any knowledge. The kind-
ness was as if one should put money in the hands of a
little child and bid him fare forth to care for himself hi
the crowds of city streets. Will he not promptly be de-
coyed, beaten, robbed, and subjected to pains such as he
never would have known had he not been so foolishly
endowed? There were many motives for the act. Some
persons were vindictive; what a bitter dose they would
make the Southerner take ! Some were really negrophiles,
and honestly, though shortsightedly, fancied that the negro
would have, in his vote, a weapon of self-defense and a
means of making himself respected. But of course the
politicians, who really carried the measure through, did so
because it would insure a South as solidly Republican for
some years to come — for as many years as they person-
ally cared about — as it had been solidly Democratic in
years past. Just here Mr. Welles saw, and Mr. Sumner
could not see, the moral wrong. Was it not just as immoral
and dishonest to obtain a majority by calling these poor
ignorant field hands " voters" and then counting their
so-called " votes " as by counting knavish fellows whose
ballots were marketable like apples? Was the "worker"
who led these benighted creatures from the rice swamp
or the cotton field to the polls and bid them put a certain
slip of paper into the box really entitled to a clearer con-
science than the "heeler" who slipped a dollar bill into an
itching palm in a factory or a bar-room ? To what greater
strain was it possible to subject American "free institu-
tions" than to pour into them this awful flood of unfitness?
And how great was the responsibility to the country, even
to mankind, in risking the bringing of such discredit upon
the new American experiment ! Mr. Welles had the intel-
ligence and foresight to condemn the mischievous scheme;
he declared it to be at once unconstitutional and ill-ad-

1 INTRODUCTION

vised; but Mr. Sumner, with the courage of fanaticism,
was ready for the responsibility, while Stevens and Butler
hardly knew what the word responsibility meant.

As the immediate outcome of Republican success in this
business, there ensued the two or three years of negro su-
premacy in the Southern States and the riot of ignorant
and vicious legislation. The spectacle was so shocking that
historians rarely draw it with vivid or minute accuracy; it
has been hidden away out of sight, and constitutes the only
really suppressed chapter in American history. The only
relief was that excesses which would soon have put an end
to government itself were transitory; to-day, however, we
are still living among the deferred but more serious and
permanent conditions which enable us to judge whether
the Secretary or the Senator was arguing on the right side
of the controversy. Of course it can never be known what
results would have been worked out by such measures as
President Johnson and Mr. Welles would have devised.
That is necessarily mere matter of speculation, and when
we write the word IF, we open the door through which
imagination can pass into anarchic freedom. We have,
however, Mr. Welles's word for it that he would by no
means have withheld the vote from negroes as such ; that
he thought them as fit for the franchise as were the immi-
grant hordes; but that taken in bulk he did not think
either the one or the other mass was fit for it. Now, tak-
ing the privilege of the word, if the franchise had been
offered to each individual negro so soon as, but only so
soon as, he should give fair evidence of his competency to
exercise it intelligently, would there not probably have
been a steady advancement, yet so gradual that the
"negro question" would not be the difficult and cruel
problem which it is to-day? The truth was that the Rad-
icals of the Johnson days were really thinking of votes,
and were only talking of negroes. Mr. Welles set aside
temporary political expediency, and stood for good sense
and sound morality.

INTRODUCTION Ji

Of course in the Andrew Johnson drama the spectacular
act is the impeachment. Americans who so lately had been
holding their breath as they watched the great struggle
waged by Grant and Sherman against Robert E. Lee, now
had to watch with more painful feelings the assault of
Benjamin F. Butler and Thaddeus Stevens against the
President of the United States. It is indeed to " look
here upon this picture, and on this!" Fain would all cit-
izens of this land bury out of sight and memory the shame
of that endeavor, so discreditable in conception and pur-
pose, so disgraceful in conduct and conclusion. But the
chapter got itself written and every one must read it.
This Diary furnishes us our best, practically our only,
opportunity to see the interior of the defendant's council-
chamber; and it is interesting to do so. By this time Mr.
Welles had become pessimistic ; to him evil and destruction
seemed to pervade the air; darkness was around him, and
apprehension, while the fate of his country was trembling
in the balance not less dubiously and much more ignobly
than when triumphant Southern troops were marching
into Pennsylvania. He considers what is to be done in
the anticipated event of an attempt to arrest the Presid-
ent before trial, or even of an effort to depose him. Is Gen-
eral Grant to be trusted? Would it be possible to turn to
Sherman to oppose Grant, in case of the ultimate emerg-
ency? Wild fancies and improbable terrors perturbed
the staunch little band of the President's friends. To us
now these seem the phantoms of panic ; but we know not
the unrealized possibilities of those days. Even for us,
merely reading a bit of history, there is not much gratifi-
cation in thinking that in the end the nation was saved
from the infinite disgrace of a verdict of conviction only
because in the great body of her legislators a corporal's
guard of Republicans could be found with the courage
and the honesty to assert their political independence.
That we are obliged to rejoice over so narrow a salvation
of the national honor is in itself hardly honorable.

lii INTRODUCTION

After this great struggle passed, lassitude ensued; there
was not much for either side to do now save to wait, to drag
through the tedious months which yet remained of John-
son's term. The end came of course at noon on March 4,
1869, when General Grant advanced to take his turn at the
difficult task, then so exceptionally difficult, of ruling the
country, healing the still stinging wounds, and pleasing the
people. With all his popularity and prestige he did not find
that his plough was set for an easy furrow. On March 17,
1869, Mr. Welles "parted with ex-President Johnson and
family," and he writes in his Diary that "no better per-
sons have occupied the Executive Mansion, and I part
from them, socially and personally, with sincere regret."
A month later he took his own departure with "reluct-
ance." At his age the change signified, of course, that activ-
ities were over, and that during his remaining years he
must watch rather than share in the interesting toil and
struggle of life. Apart from this reflection the removal
from the capital brought also the curtailment of pleasures
which had meant much to him. He had an inborn taste for
what we call "Society," and he was well fitted to play a
prominent and effective part in it. In point of personal ap-
pearance Nature had dealt kindly by him. Mr. Seward's
intellectual greatness was certainly inadequately expressed
by his wizened face and ordinary form. Mr. Chase's stately
deportment, on the other hand, was such an exaggeration
of Jovian grandeur as seemed to outrun severe good taste.
Mr. Stanton was the incarnation of the bourgeoisie in its
American type. From much better endowed rivals Mr.
Welles would easily have carried off the honors of the dig-
nified and handsome gentleman of the official circle. He
was complacently aware of these advantages of features,
form, and manner, and did not neglect their due cultiva-
tion. At that time, it is true, Washington was by no means
the beautiful city which the lavish profusion of "boss"
Shepherd soon afterward made it, and it was only begin-
ning to attract the rich and varied throng which now fills it

INTRODUCTION liii

every winter. It was then only the place where the nation's
business was done; yet even thus it had a numerous and
ever changing society of able, interesting, noteworthy men
with whom it was most agreeable to mingle. All this life
Mr. Welles had thoroughly appreciated, and it could
hardly be altogether gratifying to pack his household goods
and gods for flight to a Connecticut town. It was natural
that on the eve of this flitting he should write gravely, al-
most sadly. Yet one would think that there must have
been some sense of relief at closing such a service as that
which he had been rendering to Mr. Johnson. It would
have been bad enough to be engaged in conducting even a
successful grapple with men who fought after the fashion
adopted by Stevens and Butler and their followers; but
to have been constantly forced backward, kept upon the
defensive, harried and assailed by such men had been a
severe test of temper and constancy. It must have been
courage and honor and duty that had made Mr. Welles
endure to the end, as he did with unflinching spirit, and
he was well entitled to write that his duties had been
"honestly and fearlessly discharged"; posterity will add
also " honorably and efficiently." However his feelings
may have been mingled between a consciousness of loss
and of relief, his sound good sense told him that it was
"best that the brief span of life that remains to me should
be passed in the land of my nativity." Thither accordingly
he went, man fashion, without repining, and found such
occupation as he could in literary work, chiefly for maga-
zines. He died at Hartford, February 11, 1878. We bid
him farewell with respect for him as a distinguished public
servant and with good will towards him as an upright
man; neither can we neglect to say that all the good serv-
ice which he rendered to his contemporaries was not of
greater value than the legacy which he left to posterity in
this invaluable Diary.

JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

VOLUME I
1861 — MARCH 30, 1864

DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

1861 — MARCH 30, 1864

:r:Z !.*;•* i r:;.;/t:''

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR*

The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference —
Porter and Barron — The Relief of Fort Pickens — Conversation with
Senator Douglas — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the Norfolk
Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War —
The Relations of Seward and Stanton — Fear of the Merrimac in Wash-
ington — " Stanton's Navy."

ON the 6th of March, 1861, two days after the inaugura-
tion of President Lincoln, Secretary Holt, who continued
to discharge the duties of Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron
not being prepared to enter at once upon the duties, called
at the Navy Department with the compliments of General
Scott and requested my attendance at the War Depart-
ment on matters of special importance. I went immedi-
ately with him to the office of the Secretary of War, where
were Generals Scott and Totten, and I think Secretary
Cameron, and perhaps one or two others.

General Scott commenced with a statement of the peril-
ous condition of the country and of the difficulties and
embarrassments he had experienced for months past; re-
lated the measures and precautions he had taken for the
public safety, the advice and admonitions he had given

1 This first chapter is not a part of Mr. Welles's diary, having been writ-
ten several years after the events narrated, but since it gives a vivid first-
hand account of these events, which occurred before the actual diary was
begun, it may properly be considered a part of the record.

4 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

President Buchanan, which, however, had been disregarded,
and, finally, his apprehensions, perhaps convictions, that
hostilities were imminent and, he feared, inevitable. He
had, with the knowledge of Secretary Holt, taken the re-
sponsibility of ordering a small military force to Washing-
ton for the protection of the government and the public
property and archives, and other troops were on then* way
from the West. His statement was full, clear in its details,
and of absorbing interest to those of us who were to meet
and provide for the conflict now at hand. Among other
matters, and that for which he had especially requested
our attendance that morning, was certain intelligence of
a distressing character from Major Anderson at Fort Sum-
ter, stating that his supplies were almost exhausted, that
he could get no provisions in Charleston, and that he with
his small command would be wholly destitute in about
six weeks. Under these circumstances it became a question
what action should be taken, and for that purpose, as well
as to advise us of the condition of affairs, he had convened
the gentlemen present.

The information was to most of us unexpected and
astounding, and there was, on the part of such of us as
had no previous intimation of the condition of things at
Surnter, an earnest determination to take immediate and
efficient measures to relieve and reinforce the garrison.
But General Scott, without opposing this spontaneous
resolution, related the difficulties which had already taken
place, and stated the formidable obstacles which were to be
encountered from the numerous and well-manned batteries
that were erected in Charleston Harbor. Any successful
attempt to reinforce or relieve the garrison by sea he sup-
posed impracticable. An attempt had already been made
and failed. The question was, however, one for naval
authorities to decide, for the army could do nothing. Com-
mander Ward, a gallant officer, had tendered his services
on a former occasion when the subject was considered, and
was ready at any time to take command of an expedition,

PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF SUMTER 5

if one were ordered. General Scott said he did not expect
any conclusion would be arrived at, at this meeting. He
had called the gentlemen together by direction of the Pre-
sident to communicate what information he had, and was
glad to have his mind relieved of overburthened care and
responsibility with which it had been loaded for months.
He especially requested me to consult with naval men, and
had thought it advisable that Commander Ward, then
on the receiving-ship at Brooklyn, should come to Wash-
ington, as he had already been made somewhat familiar
with the subject.

The meeting adjourned with an understanding that we
would come together on the following day at the Execu-
tive Mansion. In the mean time the gentlemen were to give
the subject earnest consideration.

When we met on the succeeding day, the same gentle-
men, with the exception of Judge Holt, were present, and
there were two or three others, beside the President.

Many of the naval officers then in Washington and
about the Navy Department were of questionable fidelity.
A number had already resigned and most of those who
were tainted with secession soon left the service; but some
of them, on a further consideration of the subject, aided
perhaps by adventitious circumstances, determined to
abide by the flag and the Union. Whilst there were doubts
and uncertainty on every hand as to who could be trusted,
I knew Commodore Stringham to be faithful, and there-
fore had, with the concurrence of the President, selected
him to assist me in matters of detail. With him I commun-
icated freely and fully in regard to the condition of Sum-
ter and the ability of the Navy to throw in supplies for its
relief. Both he and Commander Ward were confident that
the Navy could reinforce the garrison and furnish it with
men and provisions. The President had been apprised of
the condition of things at Sumter, on the 4th of March,
and had referred the subject to General Scott for advice,
with directions to consult the Secretaries of War and Navy.

6 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Some, but not a very lengthened, discussion took place at
this first interview at the Executive Mansion. There was
a very general and very determined opinion expressed that
Fort Sumter ought to be and should be reinforced. Major
Anderson and all the officers of the garrison expressed in
a measure the professional opinion that reinforcements
could not be thrown into the fort in time for their relief
with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-
disciplined men. Generals Scott and Totten declared it
was impracticable, and Mr. Seward, who made many sug-
gestions and inquiries, had doubts, and was evidently
wholly opposed to any attempt at relief.

No conclusion was required or expected at this niter-
view. The President then, and until decisive steps were
finally taken, was averse to offensive measures, and anxious
to avoid them. In council, and in personal interviews with
myself and others, he enjoined upon each and all to for-
bear giving any cause of offense; and as regarded party
changes consequent upon a change of administration,
while they would necessarily be made elsewhere, he wished
no removal for political causes to be made hi the Southern
States, and especially not in Virginia. Although disturbed
by the fact that the supplies of the garrison at Sumter
were so limited, he was disinclined to hasty action, and
wished time for the Administration to get in working order
and its policy to be understood. He desired, I think on the
suggestion of Mr. Seward, that General Scott should pre-
pare a statement of the position of Sumter, and of the other
batteries, and of preparations in Charleston and Charles-
ton Harbor, — the strength of each, how far and long could
the garrison maintain itself and repel an attack if made,
what force would be necessary to overcome any rebel force
or organized military of the State of South Carolina, should
she bid defiance to and resist the Federal authorities.

No regular Cabinet-meetings were held in these days,
nor for several weeks subsequently, but the heads of De-
partments were frequently convened, always by special

CABINET-MEETINGS 7

summons through the Secretary of State. Sometimes
there was not a full attendance, but on such occasions
when there was an omission to invite any members, the
absentees were considered not particularly interested in
the questions submitted, or the questions did not affect the
unrepresented Departments.

The Secretary of State was, of course, apprised of every
meeting and never failed in his attendance, whatever was
the subject-matter, and though entirely out of his official
province. He was vigilantly attentive to every measure
and movement in other Departments, however trivial, —
as much so as to his own, — watched and scrutinized every
appointment that was made or proposed to be made, but
was not communicative in regard to the transactions of
the State Department. Other members began to inter-
change views on these proceedings by which one of the
heads of Departments was exclusively apprised on all
measures, and at length Mr. Chase, as the second in rank
and by request of his associates, inquired at one of the
special meetings, whether it had not been usual in past
administrations to have regular Cabinet-meetings on stated
days of each week, and if it would not be conducive to
unity and efficiency were the Administration to conform
to past usage in that respect,

Mr. Seward very promptly replied that it was not ad-
visable to consume the time of all the gentlemen on stated
days and when perhaps it would be unnecessary. The
President had only to send word to the State Department,
at any tune, day or night, when he wanted to call his Cabi-
net together, or any portion of them, and he, Seward,
would take upon himself to have every member notified
whose attendance was required. The times were such, he
remarked, that the President might find it necessary to
call them, or portions of them, frequently, perhaps daily,
and even oftener, together, for consultation.

It was said on the other hand, by all the members except
Mr. Seward, that the stated meetings need not prevent

8 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

special calls whenever the President deemed proper, and
that it was advisable, for the sake of unity and efficacy,
that all the members should attend these meetings and
share hi the responsibility, instead of having partial
gatherings.

The President concurred in these views of the majority,
and it was decided that thereafter the Cabinet should
assemble at meridian on Tuesdays and Fridays.

Commander Ward, who was summoned to Washington,
expressed his readiness to receive orders and to carry
supplies to Sumter. He had volunteered to perform this
service to the late administration, but his offer was then
declined. There was a belief at that time that the garrison
could not be reinforced by the Navy, and to attempt it
would, President Buchanan feared, bring on hostilities.
This in substance was the report of Commander Ward to
me. I called with him on General Scott, who I then per-
ceived was now decidedly opposed to any attempt to re-
lieve Major Anderson. The Navy he was confident could
not do it, and an army of at least twenty thousand men
would be necessary, he said, to effect it. We had no such
army, and the Government could not collect and arm one,
to say nothing of the discipline and training, before the
garrison would starve. Commander Ward and also Com-
modore Stringham at first thought that a supply of pro-
visions and a small number of men might be thrown into
the fort by means of two small fast tugs, which could run
in hi the night. Even if one of the tugs was lost, which they
did not believe would be the case, the other could relieve
the garrison. Of course, the tugs would be abandoned after
landing the men, each one of whom was to have his sack
of provisions if they could land no more. The crews of the
tugs as well as the small additional military force would
join the garrison and share its fate.

In subsequent interviews with Generals Scott and
Totten, Commander Ward became less confident and was
finally convinced that relief was impracticable. He advised

WILLIAM H. SEWARD

SEWARD OPPOSES RELIEF PLANS 9

me that the scheme should be abandoned. Commodore
Stringham came ultimately but reluctantly to the same
conclusion, after the elaborate report of the two generals,
who maintained that if supplies could be furnished the
garrison, the fort itself could not hold out against the at-
tack of the surrounding batteries which the Secessionists
had been allowed to erect and fortify for the reduction
of Sumter.

Mr. Seward, who from the first had viewed with no
favor any attempt to relieve Sumter, soon became a very
decisive and emphatic opponent of any proposition that
was made; said he had entertained doubts, and the opin-
ions and arguments of Major Anderson and his officers,
confirmed by the distinguished military officers who were
consulted, had fully convinced him that it would be abort-
ive and useless. It was a duty to defer to these military
gentlemen, whose profession and study made them experts,
who had by long and faithful service justly acquired the
positions they held, and who possessed the confidence of
the country. It was, he was satisfied, impossible to relieve
and reinforce the garrison; the attempt would provoke im-
mediate hostilities, and if hostilities could not be avoided,
he deemed it important that the Administration should
not strike the first blow.

The President, though much distressed with the conclu-
sions of the military officers, and the decisive concurrence
of the Secretary of State in those conclusions, appeared
to acquiesce in what seemed to be a military necessity,
but was not disposed to yield until the last moment, and
when there was no hope of accomplishing the work if at-
tempted. In the mean time, he sent Mr. Lamon, his late
law-partner, to Charleston and others also to make in-
quiries, among them Mr. Fox, who, like Commander Ward,
had been a volunteer under the late administration to
relieve Sumter and who never abandoned the idea of its
practicability.

Commander Ward was so fully convinced by the argu-

10 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

ments of General Scott and General Totten and the opin-
ions of the officers of the garrison, so dissuaded by the
opposition of Mr. Seward and the general current of views
which prevailed, that he wholly abandoned the project,
stating, however, that he held himself in readiness to obey
orders and take charge of an expedition, if the Government
should at any time deem it expedient that an effort should
be made. On the llth of March he left Washington, and
returned to New York.

A strange state of things existed at that time in Wash-
ington. The atmosphere was thick with treason. Party
spirit and old party differences prevailed, however, amidst
these accumulating dangers. Secession was considered by
most persons as a political party question, not as rebellion.
Democrats to a large extent sympathized with the Rebels
more than with the Administration, which they opposed,
not that they wished secession to be successful and. the
Union divided, but they hoped that President Lincoln and
the Republicans would, overwhelmed by obstacles and
embarrassments, prove failures. The Republicans, on the
other hand, were scarcely less partisan and unreasonable.
Crowds of them at this period, when the storm of civil war
was about bursting on the country, thronged the ante-
rooms of the President and Secretaries, clamorous for the
removal of all Democrats, indiscriminately, from office.
Patriotism was with them no test, no shield from party
malevolence. They demanded the proscription and ex-
clusion of such Democrats as opposed the Rebel move-
ments and clung to the Union, with the same vehemence
that they demanded the removal of the worst Rebels who
advocated a dissolution of the Union.

Neither party appeared to be apprehensive of or to real-
ize the gathering storm. There was a general belief, in-
dulged in by most persons, that an adjustment would in
some way be brought about, without any extensive resort
to extreme measures. It seemed probable there might be
some outbreak in South Carolina, and perhaps in one or

SEWARD'S UNFORTUNATE PROPHECIES 11

two other places, but such would, it was believed, be soon
and easily suppressed. The threatened violence which the
milliners had thundered for thirty years in the ears of
the people had caused then' threats to be considered as the
harmless ebullitions of excited demagogues throughout
the North, while at the South those utterances had so
trained the Southern mind, and fired the Southern heart,
as to cause them to be received as truthful. The South
were, therefore, more united and earnest at this crisis,
more determined on seceding, than either the Democrats
or Republicans supposed. But, while the great body of
the people and most of their leaders in the Northern States,
listening to the ninety-day prophecies of Mr. Seward, were
incredulous as to any extensive, serious disturbance, there
were not a few whose forebodings were grave and sad. All
the calamities which soon befell the country these men
anticipated. Yet such as were in positions of responsibility
would not permit themselves to despond, or despair of the
Republic. Mr. Seward possessed a hopeful and buoyant
spirit which did not fail him in that dark period, and at no
time were his party f eelings more decided than during the
spring of 1861. Old Whig associates he clung to and strove
to retain. All Democrats he distrusted, unless they became
identified with the Republican Party. He had probably
overestimated his own power and ability to allay the rising
storm, and had not the personal influence he supposed.
He had prophesied during the winter peace and harmony,
within a very brief period after the change of administra-
tion was to be effected. These unfortunate prophecies,
which became a matter of mirth with many of his friends
and of ridicule among his opponents, were not entirely vain
imaginings or without some foundation. In the confident
belief that he could, if once in place and power, effect con-
ciliation and peace, it had been an object with him to tide
the difficulties past the 4th of March. He therefore had
operated to that end, and so had Mr. Buchanan, though
for different reasons.

12 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Through Mr. Stanton, after that gentleman entered Mr.
Buchanan's Cabinet, Mr. Seward and others were secretly
advised in regard to the important measures of the
Buchanan Administration, and in the course of the winter
Mr. Seward came to an understanding, as was alleged and
as events and circumstances indicated, with certain of the
leading Secessionists. Among other things it was asserted
that an agreement had been entered into that no assault
should be made on Fort Sumter, provided the garrison
should not be reinforced. Mr. Buchanan was to observe
the status thus understood during the short remaining pe-
riod of his administration, and Mr. Seward, as the coming
premier, was, on the change of administration, to carry
forward the policy of non-reinforcement of Sumter. If not
supplied or reinforced, famine would certainly effect the
downfall of the fortress without bloodshed on either side.
Until blood was spilled, there was hope of conciliation. In
fulfillment of this arrangement, Mr. Seward opposed any
and every scheme to reinforce Sumter, and General Scott,
who was old and much under his influence, if not a party
to the understanding, seconded or took a leading part in
that opposition.

On the 5th of March commissioners from the Rebel
Government arrived in Washington and soon put them-
selves in communication with the Secretary of State, but
the specific object which they had in view, and the nego-
tiations or understanding between him and the parties
were not immediately detailed to the Cabinet. They un-
doubtedly influenced the mind and course of Mr. Seward,
who did not relinquish the hope of a peaceful adjustment
of difficulties, and he in conversation continued to allure
his friends with the belief that he should be able to effect
a reconciliation.

In the many, almost daily, discussions which for a time
were held in regard to Sumter, the opposition to forward-
ing supplies gathered strength. Commodore Stringham,
as well as Commander Ward, on a final application which

THE PRESIDENT AROUSED 13

I made to him, by request of the President, and finally
by the President himself, said he was compelled to advise
against it. The tune had gone by. It was too late. The mil-
itary gentlemen had satisfied him it was impossible, that
nothing could be gained by it, were the attempt made,
that it would be attended with a useless sacrifice of blood
and treasure, and he felt constrained to state his belief of
the inability of the Navy to give relief.

Postmaster-General Blair, who had been a close and near
observer of what had taken place through the whiter
and spring, took an opposite view from Mr. Seward and
General Scott. To some extent he was aware of the un-
derstanding which Mr. Seward had with the members of
Buchanan's Administration, or was suspicious of it, and his
indignation that any idea of abandoning Sumter should
be entertained or thought of was unbounded. With the
exception of Mr. Seward, all his colleagues concurred with
Mr. Blair at the commencement, but as the subject was
discussed, and the impossibility and inutility of the scheme
was urged, with assurance from the first military men in
the country, whose advice was sought and given, that it
was a military necessity to leave Sumter to its fate, the
opinions of men changed, or they began at least to waver.
Mr. Blair saw these misgivings, in which he did not at all
participate, and finally, observing that the President, with
the acquiescence of the Cabinet, was about adopting the
Seward and Scott policy, he wrote his resignation, de-
termined not to continue hi the Cabinet if no attempt
were made to relieve Fort Sumter. Before handing in his
resignation, a delay was made at the request of his father.
The elder Blair sought an interview with the President, to
whom he entered his protest against non-action, which he
denounced as the offspring of intrigue. His earnestness
and indignation aroused and electrified the President; and
when, in his zeal, Blair warned the President that the aban-
donment of Sumter would be justly considered by the
people, by the world, by history, as treason to the country,

14 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

he touched a chord that responded to his invocation.
The President decided from that moment that an attempt
should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson,
and that he would reinforce Sumter. This determination
he communicated to the members of the Cabinet as he saw
them, without a general announcement in Cabinet-meet-
ing. The resolve inspired all the members with hope and
courage, except Mr. Seward, who was evidently disap-
pointed. He said it was of vastly more importance to turn
our attention to Fort Pickens. I told him this had been
done and how; that we had a considerable naval force there,
almost the whole of the Home Squadron, and we had sent,
a fortnight before, orders to land the troops under Captain
Vogdes from the Brooklyn. He said that still more should,
hi his opinion, be done; that it was practicable to save
Fort Pickens, but it was confessedly impossible to retain
Sumter. One would be a waste of effort and energy and
life, would extinguish all hope of peace, and compel the
Government to take the initiative in hostile demonstra-
tions, while the other would be an effective and peace-
able movement. Although, as already mentioned, stated
Cabinet-meetings were not then established, the members
were in those early days of the Administration frequently
together, and the President had every day more or less
interviews with them, individually or collectively. The
Secretary of State spent much of each day at the Execu-
tive Mansion and was vigilant to possess himself of every
act, move, and intention of the President and of each of
his associates. Perhaps there was an equal desire on their
part to be informed of the proceedings of the Administra-
tion in full, but less was known of the transactions of the
State Department than of any other.

The President, after his interview with the elder Blah*,
asked me if a naval expedition could be promptly fitted
out to relieve Sumter. Mr. Fox,1 who had in February
proposed to the Buchanan Administration a plan for the

1 Gustavus V. Fox, subsequently Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

FOX UNDERTAKES THE EXPEDITION 15

relief of Sumter, again volunteered for the service, and
was accepted by Mr. Lincoln. On the 19th of March he
received the following communication from General Scott :

HEADQUARTERS OP THE ARMY,

Washington, March 19, 1861.

DEAR SIR: In accordance with the request contained in a note
from the Secretary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I re-
quest that you will have the goodness to proceed to Charleston,
S. C., and obtain permission, if necessary, to visit Fort Sumter,
in order to enable you to comply with the wish expressed in the
Secretary's note.

Please, on your return, to report accordingly.

I remain, with high consideration, your most obedient serv-
ant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

G. V. Fox, ESQ.

Mr. Fox visited the fort and saw Major Anderson, and
was confident he could reinforce the garrison with men
and supply it with provisions. Commodore Stringham
was tendered the command of the naval part of the expe-
dition, but doubted the practicability of succeeding. The
President, notwithstanding Stringham's reluctance, de-
termined to accept the volunteer services of Mr. Fox, who,
though then in no way connected with the Government,
had formerly been an officer of the Navy. The object
being the relief of a military garrison and the supplies and
troops for reinforcement being from the army, the expe-
dition was made a military and not a naval one, but with
naval aid and cooperation. The transports which the War
Department was to charter were to rendezvous off Charles-
ton with the naval vessels, which would act as convoy, and
render such assistance as would be required of them. The
steam frigate Powhatan, which had returned from service
in the West Indies and needed considerable repairs, had
just arrived and been ordered out of commission, and the
crew discharged the day before the final decision of the
President was communicated. Dispatches were forthwith

16 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

sent revoking the orders which had been issued, directing
that the Powhatan be again put in commission, and to fit
her without delay for brief service. The Pawnee and one
or two other vessels, including the Harriet Lane, a revenue
cutter transferred to the Navy for the occasion, there*not
being sufficient naval vessels available for the expedition,
were ordered to be in readiness for sea service on or before
the 6th of April with one month's stores on board. These
preparatory orders were given on the 30th of March.

On the 1st of April, while at my dinner at Willard's,
where I then boarded, Mr. Nicolay, the private secretary
of the President, brought to me and laid upon the table a
large package from the President. It was between five and
six o'clock in the afternoon when I received this package,
which I immediately examined and found it contained
several papers of a singular character, in the nature of in-
structions, or orders from the Executive in relation to naval
matters, and one in reference to the government of the
Navy Department more singular and remarkable than
either of the others. This extraordinary document was as
follows : —

(Confidential)

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.
To the Secretary of the Navy.

DEAR SIR: You will issue instructions to Captain Pendergrast,
commanding the home squadron, to remain in observation at
Vera Cruz — important complications in our foreign relations
rendering the presence of an officer of rank there of great import-
ance.

Captain Stringham will be directed to proceed to Pensacola
with all possible despatch, and assume command of that portion
of the home squadron stationed off Pensacola. He will have con-
fidential instructions to cooperate in every way with the com-
manders of the land forces of the United States in that neighbor-
hood.

The instructions to the army officers, which are strictly con-
fidential, will be communicated to Captain Stringham after he
arrives at Pensacola.

SEWARD'S INTERFERENCE 17

Captain Samuel Barren will relieve Captain Stringham in
charge of the Bureau of Detail.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

P. S. As it is very necessary at this time to have a perfect know-
ledge of the personal of the navy, and to be able to detail such
officers for special purposes as the exigencies of the service may
require, I request that you will instruct Captain Barren to pro-
ceed and organize the Bureau of Detail in the manner best
adapted to meet the wants of the navy, taking cognizance of the
discipline of the navy generally, detailing all officers for duty,
taking charge of the recruiting of seamen, supervising charges
made against officers, and all matters relating to duties which
must be best understood by a sea officer. You will please afford
Captain Barren any facility for accomplishing this duty, trans-
ferring to his department the clerical force heretofore used for
the purposes specified. It is to be understood that this officer
will act by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, who will
exercise such supervision as he may deem necessary.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Without a moment's delay I went to the President with
the package in my hand. He was alone in his office and,
raising his head from the table at which he was writing,
inquired, "What have I done wrong?" I informed him I
had received with surprise the package containing his in-
structions respecting the Navy and the Navy Department,
and I desired some explanation. I then called his atten-
tion particularly to the foregoing document, which I read
to him. This letter was in the handwriting of Captain
Meigs of the army, then Quartermaster-General; the post-
script in that of David D. Porter, since made Vice-Ad-
miral. The President expressed as much surprise as I felt,
that he had sent me such a document. He said Mr. Seward,
with two or three young men, had been there through the
day on a subject which he (Seward) had in hand, and
which he had been some time maturing; that it was Sew-
ard's specialty, to which he, the President, had yielded, but
as it involved considerable details, he had left Mr. Seward

18 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had
signed, many of them without reading, — for he had not
time, and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, he
knew not whom he could trust. I asked who were asso-
ciated with Mr. Seward. "No one," said the President,
"but these young men were here as clerks to write down
his plans and orders." Most of the work was done, he said,
in the other room. I then asked if he knew the young men.
He said one was Captain Meigs, another was a naval officer
named Porter.

I informed the President that I was not prepared to
trust Captain Barren, who was by this singular pro-
ceeding, issued in his name, to be forced into personal and
official intimacy with me. He said he knew nothing of
Barren except he had a general recollection that there
was such an officer in the Navy. The detailing officer of
the Department, I said to him, ought to have the implicit
confidence of the Secretary, and should be selected by him.
This the President assented to most fully. I then told
him that Barron, though a pliant gentleman, had not my
confidence, and I thought him not entitled to that of the
President in these times; that his associations, feelings,
and views, so far as I had ascertained them, were with the
Secessionists; that he belonged to a clique of exclusives,
most of whom were tainted with secession notions; that,
though I was not prepared to say he would desert us when
the crisis came on, I was apprehensive of it, and while I
would treat him kindly, considerately, and hoped he would
not prove false like most others of his set, I could not
give him the trust which the instructions imposed.

The President reiterated they were not his instructions,
though signed by him, that the paper was an improper one,
that he wished me to give it no more consideration than I
thought proper, to treat it as canceled, or as if it had never
been written. He said he remembered that both Seward
and Porter had something to say about Barron, as if he
was a superior officer, and hi some respects, perhaps, with-

DEFECTION AMONG NAVAL OFFICERS 19

out any equal in the Navy, but he certainly never would
have assigned him or any other man knowingly the posi-
tion without consulting me.

Barren was a courtier, of mild and affable manners, a
prominent and influential officer, especially influential
with the clique which recognized him as a leader. He and
D. D. Porter were intimate friends, and both were favor-
ites of Jefferson Davis, Slidell, and other Secessionists,
who, I had learned, paid them assiduous attention.

When I took charge of the Navy Department, I found
great demoralization and defection among the naval of-
ficers. It was difficult to ascertain who among those that
lingered about Washington could and who were not to be
trusted. Some belonging to the Barren clique had already
sent in their resignations. Others, it was well understood,
were prepared to do so as soon as a blow was struck. Some
were hesitating, undecided what step to take. Barron,
Buchanan, Maury, Porter, and Magruder were in Wash-
ington, and each and all were, during that unhappy winter,
courted and caressed by the Secessionists, who desired to
win them to their cause. I was by reliable friends put on
my guard as respected each of them. Buchanan, Maury,
and Magruder were each holding prominent place and on
duty. Barron was familiar with civil and naval matters,
was prepared for any service, ready to be called to dis-
charge such duties as are constantly arising in the Depart-
ment, requiring the talents of an intelligent officer.

Porter had some of the qualities of Barron, with more
dash and energy, was less plausible, more audacious, and
careless in his statements, but like him was given to in-
trigues. His associations, as well as Barron's, during the
winter of 1861, had been intimate with the Secessionists.
He sought and obtained orders for Coast Survey service
in the Pacific, which indicated an intention to avoid active
participation in the approaching controversy. That class
of officers who at such a time sought duties in the Pacific
and on foreign stations were considered, prima facie, as in

20 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

sympathy with the Secessionists, but yet not prepared to
give up their commissions and abandon the Government.
No men were more fully aware that a conflict was impend-
ing, and that, if hostilities commenced and they were
within the call of the Department, they would be required
to participate. Hence a disposition to evade an unpleasant
dilemma by going away was not misunderstood.

Barron and Porter occupied in the month of March an
equivocal position. They were intimate, they were popu-
lar, and the eye of the Department was necessarily upon
them, as it was, indeed, upon all in the service. In two or
three interviews with me, Barron deprecated the unfor-
tunate condition of the country, expressed his hopes that
extreme measures would not be resorted to, avowed his
love for the profession with which from early childhood
he had been identified and in which so many of his family
had distinguished connection. There were suavity in his
manner and kindly sentiments in his remarks, but not that
earnest, devoted patriotism which the times demanded,
and which broke forth from others of his profession, in
denunciation of treason and infidelity to the flag. Porter
had presented himself but once to the Department, and
that was to make some inquiries in relation to his orders
to the Pacific, but there was no allusion to the impending
difficulties nor any proffer of service if difficulties ensued.
As with many others, some of whom abandoned the Gov-
ernment, while some remained and rendered valuable
service, the Department was in doubt what course these
two officers would pursue.

This was the state of the case when the instructions of
the 1st of April were sent me. On learning from the Pre-
sident who were Mr. Seward's associates, I was satisfied
that Porter had through him proposed and urged the
substitution of Barron for Stringham as the detailing and
confidential officer of the Secretary of the Navy. I was
unwilling to believe that my colleague Mr. Seward could
connive at, or be party to, so improper and gross an affair

THE BARRON INTRIGUE 21

as to interfere with the organization of my Department, and
jeopardize its operations at such a juncture. What, then,
were the contrivances which he was maturing with two
young officers, one of the army and the other of the Navy,
without consulting the Secretary of War or the Secretary
of the Navy ? What had he, the Secretary of State, to do
with these officers in any respect? I could get no satis-
factory explanation from the President of the origin of this
strange interference, which mystified him, and which he
censured and condemned more severely than myself. He
assured me it would never occur again. Although very
much disturbed by the disclosure, he was anxious to avoid
difficulty, and, to shield Mr. Seward, took to himself the
whole blame and repeatedly said that I must pay no more
attention to the papers sent me than I thought advisable.
He gave me, however, at that time no information of the
scheme which Mr. Seward had promoted, farther than
that it was a specialty, which Mr. Seward wished should
be kept secret. I therefore pressed for no further disclos-
ures.

The instructions in relation to Barron I treated as null-
ities. My first conclusions were that Mr. Seward had been
made a victim to an intrigue, artfully contrived by those
who favored and were promoting the Rebellion, and that
the paper had been in some way surreptitiously introduced
with others in the hurry and confusion of that busy day
without his knowledge. That he would commit the discour-
tesy of imposing on me such instructions I was unwilling'to
believe, and that he should be instrumental in placing, or
attempting to place, a person more than suspected, and
who was occupying so equivocal a position as Barron, in
so responsible a position in the Navy Department, and
commit to him all the information of that branch of the
Government, seemed to me impossible.

The preparations for the Sumter expedition were carried
forward with all the energy which the Department could
command, for we were notified the provisions of the garri-

22 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

son would be exhausted on the 15th of April. It was ar-
ranged by the War and Navy Departments that their
forces — the naval vessels and transports — should meet
and rendezvous ten miles due east of Charleston lighthouse
on the morning of the llth of April. Each of the vessels
was to report to Gapt. Samuel Mercer, commanding the
Powhatan, and the following final instructions were sent to
that officer: —

(Confidential)

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1861.

Captain Samuel Mercer, commanding U. S. Steamer Pow-
hatan, N. Y.

The United States Steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas,
and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under your com-
mand, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston, S. C., for the pur-
pose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of
which the War Department has charge.

The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort
Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the
necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston per-
mit the fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be
required of the force under your command; and after being satis-
fied that supplies have been received at the fort, the Powhatan,
Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will return to New York, and the
Pawnee to Washington.

Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to per-
mit, or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies
on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding
to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the
expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force
in such manner as to open the way for their ingress, and afford
as far as practicable security to the men and boats, and repelling
by force if necessary all obstructions toward provisioning the
fort and reinforcing it; for hi case of a resistance to the peaceable
primary object of the expedition, a reinforcement of the garri-
son will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the
supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the
expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V.
Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication, and

CAPTAIN MERGER'S ORDERS 23

cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its
object.

You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be
off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the
light-house, on the morning of the llth instant, there to await
the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores.
The Pawnee and Pocahontas will be ordered to join you there
at the time mentioned, and also the Harriet Lane, which latter
vessel has been placed under the control of this Department
for this service.

On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable
or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will re-
turn to the respective ports as above directed, unless some un-
foreseen circumstance should prevent.
I am, respectfully,

Your Obd't Serv't,

GIDEON WELLES,

Secretary of the Navy.

Sealed orders were given to Commander Rowan of the
Pawnee, Commander Gillis of the Pocahontas, and Cap-
tain Tanner of the Harriet Lane, to report to Captain
Mercer on the llth of April, and the entire military and
naval expedition was to be under the command of Mr.
Fox, who was specially commissioned by the President
and received his instructions from the Secretary of War.
My instructions to Captain Mercer were read to the Pre-
sident on the 5th of April, who approved them. Although
but brief time had been permitted us to fit out the expedi-
tion, I congratulated myself, when I went to my room at
Willard's on the evening of the 6th of April, that it had
been accomplished within the tune given us, and that the
force had probably sailed.

Between eleven and twelve that night, Mr. Seward and
his son Frederick came to my rooms at Willard's with
a telegram from Captain Meigs at New York, stating hi
effect that the movements were retarded and embarrassed
by conflicting orders from the Secretary of the Navy. I
asked an explanation, for I could not understand the nature

24 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

of the telegram or its object. Mr. Seward said he sup-
posed it related to the Powhatan and Porter's command.
I assured him he was mistaken, that Porter had no com-
mand, and that the Powhatan was the flagship, as he was
aware, of the Sumter expedition. He thought there must
be some mistake, and after a few moments' conversation,
with some excitement on my part, it was suggested that
we had better call on the President. Before doing this, I
sent for Commodore Stringham, who was boarding at
Willard's and had retired for the night. When he came, my
statement was confirmed by him, and he went with us, as
did Mr. Frederick Seward, to the President. On our way
thither Mr. Seward remarked that, old as he was, he had
learned a lesson from this affair, and that was, he had bet-
ter attend to his own business and confine his labors to his
own Department. To this I cordially assented.

The President had not retired when we reached the
Executive Mansion, although it was nearly midnight. On
seeing us he was surprised, and his surprise was not dimin-
ished on learning our errand. He looked first at one and
then the other, and declared there was some mistake, but
after again hearing the facts stated, and again looking at
the telegram, he asked if I was not in error in regard to the
Powhatan, — if some other vessel was not the flagship
of the Sumter expedition. I assured him there was no mis-
take on my part; reminded him that I had read to him
my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said
he remembered that fact, and that he approved of them,
but he could not remember that the Powhatan was the
vessel. Commodore Stringham confirmed my statement,
but to make the matter perfectly clear to the President, I
went to the Navy Department and brought and read to
him the instructions. He then remembered distinctly all
the facts, and, turning promptly to Mr. Seward, said the
Powhatan must be restored to Mercer, that on no account
must the Sumter expedition fail or be interfered with. Mr.
Seward hesitated, remonstrated, asked if the other expedi-

SEWARD'S INTERFERENCE 25

tion was not quite as important, and whether that would
not be defeated if the Powhatan was detached. The Pre-
sident said the other had time and could wait, but no time
was to be lost as regarded Sumter, and he directed Mr.
Seward to telegraph and return the Powhatan to Mercer
without delay. Mr. Seward suggested the difficulty of
getting a dispatch through and to the Navy Yard at so
late an hour, but the President was imperative that it
should be done.

The President then, and subsequently, informed me that
Mr. Seward had his heart set on reinforcing Fort Pickens,
and that between them, on Mr. Seward's suggestion, they
had arranged for supplies and reinforcements to be sent
out at the same time we were fitting out vessels for Sumter,
but with no intention whatever of interfering with the
latter expedition. He took upon himself the whole blame,
said it was carelessness, heedlessness on his part, he ought
to have been more careful and attentive. President Lin-
coln never shunned any responsibility and often declared
that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errors im-
puted to them, when I sometimes thought otherwise.

Mr. Seward never attempted any explanation. He was
not communicative on that night, nor afterwards, though
there were occasional allusions, by myself, to that singular
transaction. Mr. Cameron was greatly incensed; com-
plained that Mr. Seward was trying to run the War De-
partment, had caused Captain Meigs to desert; said he
would have Meigs arrested and tried by court martial,
that he was absent without leave, was expending the mili-
tary appropriations without authority from the Secretary
of War. My grievance was somewhat similar. Although
Lieutenant Porter had gone with the Powhatan to Pensa-
cola, there was no order or record in the Navy Department
of the facts. He was absent without leave; the last sailing-
orders to the Powhatan were [sent to] Mercer. The whole
proceeding was irregular and could admit of no justifica-
tion without impeaching the integrity or ability of the

26 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Secretaries of War and Navy. No one was more aware of
this than the President, and, solicitous that there should be
no disagreement or cause for disagreement in his Cabinet,
he was not comforted by any reflection or examination of
the subject. A large portion of the Home Squadron was off
Pensacola, and no additional vessels were required nor
could well be spared for that station whilst we were want-
ing them and many more this side of Key West. I had,
moreover, on the earnest application of Lieutenant-General
Scott, sent the Crusader and Mohawk already into the
Gulf with orders to Captain Adams, the senior officer off
Pensacola, to land the troops in order to reinforce Fort
Pickens. No additional frigate like the Powhatan was
needed there, while she was indispensable here. That ves-
sel gave no greater security to Pickens. The troops, with
the naval force already there, were abundantly able to de-
fend it, as results proved. Besides, the defense was mili-
tary, not naval, and could easily have been reinforced.
Hence the reinforcements were stolen away from Sumter
and sent to Pickens.

When at a later date I saw the communication of the
Rebel commissioners of the 9th of April to Mr. Seward and
also Judge Campbell's letter of the 13th of that month,
I had one of the keys to the mystery and movements of
Mr. Seward. The commissioners state that "on the 15th
of March Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured
by a person occupying a high official position in the
Government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by
authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a
very few days, and that no measure changing the existing
status prejudicially to the Confederate States as respects
Fort Pickens was then contemplated; and these assurances
were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any
contemplated change as respects Pickens [= Sumter] would
be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again
informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort
Sumter with provisions, but that Gov. Pickens should

SEWARD AND THE COMMISSIONERS 27

have previous notice of this attempt. There was no sug-
gestion of any reinforcements."

Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson of the Supreme
Court were the high officials alluded to, and the former
in his letter of the 13th of April to Mr. Seward says, "On
the 1st of April I received from you the statement in writ-
ing: I am satisfied the govt. will not undertake to supply
Fort Sumter without giving notice to Gov. P." The 1st
of April was the day on which Mr. Seward, assisted by
Meigs and Porter, prepared the strange series of instruc-
tions to me which President Lincoln signed without read-
ing, directing that Captain Barren should be made the
confidential detailing officer of the Department with ex-
traordinary powers. It was on the 1st of April that carte
blanche was given to the two young officers, investing them
with full governmental powers and authorizing them to
act independently of then* superiors and of the heads of
their respective departments, by which a military expedi-
tion was sent out without the knowledge of the Secretary
of War and a naval ship under orders was taken from her
destination, her commander displaced, and her cruise
broken up without the knowledge of the Secretary of the
Navy, whereby the whole plan of sending supplies and re-
inforcements to Fort Sumter was defeated. The Secretary
of State writes the Rebel commission he is satisfied the
Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter
without giving notice to Governor P., when at the very
moment he knew the whole energies of the War and Navy
Departments were engaged by order of the President in
preparations to forward supplies and reinforcements to
Sumter. All was rendered abortive, however, by secretly
detaching the Powhatan, the flagship to which the squad-
ron was to report and which had the supplies.

On the night of the 6th of April, Secretary Seward was
ordered by the President to send a telegram to Porter
to restore the Powhatan to Mercer and the expedition to
Sumter. But the vessel was not so restored, and on the

28 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

following day Mr. Seward writes Judge Campbell, " Faith
as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see." I make no com-
ments on these proceedings, by which I, and the Pre-
sident, and others, as well as the Rebel commissioners,
were deceived. These letters of Judge Campbell and the
commissioners were not disclosed to me by Mr. Seward,
nor do I think the President saw them when received.

Porter's instructions, recommended by Seward and
signed by Abraham Lincoln, placed that officer hi inde-
pendent command at Pensacola, where his senior, Captain
Adams, was hi command of the squadron, and the latter
was to cooperate with and be subject to the request of his
junior in the great object and purpose of the force on that
station. The strange and irregular proceeding embar-
rassed Captain Adams and became uncomfortable to Lieu-
tenant Porter as well as embarrassing to the Secretary of
State. Captain Adams could not receive or recognize the
Powhatan as a part of his squadron; he had received no
orders from the Secretary of the Navy in relation to the
vessel or to Lieutenant Porter; and while he could not dis-
regard the strange instructions to which the Secretary of
State had persuaded the President to affix his signature,
there was nothing requiring his action as commander of the
naval forces. Porter could not report or write to the Navy
Department, for he was off Pensacola, when by naval re-
cord he should have been in the Pacific, and [as he was] in
command of the Powhatan by no order from the Secretary
of the Navy, — was without orders or instructions from
the proper Department, — the officer in command would
not receive and forward his letters. Officers are required
to send then* letters to the Navy Department through their
senior officers. The Secretary of State had therefore to
correspond with that branch of the Navy, and awkwardly
passed over the letters of the officer who was in command
of a vessel surreptitiously detached and withdrawn from
her legitimate duties.

I may here state that, as early as the llth of March,

RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS 29

I had, on the application of General Scott, who feared to
trust the mails, and was unwilling to send a messenger
through the infected region lest he should be arrested, de-
tailed the Crusader to carry an officer with instructions to
Captain Vogdes to land his forces and strengthen the gar-
rison at Fort Pickens. When the vessel was ready to sail,
General Scott concluded not to send his messenger, but
dispatched written orders to Captain Vogdes, which he
entrusted to the naval officer to deliver. But Captain
Adams, the senior naval officer, would not recognize the
orders of General Scott, nor permit Captain Vogdes and
his command to land. His justification was an armistice,
which had been entered into by Secretaries Holt and Toucey
with prominent Rebels, not to reinforce the garrison at
Fort Pickens, provided the Rebels would not attack it.

Captain Adams was not entirely satisfied with his own
decision. Though technically he might be justified in
adhering to the armistice or order of the Secretary of
the Navy, rather than obey the order of General Scott, the
emergency was one when a faithful and patriotic officer
would have been justified hi taking a reasonable respon-
sibility. To relieve himself from embarrassment, he im-
mediately dispatched Lieutenant Gwathmey with a secret
confidential communication to me, dated the 1st of April,
stating the facts and asking instructions. Lieutenant G.,
although a Secessionist, was faithful to his trust. He trav-
elled night and day, not even stopping in Richmond, where
he belonged, and reached Washington on the 6th of April.
He came to me on his arrival before he went to his hotel,
and took from a belt that was strapped around his body
under his shirt, the letter of Captain Adams, which he de-
livered into my hands. A day or two after this affair, he
tendered his resignation, which, however, was not accepted,
but he was dismissed from the service.

I went immediately to the President with Captain
Adams's communication, and we both deemed it abso-
lutely essential that a special messenger should be forth-

30 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

with sent overland with orders to immediately land the
troops. Prompt action was all-important, for the Rebellion
was rapidly culminating, and the hesitancy of Captain
Adams had caused a delay which endangered the possession
of Santa Rosa Island and the safety of Fort Pickens. But,
in the general demoralization and suspicion which per-
vaded Washington, who was to be trusted with this im-
portant mission? It was then three o'clock hi the after-
noon, and the messenger must depart by the mail train
which left that evening. Paymaster Etting was in Wash-
ington, and I sent for him to convey the message. Al-
though not well, he prepared to obey orders, but had my
consent to make inquiry for another officer, whose fidelity
and energy were unquestioned, to perform the service.
About five o'clock he reported to me that Lieut. John
Worden had just arrived in Washington, that he would
vouch for him as untainted by treason, and as possessed
of the necessary qualifications for the mission. I directed
that Lieutenant W. should immediately report to me, and
in a brief interview I informed him of my purpose to dis-
patch him on a secret, responsible, and somewhat danger-
ous duty through the South, and that he must leave hi
about two hours. He expressed his readiness to obey orders,
and, though the time was short and he indifferently pre-
pared, he would be ready at the time designated. I di-
rected him to make no mention of his orders or his journey
to any one, not even to his wife, but to call on me as soon
as ready and I would in the mean tune prepare the docu-
ment that was to be confided to him. The fact that he was
an officer of the Navy passing South to Pensacola, and
yet not a Secessionist or in sympathy with them, would
be likely to cause him to be challenged and perhaps searched.
I therefore wrote a brief dispatch to Captain Adams, which
I read to him when he called, and gave it into his hands
open, advising that he should commit it to memory, and
then, if he thought best, he could destroy the paper. When
he saw Captain Adams he could from recollection make

RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS 31

a certified copy to that officer, stating the reasons why he
did not produce the original. Everything was successful,
for, though he was questioned at one or two points and
asked if he was carrying a message, he managed to escape
detection, and I believe was not searched.

He reached Pensacola and was put on board the Brook-
lyn on the 12th of April. That night the troops under
command of Captain Vogdes with [a battalion of] marines
were landed and Fort Pickens was reinforced. Instead of
remaining with the squadron and improving the first
opportunity to reach the North by steamer, Lieutenant
Worden preferred to land as soon as his message was
delivered, and commenced his return, going to Washington
by the same route he had taken hi going to Pensacola. It
was not surprising that the Rebels, when they learned next
day that the troops had been landed and were in Fort
Pickens, connected the mission of that officer with the
movement. Although he had been gone some hours on his
homeward journey, the facts were telegraphed to the
Rebel leaders at Montgomery, who had him arrested and
confined in the prison at that place, where he remained
several months until late in the fall, when an exchange was
effected, and he reached the North in season to take com-
mand of the ironclad and turreted Monitor, the first ves-
sel of that class, and fight the Merrimac in Hampton Roads.
He was among the first, if not the very first, prisoners-of-
war captured by the Rebels.

The order to Captain Adams to land the troops was re-
ceived by him, as stated, on the 12th, and the fort was
reinforced that night. Lieutenant Porter and the Powhatan
did not reach Pensacola until the 17th, five days after Cap-
tain Vogdes and his command with the marines were in
the fort, — a force sufficient for its defense. In detaching
the Powhatan from the Sumter expedition, no important
or necessary aid was furnished by her or by Lieutenant
Porter to Pickens. Had the frigate remained under Cap-
tain Mercer, the attempt to relieve Major Anderson

32 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

probably would not have succeeded, for the Rebels of
Charleston were strangely prepared and warned of the
intended expedition, and there were other movements
which precipitated Rebel action.

Soon after President Lincoln had formed the resolu-
tion to attempt the relief of Sumter, and whilst it was yet
a secret, a young man connected with the telegraph office
in Washington, with whom I was acquainted, a native of
the same town with myself, brought to me successively
two telegrams, conveying to the Rebel authorities informa-
tion of the purpose and decision of the Administration.
One of these telegrams was from Mr. Harvey, a newspaper
correspondent, who was soon after, and with a full know-
ledge of his having communicated to the Rebels the move-
ments of the Government, appointed minister to Lisbon.
I had, on receiving these copies, handed them to the Pre-
sident. Mr. Blair, who had also obtained a copy of one,
perhaps both, of these telegrams from another source, like-
wise informed him of the treachery. The subject was once
or twice alluded to in Cabinet without eliciting any action,
and when the nomination of Mr. Harvey to the Portuguese
mission was announced, — a nomination made without
the knowledge of any member of the Cabinet but the
Secretary of State, and made at his special request, —
there was general disapprobation, except by the President
(who avoided the expression of any opinion) and by Mr.
Seward. The latter defended and justified the selection,
which he admitted was recommended by himself, but the
President was silent hi regard to it.

Two days preceding the attack on Sumter, I met Sena-
tor Douglas in front of the Treasury Building. He was in
a carriage with Mrs. Douglas, driving rapidly up the street.
When he saw me he checked his driver, jumped from the
carriage, and came to me on the sidewalk, and in a very
earnest and emphatic manner said the Rebels were deter-
mined on war and were about to make an assault on Sum-

DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 33

ter. He thought immediate and decisive measures should
be taken; considered it a mistake that there had not al-
ready been more energetic action; said the dilatory pro-
ceedings of the Government would bring on a terrible civil
war, that the whole South was united and in earnest.
Although he had differed with the Administration on
important questions, and would never be in accord with
some of its members on measures and principles that
were fundamental, yet he had no fellowship with traitors
or disunionists. He was for the Union and would stand
by the Administration and all others in its defense,
regardless of party.

I proposed that we should step into the State Depart-
ment, near which we were, and consult with Mr. Seward.
The look of mingled astonishment and incredulity which
came over him I can never forget. "Then you," said he,
"have faith in Seward. Have you made yourself acquainted
with what has been going on here all winter? Seward has
had an understanding with these men. If he has influence
with them, why don't he use it?"

I said Seward was a member of the Administration, and
nothing could be done without the knowledge of himself
and associates, that to meet him frankly and give him con-
fidence was probably the best course under the circum-
stances.

He said perhaps it was. He could now see no alterna-
tive. "Lincoln is honest and means well. He will do well if
counseled right. You and I are old Democrats," he con-
tinued, "and I have confidence in you, though we have
differed of late. I was glad when I learned you were to be
one of the Cabinet, and have told Lincoln he could safely
trust you. Seward has too much influence with him."

This is the substance of the conversation, the result of
which was that he consented to go with me to the State
Department and see Mr. Seward if still there. It was late
in the afternoon. He, Douglas, said we must take his
word for the information he gave, for he could make no

34 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

disclosure of names. He knew what he stated to be true,
— that the fire-eaters were going to fire on Sumter.

He requested Mrs. Douglas to remain in the carriage.
As we ascended the steps of the old State Department,
he said he was going to see Seward because I advised it,
and because there was no other course, for he was a part
of the Administration, but it was unfortunate for the coun-
try that he was so, because Seward did not realize the ca-
lamities that were before us, and deceived himself with the
belief he had influence at the South when he had none.

Mr. Seward received us cordially, heard the statement
of Mr. Douglas calmly, took a pinch of snuff, said he would
see the President on the subject. He knew there were wild
and reckless men at Charleston and we should have dif-
ficulty with them, but he knew of no way to prevent an
assault if they were resolved to make one.

Douglas told me subsequently he was not disappointed
at the interview. Seward, he said, was not earnest, had no
heart in this matter, could not believe the storm was be-
yond his ability and power to control, but he would soon
enough learn that no mere party management or cunning
would answer in such an emergency as this. Alluding to
his hesitancy in going to Seward, he said he knew it was
useless to make any appeal to him. Seward had no idea of
the necessities of the case, and was, at that moment, as he,
Douglas, knew, carrying on an intrigue with the Rebel
leaders, who were deceiving him, whilst he flattered him-
self that he was using and could control them.

Douglas said he had witnessed what had been going on
for months without being able to do anything effectively,
for he found himself in the confidence of neither party.
He had tried to rally the Democracy, but the party was
broken up. Slidell, Cobb, Breckenridge, and others were
determined to break up the Union also. He could do
nothing with them; others, like myself, had taken the
opposite course, and got mixed up with old Whigs, and he
had as little influence with us. Buchanan was feeble and

DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 35

incompetent. The great point with him and his Cabinet
since the election had been to drift over the fourth of
March. Seward had thought that he could then take the
reins and manage things as he pleased, had all along treated
this mighty gathering tempest as a mere party contest,
which he and Thurlow Weed could dispose of as easily as
some of their political strifes in New York.

When he spoke to me it was, he said, with a vague hope
or idea that Mr. Lincoln might be induced to act independ-
ent of Seward. He had thought of seeing me and having
a confidential conversation for some time, and ought to
have done so, but it had been postponed till the Sumter
news gave him a start, and it was then too late. When I
invited him to go to Seward, the man he wished to avoid, —
for he considered Seward's mistaken notions, unintentional
errors, refined party management, as calamitous as the
open treason of Rhett, or Toombs, or Jefferson Davis, —
my invitation and remarks awakened him to the actual
facts, — that Seward was a part of the Government, and
that nothing could be done without him. He had little
expectation that anything could be accomplished with
him. He had not, Douglas thought, risen to the occasion,
nor was he adapted to the times before us.

In detaching the Powhatan from the Sumter expedition
and giving the command to Porter, Mr. Seward extricated
that officer from Secession influences, and committed him
at once, and decisively, to the Union cause. My own im-
pression is that he would have come into that channel as
the difficulties progressed, for his energetic, restless, and
aspiring nature would not have permitted him to occupy
a neutral or passive position, and I never have believed that
when the trial test reached him, he would have proved re-
creant to the flag, whatever were his personal attachments
to, and friendships for, the Rebel leaders. As a lieutenant
he was entitled to no such command as the Powhatan,
a fact of which Mr. Seward, who had little knowledge of

36 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

details, was ignorant, but the trust flattered and gratified
the ambition of Porter. Finding himself taken into the
confidence of the President and Secretary of State, and
perceiving that in the matter before them the Secretary
giving orders was acting as principal, he presumed to go
farther, and was prompted by his audacity to present
his friend Barren, between whom and himself there was
a common sympathy, for a commanding position in the
Navy Department.

Mr. Seward, who, with all his shrewdness and talent, was
sometimes the victim of his own vanity and conceit, was
flattered by Porter's suggestion that he could give Barren
a position; it showed that he was considered by Porter, and
he hoped by others, the premier, the controlling mind of
the Administration, and it was a wish to confirm this
impression, rather than sympathy with any Secession views
of Barren, which led him into the otherwise unwarrantable
and inexcusable step that was taken.

President Lincoln believed the attempt to thrust Barren
on the Navy Department was the fault of Porter rather
than Seward, and he never thereafter reposed full confidence
in Porter, though not insensible to his professional ability.
Often during the four eventful years which followed, when
from time to time I availed myself of Porter's qualities
and gave him commands and promotion, the President
expressed his gratification that I retained no resentment,
but sacrificed personal wrongs and injustice for the good
of the country.

In about two weeks from the time when I was instructed
to take Barren into my confidence, he deserted the Govern-
ment, went to Richmond, received a commission in the
Rebel service, and was taken prisoner in the August fol-
lowing, when Fort Hatteras was captured by Rear-Ad-
miral Stringham, whom he was to have displaced. He was
the first of the faithless naval officers who abandoned the
Government and took up arms against it that was made
prisoner, and, singularly enough, surrendered his sword to

PORTER AND BARRON 37

the man whom he was, by Porter's arrangement or Seward's
order, to have superseded. Whether Porter was prompted
by any of his Rebel associates to intrigue for Barron, or
whether they concerted with him to that end, I never as-
certained. The facts will probably never be known. There
is no doubt that Mr. Seward was in communication with
the Rebel leaders, or some of them; not that he was im-
plicated in, or a party to, their rebellious schemes, but he
tampered with them, felt confident, as Douglas stated, that
when he obtained power he could shape events and control
them. He overrated his own powers always, and under-
estimated others. When he was sworn in to the office of
Secretary, he expected and intended to occupy the place
of premier, and undoubtedly supposed he could direct the
Administration in every Department. Mr. Lincoln had, he
knew, little administrative experience. Mr. Seward, there-
fore, kindly and as a matter of course, assumed that he was
to be the master mind of the Government. But whilst he
always had the regards and friendly wishes of Mr. Lincoln,
to whom he made himself useful, and who was impressed
with the belief that his Secretary of State had shrewdness,
knowledge, political experience, and capability far greater
than he actually possessed, the President in a gentle man-
ner gradually let it be understood that Abraham Lincoln
was chief. The incidents which I have detailed — the de-
tachment of the Powhatan, the irregular command given to
Porter — were improper proceedings which the President
soon comprehended, and the order in relation to Barron
convinced him that he must not give implicit trust to
any one, but depend on his own judgment in matters of
importance.

The supervising control which Mr. Seward at the com-
mencement undertook to assume over all the Depart-
ments except that of the Treasury, and the Treasury to
an extent, was checked, so far as the Navy Department
was concerned; yet, without informing himself of usage,
or international, or statute laws, he frequently involved

38 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

the Government in difficulty by inconsistently surrender-
ing national rights. Mr. Cameron sometimes complained
of interference with the War Department and army mat-
ters by the Secretary of State, and on one occasion, when
the latter was commending Meigs, as he often did, for great
ability, Cameron proposed to transfer that officer to the
State Department, where his talents were most used and
highest appreciated.

The extraordinary powers and authority with which
Captain Meigs and Lieutenant Porter were invested in the
spring of 1861 would have alarmed the country and weak-
ened the public confidence in the administrative capacity
of the Executive had the facts been known. Mr. Aspin-
wall and other gentlemen informed me that when Cap-
tain Meigs applied to them for assistance and submitted
the letters of the President and Secretary of State, cloth-
ing him and Porter with unlimited authority over the mili-
tary and naval service, — confessedly without the know-
ledge of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy,
— they were alarmed for the safety and welfare of the
Government. It betrayed weakness in the executive head.
Much had been said and was then uttered by partisans
of the incompetency of Mr. Lincoln and his unfitness. He
had not been tried, and the period was portentous. But,
whatever doubts existed in regard to Mr. Lincoln, they
had been in a great measure dispelled when his Cabinet
was appointed. Apprehension, however, revived on the
arrival of Meigs and Porter in New York, and when their
powers were made known. Such as saw those documents —
and amongst them was Mr. Aspinwall — were astonished
and almost in despair. At the best it was misgovernment
and indicated want of confidence, of unity, of energy, and
of proper administrative ability at Washington. They
were disposed to impute the strange orders and carte blanche
to the sub-officers as a blunder or mistake of the President,
who was taking to himself departmental duties, and issu-
ing direct to officers and subordinates commands and

MEIGS AND PORTER'S CARTE BLANCHE 39

instructions instead of passing them through the legitimate
channels; but the name of Mr. Seward appeared on most
of the papers, showing that he was cognizant of and recom-
mended what was doing. One gentleman, more sagacious
than the rest, in conversation with me some months later,
imputed the whole to a contrivance of Mr. Seward, and
the only unaccountable thing to him was the non-appear-
ance of Thurlow Weed in the affair.

There is no doubt that the President was induced to
take whatever steps he did, knowingly, in the matters
referred to, through the instrumentality and by the advice
of Mr. Seward, but he was not knowing to some of the
important matters herein stated, and as soon as he was
made acquainted with them, he at once disavowed and
annulled them. It was a misfortune of Mr. Seward, and
one of his characteristics, that he delighted in oblique and
indirect movements; he also prided himself in his skill and
management, had a craving desire that the world should
consider him the great and controlling mind of his party,
of the Administration, and of the country. He was in-
tensely anxious to control and direct the War and Navy
movements, although he had neither the knowledge nor
aptitude that was essential for either.

For more than a month after his inauguration President
Lincoln indulged the hope, I may say felt a strong con-
fidence, that Virginia would not, when the decisive stand
had finally to be taken, secede, but adhere to the Union.
There were among her politicians some able and influential
men who favored the Nullification or Secession party,
disciples of Calhoun, but it was notorious that a great
majority of the people were opposed to all disunion senti-
ments. These last, though vastly more numerous than
the fire-eaters, were passive and calm in their movements,
while the Secession element was positive, violent, and
active. As is usually the case, the energetic and factious
element seized the reins of power, while the more deliberate

40 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

were submissive, hesitating and hoping that extreme
measures might be avoided.

That there should be no cause of offense, no step that
would precipitate or justify secession, the President, al-
most daily, enjoined forbearance from all unnecessary
exercise of political party authority. It was, he believed,
important that the Administration should exert its power
to conciliate the people and strengthen their attachment
to the Government. Whether, in the excited and disturbed
condition of the country, when frantic sectional appeals
were made in the cause of treason and disunion, the policy
pursued was the best, may be a question. Probably a more
energetic and decisive course would have been adopted,
had events culminated at a later period; but the Admin-
istration was just entering upon its duties, and was met at
the threshold by an organized and powerful party oppo-
sition, at the very time it was encountering and struggling
with the Secessionists and before it was possessed of and
could fully exercise its rightful authority.

The traffic in slaves was great in Virginia, and embodied
more capital than any other product of the State. The
traders who were engaged in this nefarious business were
reckless and unprincipled men. Nevertheless, wealth even
in their hands had its influence, and, coupled with daring
and violence, became irresistible. Slaves were the great
staple of the State; their sale brought annually a greater
return of money to the State than tobacco or any other
product, perhaps than all others; their bondsmen found
a market in the States of the South, and nowhere else in
Christendom. It was natural, and to be expected, that all
the ferocious and brutal instincts of the slave-trader should
be in opposition to the Administration, and to those States
which would not tolerate slavery within their borders. A
heavy hand, could it have been placed on these wretches
who advocated treason and urged disunion, thronged Rich-
mond, and spent of their ill-gotten wealth profusely to
promote secession, would have been better than attempts at

NORFOLK NAVY YARD IN DANGER 41

conciliation. The times were revolutionary, and the gentle
and persuasive arguments and measures of the Admin-
istration were treated as cowardly, while the violent and
denunciatory anathemas and avowed hate of the Yankees
by the slave-traders, captivated the idle, the vicious, and
adventurers, and bore away those with whom they came
in contact.

Norfolk was the principal commercial port of the State,
and sentiment there gave tone and opinion to lower Vir-
ginia. The navy yard at Norfolk afforded employment
to many, and the government patronage in party times
had been supposed important. Aware of this, the Pre-
sident early made special request that no important or
extensive changes should be made in the navy yard at
present, or without consulting him. I soon became satisfied
that the large amount of public property there was in a
precarious condition. As a preventive, or matter of cau-
tion, it seemed to me advisable that a military force should
be placed there to protect the yard, and to serve as a rally-
ing point for Union men in case of emergency. But Gen-
eral Scott, to whom I applied for troops, said he had none
to spare, that he had not sufficient force to guard the
Capitol or to garrison Fortress Monroe and Harper's
Ferry, which were endangered, and that Norfolk was
wholly indefensible. When, after two or three interviews
with him, I appealed to the President, he not only con-;
curred with General Scott, but thought it would be inex-[
pedient and would tend to irritate and promote a conflict,
were a military force to be sent to Norfolk. Any extraor-
dinary efforts to repair the ships with a view of removing
them and the public property would, in his opinion, ex-
hibit a want of confidence and betray apprehensions that
should be avoided.

I had as early as the 14th of March ordered the Pocahon-
tas, one of the Home Squadron, which arrived in Hampton
Roads, to proceed to Norfolk. This was no unusual order,
and could create no apprehension or distrust.

42 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

The frigate Cumberland, the flagship of Commodore
Pendergrast, commanding the West Indian and Gulf
Squadron, arrived in Hampton Roads on the 23d of March,
where she was purposely detained, and on the 29th of
March I gave orders for her to proceed up Elizabeth River
to the navy yard and take the place of the Pocahontas,
ordered to join the Sumter expedition.

There were several old-class ships, some of them valu-
able but dismantled, laid up, which would require a good
deal of time and labor to be put in a condition to be removed.
The Merrimac, the most valuable vessel at the yard, was
wholly dismantled, but the Germantown, the Plymouth,
and the Dolphin, all sailing-vessels, could soon and with
very little difficulty be got ready for removal or for service.
We had, however, few or no seamen to man them, nor
could we procure them at Norfolk, but were compelled to
enlist and order them from New York or one of the North-
ern yards. Notwithstanding the sensitive feeling that
existed on the part of the people of Virginia, as well as of
the Government, I felt that we might with propriety order
a sufficient force there to man at least two of the smaller
vessels without creating alarm, as it would be legitimate
in the ordinary course of things. The Plymouth was de-
signated as the practice ship for the midshipmen, and the
Germantown was nearly ready for her armament and crew.
No exception could be taken to orders to man them. If the
seamen reached Norfolk, and an exigency should arise
rendering it expedient to move the Merrimac, they could
be made available for that purpose. The Powhatan had
just reached New York and was ordered out of commis-
sion, but those of her crew whose time had not expired
could be made available for valuable service at Norfolk,
and such was the first intention of the Department, but
important events for the relief of Fort Sumter rendered it
necessary to detain the seamen on the Powhatan for the
Sumter expedition, and to add to them the recruits from
the receiving-ship. These orders took almost all the re-

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 43

cruits who were intended for Norfolk, as soon as two hun-
dred and fifty were enlisted. Orders were given to Paymas-
ter Etting to proceed to New York and charter a vessel to
take the men to Norfolk, and also to Commander Rowan,
but the orders could not be fulfilled. The order for two
hundred men was sent to Brooklyn on the llth of April.

The fidelity and patriotism of Commodore McCauley,
who was in command of the yard, were questioned by no
one, and his reputation as a good and faithful officer all
admitted (though not particularly efficient). I had not
seen him for several years, but the inquiries which I made
in regard to him were satisfactorily answered. Subsequent
events proved him faithful but feeble and incompetent for
the crisis. His energy and decision had left him, and, what-
ever skill or ability he may have had in earlier years in
regular routine duty, he proved unequal in almost every
respect to the present occasion. He made no report or
suggestion to me of disaffection or doubt on the part of any
officer, and in answer to inquiries which I made of him as
to the time which would be necessary to put the engines or
machinery of the Merrimac in order, so that she could be
moved, he sent me word that it would require at least a
month. On receiving this answer, I became apprehensive
that I could not depend upon him if the emergency should
demand prompt action, and I at once directed the en-
gineer-in-chief, Mr. Isherwood, to proceed, with whatever
assistance he needed, to Norfolk, and, without creating a
sensation, but in a quiet manner, to put the machinery in
working condition with the least possible delay. To do
this, he was directed to call to his assistance whatever force
was necessary, and to work without cessation day and night
until it was accomplished. Instead of a month, the work
was completed within less than four days.

On the llth of April, I issued orders to Commander Al-
den, then in Washington, to proceed to Norfolk and report
to Commodore McCauley to take charge of the Merrimac
and deliver her over to the commanding officer of the

44 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Philadelphia station. Many of the instructions in those
days were given orally, for what became a matter of record
was too often, in some mysterious way, made known to the
insurgents. No more than was absolutely necessary was
put upon paper for any of the officers who were sent to
Norfolk.

Engineer Isherwood had the machinery in working order
by the 16th, and Commodore McCauley wrote me on
that day that the Merrimac would be ready for service by
the following evening, the 17th. Chief Engineer Isher-
wood returned and reported to me on the 18th that Com-
modore McCauley had defeated the plans and purposes of
the Department; that he would not permit the Merrimac
to leave; was, he thought, under the influence of liquor and
bad men. In company with the President, I saw General
Scott again the following day, when he repeated the same
opinions, but on the 19th [sic] he promised that General
Delafield or a good engineer should be detailed who would
cause some defenses to be thrown up.

My impressions are that Commander Alden called and
made report on the same day with Mr. Isherwood, but he
states it was on the 19th and that he returned to Norfolk
on the same evening on the Pawnee under Commodore
Paulding. Alden was timid, but patriotic when there was
no danger, for he was not endowed with great moral or
physical courage, yet believed himself possessed of both,
and was no doubt really anxious to do something without
encountering enemies or taking upon himself much re-
sponsibility. At Norfolk all his heroic drawing-room reso-
lution and good intentions failed him. He had not the
audacity nor the moral courage to meet his professional
brethren who had those qualities and were determined to
sustain the Secession cause. A man of energy and greater
will and force, with the orders of the Secretary, would
have inspired and influenced McCauley, whose heart was
right, and carried out these orders.

While in Cabinet-meeting, I was called out by Com-

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 45

mander Alden, who informed me, with emotion which he
could not entirely suppress, that Commodore McCauley
had refused to let him have the Merrimac, that after the
fires had been kindled they had been drawn by the Com-
modore's command, that the vessel was at the wharf, and
that the deportment and remarks of some of the younger
officers left no doubt in his mind that they had control of
the Commodore and of the yard. The old man, he said,
seemed stupefied, bewildered, and wholly unable to act.
Instead of inspiring the well-intentioned but infirm old
man, Alden had struck away from the yard and had im-
mediately returned to report to the Department. I took
him forthwith to the President, and the Cabinet, which
was then in session, when he related what had occurred.

At the consultation which took place as soon as he with-
drew, I advised that immediate steps should be taken for
the defense of the navy yard, stated the large amount of
public property there, in ships, material, ordnance, ma-
chinery, tools, and stores of every description, the neces-
sity, in a naval and military point of view, of retaining
possession of the yard, and the disastrous consequences
to the Government of permitting such a station to be
wrested from its possession, or of abandoning it to the
insurgents. The President and Cabinet concurred in these
views, and when I informed them of the opposition of
General Scott to sending a military force to protect the
yard, it was thought advisable that the President and
myself should see him on the subject.

I went from the Executive Mansion to military head-
quarters and saw General Scott, to whom I communicated
the condition of affairs and the necessity of a military
force without delay at Norfolk. But the General was still
decisive and emphatic against sending troops to defend
the place, said it was an impossibility to furnish the troops,
or to defend the navy yard if we had them; that any
force he could send there would certainly be captured;
the Navy and marines might, if on shipboard, escape, but

46 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

the troops could not; repeating continually it was enemy's
country. All this and more he repeated to the President
and myself at the interview, but he finally consented that a
battalion of Massachusetts volunteers, which he supposed
might be at Fortress Monroe, from information just re-
ceived, should accompany an expedition under Commo-
dore Paulding, to withdraw the vessels and as much of
the public property as could be secured, and that he would
send Colonel Delafield — subsequently Captain Wright,
an intelligent officer, instead of Delafield — with them.

I had previously, on the 16th, after hearing from Com-
modore McCauley that a month was required to put
the Merrimac in condition to be removed, dispatched
Commodore Paulding, who was then attached to the De-
partment as detailing officer, to Norfolk, to inquire into
and inform himself of the actual state of things at the yard,
the reliability of officers and men, and to satisfy himself
fully in regard to Commodore McCauley. If he had any
doubts of the safety of the yard after examination, he was
to advise me, and was to act for me in all particulars, pro-
vided danger was imminent, having plenary powers for the
purpose. On the morning of the 18th, Commodore Pauld-
ing unexpectedly returned and made a satisfactory verbal
report or statement concerning Commodores McCauley
and Pendergrast and the condition of the yard. Some of
the younger officers, who belonged in Virginia or the South,
had expressed a wish to be relieved from duty at the yard
in anticipation of difficulty with the insurgents, among
whom were their kinsmen and neighbors, with whom they
preferred not to come in collision; but all were, he said,
patriotic, deprecated hostility, and were governed by
honorable motives. Commodore McCauley he indorsed as
faithful, competent, and to be trusted. He was seconded
by Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the Home
Squadron, who had arrived in Hampton Roads a few
days previous with his flagship, the Cumberland, and had
orders to proceed with the frigate up the Elizabeth River

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 47

to the vicinity of the navy yard. Commodore Pendergrast
said he had consulted freely and fully with both those of-
ficers, had made some suggestions and assented to others
made by them, and was so well satisfied that the workmen
were reliable and that the public property was in good
and trustworthy hands, that he thought it unnecessary he
should remain, but that it was best he should return to
Washington and make report in person. Although this
report was more favorable than I had expected, I greatly
regretted he did not remain and act for the Department,
and so informed him. I also blamed myself for not having
given him explicit written orders to that effect.1

My preliminary orders and inquiries were oral and not
matters of record; my first written orders were on the 29th
of March; Virginia did not pass the ordinance of secession
until the 17th April. Until then it was hoped and believed
by many, including the President and Secretary of State,
that Virginia would not secede.

It will be borne in mind that Congress, which had just
adjourned, put forth no preparation for the coming crisis,
had made no extra appropriations, had not authorized the
enlistment of any additional seamen; almost all our naval
force was abroad; most of the small Home Squadron was
in the Gulf or West Indies, nearly as remote and inaccess-
ible as the European Squadron; and the whole available
force north of the Chesapeake had been dispatched to the

1 [Mr. Welles in his manuscript here cited such orders and portions of
the correspondence as became a matter of record: —

"See Order of March 29th to Pendergrast to proceed with Cumberland
to Norfolk.

"Order to Breese 31st of March for seamen — also order of llth April
for seamen.

'Order of llth April to Alden.

'Orders of llth April to McCauley to prepare the Merrimac and Ply-
mouth.

'Orders of llth April to Isherwood to proceed to Norfolk.

'Letter 16th April to McCauley.

' McCauley's letter of 16th April to me.

'Order to Paulding of 18th April.

'Isherwood's report 18th April."]

48 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

relief of Fort Sumter and secretly and surreptitiously,
without the knowledge of the Navy Department, sent to
Fort Pickens. Without men, without funds, without legis-
lative authority, without advice, suggestion, or intimation
of any kind from Congress, from the Senators on the
Naval Committee, who remained in Washington through
the month of March, while rebellion was gathering
strength, the Secretary was compelled to take the whole
responsibility and to act in that great emergency. Fore-
most among the men who had defied the South and treated
with scorn and derision the secession theory and move-
ment, was Senator John P. Hale, Chairman of the Naval
Committee of the Senate: one of the first to flee from Wash-
ington, when the storm which had gathered was about to
burst, was the same distinguished Senator. When, how-
ever, Congress convened in special session in July, and
Washington was garrisoned and shielded by a large army,
this burning and eloquent patriot returned, and, over-
flowing with courage, was moved in the exuberance of his
zeal to introduce a resolution to inquire into the circum-
stances attending the destruction of the property of the
United States at the navy yard at Norfolk, and espe-
cially if there was any default on the part of any officer.
Pensacola and Harper's Ferry were included in the inquiry,
but the virtuous indignation of the Chairman of the Naval
Committee was chiefly exercised and wholly exhausted in
regard to Norfolk. His wrath was less against the Rebels
than somebody else, he did not care to mention whom.
When notified by Mr. Hale that his committee was in ses-
sion, that certain information was wanted by them, and I
was told in a patronizing way that any explanation by way
of justification of the Department would be received, I
directed that the whole transactions in relation to Norfolk
should be thrown open for his examination, that, so far as
the Department could furnish them, answers should be
given to all specific inquiries, and that every facility should
be extended to the Committee; but for myself I declined

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 49

any appearance or explanation. My time, I assured the
honorable chairman, was too much occupied in attending
to necessary public duties to detail narratives or enter
into explanations that were personal. It was my intention
they should have all the facts, and I wished them fully
and fairly reported, but I certainly should volunteer no
attendance.

In his report as Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Hale
manifests his patriotic fervor, military skill, and intelli-
gence, and all the candor and fairness within him. There
was a wide difference between him and General Scott in
regard to the defense of Norfolk, for while the old hero said
no troops could be had, and insisted that the yard could
not be defended, that the place was without fortifications
or defenses of any kind, that troops placed there would
inevitably be captured, the chairman of the committee of
investigation, Mr. John P. Hale, represented otherwise,
and asserted in his report that " Cap tain McCauley was
abundantly able to defend the yard," which was " encom-
passed on two sides by a wall ten or twelve feet high, and
eighteen inches thick," that there was an available force
of at least one hundred and fifty marines and sailors with
two howitzers "and the crew of the Cumberland of three
hundred and fifty men."

The report enumerates other means also, none of which
appear to have convinced General Scott, or either of
the three commodores who were there with full powers,
and who commanded the forces and were entrusted with
the defense. There is this difference between the military
and naval officers on one side, and the Senatorial Commit-
tee on the other: the naval and military gentlemen were
compelled to take the responsibility and act promptly
according to their best judgment in the line of their profes-
sion, and the performance of duty to which they had been
trained. They may have erred in some respects; it would
be strange if they did not under the extraordinary circum-
stances of the case. Mr. Hale had no responsibility, was

50 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

embarrassed by no military or naval teaching, was beyond
danger, and made his report, criticizing and condemn-
ing their conduct, twelve months after the event took
place.

Mr. Horace Greeley, in his " American Conflict," eluci-
dates and illuminates the report of Mr. Hale, which he
assumes to be non-partisan and correct, by saying "Capt.
Paulding might have held his position a week, and that
week would have brought at least 30,000 men to his aid."
Not thirty thousand men reached imperiled Washington
hi one week, in response to the call of the President by
proclamation, aided by all the State authorities, and of-
ficial and individual effort, zeal, and influence; and such
as came in obedience to that national call were indifferently
provided with arms, munitions, and supplies, backed
though they were by the Federal and State governments.
If the historian is to be believed, a larger army would
have gathered on an appeal from the Commodore to save
the navy yard, than came to defend the National Capital
on the official call of the President. What thirty thousand
men could have done, had they gathered at Norfolk in a
week, towards defending a place in the enemy's country,
without batteries or shore defenses of any kind, without
engineers to construct them, without resources, with no
commissariat or quartermaster's supplies, are matters not
clearly explained in the " American Conflict." It is doubted
if Mr. Greeley could have got that number of men at Nor-
folk, to say nothing of their equipment and supplies, when
the President, with all the power and energies of the
country, gathered no such number in that brief tune at
Washington to defend the capital of the nation.

In closing his chapter on "the national disgrace at Nor-
folk," in his "American Conflict," Mr. Greeley, who read-
ily, oracularly, and dogmatically, without investigation,
adopted the statements of the factious, partisan, untruth-
ful, unjust, and iniquitous report of Mr. Hale, says:
"Thus ended the most shameful, cowardly, disastrous

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 51

performance that stains the annals of the American Navy."
Such is contemporary history.

In the light of subsequent events the performance may
be condemned. It was certainly unfortunate and disas-
trous. There were feebleness and incapacity in McCauley,
and treachery and infidelity on the part of some, in fact
most, of his subordinates, — matters shameful indeed,
but I am aware of no evidence of cowardice, even in the
pusillanimous commander. He and his associates were
astounded by the defection of Virginia, and overwhelmed
with the magnitude of the rebellion, for which Mr. Sena-
tor Hale had, neither in Congress nor out of it, suggested
preparations, and Congress had made but feeble or no pro-
vision. Mr. Greeley had in his organ, the Tribune, said if
the States wished to secede, let them go. Until the storm
burst, Congress had not believed that the overthrow of the
government or a division of the Union was intended, nor
could the members realize that such a tornado was then
upon them. At the commencement they would not be
aggressive; they hesitated to be the first to imbrue their
hands in the blood of their countrymen. Mr. John P. Hale
and Mr. Horace Greeley might have done differently from
those officers and saved the navy yard and public property
at Norfolk by tactics of their own, when military and naval
men could not.

The misfortune was bad enough when truly and fairly
stated, but aggravated by the misrepresentations and ex-
aggerations of reckless and unscrupulous men in Congress,
like Hale, and by the partisan fictions and imaginary de-
lusions of journalists such as Greeley, great injustice was
done to officers of courage and undoubted patriotism, as well
as to the Department and Administration. It is easy to
be seen that had a younger and more vigorous officer than
McCauley been hi command of the yard, or a more daring
and energetic officer than Alden sent there, a different
course might and probably would have been adopted, and
some of the vessels and public property been saved. But

52 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

at the time no officer in the service had a more unexcep-
tionable record than McCauley. Not a word, not a sus-
picion, was breathed of any want of ability, courage, or
fidelity in that officer. Nor was there any want of con-
fidence in Paulding, or Pendergrast, who were younger and
more vigorous men, nor were the heroic and gallant juniors
who participated with them in that disastrous performance
destitute of true heroism or devoted patriotism. In scut-
tling the ships, McCauley and Pendergrast committed a
lamentable mistake. They were deceived without doubt,
and in that terrible crisis were not equal to the emergency.
They were not partisan politicians, and could not believe
that so wanton, causeless, and extensive a conspiracy ex-
isted; and when the crisis came, they were confounded and
not prepared to act. When they did act, it was in bewil-
derment and error. Whether different officers would have
had better success cannot be known. They might have
rescued the Merrimac and some other vessels, though that
is uncertain, for the Rebels had been long preparing for the
event, and were the positive element; the Union men were
passive. The Rebels were resolute and acted on the offens-
ive; our officers were incredulous and on the defensive.
They were anxious to strike and fight, while the others
merely deprecated and repelled.

When Greeley says that one week would have brought
thirty thousand men to Norfolk to aid Commodore Pauld-
ing, he betrays weakness and his unfitness as a historian.
General Scott knew better. He would have sent no thirty
thousand troops there, had the men been in Washington.
What could thirty thousand undisciplined, unofficered men
have accomplished, but their own destruction? Like the
heedless and senseless cry from the same vicious source,
"On to Richmond," the assertion that Norfolk could have
rallied to its defense thirty thousand men is the essence of
partisan folly.

Senator Hale, who hurried to introduce a resolution to
investigate and report in July, 1861, but delayed and lin-

NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 53

gered in communicating his invidious and unjust document
until April, 1862, had an object in his movement. He
desired to embarrass and assail the Navy Department, of
which he was the Senatorial organ, and to which he should
have given his earnest, honest, and zealous support. No-
thing would have afforded him higher gratification than
to have found the Secretary, who had mildly dispensed
with his proffered agency, remiss and delinquent, and it
would have delighted him had I subjected myself to his
criticism and rebuke, or attempted to defend or explain
to him and his committee the proceedings and errors of
naval officers. I neither sought nor shunned him. The
records of the Department were thrown open to him, and
they were a defense and justification. He slurs over the
orders, oral and written, in March and early April, preced-
ing the occurrence, and says the first steps taken for the
defense of Norfolk were on the 10th of April, thirty-seven
days after the inauguration. Were that the fact, it would
not have been, under the circumstances, when Congress
had been delinquent, tardy action. But I had on the 29th
of March changed the destination of the frigate Cumber-
land, which, by special direction of the President, on re-
quest of the Secretary of State, was about proceeding to
the Gulf, and ordered her from Hampton Roads to Norfolk
to check disorderly proceedings, should any appear. In
repeated verbal applications to General Scott for a mili-
tary force in the months of March and April, as a precau-
tionary measure, I met a refusal, on the ground of military
necessity and inability to comply. He had not, he said,
troops to defend Harper's Ferry, a military station, which
was actually captured by the Rebels simultaneously with
the destruction of Norfolk. As there was not a soldier to
defend the place and we had no sailors to man the vessels,
I sent, on the 31st of March, to New York, general and
special orders for two hundred and fifty men to be dis-
patched to Norfolk, and, if there were not that number on
hand, to enlist and forward them as soon as possible. All

54 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

the steamers, and almost the whole limited naval force in
all the Atlantic ports, had been sent to the relief of Forts
Sumter and Pickens.

These facts were well known to Senator Hale, Chairman
of the Naval Committee of the Senate and of the special
committee to investigate the destruction of property at
Norfolk, — many of them, and others, were not matters
of record, — but he was careful to suppress and make no
allusion to them; some that were mentioned were greatly
perverted and distorted. The report was his own. Sena-
tor Grimes, who was associated with him on the commit-
tee, took especial pains on more than one occasion to as-
sure me that he had no hand in drawing it up, that he never
gave it his approval, and I think he said he never read it
until after it was presented to the Senate and published.
I should have been better pleased had he made this state-
ment and disclaimer publicly and in open Senate. But I
would not ask it.

I knew I had done my duty faithfully, honestly, and as
well as I knew how. I knew that the President, to whom
I was immediately accountable, approved of my course,
and was fully satisfied with it. Congress, under all the mis-
representations and intrigues of the malcontents, while re-
gretting in common with the Administration and the whole
country the loss of the navy yard and property, were
convinced that the Department acquitted itself faithfully
and well.

I was introduced to Mr. Stanton by President Lincoln
at the Executive Mansion in January, 1862. It was at the
first Cabinet-meeting which he attended after receiving
the appointment of Secretary of War. I had not previously
met him, although I had then been ten months in Mr. Lin-
coln's Cabinet. The period was trying; true and patriotic
friends had come forward to encourage us, but Mr. Stan-
ton, who was a resident of Washington, avoided the Presi-
dent and most of his Cabinet. The times were such as to

STANTON BEFORE HIS APPOINTMENT 55

interrupt social intercourse in the District between Union-
ists and Secessionists, and the lines between them were
marked. Old associations were broken up, and it was dif-
ficult to form new ones, even when persons had leisure,
which members of the Administration had not. A major-
ity of the resident population, and particularly of those
who formed the resident elite of society, were Secessionists,
or in sympathy with Secessionists. A feeling of bitterness
pervaded the whole community, and the members of the
Court Circle, which had been in the fashionable ascendant
during the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, did
not conceal their dislike, detestation, and hate of the Black
Republicans, intensified among the masses in the District.
Mr. Stanton had not been counted as a Republican, al-
though there was an impression he had, as a member of
Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, approved the policy of that ad-
ministration hi the winter of 1861, and acted with Dix and
Holt. This impression did not obtain with Mr. Black1
and the intimate friends and supporters of Buchanan.

Although not fond of the gayeties and parties of Wash-
ington, he could at times make himself companionable
and entertaining; but from the day he left Mr. Buchanan's
Cabinet until he entered that of Mr. Lincoln, he mingled
little in society, and none with the men in authority. It
was represented that he eschewed the new administra-
tion, ridiculed the President, and freely expressed his
opposition to the measures adopted and course pursued
by the Government. The Secessionists distrusted him, and
neither of the parties confided in him in the early days of
the War. The Administration did not consider him one
of its supporters, though he was on friendly terms with
Seward. He had the reputation of being an Anti-Secession
Democrat, who nevertheless wished to preserve his rela-
tionship with the Democratic Party, and as having no
fellowship with Republicans.

1 Jeremiah S. Black, first Attorney-General, then Secretary of State, In
Buchanan's Cabinet.

56 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

When the appointment of District Attorney for Wash-
ington was under consideration in the spring of 1861, Mr.
Stanton and Mr. Carrington were the rival candidates.
Some diversity of opinion was entertained by the members
of the Cabinet in regard to them. Mr. Seward earnestly
pressed Mr. Stanton, vouched for his loyal sentiments, and
claimed that he had in a confidential way rendered great
service to the Union cause while in Mr. Buchanan's Cabi-
net. Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General, desired the appoint-
ment of Mr. Carrington, who was, I believe, not only an
intimate friend, but kinsman. Himself a man of courteous
manners, Mr. Bates could not, he thought, have the unre-
served freedom with or repose the same confidence in Mr.
Stanton that he could in Mr. Carrington, and the times
were such that there should be implicit confidence between
the Attorney-General and the District Attorney in the
discharge of their frequently delicate and always highly
responsible duties.

The subject was several times before the Cabinet, but
as I knew neither of the gentlemen personally, I expressed
no opinion, for I had none in regard to either. Mr. Chase
seconded the views of Mr. Seward for Stanton, but no
other one interested himself in the case, or seemed disposed
to interfere in the question. At length the President de-
clared the subject must be disposed of, and wished each
one present to communicate whatever knowledge he pos-
sessed of either. He appealed particularly to Mr. Blair,
who resided in Washington, was a member of the bar, and
knew both the gentlemen well.

Mr. Blair said that he had not for that reason wished to
say much, but thus called upon he should speak the truth.
In point of ability, he said, Mr. Stanton was undoubtedly
the superior of Mr. Carrington. He doubted, however,
Stanton's integrity, and stated a damaging fact which was
within his own personal knowledge, but which it is not
necessary here to repeat. The statement astonished the
President and disconcerted both Seward and Chase, each

STANTON MADE SECRETARY OF WAR 57

of whom questioned whether there might not be some mis-
take in this matter, but Blair said there could be none, and
farther that he (Stanton) was a prote'ge' of Black, Buch-
anan's Secretary of State, and in feeling with him. The
President remarked he thought it judicious to conciliate
and draw in as much of the Democratic element as pos-
sible, and he was willing to try Stanton, though personally
he had no special reason to regard him favorably; but the
office came within the province of the Attorney-General,
and he would turn the question over to him. The Attor-
ney-General thanked the President, and said he would on
returning to his office send over the appointment of Mr.
Carrington.

From current rumors I was not very favorably impressed
in regard to Mr. Stanton. His remarks on the personal
appearance of the President were coarse, and his freely
expressed judgment on public measures unjust. He may
have felt chagrined at the preference of Carrington.

In the fall and winter of 1861, when murmurs began to
be heard against General McClellan, it was said, and I
suppose correctly, that Stanton was his friend and adviser.
Until appointed Secretary of War, there was no intimacy
between him and the members of the Administration,
with the exception of Mr. Seward. I have reason to know
that he was engaged with discontented and mischievous
persons in petty intrigues to impair confidence in the
Administration.

When it was determined that Mr. Cameron should re-
tire from the office of Secretary of War, — not wholly for
the reason that was given out, but for certain loose matters
of contracts, and because he had not the grasp, power,
energy, comprehension, and important qualities essential
to the administration of the War Department of that
period, to say nothing of his affiliation with Chase, — it was
a surprise, not only to the country but to every member
of the Administration but the Secretary of State, that
Stanton was selected. He was doubtless the choice of

58 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Mr. Seward, who influenced the President and secured the
appointment.

Seward and Stanton had been brought into fellowship
in the winter of 1861, when the latter was a member of
Buchanan's Cabinet, and confided to the former the opera-
tions and purposes of the Administration. It was this com-
munion between the two, who had been of opposing politics
and parties, — one at the time a member of the outgoing,
the other of the incoming Executive Council, — which led
to that political and personal intimacy which eventuated
in the induction of Stanton to the War Department. Mr.
Seward always looked upon Stanton as his protege", and
Stanton, who, with all his frankness, real and assumed, had,
towards his superiors in position or intellect, some of the
weaker qualities of a courtier, was studious to continue the
inpression that he was dependent upon and a follower of
the Secretary of State. It gratified Mr. Seward, who felt
his own consequence when a member of Buchanan's Cabi-
net sought the opportunity and gave him his confidence,
and gave Stanton an influence and hold upon his acknow-
ledged leader that remained during the whole of the lat-
ter's official career. . . .

Others claimed and have been given some portion of the
credit of Stanton's appointment, but it belonged exclus-
ively to Mr. Seward, and this Mr. Stanton well knew. It
has been stated that Mr. Cameron selected his successor,
and, to soften his exit from a position that he was reluctant
to leave, the change was permitted to assume that shape;
but Mr. Seward was the engineer and manager, and he it
was who selected Edwin M. Stanton to be Secretary of War.
There was reluctance on the part of the President to re-
move Mr. Cameron, and only a conviction of its absolute
necessity and the unauthorized assumption of executive
power in his Annual Report would have led the President
to take the step.

From the 4th of March, 1861, to the day he was selected,
a period of darkness and struggle for national existence,

STANTON SELECTED BY SEWARD 59

when the Rebels had the Government by the throat, and
true friends were wanted, no word of encouragement, no
outspoken support of the Administration, was heard, from
Mr. Stanton. He may in private interviews with Mr. Sew-
ard, or in incidental conversations with Mr. Chase, have
modified his expressions, but the Administration did not
know him as an open, fearless, outspoken friend. It has
been said that all the members of the Cabinet but Mr.
Blair heartily concurred in the appointment. No member
of the Cabinet was aware of his selection until after it was
determined upon, except Mr. Seward, and the machinery
of having Mr. Cameron name his successor was an after
arrangement. Then Mr. Chase was called in and consulted
on a predetermined question, but without a full knowledge
of all the facts, and no other member was advised in regard
to it.

Mr. Chase was peculiarly sensitive in matters where Mr.
Seward was operating, and, to preserve harmony, he was
led to believe that he was early consulted and one of the
original prune movers in effecting the change. He had,
however, known little of the retirement of Cameron, who
had at the beginning been attached to the State rather
than the Treasury Department, but latterly Cameron
leaned to Chase, who sought the association. Mr. Blair's
opinion of Stanton was well understood, and to have con-
sulted him when it was known he could not, with the facts
in his possession, give the selection his approval, would
have been trifling; and the other members of the Cabinet,
having little knowledge of and no intimacy with Stanton,
could furnish nothing to influence or guide the President.
He, therefore, deemed it best, after yielding to Seward's
urgent representations, to act without consulting a major-
ity of the Cabinet, who, he knew, could give him no light
on the subject. The course adopted soothed Mr. Blair,
gratified Mr. Chase, and, the scheme being one of Mr.
Seward's contrivance, he could not be otherwise than
satisfied.

60 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Mr. Black says that Stanton went into Buchanan's Cab-
inet under his auspices, and no one has ever questioned it.
He further asserts that Mr. Stanton "said, many times,
that he was there only that I [Black] might have two voices
instead of one," that "he would resign if I did." The
same professions and the same expressions were made by
the same individual to Mr. Seward when he entered the
Lincoln Cabinet, and subsequently, as I heard Mr. Seward
say; and I doubt not with equal sincerity to each, though
Black and Seward were entirely antagonistic in their
political views and principles.

When introduced to Mr. Stanton, I met him frankly,
friendly, and sincerely, as an associate and colleague with
whom I was to hold intimate personal and official relations
in a responsible position and in a trying period. There
was, however, no immediate cordiality between us, but
there was formal courtesy. I was at that time furiously
attacked by many newspapers and active partisans, as
well as by disappointed speculators and contractors, and
Mr. Stanton may have received unfavorable impressions
from them. I knew that he had been hi consultation with,
and given improper and hostile advice to, some of the dis-
affected. He was not, however, aware that I was possessed
of that information, and I am certain it did not influence
my action or deportment towards him.

The New Orleans expedition, which was far under way
when Stanton was appointed, but all knowledge of which
had been studiously withheld from the War Department
and all others, first brought us together. A force had been
gathered in the Gulf, ostensibly to attack Mobile or Gal-
veston, but really destined for the Mississippi. The latter
fact had not been communicated to the War Department,
because secrets could not then be kept but inevitably
leaked out, contractors became importunate, and the
Rebels often were forewarned. Shortly after Mr. Stanton's
appointment, Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
inadvertently and incautiously made known to General

THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS 61

Butler and to Mr. Stanton the great object which had
occupied the attention of the Navy Department for several
months. Mr. Stanton seized hold of the information with
avidity, and gave a hearty support to the movement — the
more acceptable because General McClellan, who had
known our object and was by express direction of President
Lincoln to cooperate with the Navy, appeared indifferent
and had little confidence in our success. Mr. Stanton also
united with us in the necessity of driving the Rebels from
the right banks of the Potomac, taking possession of their
batteries, and opening the river to uninterrupted naviga-
tion, a work in which General McClellan had frequently
disappointed us. The expectations and hopes that some-
thing effective might be done in opening the navigation of
that important avenue to Washington had been so delusive
that we united in requesting President Lincoln to issue his
celebrated order of the 27th of January for a forward move-
ment, which was ordered to take place on the 22d of Feb-
ruary. Such an order had been suggested, before Mr.
Stanton's appointment, by the Navy Department, which
had become wearied with the delays and tardy action of
the General-in-Chief.

These and other matters had brought the War and Navy
Departments into harmonious action, but with no cordial
intimacy between the Secretaries. Indeed, no member of
the Cabinet but Mr. Seward enjoyed intimate relations
with the new Secretary of War, although Mr. Chase paid
him assiduous attention, and was in return treated with
due respect and courtesy. To Mr. Chase he may have been
more communicative than to others, because the former
was almost daily at the War Department, while the rest
of us seldom went there save on business, and were less
attentive.

When intelligence reached Washington on Sunday morn-
ing, the 9th of March, that the Merrimac had come down
from Norfolk and attacked and destroyed the Cumberland
and Congress, I called at once on the President, who had sent

62 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

for me. Several members of the Cabinet soon gathered.
Stanton was already there, and there was general excite-
ment and alarm. Although my Department and the branch
of the Government entrusted to me were most interested
and most responsible, the President ever after gave me the
credit of being, on that occasion, the most calm and self-
possessed of any member of the Government. The Pre-
sident himself was so excited that he could not deliberate
or be satisfied with the opinions of non-professional men,
but ordered his carriage and drove to the navy yard to
see and consult with Admiral Dahlgren and other naval
officers, who might be there. Dahlgren, always attentive
and much of a courtier, had, to a great extent, the Pre-
sident's regard and confidence; but in this instance Dahl-
gren, who knew not of the preparation or what had been
the purposes of the Department, could give the President
no advice or opinion, but referred him to me. The inabil-
ity of Dahlgren to advise seemed to increase the panic.
General Meigs, who was of much the same temperament
with Dahlgren, was also sent for by the President, Stan-
ton, or Seward. The latter had great confidence in Meigs
on all occasions, and deferred to him more than to his
superior, in all matters of a military character.

Dahlgren and Meigs were both intelligent officers and in
their specialties among the first of their respective profes-
sions, but neither of them was endowed with the fighting
qualities of Farragut or Sheridan, and in that time of gen-
eral alarm, without information or facts, they were not the
men to allay panic or tranquillize the government officials.
They were prudent, cautious men, careful to avoid danger,
and provide the means to escape from it.

But the most frightened man on that gloomy day, the
most so I think of any during the Rebellion, was the Sec-
retary of War. He was at times almost frantic, and as
he walked the room with his eyes fixed on me, I saw well
the estimation in which he held me with my unmoved and
unexcited manner and conversation.

STANTON'S FEAR OF THE MERRIMAC 63

The Merrimac, he said, would destroy every vessel in the
service, could lay every city on the coast under contribu-
tion, could take Fortress Monroe; McClellan's mistaken
purpose to advance by the Peninsula must be abandoned,
and Burnside would inevitably be captured. Likely the
first movement of the Merrimac would be to come up
the Potomac and disperse Congress, destroy the Capitol
arid public buildings; or she might go to New York and
Boston and destroy those cities, or levy from them con-
tributions sufficient to carry on the War. He asked what
vessel or means we had to resist or prevent her from doing
whatever she pleased.

I stated our vessels were not as powerful or in numbers
as extensive as I wished. It was certain, however, the Mer-
rimac could not come to Washington and go to New York
at the same time. I had no apprehension of her visiting
either, and wished she were then in the Potomac, for if so
we could take efficient measures to dispose of her. That
Burnside and the force in the Sounds were safe from
her, because her draft of water was such she could not
approach them. That the Monitor was in Hampton
Roads, and I had confidence in her power to resist, and,
I hoped, to overcome, the Merrimac. She should have been
there sooner to have destroyed the Merrimac, but the
contractors had disappointed us.

Mr. Seward, who had been desponding, contrary to his
usual temperament and custom, rendered more timid by
the opinion and alarm of Stanton, said my remark in rela-
tion to the draft of water of the Merrimac gave him the
first moment's relief he had experienced.

Stanton made some sneering inquiry about this new
vessel the Monitor, of which he admitted he knew^fittle
or nothing. I described her, and [said] that it had been our
intention, had she been completed within contract time,
to have sent her up to Norfolk to destroy the Merrimac
before she came out of the dry dock. Stanton asked about
her armament, and when I mentioned she had two guns,

64 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

his mingled look of incredulity and contempt cannot be
described; and the tone of his voice, as he asked if my
reliance was on that craft with her two guns, is equally
indescribable. Others mingled in the conversation with
anxiety and concern, but on the part of Stanton there was
censure, bitterness, and a breaking-out of pent-up male-
volence that I could not misunderstand. Others, alarmed
by the destruction which had taken place and dreading
further disaster, had their fears increased by his harsh
manner; but, though unsupported and unassisted, I was
not appalled or affected by his terror and bluster. I more
correctly read and understood his character in that crisis
than he mine. It was the first, and, save a repetition on
the following day, the only, occasion when he attempted to
exercise towards me that rude and offensive insolence for
which he became notorious in the discharge of his official
duties.

That day and its incidents were among the most un-
pleasant and uncomfortable of my life. The events were
momentous and portentous to the nation, the responsibil-
ity and the consequence of the disaster were heavier on me
than on any other individual; there was no one to encour-
age and sustain me. Admiral Smith, always self-possessed
and intelligent, who would have stood by me, was over-
whelmed with the tidings, for his son was on the Congress,
and, as his father predicted when tidings reached him of
the fate of that vessel, had fallen a victim. My Assistant,
Fox, was absent at Hampton Roads in anticipation of the
arrival of the Monitor, whither he had gone before these
occurrences to meet her. Dahlgren and Meigs, by nature
and training cautious, not to say timid, who had been
called in, were powerless, and in full sympathy with
Stanton in all his fears and predictions.

In all that painful time my composure was not disturbed,
so that I did not perhaps as fully realize and comprehend
the whole impending calamity as others, and yet to me
there was throughout the whole day something inexpress-

STANTON'S FEAR OF THE MERRIMAC 65

ibly ludicrous in the wild, frantic talk, action, and rage of
Stanton as he ran from room to room, sat down and jumped
up after writing a few words, swung his arms, scolded, and
raved. He could not fail to see and feel my opinion of him
and his bluster, — that I was calm and unmoved by his rant,
spoke deliberately, and was not excited by his violence.

The President, though as uncomfortable as any of us,
and having his alarm increased by the fears and scary
apprehensions of Stanton, manifested much sympathy and
consideration for me. My composure and the suggestions
and views I presented were evidently a relief to him, but
Stanton's wailings and woeful predictions disturbed him.
Both he and Stanton went repeatedly to the window and
looked down the Potomac — the view being uninterrupted
for miles — to see if the Merrimac was not coming to Wash-
ington. It was asked what we could do if she were now in
sight. I told the President she could not, if in the river,
with her heavy armor, cross the Kettle Bottom Shoals.
This was a relief. Dahlgren was consulted. He thought
it doubtful if she could reach Washington, if she entered
the river.

Stanton asked what we could do for the defense and pro-
tection of New York and other cities. I knew of nothing.
Our information of the Merrimac — for we had had every
few days report of her condition — was that she could
not, with her heavy and ill-adjusted armor, penetrate the
river nor venture outside, and was to be used in Hampton
Roads and the Chesapeake. I stated these facts, and they
with other matters had a good effect upon the President.
But Stanton in his terror telegraphed to the governors
of the Northern States and the mayors of some of the
cities, warning them of the danger, and advising, as I was
told, that rafts of timber and other obstructions should be
placed at the mouths of the harbors.

These occurrences took place at different interviews
which we had through the day and evening, for it was one
of the many exciting Sundays which we had during the

66 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

Civil War. I received that evening a telegram from Dahl-
gren at the navy yard, stating he had secured a large
number of boats and had a full force loading them with
stone and gravel, and asking if he was acting in conform-
ity with my wishes. I answered no, and that I had given
no orders to sanction his proceedings. On the following
morning we met at the President's, and Stanton, with
affected calmness but his voice trembling with emotion,
inquired if I had given orders to prevent the boats which
he had provided from being prepared and loaded. I replied
that I had given no orders to prepare and load any boats,
nor did I intend to; that I had received a singular note
from Dahlgren to which I had given this reply: that he
had no authority from me for such work. Stanton said he
had given the order to Meigs and Dahlgren, and had done
it to protect Washington and with the approval of the
President, to whom he turned. The President confirmed
his statement, or remarked that Mr. Stanton had thought
it imperative that something should immediately be done
for our security; that those officers, Meigs and Dahlgren,
one or both, were present, and he thought no harm would
come of it, if it did no good. The purpose was to load fifty
or sixty canal-boats and other craft with stone and sink
them at Kettle Bottom Shoals, or some other place in the
channel.

I stated that I was very sorry to hear it, that for five
or six months we had labored with General McClellan
and the War Department to keep this important avenue
open to unrestricted navigation, and that, the Rebels
having left, we ourselves were now to shut ourselves off
by these obstructions. As the President had authorized
the proceeding, I had nothing to say except to express my
dissent the moment Admiral Dahlgren was told he might
go forward with the work he had commenced under the
War Department, and at its expense. Mr. Stanton said
the War Department would bear both the expense and the
responsibility.

STANTON'S NAVY 67

The passages were sharp and pungent, and they were
the last of that description which he ever used towards me.
The occasion, the termination, and subsequent events ap-
peared to have satisfied him that he had in some respects
mistaken my true character. No member of the Cabinet
did he thenceforward treat with more courtesy and con-
sideration, and the roughness and something worse which
he manifested towards some of our colleagues he never
extended to me.

The result was he procured a fleet of some sixty canal-
boats, which were laden, but Mr. Lincoln had forbidden,
after our interview, that they should be sunk in the chan-
nel until it was known the Merrimac was approaching.
Some weeks later, when the President, with Stanton and
some others, was going down the river in a steamer, the
long line of boats on the Maryland side near the Kettle
Bottom Shoals attracted attention, and some one inquired
concerning them. "Oh," said the President, "that is Stan-
ton's navy. That is the fleet concerning which he and Mr.
Welles became so excited in my room. Welles was incensed
and opposed the scheme, and it has proved that Neptune
was right. Stanton's navy is as useless as the paps of a
man to a sucking child. There may be some show to amuse
the child, but they are good for nothing for service."

I have narrated, at some length, what took place on
an occasion of great interest to the country, and which
brought out in strong light the traits of Mr. Stanton in
a crisis, when he thought he had me at disadvantage and
could exercise towards me his imperious nature. He saw
that even under the excitement and alarm I treated his
bluster with indifference, that the impression which each
made upon the President was by no means to his advan-
tage; and I have supposed was admonished to that effect
by the President himself.

Mr. Stanton was fond of power and of its exercise. It
was more precious to him than pecuniary gain to dominate
over his fellow man. He took pleasure in being ungracious

68 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES

and rough towards those who were under his control, and
when he thought his bearish manner would terrify or
humiliate those who were subject to him. To his superiors
or those who were his equals in position, and who neither
heeded nor cared for his violence, he was complacent,
sometimes obsequious. From long association and close
observation I am convinced he had but little moral courage
nor much self-reliance when in trouble. It never struck me
that he was mercenary or that he made use of his position
to add to his private fortune, but he was reckless and re-
gardless of public expenditure, and the war expenses were
greater by hundreds of millions than was necessary, or than
they would have been had the Department been in other
hands.

Of his zeal, devotion, and great labor in his office there
can be no question by those who were at all familiar with
him as Secretary, although there are differences as to the
wisdom of many of his measures and the value of his serv-
ices. He was vigilant, often efficient, and his friend and
patron Mr. Seward styled him the "Carnot of the War,"
"Stanton the Divine." But this was mere fulsome adula-
tion from an old politician. With the resources of a nation
in men and money at his command, and each used without
stint or scruple, he might well be efficient and powerful,
and no one better knew this than Stanton himself. He was
an adept in intrigue and knew how to meet and move the
leading spirits in Congress, and for that matter always had
a little Congress of his own. No one courted the members
with more assiduous attention, or, in an adroit way, flat-
tered and pandered to them with more success. He did
not, like Mr. Seward, to whom he was indebted for his
greatness, entertain and feed them, yet Se ward's parties
were made subservient to Stanton and his views, and no
one contributed more to it than Seward himself. The Sec-
retary of State supposed, as did his predecessor Black, that
Stanton was an appendage to him in the Administration,
and they each, though diametrically opposed in their prin-

STANTON'S CLAIM TO GREATNESS 69

ciples and views of government, had a common interest in
all that took place.

If an expenditure of the public money exceeding that
of any minister in all history, either of our own or of
any other country, makes one a great war minister, then
Stanton may lay claim to greatness. A willing Congress,
lavish of public money, readily granted all that he asked,
and he was willing to ask all they would give. For a
tune the President was alarmed at his headlong career, but,
finding that Stanton was sustained and glorified in his
extravagance, he interposed no obstacles to the military
measures and movements of the War Department.

When Mr. Stanton came into the War Department, for
several months he assumed that the Navy was secondary
and subject to the control and direction of the military
branch of the Government. These pretensions, which had
agitated each branch of the service, I never recognized,
but stated that we were equal and would be ready at all
times to cooperate with the armies in any demonstration,
but it must not be under orders. If a movement originated
in Washington, I claimed, if the Navy was to participate,
I must be cognizant of it ; if an expedition was undertaken
by any general who needed the aid of the Navy, the
admiral or senior naval officer on the station must be
consulted and cooperation asked. Stanton claimed that,
instead of consulting and asking, the military could order
naval assistance, and that it was the duty of the Secretary
of the Navy and of naval officers to render it. President
Lincoln would not, however, lend himself to this view of
the subject.

The President broaches the Subject of Emancipation — Navy Department
Worries — Commodore Wilkes — Disappointed Officers — Seward's
Assumption of Authority — How Lincoln chose his Cabinet — The
Army's Failure to cooperate — The Military Theory of Frontiers —
Promotion of W. D. Porter — Proposed Line of Gunboats on the Ohio
— The Cabal against McClellan — Stanton on McClellan — The Need
of Better Generals.

ON Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln in-
vited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral
of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and
Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr.
Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence the
house of a naval officer, I think Hazard, some two or three
miles west, or northwest, of Georgetown. It was on this
occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr.
Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves
by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist
in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he
saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, im-
portance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given
it much thought and had about come to the conclusion
that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the
salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be
ourselves subdued, etc., etc.

This was, he said, the first occasion when he had men-
tioned the subject to any one, and wished us to frankly
state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the
subject involved consequences so vast and momentous
that he should wish to bestow on it mature reflection be-
fore giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion in-
clined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might
say expedient and necessary. These were also my views.
Two or three times on that ride the subject, which was of

1862] EMANCIPATION BROACHED 71

course an absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to,
and before separating the President desired us to give the
question special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest
in the conviction that something must be done. It was a
new departure for the President, for until this time, in all
our previous interviews, whenever the question of eman-
cipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way
alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denounc-
ing any interference by the General Government with the
subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every mem-
ber of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President,
considered it a local, domestic question appertaining to
the States respectively, who had never parted with their
authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and
the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection,
which extended through all the Slave States, and had com-
bined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union,
impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary meas-
ures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not
armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who
were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thou-
sands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the
field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifica-
tions and intrenchments were constructed by them.

August 10, 1862, Sunday. The last two days have been
excessively warm. Thermometer on the north porch at
100 on each day. A slight breeze from the west makes this
day somewhat more comfortable. News unimportant from
the army, and but little from the Navy. Shall have some-
thing exciting within a few days. Sensation items are the
favorite ones of the press. Alarming predictions delight
their readers. Am sorry that better progress is not made
in the war upon the Rebels. Our squadrons are paralyzed
everywhere by the inactive and dilatory movements of
the army. Vicksburg should have been taken by the first
of June, but no adequate cooperating military force was

72 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 10

furnished, and as a consequence our largest squadron in
the Gulf and our flotilla in the Mississippi have been de-
tained and injured. The most disreputable naval affair
of the War was the descent of the steam ram Arkansas
through both squadrons till she hauled in under the bat-
teries of Vicksburg, and there the two flag officers aban-
doned the place and the ironclad ram, Farragut and his
force going down to New Orleans, and Davis proceeding
with his flotilla up the river. I have written them both,
briefly but expressively, on the subject of the ram Arkan-
sas. I do not blame them in regard to Vicksburg, though
had Farragut obeyed his original orders and gone up the
river at once after the capture of New Orleans, I think
things might have been different. Butler would not, I pre-
sume, give sufficient support from the army, for he has
proved prompt as well as fearless.

We have sensation articles in yesterday's New York
papers that the steamer Fingal at Savannah has been clad
with iron and threatens our army and vessels. Have no
word from Admiral Du Pont, who is watchful but slow to
express apprehension. Am inclined to believe there is
truth in the rumor that the boat has been clad with armor,
but have my doubts if there is any immediate intention to
attempt to pass outside. She is probably designed for river
defense of the city against our gunboats; but may, if there
is opportunity, assume the offensive. In the mean time the
sensationalists will get up exciting alarms and terrify
the public into distrust and denunciation of the Navy
Department.

We have similar sensations every few days in regard to
Merrimac No. 2, an armored boat at Richmond. As yet
she has made no attempt to pass below the obstructions,
though two or three times a week we are assured they are
in sight, — " Smoke from half a dozen steam-stacks vis-
ible." Wilkes writes he is fully prepared for her and her
associates at any tune, and Rodgers l writes to the same
1 Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, John Rodgers.

1862] COMMODORE WILKES 73

effect. But in a day or two some changes will take place
that may affect operations on James River.

Have had to write Wilkes pretty decisively. He is very
exacting towards others, but is not himself as obedient as
he should be. Interposes his own authority to interrupt
the execution of the orders of the Department. Wrote him
that this was not permissible, that I expected his command
to obey him, and it was no less imperative that he should
obey the orders of the Department. He wrote for permis-
sion to dismiss from service a class of officers if they did not
suit him, and as he thought them inefficient. I told him
the suggestion could not be entertained, that the Depart-
ment must retain the administrative control of the Navy.
I have not heard from him in reply, or explanation. It is
pretty evident that he will be likely to cause trouble to
the Department. He has abilities but not good judgment
in all respects. Will be likely to rashly assume authority,
and do things that may involve himself and the country
in difficulty, and hence I was glad that not I but the Pre-
sident and Secretary of State suggested him for that com-
mand. It is the first tune that either has proposed a candi-
date for a command, since taking Stringham from the office
of detail in 1861 to go to Pensacola. Seward's intrigue. It
was almost a necessity that something should be done for
Wilkes. His act, in taking Mason and Slidell from the
Trent, had given him eclat, — it was popular with the coun-
try, was considered right by the people, even if rash and
irregular; but when and how to dispose of Wilkes was an
embarrassment to me, until the command of the James
River Flotilla was suggested. He was, however, unwilling
to report to Goldsborough, and to have done so would have
caused delay. But giving him an independent command
caused Goldsborough to take offense, and he asked to
resign the command of the squadron. To this I had no
objection, for he was proving himself inefficient, — had
done nothing effective since the frigates were sunk by the
Merrimac, nor of himself much before.

74 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 10

The State Department is in constant trepidation, fear-
ing our naval officers do not know their duties, or that they
will transcend them. Both points are marked weaknesses
in the management of our foreign affairs. We are insulted,
wronged, and badly treated by the British authorities,
especially at Nassau, and I have called the attention of the
Secretary of State repeatedly to the facts, but he fears to
meet them. After degrading ourselves, we shall be com-
pelled to meet them. I am for no rash means, but I am
clearly and decidedly for maintaining our rights. Almost all
the aid which the Rebels have received in arms, munitions,
and articles contraband have gone to them through the
professedly neutral British port of Nassau. From them
the Rebels have derived constant encouragement and sup-
port, from the commencement of hostilities. Our officers
and people are treated with superciliousness and contempt
by the authorities and inhabitants, and scarcely a favor
or courtesy is extended to them while they are showered
upon the Rebels. It is there that vessels are prepared to
run the blockade and violate our laws, by the connivance
and with the knowledge of the Colonial, and, I apprehend,
the parent, government.

In reorganizing the Department there are some difficul-
ties. I am assailed for continuing Lenthall as Naval Con-
structor at the head of the bureau. He has not much plia-
bility or affability, but, though attacked and denounced as
corrupt and dishonest, I have never detected any obliquity
or wrong in him. His sternness and uprightness disap-
pointed the jobbers and the corrupt, and his unaffected
manner has offended others. There is an intrigue to pre-
vent his confirmation, in which very great rogues and
some honest and good men are strangely mixed up, the
last being the dupes, almost the willing victims, of the
former.

Admiral Foote reported for duty on Thursday, but his
rooms were not prepared, and I advised him, as he was yet
lame and on crutches, to delay active duty for a month or

1862] DISAPPOINTED OFFICERS 75

so. It is some forty years since we were school-boys to-
gether in the quiet town of Cheshire, and it has been a
pleasant opportunity to me to bring out the qualities of
my early friend. He left yesterday for a few weeks.

Mr. Faxon, Chief Clerk, is absent, and I am somewhat
embarrassed in relation to the true disposition of the cler-
ical force. It seems not to have occurred to Admiral Foote
that he could not appoint whom he pleased in his bureau,
regardless of the claims and capabilities of older and more
experienced clerks on less pay. I told him I wished him to
have the selection of his chief or at least one confidential
clerk, but that I could not displace old and worthy em-
ployees. This he said he did not wish, though he was, I
think, a little disappointed.

Davis continues in command of the flotilla on the Missis-
sippi. Had he captured the Arkansas, I would have had
him come on immediately and take charge of the Bureau
of Navigation.

In reorganizing the Navy under the late act, there were
nine admirals to be appointed on the retired list. The
names of nine were presented, but the Senate failed to con-
firm or act upon them. After the adjournment of Congress,
commissions were sent them under executive appoint-
ment. Of course the men superseded were dissatisfied.
Aulick was the first who called, complaining that injust-
ice was done, and desiring to know wherein his record
was defective and why he had been set aside. I told him
that had it been the intention of Congress that the nine
senior officers should be the admirals, the act would doubt-
less have so stated; that as regarded himself, while, per-
sonally, our relations had been pleasant if not intimate,
he had not made himself known or felt by the Depart-
ment or the Government in the hour of peril; that he had,
just as the Rebellion commenced, applied for six months'
leave to visit Europe, on account of alleged illness of his
daughter; that he left about the time of the assault on
Sumter; that he remained abroad until notified that his

76 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 10

leave would not be extended, and never had made a sug-
gestion for the country, or expressed any sympathy for
the cause. Under these circumstances I had felt justified
in advising the President to omit his name. He said he
had supposed it was other influences than mine which had
done him this injustice, that we had been long and well
acquainted. I told him I shunned no responsibility in the
case, and yet it was due to candor to say that I never had
heard a word in his behalf from any one.

Commodore Mervine writes me of his disappointment,
feels hurt and slighted. By the advice of Paulding, chiefly,
I gave the command of the Gulf Squadron to Mervine in
the spring of 1861 ; but he proved an utter failure. He is
not wanting in patriotism, but in executive and admin-
istrative ability; is quite as great on little things as on
great ones. He was long in getting out to his station, and
accomplished nothing after he got there. When I detached
him and appointed McKean, he was indignant and ap-
plied for a court of inquiry; but I replied that we had not
the time nor men to spare, that I had called him to pro-
mote the public interest, and recalled him for the same
purpose. He is a man of correct deportment and habits,
and in ordinary times would float along the stream with
others, but such periods as these bring out the stronger
points of an officer, if he has them. I had no personal, or
political, or general, feeling against him, but as there were
other officers of mark and merit superior to him, they
were selected. Yet I felt there could not be otherwise than
a sense of slight that must be felt by himself and friends,
which I could not but regret. Yet any person with whom
I consulted commended the course I pursued in regard to
him.

Commodore Samuel Breese was a more marked case
than Mervine's, but of much the same character. Nothing
good, nothing bad, in him as an officer. A gentleman of
some scholarly pretensions, some literary acquirements,
but not of much vigor of mind. Paulding was his junior,

1862] DISAPPOINTED OFFICERS 77

and the slight, as he conceived it, almost broke poor
Breese's heart. He came immediately to Washington,
accompanied by his wife, a pleasant woman, and called
on me, sad and heartsore, his pride wounded, his vanity
humiliated to the dust. For three nights he assured me he
had not closed his eyes; morning and evening the flag of
Paulding was always before him. He said Read would
not live long and implored that he might have the place.

Charles Stewart, first on the list and the oldest officer
in the service, wrote, requesting the permission of the
President to decline the appointment. It is a singular
letter, and required a singular answer, which I sent him,
leaving the subject in his hands.

The Advisory Board, which had to pass on subordinate
active appointments, have completed their labors the past
week. I am not altogether satisfied with their action, and
perhaps should not be with any board, when so much was
to be done, and so many men to pass under revision. The
omission of Self ridge and Porter (W. D.) were perhaps
the most marked cases, and the promotion of Fleming
and Poor the most objectionable.

In the action of this board I have taken no part, but
scrupulously abstained from any conversation with its
members, directly or indirectly. I did say to Assistant
Secretary Fox that I regretted the action in the case of
the elder Selfridge and Walke, and I think he must have
intimated these views in regard to W., for the action of
the board was subsequently reversed. But I know not
how this may have been.

Had a letter last evening from Lieutenant Budd, stating
that he presented me with a chair rumored to have be-
longed to General Washington, which was captured on the
Steamer Memphis, and asking me to accept it. Admiral
Paulding had written me there was such a chair, which he
had carried to his house, and asking what should be done
with it. The chair was private property and sent by a
lady to some one abroad, for friendly feeling to the Rebels.

78 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 10

I sent word to Admiral P. that the captors could donate
it or it might be sold with the other parts of the cargo. It
is, I apprehend, of little intrinsic value. If it really be-
longed to Washington, it seemed to me impolitic to sell it
at auction as a Rebel capture; if not Washington's, there
should be no humbug. My impressions were that it might
be given to Admiral P. or to the Commandant's House
at the navy yard, and I am inclined to think I will let it
take the latter course, at least for the present.

Governor Buckingham was here last week, and among
other matters had in view the selection of Collectors and
Assessors for our State. There was great competition.
The State ticket was headed by Howard, and the Congress
ticket headed by Goodman. While personally friendly to
all, my convictions were for the State ticket, which was
moreover much the ablest. The Secretary of the Treasury
gave it the preference but made three alterations.

I met Senator Dixon the next day at the Executive Man-
sion, he having come on to Washington with express refer-
ence to these appointments. He has written me several
letters indicating much caution, but I saw at once that he
was strongly committed and exceedingly disappointed. He
promised to see me again, but left that P.M. to get counter
support.

Intelligence reaches us this evening that the Rebel iron-
clad ram Arkansas has been destroyed. We have also news
of a fight yesterday on the Rapidan by forces under Gen-
eral Pope, the Rebels commanded by Stonewall Jackson.

Was told confidentially to-day that a treaty had been
brought about between Thurlow Weed and Bennett of
the Herald, after a bitterness of twenty years. A letter
was read to me giving the particulars. Weed had word
conveyed to Bennett that he would like to make up. Ben-
nett thereupon invited Weed to Fort Washington. Weed
was shy; sent word that he was engaged the evening named,
which was untrue. Bennett then sent a second invitation,
which was accepted; and Weed dined and stayed for the

1862] SEWARD'S ASSUMPTION 79

night at Fort Washington, and the Herald directly changed
its tune.

August 11, Monday. A busy day, reading and preparing
dispatches. State Department is sensitively apprehensive
that our naval officers will not be sufficiently forbearing
towards Englishmen. The old error, running back to the
commencement of difficulties, when the Rebels were re-
cognized as belligerents, and a blockade was ordered instead
of closing the ports. We are not, it is true, in a condition
for war with Great Britain just at this time, but England
is in scarcely a better condition for a war with us. At all
events, continued and degrading submission to aggressive
insolence will not promote harmony nor self-respect. It
is a gratification to me that our naval officers assert our
rights. I have no fears they will trespass on the rights of
others. Full dispatches received from Admiral Farragut,
who has got his larger vessels down the river to New Or-
leans. I had been under apprehensions that the Mississippi
was getting so low he would experience difficulty.

August 12, Tuesday. I called early this morning on the
Secretary of State touching a communication of his of
the 8th inst. which I received yesterday, in which I am
directed in the name of the President to give instructions
of an extraordinary character to our naval officers, instruc-
tions which I do not approve, and which in one or two
points conflict with law and usage. Though the direction
was in the President's name, I learned he knew nothing of
the proceeding.

Mr. Seward has a passion to be thought a master spirit
in the Administration, and to parade before others an
exhibition of authority which if permitted is not always
exercised wisely or intelligently. Englishmen have com-
plained that their vessels were detained and searched, and
that they have experienced great inconvenience by the
delay in the transmission of letters by blockade-runners.

80 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 12

These matters having been brought before the Secretary
of State, he on the instant, without consultation with any
one, without investigation, without being aware he was
disregarding law and long-settled principles, volunteered
to say he would mitigate or remedy the grievance, would
put the matter right; and, under the impulse of the mo-
ment and with an ostentatious show of authority which
he did not possess, yielded all that was asked and more
than the Englishmen had anticipated or than the Secretary
was authorized to give. I saw that he had acted precip-
itately and inconsiderately, and was soon aware that the
President, in whose name he assumed to act, was unin-
formed on the subject. But Seward is committed and can-
not humiliate himself to retrace his steps. I gave him to
understand, however, I would send out no such instruc-
tions as he had sent me in the President's name; that we
had, under the belligerent right of search, authority to
stop any suspected vessel, and if she had contraband on
board to capture her; that no blockade-runner ever cleared
for a Rebel port, like Charleston, though that might be its
actual destination, but for Halifax, Nassau, or some neu-
tral port; that the idea of surrendering mails and letters
captured on blockade-runners to foreign consuls, officers,
and legations, instead of delivering them, as the law ex-
plicitly directs, to the courts, could not be entertained for
a moment. Seward suggested that I could so modify the
proposed instructions as to make them conform to the
law, which he admitted he had not examined. Said it
would relieve him and do much to conciliate the English-
men, who were troublesome, and willing to get into dif-
ficulty with us. It will be useless to see the President, who
will be alarmed with the bugaboo of a foreign war, a bug-
bear which Seward well knows how to use. These absurd
instructions do not originate with the President, yet,
relating to foreign matters, he will endorse them, I have no
doubt, under the appeals which Seward will make.
Nothing of special interest to-day in the Cabinet. Some

1862] HOW LINCOLN CHOSE HIS CABINET 81

gentlemen — Roseleas, Coltman, and Bullitt of Louisiana
— were with the President when I called. He was reading
some printed letters as to the policy which the Union men
of Louisiana, for whom they appeared, should pursue. He
did not think it wise or expedient for them to shrink from
an honest and open avowal of then- principles and pur-
pose, assured them that rallying earnestly for the Govern-
ment and the service would be the surest way to restore
tranquillity.

Had a long private letter from Commodore Wilkes, who
deplores recent orders in regard to the army under Mc-
Clellan; thinks it suicidal. I fear there is truth in his
apprehensions.

August 15, Friday. Received yesterday a note from
Chase that the President proposed to change two of the
nominees under the new tax law in Connecticut. Called
on the President, and stated to him I did it as a duty, that
duty alone impelled me. He said he fully believed it, and
was glad to do me the justice to say that in matters of ap-
pointments, patronage, I had never given him any trouble.

Having an appointment this Friday morning at 9 with
the President, I met there Babcock l and Platt 2 of Connecti-
cut. They had called and stated their case, which was ex-
tremely unjust to Mr. Howard, and, turning to me, Mr. B.
said H. claimed he had procured or secured my appoint-
ment. The President said he had a slight acquaintance
with Mr. H. himself. Had met him in Illinois and knew
him as a friend of mine. Had received letters from him ex-
pressing regard for me, and one signed jointly by H. and
Senator Dixon. But these gentlemen did not originate his
action hi relation to my appointment. "The truth is,"
said he, — "and I may as well state the facts to you, for
others know them, — on the day of the Presidential elec-

1 James F. Babcock, editor of the New Haven Palladium. Lincoln
appointed him Collector at New Haven.

1 O. H. Platt, subsequently United States Senator.

82 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 15

tion, the operator of the telegraph in Springfield placed his
instrument at my disposal. I was there without leaving,
after the returns began to come in, until we had enough
to satisfy us how the election had gone. This was about
two in the morning of Wednesday. I went home, but not
to get much sleep, for I then felt, as I never had before, the
responsibility that was upon me. I began at once to feel
that I needed support, — others to share with me the bur-
den. This was on Wednesday morning, and before the
sun went down I had made up my Cabinet. It was almost
the same that I finally appointed. One or two changes
were made, and the particular position of one or two was
unsettled. My mind was fixed on Mr. Welles as the mem-
ber from New England on that Wednesday. Some other
names passed through my thoughts, and some persons were
afterwards pressed upon me, but the man and the place
were fixed in my mind then, as it now is. My choice was
confirmed by Mr. H., by Senator Dixon, Preston King,
Vice-President Hamlin, Governor Morgan, and others, but
the selection was my own, and not theirs, and Mr. H. is
under a mistake in what he says."

August 16, Saturday. With the President an hour or two
this A.M., selecting candidates from a large number recom-
mended for midshipmen at the naval school.

Finished a set of instructions for our naval officers hi
matters relating to prize captures and enforcing the block-
ade. Mr. Seward sent me a few days since in the name of
the President some restraining points on which he wished
the officers to be instructed, but I was convinced they
would work injury. Have toned down and modified his
paper, relieved it of its illegal features, added one or two
precautionary points and sent the document to the State
Department for criticism and suggestions.

Mem. It may be well, if I can find time, to get up a com-
plete set of instructions, defining the points of international
and statute law which are disputed or not well understood.

1862] COOPERATION OF ARMY AND NAVY 83

Have a long telegram from Wilkes, who informs me that
the army has left, and asking for instructions what to do
now that McClellan has gone. I have not been advised of
army movements by either the Secretary of War or General
Halleck. Both are ready at all times to call for naval aid,
but are almost wholly neglectful of the Navy and of their
own duties in regard to it, as in this instance.

August 17, Sunday. Called this morning on General
Halleck, who had forgotten or was not aware there was a
naval force in the James River cooperating with the army.
He said the army was withdrawn and there was no neces-
sity for the naval vessels to remain. I remarked that I
took a different view of the question, and, had I been con-
sulted, I should have advised that the naval and some army
forces should hold on and menace Richmond, in order to
compel the Rebels to retain part of their army there while
our forces in front of Washington were getting in position.
He began to rub his elbows, and, without thanking me or
acknowledgment of any kind, said he wished the vessels
could remain. Telegraphed Wilkes to that effect. Strange
that this change of military operations should have been
made without Cabinet consultation, and especially with-
out communicating the fact to the Secretary of the Navy,
who had established a naval flotilla on the James River
by special request to cooperate with and assist the army.
But Stanton is so absorbed in his scheme to get rid of
McClellan that other and more important matters are
neglected.

A difficulty has existed from the beginning in the mili-
tary, and I may say general, management of the War. At
a very early day, before even the firing on Sumter and the
abandonment of Norfolk, I made repeated applications
to General Scott for one or two regiments to be stationed
there. Anticipating the trouble that subsequently took
place, and confident that, with one regiment well com-
manded and a good engineer to construct batteries, with

84 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 17

the cooperation of the frigate Cumberland and such small
additional naval force as we could collect, the place might
be held at least until the public property and ships could
be removed, I urged the importance of such aid. The
reply on each occasion was that he not only had no troops
to spare from Washington or Fortress Monroe, both of
which places he considered in great danger, but that if
he had, he would not send a detachment in what he con-
sidered enemy's country, especially as there were no
intrenchments. I deferred to his military character and
position, but remonstrated against this view of the case, for
I was assured, and, I believe, truly, that a majority of the
people in the navy yard and in the vicinity of Norfolk
were loyal, friends of the Union and opposed to Secession.
He said that might be the political, but was not the mili-
tary, aspect, and he must be governed by military consid-
erations in disposing of his troops.

There was but one way of overcoming these objections
and that was by peremptory orders, which I could not,
and the President would not, give, in opposition to the
opinions of General Scott. The consequence was the loss
of the navy yard and of Norfolk, and the almost total
extinguishment of the Union sentiment in that quarter.
Our friends there became cool and were soon alienated by
our abandonment. While I received no assistance from
the military in that emergency, I was thwarted and embar-
rassed by the secret interference of the Secretary of State
in my operations. General Scott was for a defensive policy,
and the same causes which influenced him in that matter,
and the line of policy which he marked out, have governed
the educated officers of the army and to a great extent
shaped the war measures of the Government. "We must
erect our batteries on the eminences in the vicinity of
Washington," said General Mansfield to me, "and estab-
lish our military lines; frontiers between the belligerents,
as between the countries of Continental Europe, are
requisite." They were necessary in order to adapt and

1862] MILITARY THEORY OF FRONTIERS 85

reconcile the theory and instruction of West Point to the war
that was being prosecuted. We should, however, by this
process become rapidly two hostile nations. All beyond
the frontiers must be considered and treated as enemies,
although large sections, and in some instances whole States,
have a Union majority, occasionally in some sections
approximating unanimity.

Instead of halting on the borders, building intrench-
ments, and repelling indiscriminately and treating as
Rebels — enemies — all, Union as well as disunion, men
in the insurrectionary region, we should, I thought, pene-
trate their territory, nourish and protect the Union senti-
ment, and create and strengthen a national feeling counter
to Secession. This we might have done in North Carolina,
western Virginia, northern Alabama and Georgia, Arkan-
sas, Texas, and in fact in large sections of nearly every
seceding State. Instead of holding back, we should be ag-
gressive and enter their territory. Our generals act on the
defensive. It is not and has not been the policy of the coun-
try to be aggressive towards others, therefore defensive
tactics, rather than offensive have been taught, and the
effect upon our educated commanders in this civil war is
perceptible. The best material for commanders in this
civil strife may have never seen West Point. There is some-
thing in the remark that a good general is "born to com-
mand." We have experienced that some of our best-edu-
cated officers have no faculty to govern, control, and direct
an army in offensive warfare. We have many talented
and capable engineers, good officers in some respects, but
without audacity, desire for fierce encounter, and in that
respect almost utterly deficient as commanders. Courage
and learning are essential, but something more is wanted for
a good general, — talent, intuition, magnetic power, which
West Point cannot give. Men who would have made the
best generals and who possess innately the best and high-
est qualities to command may not have been so fortunate
as to be selected by a Member of Congress to be a cadet.

86 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 17

Jackson and Taylor were excellent generals, but they were
not educated engineers, nor were they what would be con-
sidered in these days accomplished and educated military
men. They detailed and availed themselves of engineers,
and searched out and found the needed qualities in others.

We were unused to war when these present difficulties
commenced, and have often permitted men of the army
to decide questions that were more political than military.
There is still the same misfortune, — for I deem it such.

From the beginning there was a persistent determination
to treat the Rebels as alien belligerents, — as a hostile
and distinct people, — to blockade, instead of closing, their
ports. The men "duly accredited by the Confederate
States of America" held back-door intercourse with the
Secretary of State, and lived and moved in ostentatious
style in Washington for some weeks. Thus commencing,
other governments had reason to claim that we had in-
itiated them into the belief that the Federal Government
and its opponents were two nations; and the Union peo-
ple of the South were, by this policy of our Government
and that of the army, driven, compelled against their
wishes, to be our antagonists.

No man in the South could avow himself a friend of the
Union without forfeiting his estate, his liberty, and per-
haps his life under State laws of the Confederates. The
Federal Government not only afforded him no protection,
but under the military system of frontiers he was treated
as a public enemy because he resided in his own home at
the South.

August 18, Monday. Had a call to-day from an old
schoolmate at Cheshire, now a chaplain in the army,
Joseph H. Nichols. Invited and had him to tea with me
and talked over school-boy days. It is thirty-five years or
over since we have met, though not unfrequently in the
same place.

Sent Commodore Wilkes a dispatch to hold his ground

1862] WILKES A TROUBLESOME OFFICER 87

and await events. Will send him specific orders when de-
velopments justify. He is a troublesome officer in many
respects, unpopular in the Navy and never on good terms
with the Department, yet I have thus far got along with
huii very well, though in constant apprehension that he
will commit some rash act. He is ambitious, self-con-
ceited, and self-willed. The withdrawal of the army from
before Richmond disconcerts him, and to make his mark
he may do some indiscreet, rash, and indefensible act.
But I trust not. He has abilities but not sound judg-
ment, and is not always subordinate, though he is himself
severe and exacting towards his subordinates.

Had a letter from Fox at Portsmouth. Says there are
traitors even there. It will be necessary that the Govern-
ment should be felt as a power before this Rebellion can
be suppressed. The armored boats, to which he was to
give some attention, are progressing as well as can be
expected. . . .

August 20, Wednesday. Memo. Soon after hostilities
commenced, in the spring or summer of 1861, a letter from
William D. Porter to his son was published. The son had
joined the Rebels, and so informed his father, who wrote
him he thought he had committed a mistake. But, having
taken this step, he advised him to adhere and do his duty.
At that tune W. D. P. was on duty in the Pacific. I im-
mediately detached and ordered him home. He reported
to me in great distress; disavowed the letter; said it was
a forgery, that his son and himself were on bad terms and
the letter had been written and published to injure him.
There was, he informed me, much disagreement in the
family; his son had been alienated from him, and, like
David, sympathized with the Secessionists, while he (W.)
had taken the opposite course. David, he remarked,
was the intimate friend of Jefferson Davis and the Rebel
conspirators, and he had expected that he would act
with them, and he had no doubt that David's course had

88 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 20

injured him; confounding him with D., he was made ac-
countable for D.'s acts. David said he had no doubt that
Bill wrote the letter, and I was of that opinion.1 William
had, not without reason, the reputation of being very
untruthful, — a failing of the Porters, for David was not
always reliable on unimportant matters, but amplified
and colored transactions, where he was personally inter-
ested especially, but he had not the bad reputation of
William. I did not always consider David to be depended
upon if he had an end to attain, and he had no hesitation
in trampling down a brother officer if it would benefit him-
self. He had less heart than William.

Had a conversation with the President hi relation to
W. D. Porter, who was the efficient officer that attacked
and destroyed the Rebel armored ram Arkansas. Porter
is a bold, brave man, but reckless in many respects, and
unpopular, perhaps not without reason, in the service. He
has been earnest and vigorous on the Mississippi, and made
himself. The Advisory Board under the late law omitted
to recommend him for promotion. It was one of the few
omissions that I regretted, for whatever the infirmities of
the man I recognize his merits as an officer.

His courage in destroying the Arkansas was manifest.
Both the flag officers were delinquent in the matter of that
vessel at Vicksburg, and I so wrote each of them. Ad-
miral Farragut cannot conceal his joy that she is destroyed,
but is not ready to do full justice to Porter.

I canvassed the whole question, — the law, the proceed-
ings, the difficulties, the man, the officer, the responsibil-
ity of promoting him and of my advising it, — yet I felt
it a duty, if service rendered in battle and under fire were
to govern. The President conversed with me most fully,
and said, ' ' I am so satisfied that you are right generally, and

1 I some years later, and after William's death, learned from Admiral
Farragut and Mrs. Farragut that they knew the letter to be a forgery and
that it was got up for mischievous purposes. — G. W,

1862] PROMOTION OF W. D. PORTER 89

in this case particularly, that I say to you, Go ahead, give
Porter as you propose a Commodore's appointment, and
I will stand by you, come what may."

Sent a letter of reproof to Colonel Harris and also one
to Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds of the Marine Corps,
between whom there is a bitter feud. Almost all the elder
officers are at loggerheads and ought to be retired. Rey-
nolds had been tried by court martial on charges pre-
ferred by Harris, and acquitted, though by confessions
made to me personally guilty. But a majority of the
anti-Harris faction constituted the court, and partisan-
ship, not merit, governed the decision. I refused to ap-
prove the finding. In his turn, Reynolds brought charges
against Harris, and of such a character as to implicate
others. To have gone forward would have been to plunge
into a series of courts martial for a year to come.

McClellan's forces have left the banks of James River
several days since. Their exodus I think was not anti-
cipated at Richmond, nor believed until after all had left
and crossed the Chickahominy. We are beginning to hear
of the arrival of the advance guard at Acquia Creek, Alex-
andria, and Fredericksburg. In the mean time Pope is
being heavily pressed at Culpeper by Stonewall Jackson
and the whole accumulated forces from Richmond, which
has compelled him to fall back on the left bank of the
Rapidan, his policy being to keep the enemy in check
until McClellan's forces can unite with him.

August 22, Friday. The President tells me he has a list
of the number of new recruits which have reached Wash-
ington under the late call. Over 18,000 have arrived in
just one week. There is wonderful and increasing enthu-
siasm and determination to put down this Rebellion and
sustain the integrity of the Union. It is confined to
no class or party or description: rich and poor, the edu-
cated and ignorant, the gentle and refined as well as the
stout, coarse, and athletic, the Democrats generally as

90 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 22

well as the Republicans, are offering themselves to the
country.

Governor Dennison and Judge Swayne * of Ohio, with
others, are urging in person the establishment of a line of
armed and armored steamers on the Ohio River. The plan
has been elaborated with much care, and has been before
presented and pressed with some zeal. Distrust, no doubt,
in regard to army management leads these men to seek
naval protection. The Blah's are quoted to me as favoring
the movement, and Fox has given them encouragement.
It has not found favor with me at any time. It is now
brought to my attention in such a way that I am compelled
to take it up. I find that great names and entire com-
munities in Ohio and Indiana, led on by the authorities of
those States, are engaged in it. I told the principal agent,
who, with Governor D., had a long interview with me,
that my judgment and convictions were against it, for:
First : I had no faith that light-draft gunboats would be
a safe and reliable means of frontier river-defense. They
might be auxiliary and essential aids to the army, but they
cannot carry heavy armament, are frail, and in low stages
of the water, with high banks which overlook the river,
would not be effective and could hardly take care of them-
selves, though in certain cases, and especially in high water,
they might greatly aid the army. Secondly: As a matter
of policy it would be injudicious and positively harmful
to establish a frontier line between Ohio and Kentucky,
making the river the military boundary, — it would be
conceding too much. If a line of boats could assist in pro-
tecting the northern banks of the Ohio they could afford
little security to the southern banks, where, as in Ohio,
there is, except hi localities, a majority for the Union. I
added that I should be opposed to any plan which pro-
posed to establish frontier lines, therein differing from
some of our best army officers; that I thought neither Ohio
nor Indiana could, on deliberate consideration, wish the
1 Noah H. Swayne, of the United States Supreme Court.

1862] BURNSIDE ASKS FOR GUNBOATS 91

line of separation from hostile forces should be the north-
ern boundary of Kentucky. It appeared to me the true
course was to make their interest in this war identical with
that of Kentucky, and if there were to be a line of de-
marcation it should be as far south as the southern bound-
ary of Tennessee, and not the banks of the Ohio. The
gentlemen seemed to be impressed with these general views.
y$<

August 24, Sunday. Have a dispatch from General Burn-
side at Falmouth, calling earnestly for five or six gunboats
in the Potomac at Acquia Creek. Mentions having made
a personal application at the Navy Department. Nothing
has been said to me by him or any one, nor has any re-
quisition been made. I find, however, on inquiry, that in
a general conversation in the room of the Chief Clerk he
expressed something of the kind. The General feels that
a heavy responsibility is upon him, and in case of disaster
desires like others the protection of the gunboats. It is
honorable to him that, unlike some other generals, he
willingly gives credit to the Navy. The protection he now
seeks is a wise precaution, perhaps, but, I apprehend,
wholly unnecessary. I have, however, ordered Wilkes to
send round five gunboats from James River. The War
Department sends me a letter from Major-General Curtis
to General Halleck, requesting more gunboats on the
Western rivers. Wrote Admiral Davis that the navigation
of the Mississippi should be kept unobstructed, not only
between Memphis and Arkansas River but elsewhere, and
to cooperate with and assist the army.

August 25, Monday. Wrote Wilkes, preparatory to dis-
continuing the organization of the James River Flotilla
as a distinct organization. Received from him, after it
was written, an unofficial letter communicating a plan
of offensive operations. Directed him in reply to engage
in no scheme whereby the gunboats would be detained in
James River longer than the army absolutely needed them

92 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 25

to divert the attention of the Rebels and prevent them
from sending their whole force against General Pope
before General McClellan could reach him. The change
of the plan of operations is a military movement, suggested
and pushed by Chase and Stanton. It will be a great dis-
appointment to Wilkes as well as others, but there is no
remedy. As soon as the gunboats can be released we want
them elsewhere. They have been locked up in James
River for two months, when they should have been on
other duty. McClellan's tardy policy has been unfortun-
ate for himself and the country. It has strengthened
the combination against him. Faxon l showed me a letter
from Admiral Foote which I was sorry to read, evincing
a petulance that is unworthy of him, and proposing to
relinquish his bureau appointment, if he cannot control
the selection of certain clerks.

August 27, Tuesday. Called on the Attorney-General
in relation to the appointment of a chaplain, — a singular
case. When the Cumberland was sunk in March last, and a
considerable portion of her crew, it was supposed the chap-
lain was lost. This fact brought a large flock of clerical
gentlemen to Washington for the place. The first who
reached here was Rev. K. of Germantown, and the Pre-
sident hi the kindness of his heart wrote a note requesting
that Mr. K. might, if there was nothing to prevent, have
the place of the supposed drowned. It was not certain,
however, that there was a vacancy, — we were daily hear-
ing of escaped victims who were preserved, — and duty
forbade an immediate appointment. Congress, before ad-
journing, enacted a law that no person should be appointed
chaplain who was over thirty-five. Mr. K. is forty-eight,
but, unwilling to relinquish the place, he pressed the Presi-
dent with his friends and procured from him another letter,
directing the appointment to be made now, if it was one
that could have been made then. On bringing this to me,
1 William Faxon, Chief Clerk of the Navy Department.

1862] CABAL AGAINST McCLELLAN 83

I told the reverend gentleman it was in disregard of the
law, and could not be made in my opinion ; that I must
at all events see the President before any steps were taken
and advise him of the facts.

This I did, and by his request called on the Attorney-
General. That gentleman, as I expected, requests a written
application for his opinion.

Have a letter from Admiral Foote, who has thought a
second time of his conclusions in his letter to Mr. Faxon,
expresses regret, and very handsomely apologizes. I had
expected this; should have been disappointed in the man
if he had not made it.

August 31, Sunday. For the last two or three days there
has been fighting at the front and army movements of
interest. McClellan with most of his army arrived at Alex-
andria a week or more ago, but inertness, inactivity, and
sluggishness seem to prevail. The army officers do not
engage in this move of the War Department with zeal.
Some of the troops have gone forward to join Pope, who has
been beyond Manassas, where he has encountered Stone-
wall Jackson and the Rebel forces for the last three days
in a severe struggle. The energy and rapid movements of
the Rebels are in such striking contrast to those of our own
officers that I shall not be seriously surprised at any sud-
den dash from them. The War Department — Stanton and
Halleck — are alarmed. By request, and in anticipation
of the worst, though not expecting it, I have ordered
Wilkes and a force of fourteen gunboats, including the
five light-draft asked for by Burnside, to come round into
the Potomac, and have put W. in command of the flotilla
here, disbanding the flotilla on the James.

Yesterday, Saturday, P.M., when about leaving the De-
partment, Chase called on me with a protest addressed to
the President, signed by himself and Stanton, against con-
tinuing McClellan in command and demanding his immedi-
ate dismissal. Certain grave offenses were enumerated.

94 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 31

Chase said that Smith had seen and would sign it in turn,
but as my name preceded his in order, he desired mine
to appear in its place. I told him I was not prepared to
sign the document; that I preferred a different method
of meeting the question; that if asked by the President,
and even if not asked, I was prepared to express my opin-
ion, which, as he knew, had long been averse to McClellan's
dilatory course, and was much aggravated from what I
had recently learned at the War Department; that I did
not choose to denounce McC. for incapacity, or to pro-
nounce him a traitor, as declared in this paper, but I would
say, and perhaps it was my duty to say, that I believed
his removal from command was demanded by public
sentiment and the best interest of the country.

Chase said that was not sufficient, that the time had ar-
rived when the Cabinet must act with energy and prompti-
tude, for either the Government or McClellan must go
down. He then proceeded to expose certain acts, some of
which were partially known to me, and others, more start-
ling, which were new to me. I said to C. that he and Stanton
were familiar with facts of which I was ignorant, and there
might therefore be propriety in then* stating what they
knew, though in a different way, — facts which I could
not indorse because I had no knowledge of them. I pro-
posed as a preferable course that there should be a gen-
eral consultation with the President. He objected to this
until the document was signed, which, he said, should be
done at once.

This method of getting signatures without an inter-
change of views with those who are associated in council
was repugnant to my ideas of duty and right. When I
asked if the Attorney-General and Postmaster-General
had seen the paper or been consulted, he replied not yet,
then1 turn had not come. I informed C. that I should de-
sire to advise with them in so important a matter ; that I
was disinclined to sign the paper ; did not like the proceed-
ing; that I could not, though I wished McClellan removed

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN

1862] STANTON ON McCLELLAN 95

after what I had heard, and should have no hesitation in
saying so at the proper time and place and in what I con-
sidered the right way. While we were talking, Blair came
in. Chase was alarmed, for the paper was in my hand and
he evidently feared I should address B. on the subject.
This, after witnessing his agitation, I could not do with-
out his consent. Blair remained but a few moments; did
not even take a seat. After he left, I asked Chase if we
should not call him back and consult him. C. said in great
haste, "No, not now; it is best he should for the present
know no thing of it." I took a different view; said that there
was no one of the Cabinet whom I would sooner consult
on this subject, that I thought Blair's opinion, especially
on military matters, he having had a military education,
very correct. Chase said this was not the time to bring
him in. After Chase left me, he returned to make a special
request that I would make no allusion concerning the paper
to Blair or any one else.

Met, by invitation, a few friends last evening at Baron
Gerolt's.1 My call was early, and, feeling anxious concern-
ing affairs in front, I soon excused myself to go to the War
Department for tidings. Found Stanton and Caleb Smith
alone in the Secretary's room. The conduct of McClellan
was soon taken up; it had, I inferred, been under discus-
sion before I came in.

Stanton began with a statement of his entrance into
the Cabinet in January last, when he found everything in
confusion, with unpaid bills on his table to the amount of
over $20,000,000 against the Department; his inability,
then or since, to procure any satisfactory information
from McClellan, who had no plan nor any system. Said
this vague, indefinite uncertainty was oppressive; that
near the close of January he pressed this subject on the
President, who issued the order to him and myself for an
advance on the 22d of February. McClellan began at once
to interpose objections, yet did nothing, but talked always

1 The Prussian Minister.

96 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 31

vaguely and indefinitely and of various matters except
those immediately in hand. The President insisted on,
and ordered, a forward movement. Then McClellan stated
he intended a demonstration on the upper waters of the
Potomac, and boats for a bridge were prepared with great
labor and expense. He went up there and telegraphed
back that two or three officers — his favorites — had done
admirably in preparing the bridge and he wished them to
be brevetted. The whole thing was absurd, eventuated
in nothing, and he was ordered back.

The President then commanded that the army should
proceed to Richmond. McClellan delayed, hesitated, said
he must go by way of the Peninsula, would take transports
at Annapolis. In order that he should have no excuse, but
without any faith in his plan, Stanton said he ordered
transports and supplies to Annapolis. The President, in
the mean time, urged and pressed a forward movement
towards Manassas. Spoke of its results, — the wooden
guns, the evacuation by the Rebels, who fled before the
General came, and he did not pursue them but came back
to Washington. The transports were then ordered round
to the Potomac, where the troops were shipped to Fortress
Monroe. The plans, the number of troops to proceed, the
number that was to remain, Stanton recounted. These
arrangements were somewhat deranged by the sudden
raid of Jackson towards Winchester, which withdrew Banks
from Manassas, leaving no force between Washington and
the Rebel army at Gordonsville. He then ordered McDow-
ell and his division, also Franklin's command, to remain,
to the great grief of McDowell, who believed glory and
fighting were all to be with the grand army. McClellan
had made the withholding of this necessary force to pro-
tect the seat of government his excuse for not being more
rapid and effective; was constantly complaining. The
President wrote him how, by his arrangement, only 18,000
troops, remnants and odd parcels, were left to protect the
Capital. Still McClellan was complaining and underrating

1862] STANTON ON McCLELLAN 97

his forces; said he had but 96,000, when his own returns
showed he had 123,000. But, to stop his complaints and
drive him forward, the President finally, on the 10th of
June, sent him McCall and his division, with which he
promised to proceed at once to Richmond, but did not,
lingered along until finally attacked. McClellan's excuse
for going by way of the Peninsula was that he might have
good roads and dry ground, but his complaints were un-
ceasing, after he got there, of bad roads, water, and swamps.

When finally ordered, after his blunders and reverses,
to withdraw from James River, he delayed obeying the
order for thirteen days, and never did comply until Gen-
eral Burnside was sent to supersede him if he did not move.

Since his arrival at Alexandria, Stanton says, only delay
and embarrassment had governed him. General Halleck
had, among other things, ordered General Franklin's divi-
sion to go forward promptly to support Pope at Manassas.
When Franklin got as far as Annandale he was stopped by
McClellan, against orders from Headquarters. McClel-
lan's excuse was he thought Franklin might be in danger
if he proceeded farther. For twenty-four hours that large
force remained stationary, hearing the whole time the guns
of the battle that was raging in front. In consequence of
this delay by command of McClellan, against specific or-
ders, he apprehended our army would be compelled to fall
back.

Smith left whilst we were conversing after this detailed
narrative, and Stanton, dropping his voice, though no one
was present, said he understood from Chase that I de-
clined to sign the protest which he had drawn up against
McClellan's continuance in command, and asked if I did
not think we ought to get rid of him. I told him I might
not differ with him on that point, especially after what I
had heard in addition to what I had previously known,
but that I disliked the method and manner of proceeding,
that it appeared to me an unwise and injudicious pro-
ceeding, and was discourteous and disrespectful to the

98 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [AUG. 31

President, were there nothing else. Stanton said, with some
excitement, he knew of no particular obligations he was
under to the President, who had called him to a difficult
position and imposed upon him labors and responsibilities
which no man could carry, and which were greatly in-
creased by fastening upon him a commander who was con-
stantly striving to embarrass him in his administration
of the Department. He could not and would not submit
to a continuance of this state of things. I admitted they
were bad, severe on him, and he could and had stated his
case strongly, but I could not from facts within my own
knowledge indorse them, nor did I like the manner in
which it was proposed to bring about a dismissal. He said
among other things General Pope telegraphed to McClel-
lan for supplies; the latter informed P. they were at Alex-
andria, and if P. would send an escort he could have them.
A general fighting, on the field of battle, to send to a gen-
eral in the rear and in repose an escort !

Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, repeated to me
this last fact this morning, and reaffirmed others. He in-
forms me that my course on a certain occasion had offended
McClellan and was not approved by others; but that both
the President and Stanton had since, and now, in their
private conversation, admitted I was right, and that my
letter in answer to a curt and improper demand of Mc-
Clellan last spring was proper and correct. Watson says he
always told the President and Stanton I was right, and he
complimented me on several subjects, which, though grati-
fying, others can speak of and judge better than myself.

We hear, this Sunday morning, that our army has
fallen back to Centreville.1 Pope writes in pretty good
spirits that we have lost no guns, etc. The Rebels were
largely reinforced, while our troops, detained at Annan-
dale by McClellan's orders, did not arrive to support our
wearied and exhausted men. McClellan telegraphs that he
hears "Pope is badly cut up." Schenck, who had a wound
1 After the defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run.

1862] NEED OF BETTER GENERALS 99

in his arm, left the battle-field, bringing with him for com-
pany an Ohio captain. Both arrived safe at Willard's.
They met McCall on the other side of Centreville and
Sumner on this side. Late! late!

Up to this hour, 1 P.M., Sunday, no specific intelligence
beyond the general facts above stated. There is consid-
erable uneasiness in this city, which is mere panic. I see
no cause for alarm. It is impossible to feel otherwise
than sorrowful and sad over the waste of life and treasure
and energies of the nation, the misplaced confidence in
certain men, the errors of some, perhaps the crimes of
others, who have been trusted. But my faith in present
security and of ultimate success is unshaken. We need
better generals but can have no better army. There is
much latent disloyal feeling in Washington which should
be expelled. And oh, there is great want of capacity and
will among our military leaders.

I hear that all the churches not heretofore seized are
now taken for hospital purposes; private dwellings are
taken to be thus used, among others my next neighbor
Corcoran's l fine house and grounds. There is malice in this.
I told General Halleck it was vandalism. He admitted
it would be wrong. Halleck walked over with me from the
War Department as far as my house, and is, I perceive,
quite alarmed for the safety of the city; says that we
overrate our own strength and underestimate the Rebels'
— a fatal error in Halleck. This has been the talk of
McClellan, which none of us have believed.

1 William W. Corcoran, the banker, who among other public benefac-
tions gave the city of Washington the art gallery which bears his name.

Ill

After the Second Battle of Bull Run — Another Anti-McClellan Paper —
The Opinion about General Pope — Wilkes and McClellan — McClel-
lan's Remarks about South Carolina and Massachusetts — The Bicker-
ings of the Generals — The President's Opinion of McClellan and Pope

— Rumors of a Proposed Revolution — An Estimate of Halleck —
Panic-stricken New York — A Scheme to deport Slaves to Chiriqui

— The "West Point" Policy — An Estimate of Stanton — Lincoln's
Deference to Seward — The Administration of the Departments — The
Want of a Military Policy — Lincoln and Seward — How Cabinet-
Meetings were conducted — The Rivalry of Seward and Chase — News
of Antietam — Dismissal of Commander Preble — The Emancipation
Proclamation read to the Cabinet — Senator John P. Hale — Chase's
Financial Policy — Chase's Opinion of Stanton — The Chiriqui Scheme

— New York Politics — European Efforts to break the Blockade.

September 1, Monday. The wounded have been com-
ing in to-day in large numbers. From what I can learn,
General Pope's estimate of the killed and wounded greatly
exceeds the actual number. He should, however, be best
informed, but he feels distressed and depressed and is
greatly given to exaggeration.

Chase tells me that McClellan sends word that there
are twenty thousand stragglers on the road between Alex-
andria and Centreville, which C. says is infamously false
and sent out for infamous purposes. He called on me to-
day with a more carefully prepared, and less exceptionable,
address to the President, stating the signers did not deem
it safe that McClellan should be intrusted with an army,
etc., and that, if required, the signers would give their rea-
sons for the protest against continuing him in command.
This paper was in the handwriting of Attorney-General
Bates. The former was in Stanton's. This was signed by
Stanton, Chase, Smith, and Bates. A space was left be-
tween the two last for Blair and myself; Seward is not in
town, and, if I am not mistaken, is purposely absent to be

1862] ANOTHER ANTI-McCLELLAN PAPER 101

relieved from participation in this movement, which origin-
ates with Stanton, who is mad — perhaps with reason —
and determined to destroy McClellan. Seward and Stanton
act in concert, but Seward has opposed or declined being
a party to the removal of McClellan, until since Halleck
was brought here, when Stanton became more fierce and
determined. Seward then gave way and went away. Chase,
who has become hostile to McClellan, is credulous, and
sometimes the victim of intrigue; was taken into Stanton's
confidence, made to believe that the opportunity of Sew-
ard's absence should be improved to shake off McClel-
lan, whom they both disliked, by a combined Cabinet
movement to control the President, who, until recently,
has clung to that officer. It was not difficult, under the
prevailing feeling of indignation against McClellan, to en-
list Smith. I am a little surprised that they got Mr. Bates,
though he has for some tune openly urged the removal of
McClellan. Chase took upon himself to get my name, and
then, if possible, Blair was to be brought in. In all this,
Chase flatters himself that he is attaching Stanton to his
interest ; not but that he is himself sincere in his opposition
to McClellan, who was once his favorite, but whom he
considers a deserter from his faction and whom he now
detests.

I told Chase I thought this paper an improvement on
the document of Saturday; was less exceptionable; but I
did not like, and could not unite in, the movement; that
in a conference with the President I should have no hesi-
tation in saying or agreeing mainly in what was there ex-
pressed; for I am satisfied the earnest men of the country
would not be willing McClellan should hereafter have com-
mand of our forces in the field, though I could not say what
is the feeling of the soldiers. Reflection had more fully
satisfied me that this method of conspiring to influence
or control the President was repugnant to my feelings and
was not right; it was unusual, would be disrespectful, and
would justly be deemed offensive; that the President had

102 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 1

called us around him as friends and advisers, with whom
he might counsel and consult on all matters affecting the
public welfare, not to enter into combinations to control
him. Nothing of this kind had hitherto taken place in our
intercourse. That we had not been sufficiently intimate,
impressive, or formal perhaps, and perhaps not sufficiently
explicit and decisive in expressing our views on some
subjects.

Chase disclaimed any movement against the President
and thought the manner was respectful and correct. Said
it was designed to tell the President that the Administra-
tion must be broken up, or McC. dismissed. The course
he said was unusual, but the case was unusual. We had, it
was true, been too informal in our meeting. I had, he said,
been too reserved in the expression of my views, which he
did me the compliment to say were sound, etc. Conversa-
tions, he said, amounted to but little with the President on
subjects of this importance. Argument was useless. It
was like throwing water on a duck's back. A more decisive
expression must be made and that in writing.

It was evident there was a fixed determination to re-
move, and if possible to disgrace, McClellan. Chase frankly
stated he desired it, that he deliberately believed McClel-
lan ought to be shot, and should, were he President, be
brought to summary punishment. I told him he was aware
my faith in McClellan's energy and reliability was shaken
nine months ago ; that as early as last December I had, as
he would recollect, expressed my disappointment in the
man and stated to him specially, as the friend and in-
dorser of McClellan, my misgivings, in order that he might
remove my doubts or confirm them. McClellan's hesitat-
ing course last fall, his indifference and neglect of my
many applications to cooperate with the Navy, his failure
in many instances to fulfill his promises, when the Rebels
were erecting batteries on the west bank of the Potomac,
that they might close the navigation of the river, had
shaken my confidence in his efficiency and reliability, for

1862] ANOTHER ANTI-McCLELLAN PAPER 103

he was not deficient in sagacity or intelligence. But at
that time McClellan was a general favorite, and neither
he (Chase) nor any one heeded my doubts and appre-
hensions.

A few weeks after the navigation of the river was first
interrupted by the Rebel batteries last November, I made
known to the President and Cabinet how I had been put
off by General McClellan with broken promises and frivol-
ous and unsatisfactory answers, until I ceased convers-
ing with him on the subject. To me it seemed he had no
plan or policy of his own, or any realizing sense of the true
condition of affairs, — the Rebels in sight of us, almost
within cannon-range, Washington beleaguered, only a sin-
gle railroad track to Baltimore, the Potomac about to be
closed. He was occupied with reviews and dress-parades,
perhaps with drills and discipline, but was regardless of
the necessities of the case, — the political aspect of the
question, the effect of the closing of the only avenue from
the National Capital to the ocean, and the embarrassment
which would follow to the Government itself were the
river blockaded. Though deprecating his course and call-
ing his attention to it, I did not think, as Chase now says
he does, and as I hear others say they do, that he was im-
becile, a coward, a traitor; but it was notorious that he
hesitated, doubted, had not self-reliance, any definite and
determined plan, or audacity to act. He was wanting, in
my opinion, in several of the essential requisites of a gen-
eral in chief command; in short, he^was not a fighting
general. These are my present convictions. 13o~ine state^
ments of Stanton and some recent acts indicate failings,
delinquencies of a more serious character. The country
is greatly incensed against him, but he has the confidence
of the army, I think.

Chase was disappointed, and I think a little chagrined,
because I would not unite in the written demand to the
President. He said he had not yet asked Blair and did not
propose to till the others had been consulted. This does

104 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 1

not look well. It appears as if there was a combination by
two to get their associates committed, seriatim, in detail,
by a skillful ex parte movement without general consulta-
tion.

McClellan was first invited to Washington under the
auspices of Chase, more than of any one else, though
all approved, for Scott was old, infirm, and changeable.
Seward soon had greater intimacy with McClellan than
Chase. Blair, informed in regard to the qualities of army
officers, acquiesced in McClellan's selection ; thought him
intelligent and capable, but dilatory. In the winter, when
Chase began to get alienated from McC. in consequence
of his hesitancy and reticence, or both, if not because of
greater intimacy with Seward, Blah- seemed to confide
more in the General, yet I do not think McC. was a favor-
ite, or that he grew in favor.

September 2, Tuesday. At Cabinet-meeting all but
Seward were present. I think there was design in his
absence. It was stated that Pope, without consultation
or advice, was falling back, intending to retreat within the
Washington intrenchments. No one seems to have had
any knowledge of his movements, or plans, if he had any.
Those who have favored Pope are disturbed and disap-
pointed. Blair, who has known him intimately, says he is
a braggart and a liar, with some courage, perhaps, but not
much capacity. The general conviction is that he is a fail-
ure here, and there is a belief and admission on all hands
that he has not been seconded and sustained as he should
have been by McClellan, Franklin, Fitz John Porter, and
perhaps some others. Personal jealousies and professional
rivalries, the bane and curse of all armies, have entered
deeply into ours.

Stanton said, hi a suppressed voice, trembling with
excitement, he was informed McClellan had been ordered
to take command of the forces in Washington. General
surprise was expressed. When the President came in and

1862] THE OPINION OF POPE 105

heard the subject-matter of our conversation, he said
he had done what seemed to him best and would be re-
sponsible for what he had done to the country. Halleck
had agreed to it. McClellan knows this whole ground; his
specialty is to defend; he is a good engineer, all admit;
there is no better organizer ; he can be trusted to act on the
defensive; but he is troubled with the " slows" and good
for nothing for an onward movement. Much was said.
There was a more disturbed and desponding feeling than
I have ever witnessed in council; the President was greatly
distressed. There was a general conversation as regarded
the infirmities of McClellan, but it was claimed, by Blair
and the President, he had beyond any officer the confidence
of the army. Though deficient in the positive qualities
which are necessary for an energetic commander, his or-
ganizing powers could be made temporarily available till
the troops were rallied.

These, the President said, were General Halleck's views,
as well as his own, and some who were dissatisfied with his
action, and had thought H. was the man for General-in-
Chief, felt that there was nothing to do but to acquiesce,
yet Chase earnestly and emphatically stated his convic-
tion that it would prove a national calamity.

Pope himself had great influence in bringing Halleck
here, and the two, with Stanton and Chase, got possession
of McC.'s army and withdrew it from before Richmond. It
has been an unfortunate movement. Pope is denounced
as a braggart, unequal to the position assigned him.

Stanton and Halleck are apprehensive that Washington
is in danger. Am sorry to see this fear, for I do not believe
it among remote possibilities. Undoubtedly, after the
orders of Pope to fall back, and the discontent and con-
tentions of the generals, there will be serious trouble, but
not such as to endanger the Capital. The military believe
a great and decisive battle is to be fought in front of the
city, but I do not anticipate it. It may be that, retreating
within the intrenchments, our own generals and managers

106 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 2

have inspired the Rebels to be more daring; perhaps they
may venture to cross the upper Potomac and strike at
Baltimore, our railroad communication, or both; but they
will not venture to come here, where we are prepared and
fortified with both army and navy to meet them.

In a conversation with Commodore Wilkes, who came
up yesterday from Norfolk to take command of the Poto-
mac Flotilla, consisting now of twenty-five vessels, he took
occasion to express his high appreciation of McClellan as
an officer. This can be accounted for in more ways than
one. The two have been associated together in a severe
disappointment, and persuade themselves they should
have accomplished something important if they had not
been interrupted. I have no doubt Wilkes, who has au-
dacity, would have dashed on, and perhaps have compelled
McClellan to do so, but with what prudence and discretion
I am not assured. They both believe they would have
taken Richmond. I apprehend they would have disagreed
before getting there, even if McClellan could have been
brought to the attempt. An adverse result has made them
friends in belief, and they condemn the decision which led
to their recall. I had no part hi that decision. Probably
should not have advised the order had I been consulted,
although it may have been the proper military step. But
whether recalled or not, McC. would never have struck
a blow for Richmond, even under the impulsive urging of
Wilkes, who is often inconsiderate; and so strife would have
arisen between them.

Wilkes says they would have captured Richmond on the
1st inst., had there been no recall. His last letter to me,
about the 27th, said they would have made an attempt by
the 12th if let alone. I have no doubt that, could he have
had the cooperation of the army, Wilkes would have struck
a blow; perhaps he would alone.

September 3, Wednesday. Washington is full of exciting,
vague, and absurd rumors. There is some cause for it. Our

1862] BITTER REMARK OF McCLELLAN'S 107

great army comes retreating to the banks of the Potomac,
driven back to the intrenchments by Rebels.

The army has no head. Halleck is here in the Depart-
ment, a military director, not a general, a man of some
scholastic attainments, but without soldierly capacity.
McClellan is an intelligent engineer and officer, but not
a commander to head a great army in the field. To attack
or advance with energy and power is not in him; to fight is
not his forte. I sometimes fear his heart is not earnest in
the cause, yet I do not entertain the thought that he is
unfaithful. The study of military operations interests and
amuses him. It flatters him to have on his staff French
princes and men of wealth and position; he likes show,
parade, and power. Wishes to outgeneral the Rebels, but
not to kill and destroy them. In a conversation which I had
with him in May last at Cumberland on the Pamunkey,
he said he desired of all things to capture Charleston; he
would demolish and annihilate the city. He detested, he
said, both South Carolina and Massachusetts, and should
rejoice to see both States extinguished. Both were and al-
ways had been ultra and mischievous, and he could not tell
which he hated most. These were the remarks of the Gen-
eral-in-Chief at the head of our armies then in the field, and
when as large a proportion of his troops were from Massa-
chusetts as from any State in the Union, while as large a
proportion of those opposed, who were fighting the Union,
were from South Carolina as from any State. He was lead-
ing the men of Massachusetts against the men of South
Carolina, yet he, the General, detests them alike.

I cannot relieve my mind from the belief that to him, hi
a great degree, and to his example, influence, and conduct
are to be attributed some portion of our late reverses, more
than to any other person on either side. His reluctance to
move or have others move, his inactivity, his detention of
Franklin, his omission to send forward supplies unless Pope
would send a cavalry escort from the battle-field, and the
tone of his conversation and dispatches, all show a moody

108 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 3

state of feeling. The slight upon him and the generals asso-
ciated with him, in the selection of Pope, was injudicious,
impolitic, wrong perhaps, but is no justification for their
withholding one tithe of strength in a great emergency,
where the lives of their countrymen and the welfare of the
country were in danger. The soldiers whom McClellan has
commanded are doubtless attached to him. They have been
trained to it, and he has kindly cared for them while under
him. With partiality for him thay have imbibed his pre-
judices, and some of the officers have, I fear, a spirit more
factious and personal than patriotic. I have thought they
might have reason to complain, at the proper time and
place, but not on the field of battle, that a young officer
of no high reputation should be brought from a Western
Department and placed over them. Stanton, in his hate
of McC., has aggrieved other officers.

The introduction of Pope here, followed by Halleck, is an
intrigue of Stanton's and Chase's to get rid of McClellan.
A part of this intrigue has been the withdrawal of McClel-
lan and the Army of the Potomac from before Richmond
and turning it into the Army of Washington under Pope.

Chase, who made himself as busy in the management of
the army as the Treasury, said to the President one day in
my presence, when we were looking over the maps on the
table in the War Department, that the whole movement
upon Richmond by the York River was wrong, that we
should accomplish nothing until the army was recalled and
Washington was made the base of operations for an over-
land march. McClellan had all the troops with him, and
the Capital was exposed to any sudden blow from the
Rebels. "What would you do?" said the President.
" Order McClellan to return and start right," replied Chase,
putting his finger on the map, and pointing the course to be
taken across the country. Pope, who was present, said,
"If Halleck were here, you would have, Mr. President,
a competent adviser who would put this matter right."

The President, without consulting any one, went about

1862] HALLECK'S CALL TO WASHINGTON 109

this time on a hasty visit to West Point, where he had
a brief interview with General Scott, and immediately
returned. A few days thereafter General Halleck was
detached from the Western Department and ordered to
Washington, where he was placed in position as General-
in-Chief, and McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, on
Halleck's recommendation, first proposed by Chase, were
recalled from in the vicinity of Richmond.

The defeat of Pope and placing McC. in command of the
retreating and disorganized forces after the second disaster
at Bull Run interrupted the intrigue which had been
planned for the dismissal of McClellan, and was not only a
triumph for him but a severe mortification and disappoint-
ment for both Stanton and Chase.

September 4, Thursday. City full of rumors and but little
truth in any of them.

Wilkes laid before me his plan for organizing the Poto-
mac Flotilla. It is systematic and exhibits capacity.

Something energetic must be done in regard to the
suspected privateers which, with the connivance of British
authorities, are being sent out to depredate on our com-
merce. We hear that our new steamer, the Adirondack, is
wrecked. She had been sent to watch the Bahama Channel.
Her loss, the discharge of the Oreto by the courts of Nas-
sau, and the arrival of Steamer 290, * both piratical British
wolves, demand attention, although we have no vessels to
spare from the blockade. Must organize a flying squadron,
as has been suggested, and put Wilkes in command. Both
the President and Seward request he should go on this
service.

k When with the President this A.M., heard Pope read his
statement of what had taken place in Virginia during the
last few weeks, commencing at or before the battle of Cedar
Mountain. It was not exactly a bulletin nor a report, but
a manifesto, a narrative, tinged with wounded pride and
1 The cruiser Alabama.

110 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 4

a keen sense of injustice and wrong. The draft, he said, was
rough. It certainly needs modifying before it goes out, or
there will be war among the generals, who are now more
ready to fight each other than the enemy. No one was
present but the President, Pope, and myself. I remained
by special request of both to hear the report read. Seward
came in for a moment, but immediately left. He shuns these
controversies and all subjects where he is liable to become
personally involved. I have no doubt Stanton and Chase
have seen the paper, and Seward, through Stanton, knows
its character.

Pope and I left together and walked to the Departments.
He declares all his misfortunes are owing to the persistent
determination of McClellan, Franklin, and Porter, aided
by Ricketts, Griffin, and some others who were prede-
termined he should not be successful. They preferred,
he said, that the country should be ruined rather than he
should triumph.

September 5, Friday. We have a report this morning
that the Rebels have crossed the Potomac at Edwards
Ferry, but the War Department says the report wants
confirmation and that we have no stragglers from there, as
we should have if the rumors were true.

Wilkes claims that he ought to have the position of Act-
ing Admiral. There is reason in his claim, though some are
opposed to it. He is not in favor with his professional
brethren, has given great trouble and annoyance to the
Department heretofore and will be likely to give us more
trouble, but I believe it best to give him under the circum-
stances the position with the squadron.

The question of publishing the report of General Pope
was before us. Some little discussion took place. I did not
consider it strictly a report, for it was not accompanied by
the reports of the other officers, or any statistics of killed,
wounded, losses, or captures, but a statement from an

1862] THE ARMY FOR McCLELLAN 111

officer in command, who felt himself aggrieved and who
expressed himself in a manner to give offense. Much was
said, and all concurred or acquiesced in non-publication for
the present, especially as there is to be an inquiry into the
subject-matter reported upon.

There is a good deal of demoralization in the army;
officers and soldiers are infected.

September 6, Saturday. We have information that the
Rebels have crossed the Potomac in considerable force,
with a view of invading Maryland and pushing on into
Pennsylvania. The War Department is bewildered, knows
but little, does nothing, proposes nothing.

Our army is passing north. This evening some twenty
or thirty thousand passed my house within three hours.
There was design in having them come up from Pennsyl-
vania Avenue to H Street, and pass by McClellan's house,
which is at the corner of H and 15th. They cheered the
General lustily, instead of passing by the White House and
honoring the President.

Have unpleasant information concerning privateers,
which are getting abroad by connivance of the British au-
thorities. Am trying to get Wilkes off as speedily as possi-
ble. Wrote out his orders and instructions this evening to
cruise with a squadron in the Bahamas and West Indies for
certain vessels of no recognized nationality that were pre-
paring to prey on our commerce. Will get them copied and
in his hands on Monday. As an additional hint, told him
to-day I wished he could get off on Monday.

McClellan and his partisans have ascendency in the
army, but he has lost ground in the confidence of the coun-
try, chiefly from delays, or what the President aptly terms
the "slows."

September 7. The report prevalent yesterday that the
Rebels had crossed the upper Potomac at or near the Point
of Rocks is confirmed, and it is pretty authentic that large
reinforcements have since been added.

112 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 7

Found Chase in Secretary's room at the War Depart-
ment with D. D. Field. No others present. Some talk
about naval matters. Field censorious and uncomfortable.
General Pope soon came in but stayed only a moment.
Was angry and vehement. He and Chase had a brief con-
versation apart, when he returned to Stanton's room.

When I started to come away, Chase followed, and after
we came down stairs asked me to walk with him to the
President's. As we crossed the lawn, he said with emotion
everything was going wrong. He feared the country was
ruined. McClellan was having everything his own way, as
he (Chase) anticipated he would if decisive measures were
not promptly taken for his dismissal. It was a reward for
perfidy. My refusal to sign the paper he had prepared was
fraught with great evil to the country. I replied that I
viewed that matter differently. My estimate of McClellan
was in some respects different from his. I agreed he wanted
decision, that he hesitated to strike, had also behaved
badly in the late trouble, but I did not believe he was un-
faithful and destitute of patriotism. But aside from Mc-
Clellan, and the fact that it would, with the feeling which
pervaded the army, have been an impolitic step to dismiss
him, the proposed combination in the Cabinet would have
been inexcusably wrong to the President. We had seen the
view which the President took of the matter and how he
felt at the meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday.

From what I have seen and heard within the last few
days, the more highly do I appreciate the President's judg-
ment and sagacity in the stand he made, and the course he
took. Stanton has carried his dislike or hatred of McC. to
great lengths, and from free intercourse with Chase has
enlisted him, and to some extent influenced all of us against
that officer, who has failings enough of his own to bear with-
out the addition of Stanton's enmity to his own infirm-
ities. Seward, in whom McC. has confided more than any
member of the Administration, from the common belief
that Seward was supreme, yielded to Stanton's malignant

1862] THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE 113

feelings, and yet, not willing to encounter that officer, he
went off to Auburn, expecting the General would be dis-
posed of whilst he was away. The President, who, like the
rest of us, has seen and felt McClellan's deficiencies and
has heard Stanton's and Halleck's complaints more than
we have, finally, and I think not unwillingly, consented to
bring Pope here in front of Washington; was also further
persuaded by Stanton and Chase to recall the army from
Richmond and turn the troops over to Pope. Most of this
originated, and has been matured, in the War Depart-
ment, Stanton and Chase being the pioneers, Halleck as-
senting, the President and Seward under stress of McClel-
lan's disease "the slows," and with the reverses before
Richmond, falling in with the idea that a change of com-
manders and a change of base was necessary. The recall of
the army from the vicinity of Richmond I thought wrong,
and I know it was in opposition to the opinion of some of
the best military men in the service. Placing Pope over
them roused the indignation of many. But in this Stanton
had a purpose to accomplish, and in bringing first Pope
here, then by Pope's assistance and General Scott's advice
bringing Halleck, and concerting measures which followed,
he succeeded in breaking down and displacing McClellan,
but not in dismissing and disgracing him. This the Pre-
sident would not do or permit to be done, though he was
more offended with McC. than he ever was before. In a
brief conversation with him as we were walking together on
Friday, the President said with much emphasis: "I must
have McClellan to reorganize the army and bring it out of
chaos, but there has been a design, a purpose in breaking
down Pope, without regard of consequences to the country.
It is shocking to see and know this; but there is no remedy
at present, McClellan has the army with him."

My convictions are with the President that McClellan
and his generals are this day stronger than the Administra-
tion with a considerable portion of this Army of the Poto-
mac. It is not so elsewhere with the soldiers, or in the

114 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 7

country, where McClellan has lost favor. The people are
disappointed in him, but his leading generals have con-
trived to strengthen him in the hearts of the soldiers in
front of Washington.

Chase and myself found the President alone this Sunday
morning. We canvassed fully the condition of the army
and country. Chase took an early opportunity, since the
report of Pope was suppressed, to urge upon the President
the propriety of some announcement of the facts connected
with the recent battles. It was, he said, due to the country
and also to Pope and McDowell. I at once comprehended
why Chase had invited me to accompany him in this visit.
It was that it might appear that we were united on this
mission. I therefore promptly stated that this was the first
time I had heard the subject broached. At a proper time,
it seemed to me, there would be propriety in presenting a
fair, unprejudiced, and truthful statement of late disasters.
The country craved to know the facts, but the question
was, Could we just now with prudence give them? Dis-
closing might lead to discord and impair the efficiency of
the officers. The President spoke favorably of Pope, and
thought he would have something prepared for publication
by Halleck.

When taking a walk this Sunday evening with my son
Edgar, we met on Pennsylvania Avenue, near the junction
of H Street, what I thought at first sight a squad of cav-
alry or mounted men, some twenty or thirty in number.
I remarked as they approached that they seemed better
mounted than usual, but E. said the cavalcade was General
McClellan and his staff. I raised my hand to salute him as
they were dashing past, but the General, recognizing us,
halted the troop and rode up to me by the sidewalk, to
shake hands, he said, and bid me farewell. I asked which
way. He said he was proceeding to take command of the
onward movement. "Then," I added, "you go up the
river." He said yes, he had just started to take charge of
the army and of the operations above. "Well," said I,

1862] A FORWARD MOVEMENT 115

" on ward, General, is now the word; the country will ex-
pect you to go forward." "That," he answered, "is my
intention." "Success to you, then, General, with all my
heart." With a mutual farewell we parted.

This was our first meeting since we parted at Cumber-
land on the Pamunkey in June, for we each had been so
occupied during the three or four days he had been in
Washington that we had made no calls. On several occa-
sions we missed each other. In fact, I had no particular
desire to fall in with any of the officers who had contributed
to the disasters that had befallen us, or who had in any
respect failed to do their whole duty in this great crisis.
While McClellan may have had some cause to be offended
with Pope, he has no right to permit his personal resent-
ments to inflict injury upon the country. I may do him
injustice, but I think his management has been generally
unfortunate, to say the least, and culpably wrong since his
return from the Peninsula.

He has now been placed in a position where he may re-
trieve himself, and return to Washington a victor in tri-
umph, or he may, as he has from the beginning, wilt away
in tame delays and criminal inaction. I would not have
given him the command, nor have advised it, strong as he is
with the army, had I been consulted; and I feel sad that he
has been so intrusted. It may, however, be for the best.
There are difficulties in the matter that can scarcely be ap-
preciated by those who do not know all the circumstances.
The army is, I fear, much demoralized, and its demoraliza-
tion is much of it to be attributed to the officers whose
highest duty it is to prevent it. To have placed any other
general than McClellan, or one of his circle, in command
would be to risk disaster. It is painful to entertain the
idea that the country is hi the hands of such men. I hope
I mistake them.

September 8, Monday. Less sensation and fewer rumors
than we have had for several days.

116 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 8

The President called on me to know what we had authen-
tic of the destruction of the Rebel steamer in Savannah
River. He expressed himself very decidedly concerning the
management or mismanagement of the army. Said, "We
had the enemy in the hollow of our hands on Friday, if our
generals, who are vexed with Pope, had done their duty; all
of our present difficulties and reverses have been brought
upon us by these quarrels of the generals." These were, I
think, his very words. While we were conversing, Collector
Barney of New York came in. The President said, perhaps
before B. came, that Halleck had turned to McClellan and
advised that he should command the troops against the
Maryland invasion. "I could not have done it," said he,
"for I can never feel confident that he will do anything
effectual." He went on, freely commenting and repeating
some things said before B. joined us. Of Pope he spoke in
complimentary terms as brave, patriotic, and as having
done his duty in every respect in Virginia, to the entire
satisfaction of himself and Halleck, who . both knew and
watched, day and night, every movement. On only one
point had Halleck doubted any order P. had given; that
was in directing one division, I think Heintzelman's, to
march for the Chain Bridge, by which the flanks of that
division were exposed. When that order reached him by
telegraph, Halleck was uneasy, for he could not counter-
mand it in season, because the dispatch would have to go
part of the way by courier. However, all went off without
disaster; the division was not attacked. Pope, said the
President, did well, but there was here an army prejudice
against him, and it was necessary he should leave. He had
gone off very angry, and not without cause, but circum-
stances controlled us.

Barney said he had mingled with all descriptions of per-
sons, and particularly with men connected with the army,
and perhaps could speak from actual knowledge of public
sentiment better than either of us. He was positive that no
one but McClellan could do anything just now with this

1862] DISCUSSION OF THE GENERALS 117

army. He had managed to get its confidence, and he
meant to keep it, and use it for his own purposes. Barney
proceeded to disclose a conversation he had with Barlow
some months since. Barlow, a prominent Democratic
lawyer and politician of New York, had been to Washing-
ton to attend one of McClellan's grand reviews when he lay
here inactive on the Potomac. McClellan had specially
invited Barlow to be present, and during this visit opened
his mind, said he did not wish the Presidency, would
rather have his place at the head of the army, etc., etc.,
intimating he had no political views or aspirations. All
with him was military, and he had no particular desire to
close this war immediately, but would pursue a line of
policy of his own, regardless of the Administration, its
wishes and objects.

The combination against Pope was, Barney says, part of
the plan carried out, and the worst feature to him was the
great demoralization of his soldiers. They were becoming
reckless and untamable. In these remarks the President
concurred, and said he was shocked to find that of 140,000
whom we were paying for in Pope's army only 60,000 could
be found. McClellan brought away 93,000 from the Penin-
sula, but could not to-day count on over 45,000. As re-
garded demoralization, the President said, there was no
doubt that some of our men permitted themselves to be
captured in order that they might leave on parole, get dis-
charged, and go home. Where there is such rottenness, is
there not reason to fear for the country?

Barney further remarked that some very reliable men
were becoming discouraged, and instanced Cassius M. Clay,
who was advocating an armistice and terms of separation
or of compromise with the Rebels. The President doubted
if Clay had been rightly understood, for he had had a full
and free talk with him, when he said had we been success-
ful we could have had it in our power to offer terms.

In a conversation this morning with Chase, he said it
was a doubtful matter whether my declining to sign the

118 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 8

paper against McClellan was productive of good or harm.
If I had done it, he said, McClellan would have been dis-
posed of and not now hi command, but the condition of the
army was such under his long manipulation that it might
have been hazardous at this juncture to have dismissed
him. I assured him I had seen no moment yet when I re-
gretted my decision, and my opinion of McClellan had
undergone no change. He has military acquirements and
capacity, dash, but has not audacity, lacks decision, de-
lays, hesitates, vacillates; will, I fear, persist in delays and
inaction and do nothing affirmative. His conduct during
late events aggravates his indecision and is wholly unjusti-
fiable and inexcusable.

But I will not prophesy what he will do in his present
command. He has a great opportunity, and I hope and
pray he may improve it. The President says truly he has
the " slows," but he can gather the army together better
than any other man. Let us give him credit when he de-
serves it.

September 10, Wednesday. Colonel Marston of New
Hampshire, who has been with the Army of the Potomac
for a year, called on me to-day. Says he has no confidence
in McClellan as a general; thinks him neither brave nor
capable; expresses distrust of the integrity and patriotism
of other generals also. Marston is not a brilliant or great
man, nor perhaps a very competent military critic to judge
of the higher qualifications of his superiors; but he is polit-
ically patriotic, and gives the opinion of others with whom
he associates as well as his own.

Senator Wilson, who is by nature suspicious and sensa-
tional, tells me there is a conspiracy on foot among certain
generals for a revolution and the establishment of a pro-
visional national government. Has obtained important
information from one of McC.'s staff. Wilson is doubtless
sincere in all this, but, being on the military committee, is
influenced by Stanton, who is mad with the army and

1862] RUMORS OF REVOLUTION 119

officers who stand by McClellan. There may have been
random talk and speculation among military men when
idle in camp, but there is nothing serious or intentional in
then- loose remarks. They and the soldiers are citizens.
The government and country is theirs as well as ours.

Secretary Smith says he has heard of these movements.
Imputes misfortune and mismanagement to one (Seward)
who has the ear of the President and misadvises and mis-
leads him.

H. H. Elliott, Chairman of the Prize Commission in New
York, writes me that the public mind there is highly ex-
cited and on the eve of revolution. There is, undoubtedly,
a bad state of things in New York, and he is surrounded by
that class of Democratic partisans whose sympathies and
associations were with the Rebels, and who are still party
opponents of the Administration.

There are muttering denunciations on every side, and if
McClellan fails to whip the Rebels hi Maryland, the wrath
and indignation against him and the Administration will
be great and unrestrained. If he succeeds, there will be
instant relief, and a willing disposition to excuse alleged
errors which ought to be investigated.

General Halleck is nominally General-in-Chief and dis-
charging many of the important functions of the War De-
partment. I have as yet no intimacy with him and have
seen but little of him. He has a scholarly intellect and,
I suppose, some military acquirements, but his mind is
heavy and irresolute. It appears to me he does not possess
originality and that he has little real military talent. What
he has is educational. He is here, and came from the West,
the friend of Pope, and is in some degree indebted to Pope
for his position. Both were introduced here by an intrigue
of the War and Treasury with the design of ultimately
displacing McClellan, to whom the President has adhered
with tenacity, and from whom Stanton alone and un-
assisted could not alienate him. The President was
distressed by McClellan's tardy movements and failure

120 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 10

before Richmond, but did not understand the object which
the Secretary of War, seconded by Chase, had in view, nor
perhaps did either of the two generals, Pope and Halleck,
whose capabilities were wonderfully magnified by Stanton,
when ordered here. Pope is a connection of Mrs. Lincoln
and was somewhat intimate with the President, with
whom he came to Washington hi 1861. There were some
wonderful military operations on the Mississippi and at
Corinth reported of him just before he was ordered here,
and which led to it, that have not somehow been fully sub-
stantiated. Admiral Foote used to laugh at the gasconade
and bluster of Pope. Halleck, Foote insisted, was a mili-
tary imbecile, though he might make a good clerk. Pope
was first brought here, and soon began to second Stanton
by sounding the praises of Halleck. On one or two occa-
sions I heard him express his admiration of the extraor-
dinary capacity of Halleck and his wish that H. could be on
this field, where his great abilities would comprehend and
successfully direct military operations. Stanton would on
these occasions back Pope so far as to hope there could be
some change. The President listened, was influenced, and
finally went to West Point and saw General Scott. Chase
had in the mean time abandoned McClellan, and I well
remember the vehement earnestness with which, on one
occasion when we were examining the maps and criticizing
operations before Richmond, he maintained with emphasis
we had begun wrong, and could have no success until the
army was brought back here, and we started from this
point to reach the James River.

How far Halleck was assenting to or committed to
Stanton's implacable hostility to McClellan, or whether he
was aware of its extent before he came here, I cannot say.
Shortly after he arrived I saw that he partook of the views
of Stanton and Chase. By direction of the President he
visited the army on the James and became a partner to the
scheme for the recall of the troops. This recall or with-
drawal he pronounced one of the most difficult things to

HENRY W. HALLECK

1862] AN ESTIMATE OF HALLECK 121

achieve successfully that an accomplished commander
could execute. The movement was effected successfully,
but I did not perceive that the country was indebted to
General Halleck in the least for that success. The whole
thing at Headquarters was slovenly managed. I know that
the Navy, which was in the James River cooperating with
the army, was utterly neglected by Halleck. Stanton,
when I made inquiry, said the order to bring back the
army was not his, and he was not responsible for that neg-
lect. I first learned of the order recalling the army, not
from the General-in-Chief or the War Department, but
from Wilkes, who was left upon the upper waters of the
James without orders and a cooperating army. When I
called on Halleck, with Wilkes's letter, he seemed stupid,
said there was no further use for the Navy, supposed I had
been advised by the Secretary of War. When I suggested
that it appeared to me important that the naval force
should remain, with perhaps a small number of troops to
menace Richmond, he rubbed his elbow first, as if that was
the seat of thought, and then his eyes, and said he wished
the Navy would hold on for a few days to embarrass the
Rebels, but he had ordered all the troops to return. I
questioned then, and do now, the wisdom of recalling Mc-
Clellan and the army; have doubted if H., unprompted,
would himself have done it. It was a specimen of Chase's
and Stanton's tactics. They had impressed the President
with their ideas that a change of base was necessary. The
President had, at the beginning, questioned the move-
ment on Richmond by way of the Peninsula, but Blair had
favored it.

Pope having been put hi command of the army in front
of Washington, it was not difficult to reinforce him with
McClellan's men. Stanton, intriguing against that officer,
wanted to exclude him from command. Chase seconded
the scheme, but, fearing the influence of McClellan with
the President and the other generals and the army, the
plan of his dismissal at the instigation of the Cabinet was

122 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 10

projected. McClellan, by an unwise political letter, when
his duty was military, weakened himself and strengthened
his enemies. Events must have convinced him that there
was an intrigue against him, that he was in disfavor. Per-
haps he was conscious that he had failed to come up to pub-
lic expectation and do his whole duty. He certainly com-
mitted the great error, if not crime, after Halleck's appoint-
ment and his recall, of remaining supine, inactive, at Alex-
andria while the great battle was going on in front; and he
imparted his own disaffected feelings to his subordinates.

Halleck, destitute of originality, bewildered by the con-
duct of McClellan and his generals, without military re-
sources, could devise nothing and knew not what to advise
or do after Pope's discomfiture. He saw that the dissatis-
fied generals triumphed in Pope's defeat, that Pope and
the faction that Stanton controlled against McClellan were
unequal to the task they were expected to perform, and,
distrustful of himself , Halleck, without consulting Stanton,
assented to the President's suggestion of reinstating Mc-
Clellan in the intrenchments to reorganize the shattered
forces; and subsequently recommended giving him again
the command of the consolidated armies of Washington
and the Potomac.

The President assured me that this appointment of
McClellan to command the united forces and the onward
movement was Halleck's doings. He spoke of it in justi-
fication of the act. I was sorry he should permit General H.
to select the commander in such a case if against his own
judgment. But the same causes which influenced H. prob-
ably had some effect on the President, and Stanton, disap-
pointed and vexed, beheld his plans miscarry and felt that
his resentments were impotent, at least for a tune.

September 1 1 , Thursday. I find it difficult to hurry Wilkes
off with his command. The public, especially the com-
mercial community, are impatient; but Wilkes, like many
officers, having got position, likes to exhibit himself and

1862] PANIC-STRICKEN NEW YORK 123

snuff incense. He assumed great credit for promptness,
and has sometimes shown it, but not on this occasion.
Has been fussing about his vessel until I had, to-day, to
give him a pretty peremptory order.

Men in New York, men who are sensible in most things,
are the most easily terrified and panic-stricken of any
community. They are just now alarmed lest an ironclad
steamer may rush in upon them some fine morning while
they are asleep and destroy their city. In their imagin-
ation, under the teachings of mischievous persons and
papers, they suppose every Rebel cruiser is ironclad, while
in fact the Rebels have not one ironclad afloat. It only
requires a sensation paragraph in the Times to create
alarm. The Times is controlled by Seward through Thur-
low Weed, and used through him by Stanton. Whenever
the army is in trouble and public opinion sets against its
management, the Times immediately sets up a howl
against the Navy.

Senator Pomeroy of Kansas called yesterday in relation
to a scheme, or job, for deporting slaves and colored people
to Chiriqui. I cautioned him against committing himself
or the Government to Thompson, or any corporation or
association. Let him know my opinion of Thompson's
project and my opposition to it. Advised him, if anything
was seriously and earnestly designed, to go to the Govern-
ment of New Granada or any of the Spanish-American
States and treat with them direct, and not through schem-
ing jobbers. Should suspect P. to have a personal interest
in the matter but for the fact that the President, the
Blairs, and one or two men of integrity and character
favor it.

September 12, Friday. A clever rain last night, which
I hope may swell the tributaries of the upper Potomac.

A call from Wilkes, who is disturbed because I press him
so earnestly. Told him I wished him off as soon as possible ;
had hoped he would have left before this; Rebel cruisers

124 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 12

are about and immense injury might result from a single
day's delay. I find the officers generally dislike to sail with
him.

A brief meeting of the Cabinet. Seward was not present.
Has met with us but once in several weeks. No cause
assigned for this constant absence, yet a reluctance to
discuss and bring to a decision any great question without
him is apparent.

In a long and free discussion on the condition of the
army and military affairs by the President, Blair, Smith,
and myself, the President repeated what he had before
said to me, that the selection of McClellan to command
active operations was not made by him but by Halleck,
and remarked that the latter was driven to it by necessity.
He had arranged his army corps and designated the gen-
erals to lead each column, and called on Burnside to take
chief command. But Burnside declined and declared him-
self unequal to the position. Halleck had no other officer
whom he thought capable and said he consequently was
left with no alternative but McClellan.

"The officers and soldiers," the President said, "were
pleased with the reinstatement of that officer, but I wish
you to understand it was not made by me. I put McClel-
lan in command here to defend the city, for he has great
powers of organization and discipline; he comprehends and
can arrange military combinations better than any of our
generals, and there his usefulness ends. He can't go ahead
— he can't strike a blow. He got to Rockville, for instance,
last Sunday night, and in four days he advanced to
Middlebrook, ten miles, in pursuit of an invading enemy.
This was rapid movement for him. When he went up the
Peninsula there was no reason why he should have been
detained a single day at Yorktown, but he waited, and gave
the enemy tune to gather his forces and strengthen his
position."

I suggested that this dilatory, defensive policy was
partly at least the result of education; that a defensive

1862] THE WEST POINT POLICY 125

policy was the West Point policy. Our Government was
not intended to be aggressive but to resist aggression or
invasion, — to repel, not to advance. We had good engin-
eers and accomplished officers, but that no efficient, ener-
getic, audacious, fighting commanding general had yet
appeared from that institution. We were all aware that
General Scott had, at the very commencement, begun with
this error of defense, the Anaconda theory; was unwilling
to invade the seceding States, said we must shut off the
world from the Rebels by blockade and by OUT defenses.
He had always been reluctant to enter Virginia or strike
a blow. Blair said this was so, that we had men of narrow,
aristocratic notions from West Point, but as yet no gener-
als to command; that there were many clever second-rate
men, but no superior mind of the higher class. The dif-
ficulty, however, was in the War Department itself. There
was bluster but not competency. It should make generals,
should search and find them, and bring them up, for there
were such somewhere, — far down perhaps. The War De-
partment should give character and tone to the army and
all military movements. Such, said he, is the fact with the
Navy Department, which makes no bluster, has no blow-
ers, but quietly and intelligently does its work, inspires its
officers and men, and brings forward leaders like Farragut,
Foote, and Du Pont. The result tells you the value of
system, of rightful discrimination, good sense, judgment,
knowledge, and study of men. They make ten times the
noise at the War Department, but see what they do or fail
to do. The Secretary of War should advise with the best
and most experienced minds, avail himself of their opinions,
not give way to narrow prejudices and strive to weaken his
generals, or impair confidence in them on account of per-
sonal dislikes. We have officers of capacity, depend upon
it, and they should be hunted out and brought forward.
The Secretary should dig up these jewels. That is his duty.
B. named Sherman and one or two others who showed
capacity.

126 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 12

"McClellan," said B., "is not the man, but he is the best
among the major-generals." Smith said he should prefer
Banks. Blair said Banks was no general, had no capacity
for chief command. Was probably an estimable officer in
his proper place, under orders. So was Burnside, and
Heintzelman, and Sykes, but the War Department must
hunt up greater men, better military minds, than these to
carry on successful war.

Smith complimented Pope's patriotism and bravery, and
the President joined in the encomiums. Said that Halleck
declared that Pope had made but one mistake in all the
orders he had given, and that was in ordering one column
to retreat on Tuesday from Centreville to Chain Bridge,
whereby he exposed his flank, but no harm came of his
error. Blair was unwilling to concede any credit whatever
to Pope; said he was a blower and a liar and ought never to
have been intrusted with such a command as that in front.
The President admitted Pope's infirmity, but said a liar
might be brave and have skill as an officer. He said Pope
had great cunning. He had published his report, for in-
stance, which was wrong, — an offense for which, if it can
be traced to him, Pope must be made amenable, — " But,"
said he, " it can never, by any skill, be traced to him."
"That is the man," said Blair. "Old John Pope,1 his father,
was a flatterer, a deceiver, a liar, and a trickster; all the
Popes are so."

When we left the Executive Mansion, Blair, who came
out with me, remarked that he was glad this conversation
had taken place. He wanted to let the President know
we must have a Secretary of War who can do something
besides intrigue, — who can give force and character to the
army, administer the Department on correct principles.
Cameron, he said, had got into the War Department by
the contrivance and cunning of Seward, who used him and
other corruptionists as he pleased, with the assistance of

1 General Pope's father was Judge Nathaniel Pope, of the United States
District Court for Illinois.

1862] AN ESTIMATE OF STANTON 127

Thin-low Weed; that Seward had tried to get Cameron into
the Treasury, -but was unable to quite accomplish that, and
after a hard underground quarrel against Chase, it ended
in the loss of Cameron, who went over to Chase and left
Seward. Bedeviled with the belief he might be a candidate
for the Presidency, Cameron was beguiled and led to
mount the nigger hobby, alarmed the President with his
notions, and at the right moment, B. says, he plainly and
frankly told the President he ought to get rid of C. at once,
that he was not fit to remain in the Cabinet, and was in-
competent to manage the War Department, which he had
undertaken to run by the aid of Tom A. Scott, a corrupt
lobby-jobber from Philadelphia. Seward was ready to get
rid of Cameron after he went over to Chase, but instead of
bringing in an earnest, vigorous, sincere man like old Ben
Wade to fill the place, he picked up this black terrier, who
is no better than Cameron, though he has a better assistant
than Scott, in Watson. Blair says he now wants assistance
to "get this black terrier out of his kennel." I probably did
not respond as he wished, for I am going into no combina-
tion or movement against colleagues. He said he must go
and see Seward. In his dislike of Stanton, Blair is sincere
and earnest, but in his detestation he may fail to allow
Stanton qualities that he really possesses. Stanton is no
favorite of mine. He has energy and application, is indus-
trious and driving, but devises nothing, shuns responsi-
bility, and I doubt his sincerity always. He wants no
general to overtop him, is jealous of others in any position
who have influence and popular regard; but he has cunning
and skill, dissembles his feelings, in short, is a hypocrite, a
moral coward, while affecting to be, and to a certain extent
being, brusque, overvaliant in words. Blair says he is dis-
honest, that he has taken bribes, and that he is a double-
dealer; that he is now deceiving both Seward and Chase;
that Seward brought him into the Cabinet after Chase
stole Cameron, and that Chase is now stealing Stanton.
Reminds me that he exposed Stanton's corrupt character,

128 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 12

and stated an instance which had come to his knowledge
and where he has proof of a bribe having been received;
that he made this exposure when Stanton was a candidate
for Attorney for the District. Yet Seward, knowing these
facts, had induced and persuaded the President to bring
this corrupt man into the War Department. The country
was now suffering for this mistaken act. Seward wanted a
creature of his own in the War Department, that he might
use, but Stanton was actually using Seward.

Stanton's appointment to the War Department was in
some respects a strange one. I was never a favorite of
Seward, who always wanted personal friends. I was not
of his sort, personally or politically. Stanton, knowing his
creator, sympathized with him. For several months after
his appointment, he exhibited some of his peculiar traits
towards me. He is by nature a sensationalist, has from the
first been filled with panics and alarms, in which I have not
participated; and I have sometimes exhibited little respect
or regard for his mercurial flights and sensational disturb-
ances. He saw on more than one occasion that I was cool
when he was excited, and he well knew that I neither ad-
mired his policy nor indorsed his views. Of course we were
courteously civil, but reserved and distant. The opposi-
tion in the early days of the Administration were violent
against the Navy management, and the class of Repub-
licans who had secretly been opposed to my appointment
joined in the clamor. In the progress of events there was
a change. The Navy and my course, which had been
assailed, — and which assaults he countenanced, — grew
in favor, while my mercurial colleague failed to give satis-
faction. His deportment changed after the naval success
at New Orleans, and we have since moved along harmoni-
ously at least. He is impulsive, not administrative; has
quickness, often rashness, when he has nothing to appre-
hend; is more violent than vigorous, more demonstrative
than discriminating, more vain than wise; is rude, arrogant,
and domineering towards those in subordinate positions if

1862] THE COUNTRY DISHEARTENED 129

they will submit to his rudeness, but is a sycophant and
dissembler in deportment and language with those whom
he fears. He has equal cunning but more force and greater
capacity than Cameron; yet the qualities I have mentioned
and his uneasy, restless nature make him, though possessed
of a considerable ability of a certain sort, an unfit man in
many respects for the War Department in times like these.
I have sometimes thought McClellan would better dis-
charge the duties of Secretary of War than those of a gen-
eral in the field, and that a similar impression may have
crossed Stanton's mind, and caused or increased his hate of
that officer. There is no love lost between them, and their
enmity towards each other does not injure McClellan in
the estimation of Blair. Should McClellan in this Mary-
land campaign display vigor and beat the Rebels, he may
overthrow Stanton as well as Lee. Blair will give him act-
ive assistance. But he must rid himself of what President
Lincoln calls the "slows." This, I fear, is impossible; it is
his nature.

September 13. The country is very desponding and much
disheartened. There is a perceptibly growing distrust of
the Administration and of its ability and power to conduct
the war. Military doubts were whispered on the Peninsula
by McClellan 's favorites before his recall, and when he was
reinstated public confidence in the Administration through-
out the country was impaired. Citizens and military,
though from different causes, were distrustful. It is evi-
dent, however, that the reinstatement of McC. has inspired
strength, vigor, and hope in the army. Officers and soldiers
appear to be united in his favor and willing to follow his
lead. It has now been almost a week since he left Wash-
ington, yet he has not overtaken the enemy, who are not
distant. There is doubt whether he is thirty miles from
Washington. Perhaps he ought not to be, until he has
gathered up and massed the dispersed elements of his com-
mand. I shall not criticize in ignorance, but insist it is the

130 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 13

duty of all to sustain him. I am not without hopes that his
late experience and the strong pressure of public opinion
will overcome his hesitancy and rouse him to thorough
work. He is never rash. I fear he is not a fighting general.
Stanton is cross and grouty. A victory for McClellan will
bring no joy to him, though it would gladden the whole
country.

Rev. Dr. Patton of Chicago, chairman of a committee
appointed hi northern Illinois, desired an introduction
with his associates to the President, to advise with him on
the subject of slavery and emancipation. The President
assented cheerfully.

September 15. Some rumors yesterday and more direct
information to-day are cheering to the Union cause. Mc-
Clellan telegraphs a victory, defeat of the enemy with loss of
15,000 men, and that " General Lee admits they are badly
whipped." To whom Lee made this admission so that it
should be brought straight to McC. and telegraphed here
does not appear. A tale like this from Pope would have
been classed as one of his fictions. It may be all true,
coming from McClellan, but I do not credit Lee's confes-
sion or admission. That we have had a fight and beaten
the Rebels, I can believe. It scarcely could have been
otherwise. I am afraid it is not as decisive as it should be,
and as is the current belief, but shall rejoice if McC. has
actually overtaken the Rebels, which is not yet altogether
clear.

September 16. Chase called on me this morning. Wishes
a secret concerted attack on Richmond. Says Stanton will
furnish 10,000 men. Told him we would do all that could
be expected of the Navy in a sudden movement, but
doubted if a military expedition could be improvised as
speedily and decisively as he supposed. He thought it
could certainly be effected in six days. I told him to try.
We would have a naval force ready in that tune, though

1862] LINCOLN'S DEFERENCE TO SEWARD 131

not so large and powerful as I would wish; but we would
do our part.

Chase tells me that Harrington, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, was at Fortress Monroe last Thursday and
heard Bankhead, who commands the Minnesota, say that
the Government was a poor affair, that the Administration
was inefficient, that it is time the politicians were cleared
out of Washington and the army in power. Harrington
called subsequently and confirmed the statement, — less
strong perhaps in words but about as offensive. I re-
quested him to reduce his statement to writing.

At the Executive Mansion, the Secretary of State in-
formed us there was to be no Cabinet-meeting. He was
authorized by the President to communicate the fact.
Smith said it would be as well, perhaps, to postpone the
Cabinet-meetings altogether and indefinitely, — there
seemed no use latterly for our coming together. Others
expressed corresponding opinions. Seward turned off, a
little annoyed.

An unfavorable impression is getting abroad hi regard
to the President and the Administration, not without rea-
son, perhaps, which prompted Smith and others to express
their minds freely. There is really very little of a govern-
ment here at this time, so far as most of the Cabinet are
concerned; certainly but little consultation in this import-
ant period. Seward, when in Washington, spends more or
less of each day with the President, absorbs his attention,
and I fear to an extent influences his action not always
wisely. The President has good sense, intelligence, and an
excellent heart, but is sadly perplexed and distressed by
events. He, to an extent, distrusts his own administrative
ability and experience. Seward, instead of strengthening
and fortifying him, encourages this self-distrust, but is not
backward in giving his own judgment and experience,
which are often defective expedients, to guide the Execu-
tive. A conviction of this state of things stirred up Smith
to make his remarks. The President has, I believe, sincere

132 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 16

respect and regard for each and every member of the Cabi-
net, but Seward seeks, and has at times, influence, which
is sometimes harmful. The President would often do
better without him, were he to follow his own instincts, or
were he to consult all his advisers in council. He would
find his own opinions confirmed and be convinced that
Seward's suggestions are frequently unwise and weak and
temporizing. No one attempts to obtrude himself, or warn
the President, or even to suggest to him that others than S.
should be consulted on some of the important measures of
the Government. In fact, they are not informed of some of
the measures which are of general interest until they see
them in operation, or hear of them from others. Chase is
much chafed by these things, and endeavors, and to some
extent succeeds, in also getting beside the President, and
obtaining information of what is going forward. But this
only excites and stimulates Seward, who has the inside
track and means to keep it. The President is unsuspicious,
or apparently so; readily gives his ear to suggestions from
any one. Only one of his Cabinet, however, has manifested
a disposition to monopolize his attention; but the discus-
sion of important measures is sometimes checked almost
as soon as introduced, and, without any consultation, or
without being again brought forward, they are disposed of,
the Secretary of State alone having had sometimes cer-
tainly a view, or ear, or eye hi the matter. He alone has
abbreviated general consultation in many cases. With
greater leisure than most of the Cabinet officers, unless it
be Smith of the Interior, he runs to the President two or
three tunes a day, gets his ear, gives him his tongue, makes
himself interesting by anecdotes, and artfully contrives
with Stanton's aid to dispose of measures without action or
give them direction independent of his associates. Under
the circumstances, I perhaps am, latterly, as little inter-
fered with as any one, though the duties of the State and
Navy Departments run together; yet I am sometimes
excessively annoyed and embarrassed by meddlesome

1862] DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION 133

intrusions and inconsiderate and unauthorized action by
the Secretary of State. The Navy Department has, neces-
sarily, greater intimacy, or connection, with the State
Department than any other, for, besides international
questions growing out of the blockade, our squadrons and
commanders abroad come in contact with our ministers,
consuls, and commercial agents, and each has intercourse
with the Governments and representatives of other nations.
Mutual understanding and cooperation are therefore essen-
tial and indispensable. But while I never attempt to direct
the agents of the State Department, or think of it, or to
meddle with affairs in the appropriate sphere of the Secre-
tary of State, an entirely different course is pursued by him
as regards the Navy and naval operations. He is anxious
to direct, to be the Premier, the real Executive, and give
away national rights as a favor. Since our first conflict,
however, when he secretly interfered with the Sumter ex-
pedition and got up an enterprise to Pensacola, we have
had no similar encounter; yet there has been an itching
propensity on his part to have a controlling voice in naval
matters with which he has no business, — which he really
does not understand, — and he sometimes improperly in-
terferes as in the disposition of mails on captured vessels.
The Attorney-General has experienced similar improper
interference, more than any other perhaps; none are ex-
empt. But the Secretary of State, while meddlesome with
others, is not at all communicative of the affairs of his own
Department. Scarcely any important measures or even
appointments of that Department are brought before us,
except by the President himself or by bis express direction.
The consequence is that there is reticence by others and
the Government is administered hi a great measure by
Departments. Seward is inquisitive and learns early what
is doing by each of his associates, frequently before we
meet in council, while the other Cabinet officers limit
themselves to their provided duties and are sometimes
wholly unadvised of his.

134 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 16

I have administered the Navy Department almost
entirely independent of Cabinet consultation, and I may
say almost without direction of the President, who not only
gives me his confidence but intrusts all naval matters to
me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his
confidence, I should prefer that every important naval
movement should pass a Cabinet review. To-day, for in-
stance, Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear-
Admiral, and I have sent him off with a squadron to cruise
in the West Indies. All this has been done without Cabinet
consultation, or advice with any one, except Seward and
the President. The detail and the reserve are at the insti-
gation of Seward, who wished Wilkes, between whom and
himself, since the Trent affair, there seems to be an under-
standing, to have a command, without specifying where.
In due time our associates in the Cabinet will learn the
main facts and infer that I withheld from them my orders.
My instructions to our naval officers, — commanders of
squadrons or single ships, — cruising on our blockade
duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I
have communicated them freely to each. I have never read
but one of my letters of instructions to the President, and
that was to Captain Mercer of the Powhatan in command
of the naval expedition to Sumter a few weeks after I en-
tered upon my duties, and those instructions were, covertly,
set aside and defeated by Seward.

So in regard to each and all the Departments; if I have
known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has
not been in Cabinet consultations. Seward beyond any
and all others is responsible for this state of things. It has
given him individual power, but often at the expense of
good administration.

In everything relating to military operations by land,
General Scott first, then McClellan, then Halleck, have
directed and controlled. The Government was virtually
in the hands of the General-in-Chief, so far as armies and
military operations were concerned. The Administration

1862] LINCOLN AND SEWARD 135

had no distinct military policy, was permitted to have
none. The President was generally advised and consulted,
but Seward was the special confidant of General Scott,
was more than any one of McClellan, and, in conjunction
with Stanton, of Halleck. With wonderful kindness of
heart and deference to others, the President, with little
self-esteem and unaffected modesty, has permitted this
and in a great measure has surrendered to military officers
prerogatives intrusted to himself. The mental qualities of
Seward are almost the precise opposite of the President.
He is obtrusive and never reserved or diffident of his own
powers, is assuming and presuming, meddlesome, and un-
certain, ready to exercise authority always, never doubt-
ing his right until challenged; then he becomes timid, un-
certain, distrustful, and inventive of schemes to extricate
himself, or to change his position. He is not particularly
scrupulous in accomplishing an end, nor so mindful of
what is due to others as would be expected of one who
aims to be always courteous towards equals. The Pre-
sident he treats with a familiarity that sometimes borders
on disrespect. The President, though he observes this
ostentatious presumption, never receives it otherwise than
pleasantly, but treats it as a weakness hi one to whom
he attributes qualities essential to statesmanship, whose
pliability is pleasant, and whose ready shrewdness he finds
convenient and acceptable.

With temperaments so constituted and so unlike it is
not surprising that the obsequious affability and ready as-
sumption of the subordinate presumed on and to an extent
influenced the really superior intellect of the principal,
and made himself in a degree the centralizing personage.
While the President conceded to the Secretary of State
almost all that he assumed, not one of his colleagues made
that concession. They treated his opinions respectfully,
but as no better than the opinions of others, except as they
had merit; ar.id his errors. they exposed and opposed as
they deserved. One or two have always been ready to

136 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 16

avail themselves of the opportunity. In the early days of
the Administration the Cabinet officers were absorbed by
labors and efforts to make themselves familiar with their
duties, so as rightly to discharge them. Those duties were
more onerous and trying, in consequence of the overthrow
of old parties and the advent of new men and new organ-
izations, with the great rupture that was going on in the
Government, avowedly to destroy it, than had ever been
experienced by any of their predecessors.

Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were absorbed
in familiarizing themselves with their duties and hi prepar-
ing for impending disaster, the Secretary of State, less
apprehensive of disaster, spent a considerable portion of
every day with the President, patronizing and instructing
him, hearing and telling anecdotes, relating interesting
details of occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his
political party notions. I think he has no very profound or
sincere convictions. Cabinet-meetings, which should, at
that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were
infrequent, irregular, and without system. The Secretary
of State notified his associates when the President desired
a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unad-
visable to the Premier — as he liked to be called and con-
sidered — that the members should meet often, and they
did not. Consequently there was very little concerted
action.

At the earlier meetings there was little or no formality;
the Cabinet-meetings were a sort of privy council or
gathering of equals, much like a Senatorial caucus, where
there was no recognized leader and the Secretary of State
put himself in advance of the President. No seats were
assigned or regularly taken. The Secretary of State was
invariably present some little time before the Cabinet as-
sembled and from his former position as the chief executive
of the largest State in the Union, as well as from his recent
place as a Senator, and from his admitted experience and
familiarity with affairs, assumed, and was allowed, as was

1862] CONDUCT OF CABINET-MEETINGS 137

proper, to take the lead in consultations and also to give
tone and direction to the manner and mode of proceedings.
The President, if he did not actually wish, readily ac-
quiesced in, this. Mr. Lincoln, having never had experi-
ence in administering the Government, State or National,
deferred to the suggestions and course of those who had.
Mr. Seward was not slow in taking upon himself to pre-
scribe action and doing most of the talking, without much
regard to the modest chief, but often to the disgust of his
associates, particularly Mr. Bates, who was himself always
courteous and respectful, and to the annoyance of Mr.
Chase, who had, like Mr. Seward, experience as a chief
magistrate. Discussions were desultory and without order
or system, but in the summing-up and conclusions the
President, who was a patient listener and learner, concen-
trated results, and often determined questions adverse to
the Secretary of State, regarding him and his opinions, as
he did those of his other advisers, for what they were worth
and generally no more. But the want of system and free
communication among all as equals prevented that con-
cert and comity which is really strength to an adminis-
tration.

Each head of a Department took up and managed the
affairs which devolved upon him as he best could, fre-
quently without consulting his associates, and as a con-
sequence without much knowledge of the transactions of
other Departments, but as each consulted with the Pre-
sident, the Premier, from daily, almost hourly, intercourse
with him, continued, if not present at these interviews,
to ascertain the doings of each and all, though himself
imparting but little of his own course to any. Great events
of a general character began to impel the members to
assemble daily, and sometimes General Scott was present,
and occasionally Commodore Stringham; at times others
were called in. The conduct of affairs during this period
was awkward and embarrassing. After a few weeks the
members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be

138 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 16

better advised on subjects for which they were all meas-
urably responsible to the country. The Attorney-General
expressed his dissatisfaction with these informal proceed-
ings and advised meetings on stated days for general and
current affairs, and hoped, when there was occasion,
special calls would be made. The Secretary of State alone
dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it inex-
pedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare
the tune; but the President was pleased with the sugges-
tion, if he did not prompt it, and concurred with the rest
of the Cabinet.

The form of proceeding was discussed; Mr. Seward
thought that would take care of itself. Some suggestions
were made in regard to important appointments which had
been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of
State taking the lead in selecting high officials without
general consultation. There seemed an understanding
between the Secretaries of State and Treasury, who had
charge of the most important appointments, of which
understanding the President was perhaps cognizant.
Chase had extensive patronage, Seward appointments
of high character. The two arranged that each should
make his own selection of subordinates. These two men
had political aspirations which did not extend to their
associates (with perhaps a single exception that troubled
neither). Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this
arrangement, but he often was overreached, and the ar-
rangement was one of the mistakes of his life.

Without going farther into details, the effect, and prob-
ably the intention, of these proceedings in those early days
was to dwarf the President and elevate the Secretary of
State. The latter also circumscribed the sphere of [the
former] so far as he could. Many of the important meas-
ures, particularly of his own Department, he managed to
dispose of, or contrived to have determined, independent
of the Cabinet.

My early collision with him in some complications con-

1862] RIVALRY OF SEWARD AND CHASE 139

nected with the Sumter and Pensacola expeditions, when
he was so flagrantly wrong as to be overruled by the Presi-
dent, caused us to get along thenceforward without serious
difficulties, though, our duties being intimate, we were
often brought together and had occasional disagreements.
Between Seward and Chase there was perpetual rivalry
and mutual but courtly distrust. Each was ambitious.
Both had capacity. Seward was supple and dexterous;
Chase was clumsy and strong. Seward made constant
mistakes, but recovered with a facility that was wonderful
and almost always without injury to himself ; Chase com-
mitted fewer blunders, but persevered in them when made,
often to his own serious detriment. In the fevered condi-
tion of public opinion, the aims and policies of the [two]
were strongly developed. Seward, who had sustained
McClellan and came to possess, more than any one else in
the Cabinet, his confidence, finally yielded to Stanton's
vehement demands and acquiesced in his sacrifice. Chase,
from an original friend and self-constituted patron of
McC., became disgusted, alienated, an implacable enemy,
denouncing McClellan as a coward and military imbecile.
In all this he was stimulated by Stanton, and the victim of
Seward, who first supplanted him with McC. and then gave
up McC. to appease Stanton and public opinion.

September 18, Thursday. The last two or three days
have been pregnant with rumors and speculations of an
exciting character. Some officials on the watch-tower^
sentinels and generals, have been alarmed; but on the
whole the people have manifested a fair degree of con-
fidence and composure.

We have authentic news that a long and sanguinary
battle has been fought.1 McClellan telegraphs that the
fight between the two armies was for fourteen hours. The
Rebels must have been in strong position to have main-
tained such a fight against our large army. He also tele-
1 The Battle of Antietam was fought on the 16th and 17th.

140 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. is

graphs that our loss is heavy, particularly in generals, but
gives neither names nor results. His dispatches are seldom
full, clear, or satisfactory. "Behaved splendidly," "per-
formed handsomely," but wherein or what was accom-
plished is never told. Our anxiety is intense.

We have but few and foggy dispatches of any kind these
troublesome days. Yesterday and day before there were
conflicting accounts about Harper's Ferry, which, it is
now admitted, was thrown to the Rebels with scarcely
a struggle. Miles,1 who was hi command, is reported mor-
tally wounded. . . .

General Mansfield is reported slain. He was from my
State and almost a neighbor. He called on me last week,
on his way from Norfolk to join the army above. When
parting he once shook hands, there then was a farther
brief conversation and he came back from the door after
he left and again shook hands. "Farewell," said I, "suc-
cess attend you." He remarked, with emphasis, and some
feeling, "We may never meet again."

September 19, Friday. Am vexed and disturbed by tid-
ings from the squadron off Mobile. Preble, by sheer pusil-
lanimous neglect, feebleness, and indecision, let the pirate
steamer Oreto run the blockade. She came right up and
passed him, flying English colors. Instead of checking her
advance or sinking her, he fired all round, made a noise,
and is said to have hurt none of her English crew. This
case must be investigated and an example made. Had
been dismissed, this would not have occurred.

Nothing from the army, except that, instead of follow-
ing up the victory, attacking and capturing the Rebels,
they, after a day's armistice, are rapidly escaping over the
river. McGlellan says they are crossing and that Pleas-
anton is after them. Oh dear!

I am not writing a history of the War or its events herein.
That will be found in the books. But I record my own

1 Colonel Dlxon S. Miles. He died of his wounds, Sept. 16, 1862.

1862] DISMISSAL OF PREBLE 141

impressions and the random speculations, views, and
opinions of others also.

September 20, Saturday. Am troubled by Treble's con-
duct. There must be a stop put to the timid, hesitating,
and I fear sometimes traitorous course of some of our
officers. Tenderness, remonstrance, reproof do no good.
Preble is not a traitor, but loyal. An educated, gentle-
manly officer of a distinguished family and more than
ordinary acquirements, but wants promptitude, energy, de-
cision, audacity, perhaps courage. I am inclined to believe,
however, an excess of reading, and a fear that he might
violate etiquette, some point of international law, or that
he should give offense to Great Britain, whose insolence
the State Department fears and deprecates and submits to
with all humility, had its influence. He paused at a crit-
ical moment to reflect on what he had read and the state
of affairs. A man less versed in books would have sunk
the pirate if she did not stop when challenged, regardless
of her colors. No Englishman had a right to approach and
pass the sentinel on duty. Preble was placed there to pre-
vent intercourse, — was a sentinel to watch the Rebels
and all others, — and no Englishman had a right to tres-
pass. A board of officers would be likely to excuse him, as

in the case of and ,J on account of his amiable

qualities, general intelligence, and good intentions. The
tune has arrived when these derelictions must not go
unpunished. I should have preferred that some other man
should have been punished. I have had the subject under
consideration with some of the best minds I could consult,
and found no difference of opinion. I then took the dis-
patches to the President and submitted them to him. He
said promptly: " Dismiss him. If that is your opinion, it
is mine. I will do it." Secretary Seward and Attorney-
General Bates, each of whom I casually met, advised dis-
missal. It is painful, but an unavoidable duty. I am sorry

1 No names in original.

142 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 20

for Preble, but shall be sorry for my country if it is not
done. Its effect upon the Navy will be more salutary than
were he and fifty like him to fall in battle.

Commander Joe Smith,1 who died at his post when the
ill-fated Congress went down from the assault of the Mer-
rimac, perished in the line of duty. I have never been
satisfied with the conduct of the flag-officer2 in those days,
who was absent in the waters of North Carolina, — pur-
posely and unnecessarily absent, in my apprehension,
through fear of the Merrimac, which he knew was com-
pleted, and ready to come out. It was like dread of the
new Merrimac at Richmond, which was nearly ready, that
led him finally to resign his squadron command. He has
wordy pretensions, some capacity, but no hard courage.
There is a clan of such men in the Navy, varying in shade
and degree, who in long years of peace have been students
and acquired position, but whose real traits are not gener-
ally understood. The Department is compelled to give
them commands, and at the same time is held responsible
for their weakness, errors, and want of fighting qualities.

Nothing conclusive from the army. The Rebels have
crossed the river without being hurt or seriously molested,
— much in character with the general army management
of the war. Little is said on the subject. Stanton makes
an occasional sneering remark, Chase now and then a
better one, but there is no general review, inquiry, or dis-
cussion. There is no abatement of hostility to McClellan.

September 22. A special Cabinet-meeting. The subject
was the Proclamation for emancipating the slaves after
a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion.
For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the
President says never lost sight of. When it was submitted,
and now in taking up the Proclamation, the President
stated that the question was finally decided, the act and

1 Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith.

1 Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, Louis M. Goldsborough.

PL,

the consequences were his, but that he felt it due to us to
make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticism
on the paper which he had prepared. There were, he had
found, not unexpectedly, some differences in the Cabinet,
but he had, after ascertaining in his own way the views of
each and all, individually and collectively, formed his own
conclusions and made his own decisions. In the course of
the discussion on this paper, which was long, earnest, and,
on the general principle involved, harmonious, he re-
marked that he had made a vow, a covenant, that if God
gave us the victory in the approaching battle, he would
consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was
his duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It
might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way
submitted the disposal of matters when the way was not
clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this
question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was
right, was confirmed and strengthened in his action by
the vow and the results. His mind was fixed, his decision
made, but he wished his paper announcing his course as
correct in terms as it could be made without any change
in his determination. He read the document. One or two
unimportant amendments suggested by Seward were ap-
proved. It was then handed to the Secretary of State
to publish to-morrow. After this, Blair remarked that he
considered it proper to say he did not concur in the ex-
pediency of the measure at this time, though he approved
of the principle, and should therefore wish to file his objec-
tions. He stated at some length his views, which were
substantially that we ought not to put in greater jeopardy
the patriotic element in the Border States, that the results
of this Proclamation would be to carry over those States
en masse to the Secessionists as soon as it was read, and
that there was also a class of partisans in the Free States
endeavoring to revive old parties, who would have a club
put into their hands of which they would avail themselves
to beat the Administration.

144 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 22

The President said he had considered the danger to be
apprehended from the first objection, which was undoubt-
edly serious, but the objection was certainly as great not
to act; as regarded the last, it had not much weight with
him.

The question of power, authority, in the Government to
set free the slaves was not much discussed at this meeting,
but had been canvassed by the President in private con-
versation with the members individually. Some thought
legislation advisable before the step was taken, but Con-
gress was clothed with no authority on this subject, nor is
the Executive, except under the war power, — military
necessity, martial law, when there can be no legislation.
This was the view which I took when the President first
presented the subject to Seward and myself last summer
as we were returning from the funeral of Stanton's child, —
a ride of two or three miles from beyond Georgetown.
Seward was at that time not at all communicative, and, I
think, not willing to advise, though he did not dissent from,
the movement. It is momentous both in its immediate
and remote results, and an exercise of extraordinary power
which cannot be justified on mere humanitarian principles,
and would never have been attempted but to preserve the
national existence. The slaves must be with us or against
us in the War. Let us have them. These were my convic-
tions and this the drift of the discussion.

The effect which the Proclamation will have on the
public mind is a matter of some uncertainty. In some
respects it would, I think, have been better to have issued
it when formerly first considered.

There is an impression that Seward has opposed, and is
opposed to, the measure. I have not been without that
impression myself, chiefly from his hesitation to commit
himself, and perhaps because action was suspended on his
suggestion. But in the final discussion he has as cordially
supported the measure as Chase.

For myself the subject has, from its magnitude and its

1862] THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 145

consequences, oppressed me, aside from the ethical features
of the question. It is a step in the progress of this war
which will extend into the distant future. A favorable
termination of this terrible conflict seems more remote
with every movement, and unless the Rebels hasten to
avail themselves of the alternative presented, of which I
see little probability, the war can scarcely be other than
one of emancipation to the slave, or subjugation, or sub-
mission to their Rebel owners. There is in the Free States
a very general impression that this measure will insure a
speedy peace. I cannot say that I so view it. No one in
those States dare advocate peace as a means of prolonging
slavery, even if it is his honest opinion, and the pecuniary,
industrial, and social sacrifice impending will intensify the
struggle before us. While, however, these dark clouds are
above and around us, I cannot see how the subject can be
avoided. Perhaps it is not desirable it should be. It is,
however, an arbitrary and despotic measure in the cause
of freedom.

September 23, Tuesday. Received a letter from Commo-
dore W. D. Porter stating his arrival in New York after
many signal exploits, — capturing the ironclad steamer
Arkansas, running Bayou Sara, etc. Charges from Admirals
Farragut and Davis, accusing him of misrepresentation
and worse, have preceded his arrival. The War Depart-
ment has sent me an inexcusable letter, abusive of the
military, which Porter has written, and which Stanton
cannot notice. I have been compelled to reprove him
and to send him before the Retiring Board. Like all the
Porters, he is a courageous, daring, troublesome, reckless
officer.

No news from the army. The Rebels appear to be mov-
ing back into Virginia in their own time and way, to select
their own resting-place, and to do, in short, pretty much
as they please. Am sad, sick, sorrowful over this state of
things, but see no remedy without change of officers.

146 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 24

September 24, Wednesday. Secretary Smith called this
morning. Said he had just had an interview with Judge-
Advocate Turner, who related a conversation which had
taken place between himself (T.) and Colonel Key, one of
Halleck's staff. T. had expressed to K. his surprise that
McClellan had not followed up the victory last week by
pursuing the Rebels and capturing them or cutting them
in pieces. That, said K., is not the policy. Turner asked
what, then, was the policy. Key said it was one of ex-
haustion; that it would have been impolitic and injudicious
to have destroyed the Rebel army, for that would have
ended the contest without any compromise, and it was the
army policy at the right time to compel the opposing
forces to adopt a compromise.1

Smith assures me that Turner made to him this com-
munication. It is most extraordinary, yet entirely con-
sistent with current events and what Wilson and others
have stated. While I can hardly give credit to the state-
ment, the facts can be reconciled with every action or
inaction, — with wasted energies, fruitless campaigns, and
barren fights. Smith fully believes it.

Had an impertinent letter from Senator John P. Hale,
who asks for copies of different opinions given me by the
Attorney-General on the subject of appointing midship-
men, and cautioning me not to disregard the plain language
of the law, whatever might be the opinion of the Attorney-
General. Informed Senator Hale that I had the unofficial
advice instead of the official opinion of the law officer of
the Government, given as a patriot and statesman, recom-
mending that the appointments should be made, what-
ever might be the preliminary forms rendered impossible
by the anomalous condition of the country; that every
person whom I had consulted — and I had consulted many
— concurred in giving similar advice; that it accorded

1 Major John J. Key was summarily called upon by the President to
account for his language, stingingly rebuked, and forthwith discharged
from the service.

1862] SENATOR JOHN P. HALE 147

with my own views, etc., etc.; that I had made the ap-
pointments before receiving his letter indicating, on his
part, an opposite policy.

That he will assail these appointments I have little
doubt, his object being hi this instance to attack the
Attorney-General, whom he cannot use, rather than
myself, though willing to assail both provided he can do
so successfully. With some humor but little industry,
some qualities as a jester and but few as a statesman,
I have not much respect for this Senatorial buffoon, who
has neither application nor fidelity, who is neither honest
nor sincere. Such men are not useful legislators.

As I write, 9 P.M., a band of music strikes up on the
opposite side of the square, a complimentary serenade to
the President for the Emancipation Proclamation. The
document has been in the main well received, but there is
some violent opposition, and the friends of the measure
have made this demonstration to show their approval.

September 25, Thursday. Had some talk to-day with
Chase on financial matters. Our drafts on Barings now cost
us 29 per cent. I object to this as presenting an untrue state-
ment of naval expenditures, — unjust to the Navy De-
partment as well as incorrect hi fact. If I draw for $100,000
it ought not to take from the naval appropriation $129,000.
No estimates, no appropriations by Congress, embrace the
$29,000 brought on by the mistaken Treasury policy of de-
preciating the currency. I therefore desire the Secretary of
the Treasury to place $100,000 in the hands of the Barings
to the credit of the Navy Department, less the exchange.
This he declines to do, but insists on deducting the differ-
ence between money and inconvertible paper, which I
claim to be wrong, because in our foreign expenditures the
paper which his financial policy forces upon us at home is
worthless abroad. The depreciation is the result of a mis-
taken financial policy, and illustrates its error and tendency
to error.

148 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 25

The departure from a specie standard and the adoption
of an irredeemable paper currency deranges the finances
and is fraught with disastrous consequences. This vitiation
of the currency is the beginning of evil, — a fatal mistake,
which will be likely to overwhelm Chase and the Adminis-
tration, ii he and they remain here long enough.

Had some conversation with Chase relating to the War.
He is much discouraged, thinks the President is, believes
the President is disposed to let matters take their course,
deplores this state of things but can see no relief. I asked
if the principal source of the difficulty was not in the fact
that we actually had not a War Department. Stanton is
dissatisfied, and he and those under his influence do not
sustain and encourage McClellan, yet he needs to be con-
stantly stimulated, inspired, and pushed forward. It was,
I said, apparent to me, and I thought to him, that the
Secretary of War, though arrogant and often offensive in
language, did not direct army movements; he appears to
have something else than army operations in view. The
army officers here, or others than he, appear to control
military movements. Chase was disturbed by my re-
marks. Said Stanton had not been sustained, and his
Department had become demoralized, but he (C.) should
never consent to remain if Stanton left. I told him he mis-
apprehended me. I was not the man to propose the exclu-
sion of Stanton, or any one of our Cabinet associates, but
we must look at things as they are and not fear to discuss
them. It was our duty to meet difficulties and try to correct
them. It was wrong for him, or any one, to say he would
not remain and do his duty if the welfare of the country
required a change of policy or a personal change in any one
Department. If Stanton was militarily unfit, indifferent,
dissatisfied, or engaged in petty personal intrigues against
a man whom he disliked, to the neglect of the duties with
which he was intrusted, or had not the necessary adminis-
trative ability, was from rudeness or any other cause of-
fensive, we ought not to shut our eyes to the fact. If a man

1862] CHASE'S OPINION OF STANTON 149

were to be brought into the War Department, or proposed
to be brought in, with heart and mind in the cause, sin-
cere, earnest, and capable, who would master the generals
and control them, break up cliquism, and bring forward
those officers who had the highest military qualities, we
ought not to object to it. I knew not that such a change
was thought of. Without controverting or assenting, he
said Stanton had given way just as Cameron did, and in
that way lost command and influence. It is evident that
Chase takes pretty much the same views that I do, but has
not made up his mind to act upon his convictions. He
feels that he has been influenced by Stanton, whose polit-
ical and official support he wants in his aspirations, but
begins to have a suspicion that S. is unreliable. They have
consulted and acted in concert and C. had flattered him-
self that he had secured S. in his interest, but must have be-
come aware that there is a stronger tie between Seward and
Stanton than any cord of his. C. is not always an acute
and accurate reader of men, but he cannot have failed to
detect some of the infirm traits of Stanton. When I de-
clined to make myself a party to the combination against
McClellan and refused to sign the paper which Chase
brought me, Stanton, with whom I was not very intimate,
spoke to me in regard to it. I told Stanton I thought the
course proposed was disrespectful to the President. Stan-
ton said he felt under no obligation to Mr. Lincoln, that
the obligations were the other way, both to him and to me.
His remarks made an impression on me most unfavorable,
and confirmed my previous opinion that he is not faithful
and true but insincere.

The real character of J. P. Hale is exhibited in a single
transaction. He wrote me an impertinent and dictatorial
letter which I received on Wednesday morning, admonish-
ing me not to violate law in the appointment of midship-
men. Learning from my answer that I was making these
appointments notwithstanding his warning and protest, he
had the superlative meanness to call on Assistant Secretary

150 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 25

Fox, and request him, if I was actually making the ap-
pointments which he declares to be illegal, to procure
on his (Hale's) application the appointment of a lad for
whom he felt an interest. This is after his supercilious
letter to me, and one equally supercilious to Fox, which
the latter showed me, in which he buttoned up his virtue
to the throat and said he would never acquiesce in such
a violation of the law. Oh, John P. Hale, how transparent
is thy virtue ! Long speeches, loud professions, Scriptural
quotations, funny anecdotes, vehement denunciations avail
not to cover thy nakedness, which is very bald.

The President has issued a proclamation on martial
law, — suspension of habeas corpus he terms it, meaning,
of course, a suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Of this proclamation, I knew nothing until
I saw it in the papers, and am not sorry that I did not.
I question the wisdom or utility of a multiplicity of pro-
clamations striking deep on great questions.

September 26, Friday. At several meetings of late the
subject of deporting the colored race has been discussed.
Indeed for months, almost from the commencement of this
administration, it has been at tunes considered. More
than a year ago it was thrust on me by Thompson and
others in connection with the Chiriqui Grant, a claim to
title from the Government of Central America of a large
part of Costa Rica. Speculators used it as a means of dis-
posing of that grant to our Government. It was a rotten
remnant of an intrigue of the last administration. The
President, encouraged by Blair and Smith, was disposed to
favor it. Blair is honest and disinterested ; perhaps Smith
is so, yet I have not been favorably impressed with his
zeal in behalf of the Chiriqui Association. As early as
May, 1861, a great pressure was made upon me to enter
into a coal contract with this company. The President was
earnest in the matter; wished to send the negroes out of the
country. Smith, with the Thompsons, urged and stimu-

1862] THE CHIRIQUI SCHEME 151

lated him, and they were as importunate with me as the
President. I spent two or three hours on different days
looking over the papers, — titles, maps, reports, and evi-
dence, — and came to the conclusion that there was fraud
and cheat in the affair. It appeared to be a swindling
speculation. Told the President I had no confidence in it,
and asked to be released from its further consideration.
The papers were then referred to Smith to investigate and
report. After a month or two he reported strongly in favor
of the scheme, and advised that the Navy Department
should make an immediate contract for coal before foreign
governments got hold of it. Mr. Toucey had investigated
it. Commodore Engle had been sent out to examine the
country and especially in relation to coal. The President
was quite earnest in its favor, but, satisfied myself it was
a job, I objected and desired to be excused from any parti-
cipation in it. Two or three times it has been revived, but
I have crowded off action. Chase gave me assistance on one
occasion, and the scheme was dropped until this question
of deporting colored persons came up, when Smith again
brought forward Thompson's Chiriqui Grant. He made
a skillful and taking report, embracing both coal and ne-
groes. Each was to assist the other. The negroes were to
be transported to Chiriqui to mine coal for the Navy, and
the Secretary of the Navy was to make an immediate
advance of $50,000 for coal not yet mined, — nor laborers
obtained to mine it, nor any satisfactory information or
proof that there was decent coal to be mined. I respectfully
declined adopting his views. Chase and Stanton sustained
me, and Mr. Bates to an extent. Blair, who first favored
it, cooled off, as the question was discussed, but the
President and Smith were persistent.

It came out that the governments and rival parties in
Central America denied the legality of the Chiriqui Grant
and Thompson's claim, — declared it was a bogus transac-
tion. The President concluded he ought to be better satis-
fied on this point, and determined he would send out an

152 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 26

agent. At this stage of the case Senator Pomeroy appeared
and took upon himself a negro emigrating colonization
scheme. Would himself go out and take with him a cargo
of negroes, and hunt up a place for them, — all, profess-
edly, in the cause of humanity.

On Tuesday last the President brought forward the sub-
ject and desired the members of the Cabinet to each take
it into serious consideration. He thought a treaty could
be made to advantage, and territory secured to which the
negroes could be sent. Thought it essential to provide an
asylum for a race which we had emancipated, but which
could never be recognized or admitted to be our equals.
Several governments had signified their willingness to
receive them. Mr. Seward said some were willing to take
them without expense to us.

Mr. Blair made a long argumentative statement in favor
of deportation. It would be necessary to rid the country
of its black population, and some place must be found
for them. He is strongly for deportation, has given the
subject much thought, but yet seems to have no matured
system which he can recommend. Mr. Bates was for
compulsory deportation. The negro would not, he said, go
voluntarily, had great local attachments but no enterprise
or persistency. The President objected unequivocally to
compulsion. Then: emigration must be voluntary and
without expense to themselves. Great Britain, Denmark,
and perhaps other powers would take them. I remarked
there was no necessity for a treaty, which had been sug-
gested. Any person who desired to leave the country could
do so now, whether white or black, and it was best to leave
it so, — a voluntary system; the emigrant who chose to
leave our shores could and would go where there were the
best inducements.

These remarks seemed to strike Seward, who, I per-
ceive, has been in consultation with the President and
some of the foreign ministers, and on his motion the sub-
ject was then postponed, with an understanding it would

1862] MEETING OF THE GOVERNORS 153

be taken up to-day. Mr. Bates had a very well prepared
paper which he read, expressing his views. Little was
said by any one else except Seward, who followed up my
suggestions. But the President is not satisfied; says he
wants a treaty. Smith says the Senate would never ratify
a treaty conferring any power, and advised that Seward
should make a contract.

The Governors of the loyal States called to-day on the
President. They have had a meeting at Altoona, for what
purpose I scarcely know. It was an unauthorized gather-
ing of State Executives, doubtless with good intent; but I
dislike these irregular and extraordinary movements. They
must tend to good or evil, and I see no good. These offi-
cials had better limit their efforts within their legitimate
sphere.

Admiral Gregory came to see me in relation to the iron-
clads which are being constructed under his superintend-
ence. Enjoined upon him to have them completed by
November at farthest. A demonstration is to be made on
Charleston, and it will not do to depend upon the army
even for cooperation there.

It is now almost a fortnight since the battle near Sharps-
burg [Antietam]. The Rebels have recrossed the Po-
tomac, but our army is doing nothing. The President
says Halleck told him he should want two days more to
make up his mind what to do. Great Heavens! what
a General-in-Chief!

September 27, Saturday. Governor Tod1 called on me
to-day. Is hopeful and earnest. Thinks delay is necessary.
His confidence in McClellan is unimpaired, and in the
President it is greatly increased. Has full, unwavering
confidence the country will be extricated and the Union
maintained.

The Republican State Convention of New York, which

1 David Tod, Governor of Ohio.

154 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 27

met at Syracuse, has nominated General James S. Wads-
worth for Governor. There has been a good deal of pecul-
iar New York management in this proceeding, and some
disappointments. Morgan, who is, on the whole, a good
Governor, though of loose notions hi politics, would, I
think, have been willing to have received a third nomina-
tion, but each of the rival factions of the Union party had
other favorites. The Weed and Seward class wanted Gen-
eral Dix to be the conservative candidate, — not that they
have any attachment for him or his views, but they have
old party hate of Wadsworth. The positive Republican
element selected Wadsworth. It is an earnest and fit selec-
tion of an earnest and sincere man. In bygone years both
Wadsworth and Dix belonged to the school of Silas Wright
Democrats. It would have been better had they (Seward
and Weed) taken no active part. I am inclined to believe
Weed so thought and would so have acted. He proposed
going to Europe, chiefly, I understand, to avoid the strug-
gle, but it is whispered that Seward had a purpose to ac-
complish, — that, finding certain currents and influences
are opposed to him and his management of the State De-
partment, he would be glad to retreat to the Senate.

Seymour, the Democratic candidate, has smartness, but
not firm, rigid principles. He is an inveterate partisan,
place-hunter, fond of office and not always choice of means
hi obtaining it. More of a party man than patriot. Is of
the Marcy school rather than of the Silas Wright school,
— a distinction well understood in New York.

September 29, Monday. Seward brought me to-day a
long dispatch from Dudley, consul at Liverpool. Although
his fears were somewhat simulated, I saw he was really
excited and alarmed. He is easily frightened. I therefore
talked on general subjects, but he turned away, said there
were terrible combinations in Europe to break the block-
ade, that there was evidence of it in the documents he
brought and wished me to read. They were getting eight

1862] THE BLOCKADE-BREAKERS 155

or ten steamers ready to break the blockade. I told him
I had no apprehensions from any general concerted attack,
such as he dreaded, but that I was annoyed by the sneak-
ing method which the Englishmen practiced of stealing
into Charleston in the darkness of the night. On reading
the principal dispatch, I assured him there was no evidence
in that document of any purpose to break the blockade,
that there was no mention of an armed vessel by Consul
Dudley, that there was activity among the merchant
adventurers of Great Britain, stimulated by the Bull Run
tidings, which they had just previously received. I did not
doubt that British merchants were actively preparing to
try to run the blockade, but we would be active in trying
to catch them.

He seemed relieved yet not perfectly satisfied. We had
some conversation in relation to letters of marque, which
he favors. Wishes me to purchase the Baltic and give
Comstock the command. Told him I trusted our naval
cruisers, though some were not as fast as I wished, would
perform the service, and that were we to buy and arm the
Baltic, a naval officer must command her.

This scheme for Comstock and the Baltic is a key to the
affected alarm. It has been concocted by Thurlow Weed,
who has a job in view for himself or friends, perhaps both.
Though Seward was somewhat frightened, his fears may
have been greater in appearance than reality. He did not
alarm me. It is shameful that an old profligate party-
debaucher like Weed should have such influence, and
Seward is mistaken in supposing I could be deceived by
this connivance. His own fears of breaking the blockade
were in a degree simulated. Weed is the prompter in this
Comstock and Baltic intrigue. It is a job. Wrote Seward
a letter of some length on the subject of cruising to sup-
press the slave trade under the treaty which he, without
consulting the Cabinet, had recently negotiated with Great
Britain. The letter is in answer to one addressed to him
by Mr. Stuart, the British Charge d'Affaires. The treaty

156 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [SEPT. 29

looks to me like a trap, and as if the Secretary of State had
unwittingly ' ' put his foot in it. " He thinks it would be popu-
lar to make a demonstration against slavery and the slave
trade, — would conciliate the Abolitionists, who distrust
him, and be a feather in his administration of the State
Department. But he has been inconsiderate or duped,
perhaps both. I declined to furnish cruisers as requested,
for it would weaken our position, and I cannot consent to
cripple our naval strength at this tune, but prefer to retain,
and to act under, the belligerent right of search, to that of
restricted right conferred by the treaty.

September 30, Tuesday. Little of importance at the
Cabinet-meeting. The President laid before us the address
of the loyal Governors who lately met at Altoona. Its pub-
lication has been delayed in expectation that Governor
Bradford of Maryland would sign it, but nothing has been
heard from him. His wife was here yesterday to get a pass
to visit her son, who is a Rebel officer and cannot come to
her. She therefore desires to go to him. Seward kindly
procured the document for her. I am for exercising the
gentle virtues when it can consistently and properly be
done, but favor no social visitations like this. Let the
Rebel perish away from the parents whom he has aban-
doned by deserting his country and fighting against his
government.

The President informed us of his interview with Key,
one of Halleck's staff, who said it was not the game of the
army to capture the Rebels at Antietam, for that would
give the North advantage and end slavery; it was the
policy of the army officers to exhaust both sides and then
enforce a compromise which would save slavery.

D. D. Porter appointed to the Western Flotilla — Porter, Davis, and Dahl-
gren — The Cabinet on Emancipation — Admiral Du Pont — Stan ton's
Threat to resign — Dahlgren's Ambitions — The Norfolk Blockade —
The Currency Question — Stuart's Raid — Spanish Claims as to Mari-
time Jurisdiction — The Case of the Steamer Bermuda — General
Scott's Influence at the Beginning of the War — The Question of raising
the Norfolk Blockade — A Hoax on Seward — Transfer of the Missis-
sippi Fleet to the Navy — Seward and the Mails captured on Blockade-
Runners.

October 1, Wednesday. Called this morning at the White
House, but learned the President had left the city. The
porter said he made no mention whither he was going, nor
when he would return. I have no doubt he is on a visit to
McClellan and the army. None of his Cabinet can have
been aware of this journey.

Relieved Davis and appointed D. D. Porter to the
Western Flotilla, which is hereafter to be recognized as a
squadron. Porter is but a Commander. He has, however,
stirring and positive qualities, is fertile in resources, has
great energy, excessive and sometimes not over-scrupulous
ambition, is impressed with and boastful of his own powers,
given to exaggeration in relation to himself, — a Porter
infirmity, — is not generous to older and superior living
officers, whom he is too ready to traduce, but is kind and
patronizing to favorites who are juniors, and generally to
official inferiors. Is given to cliquism but is brave and
daring like all his family. He has not the conscientious
and high moral qualities of Foote to organize the flotilla,
and is not considered by some of our best naval men a for-
tunate officer; has not in his profession, though he may
have personally, what the sailors admire, "luck." It is
a question, with his mixture of good and bad traits, how he
will succeed. His selection will be unsatisfactory to many,

158 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. i

but his field of operation is peculiar, and a young and active
officer is required for the duty to which he is assigned; it
will be an incentive to juniors. If he does well I shall get
no credit; if he fails I shall be blamed. No thanks in any
event will be mine. Davis, whom he succeeds, is more of
a scholar than sailor, has gentlemanly instincts and schol-
arly acquirements, is an intelligent but not an energetic,
driving, fighting officer, such as is wanted for rough work
on the Mississippi; is kind and affable, but has not the
vim, dash, — recklessness perhaps is the better word, —
of Porter.

Dahlgren, whose ambition is great, will, I suppose, be
hurt that Porter, who is his junior, should be designated
for the Mississippi command; and the President will sym-
pathize with D., whom he regards with favor, while he has
not great admiration or respect for Porter. Dahlgren
has asked to be assigned to the special duty of capturing
Charleston, but Du Pont has had that object in view for
more than a year and made it his study. I cannot, though
I appreciate Dahlgren, supersede the Admiral in this work.

The Emancipation Proclamation has, in its immediate
effects, been less exciting than I had apprehended. It has
caused but little jubilation on one hand, nor much angry
outbreak on the other. The speculations as to the senti-
ments and opinions of the Cabinet in regard to this measure
are ridiculously wild and strange. When it was first
brought forward some six or eight weeks ago, all present
assented to it. It was pretty fully discussed at two suc-
cessive Cabinet-meetings, and the President consulted
freely, I presume, with the members individually. He did
with me. Mr. Bates desired that deportation, by force if
necessary, should go with emancipation. Born and edu-
cated among the negroes, having always lived with slaves,
he dreaded any step which should be taken to bring about
social equality between the two races. The effect, he said,
would be to degrade the whites without elevating the
blacks. Demoralization, vice, and misery would follow.

1862] THE CABINET ON EMANCIPATION 159

Mr. Blair, at the second discussion, said that, while he was
an emancipationist from principle, he had doubts of the
expediency of such a movement as was contemplated.
Stanton, after expressing himself earnestly in favor of the
step proposed, said it was so important a measure that he
hoped every member would give his opinion, whatever it
might be, on the subject; two had not spoken, — alluding
to Chase and myself.

I then spoke briefly of the strong exercise of power
involved in the question, and the denial of Executive
authority to do this act, but the Rebels themselves had in-
voked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to arms,
and they must abide the consequences. It was an extreme
exercise of war powers, and under the circumstances and
in view of the condition of the country and the magnitude
of the contest I was willing to resort to extreme measures
and avail ourselves of military necessity, always harsh and
questionable. The blow would fall heavy and severe on
those loyal men in the Slave States who clung to the Union
and had most of their property in slaves, but they must
abide the results of a conflict which we all deplored, and
unless they could persuade their fellow citizens to embrace
the alternative presented, it was their hard fortune to suf-
fer with those who brought on the War. The slaves were
now an element of strength to the Rebels, — were laborers,
producers, and army attendants; were considered as
property by the Rebels, and, if property, were subject to
confiscation; if not property, but persons residing in the
insurrectionary region, we should invite them as well as
the whites to unite with us in putting down the Rebellion.
I had made known my views to the President and could say
here I gave my approval of the Proclamation. Mr. Chase
said it was going a step farther than he had proposed, but
he was glad of it and went into a very full argument on the
subject. I do not attempt to report it or any portion of it,
nor that of others, farther than to define the position of
each when this important question was before us. Some-

160 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. i

thing more than a Proclamation will be necessary, for this
step will band the South together, make opponents of
some who now are friends and unite the Border States
firmly with the Cotton States in resistance to the Govern-
ment.

October 2, Thursday. Admiral Du Pont arrived to-day;
looks hale and hearty. He is a skillful and accomplished
officer. Has a fine address, is a courtier with perhaps too
much finesse and management, resorts too much to ex-
traneous and subordinate influences to accomplish what he
might easily attain directly, and, like many naval officers,
is given to cliques, — personal, naval clanship. This evil
I have striven to break up, and, with the assistance of Se-
cession, which took off some of the worst cases, have thus
far been pretty successful, but there are symptoms of it hi
the South Atlantic Squadron, though I hope it is not seri-
ous. It is well that the officers should not only respect but
have an attachment to their commanders, but not with in-
justice to others, nor at the expense of true patriotism and
the service. But all that I have yet seen is, if not exactly
what is wished, excusable. Certainly, while he continues
to do his duty so well, I shall pass minor errors and sustain
Du Pont. He gives me interesting details of incidents con-
nected with the blockade, of the entrance to Stono, and
affairs at James Island, where Benham committed a char-
acteristic offense in one direction and Hunter a mistake hi
another.

October 3, Friday. Chase tells me that Stanton has called
on him to say he deemed it his duty to resign, being satis-
fied he could no longer be useful in the War Department.
There are, Chase says, unpaid requisitions on his table
at this tune to the amount of $45,000,000 from the War
Department, and things are hi every respect growing worse
daily. Perhaps Chase really believes Stanton, who no
more intends resigning than the President or Seward does.

1862] STANTON'S THREAT TO RESIGN 161

I remarked that the disagreement between the Secretary
of War and the generals in command must inevitably work
disastrously, that I had for some time foreseen this, and
the declaration of Stanton did not surprise me. He could
scarcely do otherwise; he could not get along if these differ-
ences continued, but sooner or later he or the generals, or
the whole, must go. My remarks were, I saw, not expected
or acceptable. Chase said if Stanton went, he would go.
It was due to Stanton and to ourselves that we should
stand by him, and if one goes out, all had better go, cer-
tainly he would.

This, I told him, was not my view. If it were best for the
country that all should go, then certainly all ought to
leave without hesitation or delay; but it did not follow be-
cause one must leave, for any cause, that all should. I did
not admire combinations among officials, preferred indi-
viduality, and did not think it advisable that we should all
make OUT action dependent on the movements or difficul-
ties of the Secretary of War, who, like all of us, had embar-
rassments and might not himself be exempt from error.
There were many things in the Administration which he
and I wished were different. He desired me to think the
matter over. Said, with much feeling, things were serious,
that he could not stand it, that the army was crushing him,
and would crush the country. Says the President takes
counsel of none but army officers in army matters, though
the Treasury and Navy ought to be informed of the par-
ticulars of every movement. This is Stanton's complaint
infused into Chase, and has some foundation, though it
is but part of the evil. This demonstration of Stanton's is
for effect and will fail.

October 7. Busy and a little indisposed for a day or two.
The President returned from his visit to the army Satur-
day night. I met him yesterday when I was riding out.
He was feeling well and much gratified with news just re-
ceived from Corinth, which he stopped me to communicate.

162 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. 7

There was an indisposition to press the subject of negro
emigration to Chiriqui at the meeting of the Cabinet,
against the wishes and remonstrances of the States of
Central America. The President gave an interesting ac-
count of his visit to Antietam, South Mountain, etc., the
late battle-fields.

Had a brief canvass for candidates for Navy chaplain.
The President wishes Coleman appointed. I suggested
that these offices should be distributed among the States,
and he concurred.

A number of highly respectable persons in Maine me-
morialized the President in behalf of George Henry
Preble, recently dismissed, desiring his restoration. Sub-
mitted the memorial, which had been inclosed to me by
Senator Fessenden with a request I would do so in a
pretty earnest letter. The President read it through, and
said no one could be dismissed or punished without bring-
ing up a host of sympathizing friends to resist the un-
pleasant but necessary action of the Government, and
make the victim a martyr. Said he would do nothing in
this case unless I advised it.

Governor Andrew of Massachusetts called upon me this
morning, and we had a frank, free, and full interchange of
views. He is impatient under the dilatory military opera-
tions and the growing ascendency of the army in civil
affairs. Our views did not materially differ on the points
discussed, though he has been impressed by Stanton, who
dislikes many army officers.

October 8, Wednesday. Had a long interview with Gov-
ernor Morgan on affairs in New York and the country.
He says Wadsworth will be elected by an overwhelming
majority; says the best arrangement would have been the
nomination of Dix by the Democrats and then by the Re-
publicans, so as to have had no contest. This was the
scheme of Weed and Seward. Says a large majority of the
convention was for renominating him (Morgan). I have

1862] DAHLGREN'S AMBITIONS 163

little doubt that Weed and Seward could have made Mor-
gan's nomination unanimous, but Weed intrigued deeper
and lost. He greatly preferred Morgan to Wadsworth, but,
trying to secure Dix, lost both. Morgan says Aspinwall,
whom he met here yesterday, had seen and got from Mc-
Clellan the general army order just published sustaining
the Emancipation Proclamation. Has some speculation in
regard to McClellan's prospects, designs, and expectations
as to the Presidency; doubts if he wants it, but thinks he
cannot avoid it, — all which is of the New York political
bill of fare.

October 9, Thursday. Letter to Senator Fessenden in
regard to dismissal of Preble, stating the case, — the
fault, the dismissal, and the impossibility of revoking it
without injury to the service. The subject is a difficult one
to handle. His friends believe he has great merit as an
officer, when he has but little, whatever may be his learn-
ing, respectability, and worth as a gentleman. It will not
do to tell his friends the truth, for they would denounce
it as unjust; besides it is ungenerous to state unpleasant
facts of a stricken man. A more difficult letter to answer
was one from Captain Adams, who commanded the naval
force off Pensacola in the spring of 1861.

Got off two long communications to Seward on the sub-
ject of reciprocal search and the belligerent right of search,
the British treaty and the Danish agreement, law and
instructions, — a queer medley of feeble diplomacy, poor
administration, illegality, departure from usage, etc., etc.

Dahlgren is grieved with my action in his case. He de-
sires, beyond almost any one, the high honors of his pro-
fession, and has his appetite stimulated by the partiality
of the President, who does not hesitate to say to him and
to me, that he will give him the highest grade if I will send
him a letter to that effect, or a letter of appointment. Title
irregularly obtained cannot add to Dahlgren's reputation,
yet he cannot be reasoned with. He has yet rendered no

164 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. 9

service afloat during the war, — has not been under fire, —
and is not on the direct road for professional advancement.
But he is a favorite with the President and knows it. The
army practice of favoritism and political partyism cannot
be permitted in the Navy. Its effect will be more demoral-
izing than that of the military, where it is bad enough. I
am compelled, therefore, to stand between the President
and Dahlgren's promotion, in order to maintain the serv-
ice in proper condition. Dahlgren has the sagacity and
professional intelligence to know I am right, and to appre-
ciate my action though adverse to himself. He therefore
now seeks service afloat. Wants an opportunity to ac-
quire rank and distinction, but that opportunity must be
a matter of favor. His last request was to be permitted to
capture Charleston. This would give him eclat. I told him
I could not rob Du Pont of that honor, but that if he wished
I would give him an opportunity to participate, and un-
derstood from him it would be acceptable. I therefore
tendered him an ironclad and the place of ordnance officer,
he retaining his position at the head of the Bureau, with
leave of absence as a volunteer to fight.

My proposition has not been received in the manner
I expected. He thinks the tender of a single ship to an
officer who has had a navy yard and is now in the Bureau,
derogatory, yet, wishing active service as the means of
promotion, intimates he will accept and resign the Bureau.
This I can't countenance or permit. It would not meet
the views of the President, would be wrong to the service,
and a great wrong to the country, for him to leave the
Ordnance Bureau, where he is proficient and can be most
useful. His specialty is in that branch of the service; he
knows his own value there at this time, and for him to
leave it now would be detrimental to the object he desires
to attain. He is not conscious of it, but he has Dahlgren
more than the service in view. Were he to be present at the
capture of Charleston as a volunteer who had temporarily
left the Bureau for that special service, it would redound

JOHN A. DAHLGREN

1862] THE NORFOLK BLOCKADE 165

to his credit, and make him at least second to Du Pont in
the glory of the achievement.

October 10, Friday. Some vague and indefinite tidings
of a victory by Buell in Kentucky in a two days' fight at
Perryville. We hear also of the capture of batteries by the
Navy on the St. John's in Florida, but have no particulars.

A telegram from Delano 1 at New Bedford tells me that
the pirate or Rebel steamer 290, built in Great Britain and
manned by British seamen, fresh from England, has cap-
tured and burnt five whaling vessels off the Western
Islands. The State Department will, I suppose, submit to
this evidence that England is an underhand auxiliary to the
Rebels, be passive on the subject, and the Navy Depart-
ment will receive as usual torrents of abuse.

At Cabinet to-day, among other subjects, that of trade
at Norfolk was under consideration. We were told the
people are in great distress and trouble, cannot get subsist-
ence nor make sale of anything by reason of the blockade.
Chase thought it very hard, was disposed to open the port
or relax the blockade. Stanton opposed both; said Norfolk
was hot with rebellion, and aid to Norfolk would relieve
Richmond. The President, in the kindness of his heart,
was at first inclined to grant relief. Chase said I had
instructed the squadron to rigidly enforce the blockade.
I admitted this to be true as regarded Norfolk and all the
blockaded ports, and assured him I should not relax unless
by an Executive order, or do otherwise until we had an-
other policy. That to strictly maintain the blockade
caused suffering I had no doubt; that was the chief object
of the blockade. I was doing all in my power to make re-
bellion unpopular, and as a means, I would cause the whole
insurrectionary region to suffer until they laid down their
arms and became loyal. The case was not one of sympathy
but of duty. Chase urged that they might be permitted to
bring out and exchange some of their products, such as
1 B. F. Delano, Naval Constructor.

166 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. 10

shingles, staves, tar, etc., which they could trade for neces-
saries that were indispensable. "Then," said I, "raise the
blockade. Act in good faith with all; let us have no favor-
itism. That is my policy. You must not use the blockade
for domestic traffic or to enrich a few."

The President said these were matters which he had not
sufficiently considered. My remarks had opened a view
that he had not taken. He proposed that Seward and
Chase should see what could be done.

There is, I can see, a scheme for permits, special favors,
Treasury agents, and improper management hi all this; not
that Chase is to receive any pecuniary benefit himself, but
in his political aspirations he is courting, and will give au-
thority to, General Dix, who has, he thinks, political influ-
ence. It is much less, I apprehend, than Chase supposes.
Dix is, I presume, as clear of pecuniary gain as Chase, but
he has on his staff and around him a set of bloodsuckers
who propose to make use of the blockade as a machine to
enrich themselves. A few favorites design to monopolize
the trade of Norfolk, and the Government is to be at the
expense of giving them this monopoly by absolute non-
intercourse, enforced by naval vessels to all but them-
selves. As we have absolute possession of Norfolk and its
vicinity, there is no substantial reason for continuing the
blockade, and it can benefit none but Army and Treasury
favorites. General Dix has, I regret to see, lax notions.
Admiral Lee holds him in check; he appeals' to Chase, who
is very severe towards the Rebels, except in certain mat-
ters of trade and Treasury patronage carrying with them
political influence.

Seward wishes me to modify my second letter on the
subject of instructions under the British slavery treaty, so
as to relieve him in a measure. I have no objection; he
does not appear to advantage in the proceedings. In a
scheme to obtain popularity for himself, he has been se-
cretive, hasty, inconsiderate, overcunning, and weak. The
Englishmen have detected his weak side and taken advan-

1862] THE CURRENCY QUESTION 167

tage of it. His vanity and egotism have been flattered, and
he has undertaken an ostentatious exhibition of his power
to the legations, and at the same time would secure favor
with the Abolitionists and Anti-Slavery men by a most
singular contrivance, which, if carried into effect, would
destroy our naval efficiency. His treaty binds us to sur-
render for a specific purpose the general belligerent right of
search in the most important latitudes. The effect would
be in the highest degree advantageous to the Rebels, and
wholly in their interest. It seems to me a contrivance to
entrap our Government, into which the Secretary of State,
without consulting his associates, has been unwittingly
seduced.

D. D. Porter left Wednesday to take command of the
Mississippi Squadron, with the appointment of Acting
Admiral. This is an experiment, and the results not en-
tirely certain. Many officers of the Navy who are his
seniors will be dissatisfied, but his juniors may, by it, be
stimulated. The river naval service is unique. Foote per-
formed wonders and dissipated many prejudices. The
army has fallen in love with the gunboats and wants them
in every creek. Porter is wanting in some of the best qual-
ities of Foote, but excels him perhaps in others. The
service requires great energy, great activity, abundant re-
sources. Porter is full of each, but is reckless, improvident,
often too presuming and assuming. In an interview on
Wednesday, I endeavored to caution him on certain points
and to encourage him in others. In conformity with his
special request, General McClernand is to command the
army with which the Navy cooperates. This gratifies him,
for he dreads and protests against association with any
West Point general; says they are too self-sufficient,
pedantic, and unpractical.

The currency and financial questions will soon be as
troublesome as the management of the armies. In making
Treasury notes or irredeemable paper of any kind a legal
tender, and in flooding the country with inconvertible

168 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. 10

paper money down to a dollar and fractional parts of a
dollar, the Secretary'of the Treasury may obtain moment-
ary ease and comfort, but woe and misery will follow to
the country. Mr. Chase has a good deal of ability, but has
never made finance his study. His general ideas appear to
be crudely sound, but he does not act upon them, and his
principal and most active and persistent advisers are of
a bad school. The best and soundest financiers content
themselves with calmly stating sound financial truths. He
has not made his plans a subject of Cabinet consultation.
Perhaps it is best he should not. I think he has advised
with them but little, individually. Incidentally he and I
have once or twice had conversations on these matters, and
our views appeared to correspond, but when he has come to
act, a different policy has been pursued. It will add to the
heavy burdens that overload the people.

Singular notions prevail with some of our Cabinet as-
sociates, — such as have made me doubt whether the men
were serious in stating them. On one occasion, something
like a year ago, Smith expressed a hope that the Treasury
would hasten, and as speedily as possible get out the frac-
tional parts of a dollar, in order to put a stop to hoarding.
Chase assured Smith he was hurrying on the work as fast
as possible. I expressed astonishment and regret) and in-
sisted that the more paper he issued, the more hoarding of
coin there would be and the less money we should have;
that all attempts in all countries and times to cheat gold
and silver had proved failures and always would; that
money was one thing and currency another; convertible
paper was current for money, inconvertible paper was not;
that two currencies could not circulate at the same time
in any community; that the vicious and poor currency
always superseded the better, and must in the nature of
things.

Chase, without controverting these remarks, said I be-
longed to the race of hard-money men, whose ideas were
not exactly adapted to these times. Smith was perfectly

1862] STUART'S RAID 169

confident that hoarding up money would cease when there
was no object in it, and if the Treasury would furnish us
with paper there would be no object to hoard. He was
confident it would do the work. I asked Chase if he in-
dorsed such views, but could get no satisfactory answer.
The Treasury is pursuing a course which will unsettle all
values.

October 11, Saturday. We have word which seems reli-
able that Stuart's Rebel cavalry have been to Chambers-
burg in the rear of McClellan, while he was absent in
Philadelphia stopping at the Continental Hotel. I hope
neither statement is correct. But am apprehensive that
both may be true.

October 13, Monday. We have the mortifying intel-
ligence that the Rebel cavalry rode entirely around our
great and victorious Army of the Potomac, crossing the
river above it, pushing on in the rear beyond the Pennsyl-
vania line into the Cumberland Valley, then east and south,
recrossing the Potomac below McClellan and our troops,
near the mouth of the Monocacy. It is the second time
this feat has been performed by J. E. B. Stuart around
McClellan's army. The first was on the York Peninsula.
It is humiliating, disgraceful.

In this raid the Rebels have possessed themselves of a
good deal of plunder, reclothed their men from our stores,
run off a thousand horses, fat cattle, etc., etc. It is not a
pleasant fact to know that we are clothing, mounting, and
subsisting not only our troops but the Rebels also. McClel-
lan had returned from Philadelphia with his wife, a most
estimable and charming lady who cannot have been grati-
fied with this exhibit of her husband's public duties. He
was at Harper's Ferry when this raid of Stuart took place.
His opponents will triumph in this additional evidence of
alleged inertness and military imbecility. It is customary
for some of our generals and other officers to have their

170 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. is

wives with them in the camp and field. The arrangement
does not make them better soldiers. I wish it were pro-
hibited. Some naval officers cite army precedents when
asking the company of their wives on shipboard.

Wrote Reward hi reply to a novel and extraordinary
assumption of Tassara, the Spanish Minister, who claims
a maritime jurisdiction of six miles around the island of
Cuba, instead of three, the recognized coast jurisdiction
by international law. Seward is disposed to concede it to
Spain, because she is better disposed than the other powers,
and he flatters himself he can detach her from them, if we
will be liberal, — that is, give up our rights. It is among
the most singular things of these singular times, that our
Secretary of State supposes that he and a foreign minister
can set aside established usage, make and unmake inter-
national law, can enlarge or circumscribe at pleasure na-
tional jurisdiction and authority. I have remonstrated
with him most emphatically against any such surrender of
our national rights, warned him that the country never
would assent, at all events during hostilities; but there is
a difficulty and delicacy in so managing these questions,
when the Secretary of State, with loose notions of law,
usage, and his own legitimate duty, has undertaken to set
aside law, that is embarrassing. He has a desire to make
instead of to execute national law, paying little attention
to the practice of nations; does not inquire into them until
after he has been committed. The foreigners detect and
profit by this weakness.

October 14, Tuesday. The Secretary of State sends me
an important dispatch from Stuart, British Charge*
d'Affaires during the absence of Lord Lyons, in which he
undertakes to object, unofficially, to the purchase by the
Government of the steamer Bermuda, a prize captured
last April, until the judgment of the court shall have been
pronounced. Seward gives in, cringes under these super-
cilious and arrogant claims and assumptions. It sometimes

1862] THE STEAMER BERMUDA 171

appears to me there is a scheme among some of the lega-
tions to see how far they can impose upon our Secretary of
State by flattery and pretension. I have written a reply
which will be likely, I think, to settle Mr. Stuart, and
possibly annoy Mr. Seward, who, since the affair of the
Trent, when at first he took high and untenable ground,
has lost heart and courage, and is provokingly submissive
to British exactions. I hope he will let Stuart have my
letter. It touches on some points which I wish to force on
the attention of the English Government.

Stanton read a dispatch from General Pope, stating that
the Indians in the Northwest had surrendered and he was
anxious to execute a number of them. The Winnebagoes,
who have not been in the fight, are with him, and he pro-
poses to ration them at public expense through the winter.
He has, Stanton says, destroyed the crops of the Indians,
etc. I was disgusted with the whole thing; the tone and
opinions of the dispatch are discreditable. It was not the
production of a good man or a great one. The Indian out-
rages have, I doubt not, been horrible; what may have been
the provocation we are not told. The Sioux and Ojibbe-
ways are bad, but the Winnebagoes have good land which
white men want and mean to have.

The evening papers contain a partisan speech from John
Van Buren,1 in which he introduces a letter of General
Scott, dated the 3d of March, 1861, addressed to Seward.
It was familiar. I have heard it read twice by General S.
himself, the first time, directly after the inauguration of Mr.
Lincoln, in the War Department, but I had the impression
it was addressed to the President instead of Seward. For
what reason it was placed in the hands of John Van Buren
I do not understand. The General thought much of this
letter, and wrote it, as I supposed, to influence the then
incoming administration, but it was wholly inconclusive

1 A son of Martin Van Buren and a lawyer of ability. The speech was
made in the Cooper Institute, New York, at a meeting to ratify the nom-
ination of Horatio Seymour as Governor of New York by the Democrats.

172 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. 14

when decision was wanted. He was in those days listened
to by both the President and Secretary of State, and his
indecisive policy had probably an effect on them as well as
others. I have since come to the conclusion that the Gen-
eral's own course was shaped by Seward, and that, after
Seward put him aside, took Meigs into his confidence, and
got up the military expedition to Pickens without his
knowledge, General Scott, in justification of himself and
to show his own views independent of the Secretary of
State, was decidedly for the Union.

His influence in the early months of the Administration
was, in some respects, unfortunate. It was a maze of un-
certainty and indecision. He was sincerely devoted to the
Union and anxious that the Rebellion should be extin-
guished, yet shrank from fighting. Seward had brought
him into his policy of meeting aggression with concession.
Blockade some of the worst cities, or shut up their ports,
guard them closely, collect duties on shipboard, or "let the
wayward sisters go in peace." 1 His object seemed to be to
avoid hostilities, but to throw the labor of the conflict on
the Navy if there was to be war. He still strove, however,
as did Seward, to compromise difficulties by a national con-
vention to remodel the Constitution, though aware the
Democrats would assent to nothing. General Scott inau-
gurated the system of frontiers, and did not favor the ad-
vance of our armies into the rebellious States. The time
for decisive action, he thought, had passed, and those who
were for prompt, energetic measures, which, just entering
on administrative duties, they desired, were checked by the
General-in-Chief.

October 15, Wednesday. General Dix came to see me in
relation to the blockade of Norfolk. Says Admiral Lee is
extremely rigid, allows no traffic ; that the people of Nor-
folk are suffering, though in his opinion one half the people

1 General Scott's expression as given in the letter referred to was,
" Wayward sisters, depart in peace."

1862] THE NORFOLK BLOCKADE 173

are loyal. The place, he says, is in the military occupation
of the Government and therefore is not liable to, and can-
not, be blockaded. Tells me he has been reading on the
question, and consulting General Halleck, who agrees
with him. I told him if Norfolk was not, and could not be,
a blockaded port, I should be glad to be informed of the
fact ; that the President had declared the whole coast and
all ports blockaded from the eastern line of Virginia to the
Rio Grande, with the exception of Key West. Congress,
though preferring the closing of the ports, had recognized
and approved the fact, and authorized the President from
time to time, as we recovered possession, to open ports at
his discretion by proclamation. That he had so opened the
ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans, but not
Norfolk. If he was disposed to raise the blockade of that
port, I should not oppose it but be glad of it. That I had so
informed the President and others, but there was unquali-
fied and emphatic opposition in the War Department to
such a step. If he would persuade the Secretary of War
to favor the measure, there would be little resistance in
any other quarter. Perhaps he and General Halleck could
overrule the objections of the Secretary of War. That I
intended to occupy no equivocal attitude. This was not to
be a sham blockade, so far as I was concerned. I thought,
with him, that as Norfolk was in the military occupancy of
our armies and to continue so, there was no substantial
reason for continuing the blockade; that not only humanity
towards the people but good policy on the part of the
Administration required we should extend and promote
commercial intercourse. Commerce promotes friendship.
It would induce the people in other localities to seek the
same privileges by sustaining the Union cause. That, as
things were, Admiral Lee was doing his duty and obeying
instructions in rigidly enforcing the blockade. That I was
opposed to favoritism. There should be either inter-
course or non-intercourse; if the port was open to trade, all
our citizens, and foreigners also, should be treated alike.

174 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. is

"But," said General Dix, "I don't want the blockade of
Norfolk raised; that won't answer."

"Yet you tell me there is no blockade; that it has
ended, and cannot exist because we are in military pos-
session."

"Well," said he, "that is so; we are in military oc-
cupancy and must have our supplies."

"That," I replied, "is provided for. Admiral Lee allows
all vessels with army supplies, duly permitted, to pass."

"But," continued he, "we must have more than that.
The people will suffer."

"Then," said I, "they must return to duty and not
persist in rebellion. The object of the blockade is to make
them suffer. I want no double-dealing or false pretenses.
There is, or there is not, a blockade. If there is, I shall,
until the President otherwise directs, enforce it. If there
is not, the world should know it. Should the blockade be
modified, we shall conform to the modifications."

The General thought it unnecessary to tell the world the
blockade was modified or removed. I thought we should
make the changes public as the declaration of blockade
itself, if we would maintain good faith. He seemed to
have no clear conception of things; thought there ought
to have never been a blockade. In that I concurred.
Told him I had taken that view at the commencement,
but had been overruled; we had placed ourselves in a
wrong position at the beginning, made the Rebels bellig-
erents, given them nationality, — an error and an anomaly.
It was one of Mr. Seward's mistakes.

A letter has been shown about, and is to-day published,
purporting to be from General Kearny, who fell at Chan-
tilly. The letter is addressed to O. S. Halstead of New
Jersey. It expresses his views and shows his feelings
towards McClellan, who, he says, "positively has no
talents." How many officers have written similar private
letters is unknown. "We have no generals," says this
letter of Kearny.

1862] A HOAX ON SEWARD 175

October 17, Friday. The question of traffic at Norfolk
was discussed in Cabinet. General Dix has, I see, made
some headway. Stanton wanted to transfer the whole sub-
ject of permits for army supplies and intercourse to Gen-
eral Dix. Chase thought there should be leave granted for
return cargoes also. I requested, if there was to be a modi-
fication of the blockade, that it should be distinctly under-
stood and announced to what extent. If traffic was to be
authorized, it should be publicly known. Let us not have
the shame, demoralization, and wrong of making a meas-
ure of this kind a cover for favoritism. No distinct con-
clusion was arrived at.

October 18, Saturday. The ravages by the roving
steamer 290, alias Alabama, are enormous. England
should be held accountable for these outrages. The vessel
was built in England and has never been in the ports of
any other nation. British authorities were warned of her
true character repeatedly before she left.

Seward called on me in some excitement this P.M., and
wished me to meet the President, himself, Stanton, and
Halleck at the War Department relative to important
dispatches just received. As we walked over together, he
said we had been very successful in getting a dispatch,
which opened up the whole Rebel proceedings, — dis-
closed their plans and enabled us to prepare for them; that
it was evident there was a design to make an immediate
attack on Washington by water, and it would be well to
buy vessels forthwith if we had not a sufficient number
ready for the purpose. When we entered Stanton's room,
General Halleck was reading the document alluded to and
examining the maps. No one else was present. Stanton
had left the Department. The President was in the room
of the telegraph operator.

The document purported to be a dispatch from General
Cooper, Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederates, to
one of the Rebel agents in England. A question arose as

176 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. is

to the authenticity of the dispatch. Halleck, who is famil-
iar with Cooper's signature, doubted after examining the
paper if this was genuine. Adjutant-General Thomas was
sent for and requested to bring Cooper's signature for com-
parison. Seward then took the papers and commenced
reading aloud. The writer spoke of "the mountains of
Arlington," "the fleet of the Potomac," "the fleet of the
North," etc. I interrupted Seward, and said it was a
clumsy manufacture; that the dispatch could have been
written by no American, certainly not by General Cooper,
or any person conversant with our affairs or the topo-
graphy of the country; that there were no mountains of
Arlington, no fleet of the Potomac, or fleet of the North.
General Halleck mentioned one or two other points which
impressed him that the dispatch was bogus. The President
came in while we were criticizing the document, the reading
of which was concluded by Seward, when the President
took the papers and map to examine them. General
Thomas soon brought a number of Cooper's signatures,
and all were satisfied at a glance that the purported signa-
ture was fictitious.

Seward came readily to the opinion that the papers were
bogus and that the consul, or minister, — he did not say
which, — had been sadly imposed upon, — sold. The dis-
patch had, he said, cost a good deal of money. It was
a palpable cheat. It may be a question whether the British
authorities have not connived at it, to punish our inquis-
itive countrymen for trying to pry into their secrets.

It is just five weeks since the Battle of Antietam, and
the army is quiet, reposing in camp. The country groans,
but nothing is done. Certainly the confidence of the people
must give way under this fatuous inaction. We have sinis-
ter rumors of peace intrigues and strange management.
I cannot give them credit, yet I know little of what is
being done. The Secretary of War is reticent, vexed, dis-
appointed, and communicates nothing. Neither he nor
McClellan will inspire or aid the other.

1862] THE NORFOLK BLOCKADE 177

Chase is pursuing a financial policy which I fear will
prove disastrous, perhaps ruinous. His theories in regard
to gold and currency appear to me puerile.

General Dix is pressing schemes in regard to the block-
ade and trade at Norfolk which are corrupt and demoral-
izing. Dix himself is not selling licenses, but the scoun-
drels who surround him are, and he can hardly be ignor-
ant of the fact. The gang of rotten officers on his staff
have sent him here. One of the worst has his special con-
fidence, and Dix is under the influence of this cunning,
bad man. He has plundering thieves about him, — some,
I fear, as destitute of position as honesty.

McClellan is not accused of corruption, but of criminal
inaction. His inertness makes the assertions of his op-
ponents prophetic. He is sadly afflicted with what the
President calls the " slows." Many believe him to be acting
on the army programme avowed by Key.

October 24, Friday. Wrote Chase this A.M. respecting
traffic at Norfolk. The army officers are crowding Ad-
miral Lee with permits to favorites obtained in abundance
through General Dix. All is in violation of good faith as
regards the blockade. I wrote Chase that all trade should
be interdicted or it should be opened to all; that there
ought to be no sham blockade to pamper army corrup-
tionists; that if there is a blockade it should be rigidly
enforced, excluding all; or let us open the port to all. The
subject was discussed in Cabinet. Previous to introducing
it, I had some talk with Chase. He fully agreed with me,
but preferred opening the port, while, under the repre-
sentations of Stanton, I doubted the expediency. But we
agreed that one policy or the other ought to be adopted, but
it should not be equivocal. When the subject was intro-
duced, Chase flinched, as he often does, and he did not
sustain me, though he did not oppose me, — said nothing.
Seward entreated that the question might be got along
with for ten days, until after the New York election. He

178 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [OCT. is

did not wish to have Dix and the interested fellows around
him take cause of offense at this moment. Stanton said he
thought I had consented to traffic under permits by Dix.
I replied that I had not, and that he could have had no
such thought from anything I had said or done; that I was
opposed to traffic through any blockaded ports and to
return cargoes even in army transports, or vessels carrying
army supplies.

October 25, Saturday. General Wadsworth,1 Mr. Fenton,
and others urgently insist on some changes in the Brooklyn
Navy Yard, of masters who, they claim, are active parti-
sans. But they made no clear case. Told them, I was
opposed to the policy of removals of competent officers
unless for active, offensive partisanship; that any man was
entitled to enjoy and exercise his opinion without molesta-
tion. General W. concurred with me but understood there
were such masters within the prescribed rules. Told them
that from any facts I had received I would only remove
Fairion, master machinist, who, it is shown, is so im-
mersed in politics as to neglect his business, and is a candi-
date for comptroller. As he manifests a willingness and
intention to leave the service for another place, I think he
can depart a few days hi advance without detriment. This
taking advantage of an excited election to thrust miser-
able partisans into places which they are often indiffer-
ently qualified to fill, I dislike, and so expressed myself to
General W., who assented fully to my views.

Some discussion was had yesterday in Cabinet in regard
to the course which should be pursued towards General
J. C. Davis, who killed Major-General Nelson. The grand
jury, it is reported, have ignored the bill in the civil case.
The question was whether the military ought to take notice
of the homicide after the civil authorities declined. Chase

1 Major-General James S. Wadsworth, United States Volunteers, in
charge of the defense of Washington, and later an unsuccessful Republican
candidate for Governor of New York.

1862] HALLEGK AND McCLELLAN 179

and Blair thought the military should. Stanton opposed
it. Seward thought the affair might be looked into. I re-
marked that if the transaction had occurred in the Navy,
we should at least have had a court of inquiry.

November 1, Saturday. The work on the ironclad turret
steamer Passaic is nearly finished. Ericsson makes a pro-
position to fire the fifteen-inch gun through the orifice
instead of protruding the piece. I have no faith in it. Fox
was at first disposed to consider it favorably but doubt-
ingly. Have sent Fox, Admiral Smith, and Dahlgren to
New York to witness test experiment.

November 4, Tuesday. Further news of the depredations
by the Alabama. Ordered Dacotah, Ino, Augusta, etc.,
on her track. The President read in Cabinet to-day his
sensible letter of the 13th of October to General McClellan,
ordering him to move and to pass down on the east side
of the Blue Ridge. McClellan did not wish to move at
all. Was ordered by Halleck, and when he found he
must move, said he would go down the west side of the
mountains, but when he finally started went on the east
side without advising H. or the President.

Stanton, whose dislike of McC. increases, says that
Halleck does not consider himself responsible for army
movements or deficiencies this side of the mountains, of
which he has had no notice from General McClellan, who
neither reports to him nor to the Secretary of War. All his
official correspondence is with the President direct and no
one else.

The President did not assent to the last remarks of
Stanton, which were more sneering in manner than words,
but said Halleck should be, and would be, considered re-
sponsible, for he (the President) had told him (Halleck)
that he would at any time remoVe McC. when H. required
it, and that he (the President) would take the entire
responsibility of the removal.

180 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [NOV. 4

Mr. Bates quietly suggested that Halleck should take
command of the army in person. But the President said,
and all the Cabinet concurred in the opinion, that H.
would be an indifferent general in the field, that he shirked
responsibility in his present position, that he, in short, is
a moral coward, worth but little except as a critic and
director of operations, though intelligent and educated.

Congress wisely ordered a transfer of all war vessels on
the Mississippi to the Navy. It was not by my suggestion
or procurement that this law was passed, but it was proper.
It has, however, greatly disturbed Stanton, who, supported
by Halleck and Ellet, opposes a transfer of the ram fleet as
not strictly within the letter, though it is undoubtedly the
intent of the law. That Ellet should wish a distinct com-
mand is not surprising. It is characteristic. He is full of
zeal to overflowing; is not, however, a naval man, but is,
very naturally, delighted with an independent naval com-
mand in this adventurous ram service. It is, however, a
pitiful business on the part of Stanton and Halleck, who
should take an administrative view and who should be
aware there cannot be two distinct commands on the river
under different orders from different Departments without
endangering collision.

Seward sent me a day or two since a singular note,
supercilious in tone, in relation to mails captured on
blockade-runners, telling me it is deemed expedient that
instructions be given to our naval officers that such mails
should not be opened, but that as speedily as possible they
be forwarded. Who deems it expedient to give these in-
structions, which would be illegal, abject, and an unauthor-
ized and unwarranted surrender of our maritime rights?
No man the least conversant with admiralty or statute
law, usage, or the law of prize, or who knowingly main-
tains national rights can deem it expedient to give such
instructions, and I have declined doing so. The President
must give the order, which he will never do if he looks into
the subject. This is another exhibition of the weakness and

1862] THE CAPTURED MAILS 181

the loose and inconsiderate administrative management
of the Secretary of State, who really seems to suppose him-
self the Government and his whims supreme law. We had
this subject up last August, and I then pointed out the im-
propriety of any attempt to depart from law and usage, but
so shaped a set of instructions as to relieve him; but this
proceeding is worse than the former. I shall make no
farther effort to relieve him, and have told him I cannot go
beyond my instructions of the 18th of August last. He
professes to believe something more is necessary to keep
the English authorities quiet. The truth is he then and
now undertook, in a spirit of self-conceit, to do more than
he is authorized. Stuart, the English Charge", knows it;
has, I have no doubt, pressed Seward to have instructions
issued to our officers which shall come up to the promises
he ostentatiously made. He is conscious, I think, that he
has been bamboozled, but he will not be able to extricate
himself by bamboozling me. His course is sometimes very
annoying, and exhibits an indifference which is astonish-
ing in one of his long experience and intellectual capacity.

A Private Grief — Burnside succeeds McClellan in Command of the Army
of the Potomac — The Modification of the Norfolk Blockade — The
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy — The Question of New
Navy Yards — Count Gurowski and his Book — Commander Preble's
Case — The Division of Virginia — A Roundabout Proceeding of Sew-
ard's — Seward's Resignation and the Discussion in Regard to it —
Chase tenders his Resignation and the President sees a Way out —
Cabinet Rivalries — Seward and Chase requested to withdraw their
Resignations — Depredations of the Alabama — Cabinet Discussion
of the West Virginia Question — Butler superseded by Banks at New
Orleans — The Party Spirit.

December 3. It is a month since I have opened this book
and been able to make any record of current events. A
pressure of public business, the preparation of my Annual
Report, and domestic sorrows have consumed all my wak-
ing moments. A light, bright, cherub face, which threw its
sunshine on our household when this book was last opened,
has disappeared forever. My dear Hubert, who was a treas-
ure garnered in my heart, is laid beside his five brothers
and sisters in Spring Grove. Well has it been for me
that overwhelming public duties have borne down upon
me in these sad days. Alas, frail life! amid the nation's
grief I have my own.

A change of the commander of the Army of the Potomac
has taken place. Stanton is gratified. McClellan is or-
dered to Trenton, and Burnside succeeds him. Burnside
will doubtless do his best, is patriotic and amiable, and,
had he greater powers and grasp, would make an accept-
able and popular, if not a great, general. I hope the War
Department will sustain him more earnestly than it did
McClellan. Of the change I knew nothing and wished to
know nothing when it was made. I had expected it might
take place earlier, when McClellan seemed testing the for-
bearance of the Government, and not one good word was

1862] MODIFICATION OF THE BLOCKADE 183

said for him. It seemed there could not be, but after he
commenced to move, I was less prepared to see him dis-
placed and the announcement came with a shock. We
shall see what Burnside can do and how he will be seconded
by other generals and the War Department.

The November elections have not been favorable to
the Administration. To a great extent its friends are
responsible. Some active and leading Republican minds
have ability and talent to abuse, berate, traduce, often
in secret, and assail, and these gifts are directed against
the Administration. The worst of them are opposed to the
Government and violently opposed to its being adminis-
tered by Democrats.

The efforts of the officers under General Dix and [of] the
General himself, aided by the War and Treasury Depart-
ments, have finally so far prevailed that the blockading
squadron is to allow vessels to pass on a permit from Gen-
eral Dix's military staff. I declined to recognize any such
practice unless by special order of the President, who can
if he pleases modify the blockade. To allow exports and
imports is inconsistent with a rigid and honest blockade.
There has been a good deal of manoeuvring, much backing
and filling. The prize is great. Civilians, quasi-military
men, etc., are interested, — men of political influence. Dix
has made three distinct visits to Washington on the sub-
ject. Some of his staff and Treasury agents were urgent.
I do not think military operations at Fortress Monroe
and its vicinity were suspended or that they suffered
by the absence of Dix. Repeated discussions took place
in the Cabinet. My determination being fixed, it became
necessary the President should issue an order. Chase and
Stanton each prepared a form for the President to sign.
Stanton's was adopted. When the President signed it, I
proposed that Nicolay should make duplicates, one for me.
Stanton thought it unnecessary, said he would make and
send me a perfect copy as soon as he reached the War
Department. This was on Tuesday, the llth of November.

184 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 3

On Wednesday, having business with the President, I asked
if he retained a copy. He said he did not, but, remem-
bering Stanton's promise and my objections to the pro-
ceedings, he manifested his surprise that Stanton had
failed to supply me; wished me to call on Stanton and
get it. I did stop at the War Department on my return.
S. professed astonishment, said he had entirely forgotten
it, that it was in his pocket, had never been taken out.
On Friday morning, the 14th, I received from Captain
Turner, senior officer at Hampton Roads, a letter inclos-
ing a copy of the President's order, with a letter from
Stanton to General Dix inclosing it, dated the very day on
which the order was issued, although he assured me the
dispatch was in his pocket wholly forgotten. The copy
which he sent me and the copy from the naval officer at
Hampton Roads reached me at the same time. Turner
had properly refused to recognize the order sent by
Stanton as authentic, — would not obey it unless received
through the Navy Department. It is unnecessary to com-
ment further than to say there was something more than
right in the transaction.

My Annual Report, which is necessarily long, appears to
have been well received. The New York papers give it ap-
proval, some of them reluctant approval. The Herald says
it is a document highly creditable to the country but not to
the Secretary. I am informed this article is by Bartlett,
who continues to be malignantly angry because I would
not purchase vessels through his agency. He confessed to
a friend that he had been disappointed in not making a
hundred thousand dollars through the Navy Department,
and sent me word that I should feel his vengeance, for he
controlled the New York press. It seems the papers of that
city are, on naval matters, shaped and directed much as he
wishes and said they should be. The Times, where Thur-
low Weed influences the pliant Raymond, says the Report
is too much in detail, is not what it should be, but is able,
etc. The Evening Post says nothing, publishes a brief sum-

1862] QUESTION OF NEW NAVY YARDS 185

mary only. The World publishes it in full without a word
of comment. The National Intelligencer compliments it
highly, and so do several of the Philadelphia papers which
have been sent me. The World of to-day has a compli-
mentary article on the Secretary of the Navy.

Some grumbling I anticipated from New London and
its vicinity for doing my duty. I last March, and again
in June, addressed Congress through the Navy Committee
on the need of a suitable navy yard and establishment for
the construction of iron vessels and iron armor. The sug-
gestions drew from the city of Philadelphia an offer of
League Island. I thought, if the latter place was suitable,
a change might be made without increasing the number of
yards. Congress authorized me to accept it, but Senator
Foster of Connecticut procured a condition to be affixed
that the Board which was to examine League Island with
a view of substituting it for the most limited yard should
also examine and report on the harbor of New London,
and the Rhode Island Senators had a further proviso that
the waters of Narragansett Bay should be also examined
by the same board.

For an iron navy yard and establishment neither myself
nor any one else entertained a thought of New London or
Narragansett Bay, nor would either be exactly suitable
for iron vessels and machinery; fresh water is essential.
Neither would Congress consent, nor does the country
require four navy yards east of the Hudson. But the Board
I appointed had some disagreement. Admiral Stringham,
Chairman of the Board, and a resident of Brooklyn, had
a rival feeling as regards Philadelphia, and a partiality
for New London, where he had studied in his youth. Pro-
fessor Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, who
was one of the Board, was even adroit. The Board was
divided, and, forgetful of the great object in view, — that
of an establishment for iron vessels in fresh water and the
suitability of League Island, — a majority reported that
New London was the best place for such a navy yard. Not

186 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC 3

unlikely the fact that I am from Connecticut had its influ-
ence with some of them, though it has not with me. I am
authorized by Congress to accept League Island if the
Board report it suitable, but I am not authorized to accept
of New London or Narragansett Bay. But I conclude to
take no final step without giving Congress an opportunity
to decide, though stating I propose to accept of League
Island, which would change but not increase the number of
yards, if Congress did not disapprove. I am acting for the
country, not for any section, or city, or set of speculators,
and though I have a partiality for my State, and for New
London, where I have many excellent friends, yet I should
be unworthy of my place were I to permit local or selfish
interests of any kind to control me against what is really
best for the country. But, while convinced I am right, and
deserving of approval, I shall encounter censure and abuse
in quarters where I desire the good opinions of my fellow
citizens.

December 4, Thursday. The Members of Congress from
Minnesota are urging the President vehemently to give
his assent to the execution of three hundred Indian cap-
tives, but they will not succeed. Undoubtedly the savage
wretches have been guilty of great atrocities, and I have as
little doubt the stories of their barbarities, bad enough in
themselves, are greatly exaggerated. What may have been
the aggressions and provocations which led the Indians on
is not told us. When the intelligent Representatives of a
State can deliberately besiege the Government to take the
lives of these ignorant barbarians by wholesale, after they
have surrendered themselves prisoners, it would seem
the sentiments of the Representatives were but slightly
removed from the barbarians whom they would execute.
The Minnesotians are greatly exasperated and threaten
the Administration if it shows clemency.

Some of the Members of Congress begin early to mani-
fest a perverse and bad spirit. Foremost as regards the

1862] COUNT GUROWSKI AND HIS BOOK 187

Navy, of which he should be the friend and organ, is John
P. Hale, Chairman of the Senate Naval Committee. He is
censorious to all the Administration, but especially to the
Navy Department, which, instead of supporting, he omits
no opportunity to assail and embarrass. Calvert, of the
House, is equally virulent. He thinks he has cause to be
angry with me, but has not the courage and manliness to
declare the reason or motive which governs him. Some
months since he made application to me to order the re-
turn of one or two slaves who were on the Potomac Flo-
tilla, or in the navy yard, to his sister, who, he says, is a
deserving loyal lady residing in Virginia near the Potomac.
I of course declined. I also declined appointing some one
to be midshipman under the general clause, whom he
wished selected, as I declined in many similar cases. He is
also dissatisfied because the Naval School is not immedi-
ately returned to Annapolis, which is within his district.

The lowest bidder for one of the large steamers lives at
Chester. Other competitors are greatly excited and charge
him with being disloyal. This charge is, I think, untrue,
though one of the firm is a Democrat and opposed the
election of President Lincoln. But the idea of exclusion
or favoritism in a matter of this kind, and in disregard of
law, is absurd.

Count Adam Gurowski, a Polish exile, who has been
employed as a clerk in the State Department, has pub-
lished a book which I am told is unsparing in its assaults
upon almost all in authority, but that he deals gently with
me. He is by nature a grumbler, ardent, earnest, rash, vio-
lent, unreasonable, impracticable, with no powers of right-
fully discriminating character; nor is he a correct judge of
measures and results. I have neither sought nor shunned
him. Under no circumstances could he be to me a pleasant
companion. He wants, I think, to be frank and honest in
his way, to be truthful, though given to scandal ; brave he
is without doubt, a rude, rough Polish bear who is courted
and flattered by a set of extreme partisans that delight in

188 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 4

listening to his denunciations of public men, and in hearing
his enthusiastic praises in broken English of liberty. He is
an exile for good and bad qualities, a martyr to his opin-
ions and his manners. Seward gave him a clerkship, —
why and for what reason I never understood, for his com-
panions and intimates are Seward's opponents, and the
Count himself is and always has been an open, persistent,
undisguised opponent of Seward and his course. The
Count, it seems, kept a journal or took memoranda while
in the Department and wrote scandal and hate in bad
English, which he has printed.

The proposition to divide the State of Virginia is before
Congress, and I am told it will probably be successful. I
am not clear as to its expediency, and I doubt if it can con-
stitutionally be done. Certainly the time is not auspicious
for such a step. To me the division of Virginia at this time
looks like a step towards a division of the Union, a gen-
eral break-up. This is intuitive, an impression without
investigation. Let us have no separations or divisions at
present.

I have answered two resolutions, petty calls of Congress,
in relation to the appointment of midshipmen. There are
one hundred and forty vacancies, chiefly hi consequence of
the secession of the Southern States, and I have appointed
sixty-two.

Senator Fessenden has been to see me in the case of
George H. Preble, who is one of his constituents and a
neighbor, who is dismissed for failure to do his duty on the
4th of last September, when he permitted the steamer
Oreto (Florida) to run the blockade at Mobile. Senator F.
thinks injustice has been done Preble, and asks that he be
restored and then tried by court martial. Told him this
could not be done by the Department or the President;
that, being out of the service, there was but one way of
restoring him, and that was by a new appointment. To be
reinstated, the President must nominate and the Senate
confirm. The act of confirmation would itself absolve him.

1862] COMMANDER TREBLE'S CASE 189

The Senate would not, however, confirm a man with guilt
or wrong upon him. Fessenden said he had taken a differ-
ent view; thought the President might restore without
Congressional action, yet seemed confused and in doubt.
Wished me to talk with Admirals Smith and Dahlgren;
says the officers generally justify Preble, who, he added, is
in Washington and would like to see me. I requested him
to call; told F. my view of the case was unchanged, but
would hear and give consideration to anything he might
advance.

Preble called the next day, and we went over the case.
He claims he did his whole duty; says he believed the
Oreto was an English vessel, and he wished to keep the
peace, was perhaps too prudent. I told him that in his zeal
to preserve the peace he forgot his duty as an officer;
that he had been placed as a sentinel before the harbor of
Mobile, with express orders to prevent ingress or egress,
and had, in not obeying these orders, failed to do his whole
duty. His excuse was that if he obeyed his orders he would
hurt somebody, but in not obeying he had done his country
and the service great injury; that the excuse did not become
an officer and would not justify a sentinel. We had much
discussion on this point. He said he could have boarded
and sunk the Oreto, but suppose he had done so and she
had been an English vessel with an English flag above,
what would have been the consequences to himself? I as-
sured him the Government would never let an officer suffer
for fidelity in obeying orders and being vigilant in per-
forming his duty; that it would have been better for him
had he not paused to consider consequences to himself,
better for the country had he strictly obeyed his orders,
and even if the Oreto had been an English vessel and been
sunk by him, he would have been justified, and the English-
man condemned for his temerity in violating usage and
disregarding the warning of the sentinel.

The subject has given me trouble, and I sent my con-
clusions by Assistant Secretary Fox to Fessenden. Fox,

190 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 4

when he saw Fessenden, did not find it convenient to state
his errand, but requested the Senator to call and see me,
which he did on Tuesday morning.

I informed him there was no way of instituting a court
martial nor even a court of inquiry. The officers who would
be required as witnesses were in the Gulf and could not be
detached from indispensable duty and brought home on
such an errand. That under the circumstances — the
feelings of himself and others — and in justice to both
Preble and the Government, I would appoint a board of
officers, who should take the three reports of Commodore
Preble on the 4th and 6th of September and 10th of
October, — being his own statements of his case at differ-
ent dates, — and say whether he had done his whole duty
as he claimed and in conformity with the articles of war.
That their report I would submit to the President to
dispose of, and thus end the matter, so far as the Navy
Department was concerned. He asked if I did not prefer
the certificates of other officers. I replied no, neither state-
ments, witnesses, nor arguments would be introduced, no-
thing but Preble's own reports, which I thought all he or
his friends could require. F. was a little nonplussed. Said
it was certainly fair, he was satisfied with such submission
and presumed P. would be.

Within an hour Preble called; said that Senator F. had
informed him of my proposition for an informal court,
which he thought fair, but wished Admiral Farragut's let-
ter to go to the board, as F. by his hasty letter had made
an improper prejudice on me. I assured him he was mis-
taken, — that my action was based on his own statement.
What I proposed was a board that should take his own
reports and decide upon the same evidence as the Admiral
and I had done, and I should abide their conclusion. The
tribunal would necessarily be informal and composed of
men whose opinions, if they had formed any, were un-
known to me and I hoped to him also.

He said this was all he could ask or expect, but intimated

1862] THE DIVISION OF VIRGINIA 191

it might relieve me of responsibility if Admiral Farragut's
letter was included in the submission. I said no, I evaded
no honest responsibility. My convictions were that I had
done right, though it had borne hard upon him; that he had
been in fault from error in judgment, rather than criminal
intent, but the injury was none the less, and the example
was quite necessary. Without assenting to my views he
said he should be satisfied with the judgment of the board
and left me.

I appointed Admiral Foote, Commodore Davis, and
Lieutenant-Commander Phelps and shall leave the matter
in their hands.

The House has voted to create and admit Western Vir-
ginia as a State. This is not the time to divide the old
Commonwealth. The requirements of the Constitution
are not complied with, as they in good faith should be, by
Virginia, by the proposed new State, nor by the United
States. I find that Blair, with whom I exchanged a word,
is opposed to it.

We have news of a movement of our troops at Falmouth
with the intention of crossing the Rappahannock and
attacking the Rebels.

The Rebel' steamer Alabama was at Martinique and
escaped the San Jacinto, Commander Ronckendorff , a good
officer.

December 12, Friday. The board in Treble's case this
day reported that he failed to do his whole duty. I went
immediately and read it to the President, who gave it his
approval.

Some conversation in Cabinet respecting the proposed
new State of Western Virginia. The bill has not yet
reached the President, who thinks the creation of this new
State at this tune of doubtful expediency.

December 14, Sunday. There has been fighting for two
or three days at Fredericksburg, and our troops were said

192 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. u

to have crossed the river. The rumor at the War De-
partment— and I get only rumor — is that our troops
have done well, that Burnside and our generals are in good
spirits; but there is something unsatisfactory, or not en-
tirely satisfactory, in this intelligence, or in the method
of communicating it. When I get nothing clear and explicit
at the War Department I have my apprehensions. They
fear to admit disastrous truths. Adverse tidings are sup-
pressed, with a deal of fuss and mystery, a shuffling over
of papers and maps, and a far-reaching vacant gaze at
something undefined and indescribable.

Burnside is on trial. I have my fears that he has not suf-
ficient grasp and power for the position given him, or the
ability to handle so large a force; but he is patriotic, and
his aims are right. It appears to me a mistake to fight the
enemy hi so strong a position. They have selected then* own
ground, and we meet them there. Halleck is General-in-
Chief, but no one appears to have any confidence hi his
military management, or thinks him able to advise Burnside.

Just at this juncture a great force has been fitted out and
sent off under Banks. It has struck me as strange that
Banks was not sent up James River with a gunboat force.
Such a movement would have caused a diversion on the
part of the Rebels and have thrown them into some con-
fusion, by compelling them to draw off from their strong
position at Fredericksburg. But to send an army up James
River, from which he has just withdrawn McClellan,
against the remonstrance of that general and in opposition
to the opinion of many good officers, would, in the act
itself, be a confession unpleasant to Halleck. This is
the aspect of things to me. A day or two will solve the
problem of this generalship and military management.

Assistant Secretary Fox had yesterday an invitation to
dine with Lord Lyons, and informed me before he went
that he had an idea or intimation there was a wish to learn
what were my views of the recent slave treaty. I told him
there was no secret or ulterior purpose on my part, and

1862] ONE OF SEWARD'S SCHEMES 193

that my opinions were frankly stated in the correspondence
with Seward. Returning in the evening, Fox called at my
house and said that the object was as I [sic] had supposed.
After hearing from Fox what my views were, Lord Lyons
said he well understood and rightly appreciated my posi-
tion, and was inclined to believe I was correct. Assured of
that and that I would come into the measure, he would
assent to a declaratory or supplementary clause ratifying
the matter, and make the belligerent right of search and
the treaty right of search compatible. I requested Fox, as
they had sought to get my opinion through him, to let Lord
Lyons and Secretary Seward both understand that I had
no hidden purpose but only the rights of the country in view.

This whole roundabout proceeding is one of Seward's
schemes — and he thinks it a very cunning one — to get
his mistake rectified without acknowledging his error.
Lord Lyons is no more blind to this trick than I am.

Wrote Naval Committee on Friday respecting the con-
struction of some large steamers for cruising, and, if neces-
sary, offensive purposes.

December 15, Monday. No news from Fredericksburg;
and no news at this time, I fear, is not good news.

Secretary Smith called on me to unburden his mind. He
dislikes Seward's management, and the general course
pursued in Cabinet and between the members generally.
Thinks Seward the chief cause of the unfortunate state of
things.

Smith tells me he (Smith) has made up his mind to leave
the Cabinet and accept the office of District Judge, which
he can have.

December 16, Tuesday. The army has recrossed the
Rappahannock; driven back, has suffered heavy loss. The
shock is great, and it is difficult to get any particulars. I
fear the plan was not a wise one.

194 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 19

December 19, Friday. Soon after reaching the Depart-
ment this A.M., I received a note from Nicolay, the Pre-
sident's secretary, requesting me to attend a special
Cabinet-meeting at half-past ten. All the members were
punctually there except Seward.

The President desired that what he had to communicate
should not be the subject of conversation elsewhere, and
proceeded to inform us that on Wednesday evening, about
six o'clock, Senator Preston King and F. W. Seward came
into his room, each bearing a communication. That which
Mr. King presented was the resignation of the Secretary of
State, and Mr. F. W. Seward handed in his own. Mr. King
then informed the President that at a Republican caucus
held that day a pointed and positive opposition had
shown itself against the Secretary of State, which termin-
ated in a unanimous expression, with one exception, against
him and a wish for his removal. The feeling finally shaped
itself into resolutions of a general character, and the ap-
pointment of a committee of nine to bear them to the
President, and to communicate to him the sentiments of
the Republican Senators. Mr. King, the former colleague
and the personal friend of Mr. Seward, being also from the
same State, felt it to be a duty to inform the Secretary at
once of what had occurred. On receiving this information,
which was wholly a surprise, Mr. Seward immediately
wrote, and by Mr. King tendered his resignation. Mr.
King suggested it would be well for the committee to wait
upon the President at an early moment, and, the Secretary
agreeing with him, Mr. King on Wednesday morning noti-
fied Judge Collamer, the chairman, who sent word to the
President that they would call at the Executive Mansion
at any hour after six that evening, and the President sent
word he would receive them at seven.

The committee came at the tune specified, and the
President says the evening was spent in a pretty free and
animated conversation. No opposition was manifested
towards any other member of the Cabinet than Mr.

1862] SEWARD RESIGNS 195

Seward. Some not very friendly feelings were shown
towards one or two others, but no wish that any one
should leave but the Secretary of State. Him they charged,
if not with infidelity, with indifference, with want of
earnestness in the War, with want of sympathy with
the country in this great struggle, and with many things
objectionable, and especially with a too great ascendency
and control of the President and measures of adminis-
tration. This, he said, was the point and pith of their
complaint.

The President says that in reply to the committee he
stated how this movement had shocked and grieved him;
that the Cabinet he had selected in view of impending dif-
ficulties and of all the responsibilities upon himself; that he
and the members had gone on harmoniously, whatever had
been their previous party feelings and associations; that
there had never been serious disagreements, though there
had been differences; that in the overwhelming troubles of
the country, which had borne heavily upon him, he had
been sustained and consoled by the good feeling and the
mutual and unselfish confidence and zeal that pervaded
the Cabinet.

He expressed a hope that there would be no combined
movement on the part of other members of the Cabinet to
resist this assault, whatever might be the termination.
Said this movement was uncalled for, that there was no
such charge, admitting all that was said, as should break
up or overthrow a Cabinet, nor was it possible for him to
go on with a total abandonment of old friends.

Mr. Bates stated the difference between our system and
that of England, where a change of ministry involved a
new election, dissolution of Parliament, etc. Three or four
of the members of the Cabinet said they had heard of the
resignation: Blair the day preceding; Stanton through
the President, on whom he had made a business call;
Mr. Bates when coming to the meeting.

The President requested that we should, with him, meet

196 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 19

the committee. This did not receive the approval of Mr.
Chase, who said he had no knowledge whatever of the
movement, or the resignation, until since he had entered
the room. Mr. Bates knew of no good that would come of
an interview. I stated that I could see no harm in it, and
if the President wished it, I thought it a duty for us
to attend. The proceeding was of an extraordinary char-
acter. Mr. Blair thought it would be well for us to be
present, and finally all acquiesced. The President named
half-past seven this evening.

December 20, Saturday. At the meeting last evening there
were present of the committee Senators Collamer, Fes-
senden, Harris, Trumbull, Grimes, Howard, Sumner, and
Pomeroy. Wade was absent. The President and all the
Cabinet but Seward were present. The subject was opened
by the President, who read the resolutions and stated the
substance of his interviews with the committee, — their ob-
ject and purpose. He spoke of the unity of his Cabinet, and
how, though they could not be expected to think and speak
alike on all subjects, all had acquiesced in measures when
once decided. The necessities of the times, he said, had
prevented frequent and long sessions of the Cabinet, and
the submission of every question at the meetings.

Secretary Chase indorsed the President's statement
fully and entirely, but regretted that there was not a more
full and thorough consideration and canvass of every
important measure in open Cabinet.

Senator Collamer, the chairman of the committee, suc-
ceeded the President and calmly and fairly presented the
views of the committee and of those whom they repre-
sented. They wanted united counsels, combined wisdom,
and energetic action. If there is truth in the maxim that
in a multitude of counselors there is safety, it might be
well that those advisers who were near the President and
selected by him, and all of whom were more or less re-
sponsible, should be consulted on the great questions which

1862] SEWARD'S RESIGNATION 197

affected the national welfare, and that the ear of the
Executive should be open to all and that he should have
the minds of all.

Senator Fessenden was skillful but a little tart; felt,
it could be seen, more than he cared to say; wanted the
whole Cabinet to consider and decide great questions, and
that no one in particular should absorb and direct the
whole Executive action. Spoke of a remark which he had
heard from J. Q. Adams on the floor of Congress hi regard
to a measure of his administration. Mr. Adams said the
measure was adopted against his wishes and opinion, but
he was outvoted by Mr. Clay and others. He wished an
administration so conducted.

Grimes, Sumner, and Trumbull were pointed, emphatic,
and unequivocal in their opposition to Mr. Seward, whose
zeal and sincerity in this conflict they doubted; each was
unrelenting and unforgiving.

Blair spoke earnestly and well. Sustained the President,
and dissented most decidedly from the idea of a plural
Executive; claimed that the President was accountable
for his administration, might ask opinions or not of either
and as many as he pleased, of all or none, of his Cabinet.
Mr. Bates took much the same view.

The President managed his own case, speaking freely,
and showed great tact, shrewdness, and ability, provided
such a subject were a proper one for such a meeting and
discussion. I have no doubt he considered it most judi-
cious to conciliate the Senators with respectful deference,
whatever may have been his opinion of their interference.
When he closed his remarks, he said it would be a gratifica-
tion to him if each member of the committee would state
whether he now thought it advisable to dismiss Mr.
Seward, and whether his exclusion would strengthen or
weaken the Administration and the Union cause in their
respective States. Grimes, Trumbull, and Sumner, who
had expressed themselves decidedly against the continu-
ance of Mr. Seward in the Cabinet, indicated no change of

198 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 20

opinion. Collamer and Fessenden declined committing
themselves on the subject; had in their action the welfare
of the whole country in view; were not prepared to answer
the questions. Senator Harris felt it a duty to say that
while many of the friends of the Administration would be
gratified, others would feel deeply wounded, and the
effect of Mr. Seward's retirement would, on the whole, be
calamitous in the State of New York. Pomeroy of Kansas
said, personally, he believed the withdrawal of Mr. Seward
would be a good movement and he sincerely wished it
might take place. Howard of Michigan declined answering
the question.

During the discussion, the volume of diplomatic corre-
spondence, recently published, was alluded to; some letters
denounced as unwise and impolitic were specified, one of
which, a confidential dispatch to Mr. Adams, was read. If it
was unwise to write, it was certainly injudicious and indis-
creet to publish such a document. Mr. Seward has genius
and talent, — no one better knows it than himself, — but
for one in his place he is often wanting in careful discrim-
ination, true wisdom, sound judgment, and discreet states-
manship. The committee believe he thinks more of the
glorification of Seward than the welfare of the country.
He wishes the glorification of both, and believes he is the
man to accomplish it, but has unwittingly and unwarily
begotten and brought upon himself a vast amount of dis-
trust and hostility on the part of Senators, by his endeavors
to impress them and others with the belief that he is the
Administration. It is a mistake; the Senators dislike it, —
have measured and know him.

It was nearly midnight when we left the President ; and
it could not be otherwise than that all my wakeful mo-
ments should be absorbed with a subject which, time and
circumstances considered, was of grave importance to the
Administration and the country. A Senatorial combina-
tion to dictate to the President in regard to his political
family in the height of a civil war which threatens the

1862] SEWARD'S RESIGNATION 199

existence of the Republic cannot be permitted to succeed,
even if the person to whom they object were as obnoxious
as they represent; but Seward's foibles are not serious
failings. After fully canvassing the subject in all its phases,
my mind was clear as to the course which it was my duty
to pursue, and what I believed was the President's duty
also.

My first movement this morning' was to call on the
President as soon as I supposed he could have breakfasted.
Governor Robertson of Kentucky was with him when I
went in, but soon left. I informed the President I had pon-
dered the events of yesterday and last evening, and felt it
incumbent on me to advise him not to accept the resigna-
tion of Mr. Seward; that if there were objections, real or
imaginary, against Mr. Seward, the time, manner, and cir-
cumstances — the occasion, and the method of presenting
what the Senators considered objections — were all inap-
propriate and wrong; that no party or faction should be
permitted to dictate to the President in regard to his Cabi-
net; that it would be of evil example and fraught with
incalculable injury to the Government and country; that
neither the legislative department, nor the Senate branch
of it, should be allowed to encroach on the Executive pre-
rogatives and rights; that it devolved on him — and was
his duty to assert and maintain the rights and inde-
pendence of the Executive; that he ought not, against his
own convictions, to yield one iota of the authority in-
trusted to him on the demand of either branch of Congress
or of both combined, or to any party, whatever might be
its views and intentions; that Mr. Seward had his infirm-
ities and errors, but they were venial; that he and I differed
on many things, as did other members of the Cabinet;
that he was sometimes disposed to step beyond his own
legitimate bounds and not duly respect the rights of his
associates, but these were matters that did not call for
Senatorial interference. In short, I considered it for the
true interest of the country, now as in the future, that

200 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 20

this scheme should be defeated; that, so believing, I had
at the earliest moment given him my conclusions.

The President was much gratified ; said the whole thing
had struck him as it had me, and if carried out as the Sena-
tors prescribed, the whole Government must cave in. It
could not stand, could not hold water; the bottom would
be out.

I added that, having expressed my wish that he would
not accept Mr. Seward's resignation, I thought it import-
ant that Seward should not press its acceptance, nor did
I suppose he would. In this he also concurred, and asked
if I had seen Seward. I replied I had not, my first duty was
with him, and, having ascertained that we agreed, I would
now go over and see him. He earnestly desired me to do so.

I went immediately to Seward's house. Stanton was
with him. Seward was excited, talking vehemently to Stan-
ton of the course pursued and the results that must follow
if the scheme succeeded; told Stanton he (Stanton) would
be the next victim, that there was a call for a meeting at
the Cooper Institute this evening. Stanton said he had
seen it; I had not. Seward got the Herald, got me to read;
but Stanton seized the paper, as Seward and myself entered
into conversation, and he related what the President had
already communicated, — how Preston King had come to
him, he wrote his resignation at once, and so did Fred, etc.,
etc. In the mean time Stanton rose, and remarked he had
much to do, and, as Governor S. had been over this matter
with him, he would leave.

I then stated my interview with the President, my ad-
vice that the President must not accept, nor he press, his
resignation. Seward was greatly pleased with my views;
said he had but one course before him when the doings of
the Senators were communicated, but that if the President
and country required of him any duty in this emergency
he did not feel at liberty to refuse it. He spoke of his
long political experience ; dwelt on his own sagacity and
his great services; feels deeply this movement, which was

1862] CHASE RESIGNS 201

wholly unexpected; tries to suppress any exhibition of
personal grievance or disappointment, but is painfully
wounded, mortified, and chagrined. I told him I should re-
turn and report to the President our interview and that he
acquiesced in my suggestions. He said he had no objec-
tions, but he thought the subject should be disposed of one
way or the other at once. He is disappointed, I see, that the
President did not promptly refuse to consider his resigna-
tion, and dismiss, or refuse to parley with, the committee.

When I returned to the White House, Chase and Stan-
ton were in the President's office, but he was absent. A
few words were interchanged on the great topic in hand.
I was very emphatic in my opposition to the acceptance
of Seward's resignation. Neither gave me a direct answer
nor did either express an opinion on the subject, though
I think both wished to be understood as acquiescing.

When the President came in, which was in a few mo-
ments, his first address was to me, asking if I "had seen
the man." I replied that I had, and that he assented to
my views. He then turned to Chase and said, "I sent for
you, for this matter is giving me great trouble." At our
first interview this morning the President rang and directed
that a message be sent to Mr. Chase. Chase said he had
been painfully affected by the meeting last evening, which
was a total surprise to him, and, after some not very
explicit remarks as to how he was affected, informed the
President he had prepared his resignation of the office of
Secretary of the Treasury. " Where is it?" said the Presi-
dent quickly, his eye lighting up in a moment. "I brought
it with me," said Chase, taking the paper from his pocket;
"I wrote it this morning." "Let me have it," said the
President, reaching his long arm and fingers towards C.,
who held on, seemingly reluctant to part with the letter,
which was sealed, and which he apparently hesitated to
surrender. Something further he wished to say, but the
President was eager and did not perceive it, but took and
hastily opened the letter.

202 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 20

"This," said he, looking towards me with a triumphal
laugh, "cuts the Gordian knot." An air of satisfaction
spread over his countenance such as I have not seen for
some time. "I can dispose of this subject now without
difficulty," he added, as he turned on his chair; "I see my
way clear."

Chase sat by Stanton, fronting the fire; the President
beside the fire, his face towards them, Stanton nearest
him. I was on the sofa near the east window. While the
President was reading the note, which was brief, Chase
turned round and looked towards me, a little perplexed.
He would, I think, have been better satisfied could this
interview with the President have been without the pre-
sence of others, or at least if I was away. The President
was so delighted that he saw not how others were affected.

"Mr. President," said Stanton, with solemnity, "I in-
formed you day before yesterday that I was ready to
tender you my resignation. I wish you, sir, to consider my
resignation at this time in your possession."

"You may go to your Department," said the President;
"I don't want yours. This," holding out Chase's letter,
"is all I want; this relieves me; my way is clear; the trouble
is ended. I will detain neither of you longer." We all rose
to leave, but Stanton lingered and held back as we reached
the door. Chase and myself came downstairs together. He
was moody and taciturn. Some one stopped him on the
lower stairs and I passed on, but C. was not a minute
behind me, and before I reached the Department, StantoD
came staving along.

Preston King called at my house this evening and gave
me particulars of what had been said and done at the cau-
cuses of the Republican Senators, — of the surprise he felt
when he found the hostility so universal against Seward,
and that some of the calmest and most considerate Sena-
tors were the most decided; stated the course pursued by
himself, which was frank, friendly, and manly. He was
greatly pleased with my course, of which he had been

1862] CABINET RIVALRIES 203

informed by Seward and the President in part; and I gave
him some facts which they did not. Blair tells me that his
father's views correspond with mine, and the approval of
F. P. Blair and Preston King gives me assurance that I am
right.

Montgomery Blair is confident that Stanton has been
instrumental in getting up this movement against Seward
to screen himself, and turn attention from the manage-
ment of the War Department. There may be something in
this surmise of Blair; but I am inclined to think that Chase,
Stanton, and Caleb Smith have each, but without concert,
participated, if not directly, by expressions of discontent
to their Senatorial intimates. Chase and Smith, I know,
are a good deal dissatisfied with Seward and have not hesi-
tated to make known their feelings in some quarters,
though, I apprehend, not to the President. With Stanton
I have little intimacy. He came into the Cabinet under
Seward's wing, and he knows it, but Stanton is, by nature,
an intriguer, courts favor, is not faithful hi his friendships,
is given to secret, underhand combinations. His obliga-
tions to Seward are great, but would not deter him from
raising a breeze against Seward to favor himself. Chase
and Seward entered the Cabinet as rivals, and in cold
courtesy have so continued. There was an effort by
Seward's friends to exclude Chase from the Treasury;
the President did not yield to it, but it is obvious that
Seward's more pleasant nature and consummate skill have
enabled him to get to windward of Chase in administrative
management, and the latter, who has but little tact, feels
it. Transactions take place of a general character, not
unfrequently, of which Chase and others are not advised
until they are made public. Often the fact reaches them
through the papers. Seward has not exhibited shrewdness
in this, [though] it may have afforded him a temporary
triumph as regarded Chase, and he doubtless flatters him-
self that it strengthens a belief which he desires should pre-
vail that he is the "power behind the throne greater than

204 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 20

the throne itself," that he is the real Executive. The re-
sult of all this has been the alienation of a portion of his old
friends without getting new ones, and finally this appoint-
ment of a committee which asked his removal. The objec-
tions urged are, I notice, the points on which Chase is
most sensitive.

For two or three months Stanton has evinced a grow-
ing indifference to Seward, with whom he was, at first,
intimate and to whom he was much devoted. I have
observed that, as he became alienated towards Seward,
his friendship for Chase increased.

My differences with Seward I have endeavored to settle
with him in the day and time of their occurrences. They
have not been many, but they have been troublesome and
annoying because they were meddlesome and disturbing.
He gets behind me, tampers with my subordinates, and
interferes injuriously and ignorantly in naval matters, not
so much from wrong purposes, but as a busybody by
nature. I have not made these matters subjects of com-
plaint outside and think it partly the result of usage and
practice at Albany.

I am also aware that he and his friend Thurlow Weed
were almost as much opposed to my entering the Cabinet
as they were to Chase. They wanted a fraternity of
Seward men. The President discerned this and put it
aside. But he has not so readily detected, nor been aware
of the influence which Seward exercises over him, often
unfortunately. In his intercourse with his colleagues, save
the rivalry between himself and Chase and the supercilious
self-assumption which he sometimes displays, he has
been courteous, affable, and, I think, anxious to preserve
harmony in the Cabinet. I have seen no effort to get up
combinations for himself personally, or against others. He
supposed himself immensely popular at the moment when
friends were estranged, and was as surprised as myself
when he learned the Senatorial movement for his over-
throw.

1862] THE PRESIDENT'S WAY OUT 205

December 23, Tuesday. It was announced yesterday
morning that the President had requested Mr. Seward and
Mr. Chase to withdraw their resignations and resume their
duties. This took the public by surprise. Chase's resignation
was scarcely known, and his friends, particularly those in
the late movement, were a little disgusted when they
found that he and Seward were in the same category.

Seward's influence has often been anything but salutary.
Not that he was evil inclined, but he is meddlesome, fussy,
has no fixed principles or policy. Chase has chafed under
Seward's management, yet has tried to conceal any ex-
hibition of irritated feelings. Seward, assuming to be
helmsman, has, while affecting and believing in his own
superiority, tried to be patronizing to all, especially sooth-
ing and conciliating to Chase, who sees and is annoyed by
it. The President feels that he is under obligations to each,
and that both are serviceable. He is friendly to both.
He is fond of Seward, who is affable; he respects Chase,
who is clumsy. Seward comforts him; Chase he deems
a necessity. ^

On important questions, Blair is as potent with the
President as either, and sometimes I think equal to both.
With some egotism, Blair has great good sense, a better
knowledge and estimate of military men than either or
both the others, and, I think, is possessed of more solid,
reliable administrative ability.

All the members were at the Cabinet-meeting to-day.
Seward was feeling very happy. Chase was pale; said he
was ill, had been for weeks. The subject principally dis-
cussed was the proposed division of Virginia and the crea-
tion of a new State to be called Western Virginia. Chase is
strongly for it; Blair and Bates against it, the latter, how-
ever, declining to discuss it or give his reasons except in
writing. Stanton is with Chase. Seward does not show his
hand. My impressions are, under the existing state of
things, decidedly adverse. It is a disturbance that might
be avoided at this time and has constitutional difficulties.

206 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 23

We have news that General Foster has possession of
Goldsborough, North Carolina.

December 24, Wednesday. Congress has adjourned over
until the 5th of January. It is as well, perhaps, though
I should not have advised it. But the few real business
men, of honest intentions, will dispatch matters about as
well and fast without as with them. The demagogues in
Congress disgrace the body and the country. Noisy and
loud professions, with no useful policy or end, exhibit
themselves daily.

Most of the Members will go home. Dixon says the
feeling North is strong and emphatic against Stanton, and
that the intrigue against Seward was to cover and shield
Stanton. Others say the same. Doolittle, though less full
and explicit, has this opinion. Fox tells me that Grimes
declares his object was an onslaught on Stanton. If so, it
was a strange method. Grimes went over the whole debate
in caucus with F. ; said he believed opposition manifested
itself in some degree towards every member of the Cabinet
but myself; that towards one or two only slight exhibi-
tions of dislike appeared, and most were well sustained.
All who spoke were complimentary of me and the naval
management, but Hale, while he uttered no complaint,
was greatly annoyed with the compliments of myself and
the quiet but efficient conduct of the Navy.

December 26, Friday. Some talk in Cabinet of Thayer's
scheme of emigration to Florida.1

Blah* read his opinion of the proposition for making a
new State of Western Virginia. His views correspond with
mine, but are abler and more elaborately stated. Mr.
Bates read a portion of his opinion on the constitutional

1 This was a proposal to colonize Florida with loyal citizens from the
North. Its author was Eli Thayer, whose Emigrant Aid Company had
been largely instrumental in making Kansas a Free State. He afterwards
advocated it in a public speech at the Cooper Institute, New York, Feb-
ruary 7, 1863.

1862] DEPREDATIONS OF THE ALABAMA 207

point, which appeared to me decisive and conclusive. The
President has called for opinions from each of his Cabinet.
I had the first rough draft of mine in my pocket, though
not entirely copied. Chase said his was completed, but he
had not brought it with him. Seward said he was wholly
unprepared. Stanton assured the President he would be
ready with his in season. The President said it would answer
his purpose if the opinions of each were handed in on or
before Tuesday.

December 29, Monday. We had yesterday a telegram
that the British pirate craft Alabama captured the Ariel,
one of the Aspinwall steamers, on her passage from New
York to Aspinwall, off the coast of Cuba. Abuse of the
Navy Department will follow. It will give the mercenaries
who are prostituted correspondents, and who have not
been permitted to plunder the Government by fraudulent
contracts, an opportunity to wreak vengeance for their
disappointments.

I am exceedingly glad it was an outward and not a home-
ward bound vessel. It is annoying when we want all our
force on blockade duty to be compelled to detach so many
of our best craft on the fruitless errand of searching the
wide ocean for this wolf from Liverpool. We shall, how-
ever, have a day of reckoning with Great Britain for these
wrongs, and I sometimes think I care not how soon nor in
what manner that reckoning comes.

A committee has been appointed by the Legislature of
Connecticut, of eight persons, to visit Washington and urge
the selection of New London for a navy yard. Twelve
hundred dollars are appropriated to defray their expenses.
There has been no examination by the Legislature of the
question, or investigation of the comparative merits of
this and other places, or whether an additional yard is
needed, or what the real interest of the country requires;
but there is, with excusable local pride, a speculating job
by a few individuals and a general idea that a government

208 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 29

establishment for the expenditure of money will benefit the
locality, which controls the movement. As I am a citizen of
Connecticut, there is a hope that I may be persuaded by
personal considerations to debase myself, — forget my duty
and make this selection for that locality regardless of the
wants or true interests of the country. I have proposed to
transfer the limited and circumscribed yard at Philadel-
phia to League Island, where there is an abundance of
room, fresh water, and other extraordinary advantages.
We do not want more yards, certainly not east of the Hud-
son. We do need a government establishment of a different
character from any we now have, for the construction,
repair, and preservation of iron vessels. League Island on
the Delaware combines all these required advantages, is
far in the interior, remote from assault in war, and is in the
vicinity of iron and coal, is away from the sea, etc., etc.
New London has none of these advantages, but is located
in my native State. My friends and my father's friends
are there, and I am urged to forget my country and favor
that place. A navy yard is for no one State, but this the
Legislature and its committee and thousands of their
constituents do not take into consideration; but I must.

The six members of the Cabinet (Smith absent) to-day
handed in their respective opinions on the question of
dividing the old Commonwealth of Virginia and carving
out and admitting a new State. As Stanton and myself
returned from the Cabinet-meeting to the Departments,
he expressed surprise that I should oppose division, for he
thought it politic and wise to plant a Free State south of
the Ohio. I thought our duties were constitutional, not
experimental, that we should observe and preserve the
landmarks, and that mere expediency should not override
constitutional obligations. This action was not predicated
on the consent of the people of Virginia, legitimately ex-
pressed; was arbitrary and without proper authority; was
such a departure from, and an undermining of, our system
that I could not approve it and feared it was the beginning

1862] THE WEST VIRGINIA QUESTION 209

of the end. As regarded a Free State south of the Ohio, I
told him the probabilities were that pretty much all of
them would be free by Tuesday when the Proclamation
emancipating slaves would be published. The Rebels had
appealed to arms hi vindication of slavery, were using
slaves to carry on the War, and they must be content with
the results of that issue; the arbitrament of arms to which
they had appealed would be against them. This measure,
I thought, we were justified in adopting on the issue pre-
sented and as a military necessity, but the breaking up of
a State by the General Government without the prescribed
forms, innate rights, and the consent of the people fairly
and honestly expressed, was arbitrary and wrong. Stanton
attempted no defense.

At the meeting to-day, the President read the draft of
his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and
finally directed that copies should be furnished to each.
It is a good and well-prepared paper, but I suggested that
a part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted.1 Chase
advised that fractional parts of States ought not to be
exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Prac-
tically there would be difficulty in freeing parts of States,
and not freeing others, — a clashing between central and
local authorities.

There is discontent in the public mind. The manage-
ment of our public affairs is not satisfactory. Our army
operations have been a succession of disappointments.
General Halleck has accomplished nothing, and has not
the public confidence. General McClellan has intelligence
but not decision; operated understandingly but was never
prepared. With General Halleck there seems neither mil-
itary capacity nor decision. I have not heard nor seen
a clear and satisfactory proposition or movement on his
part yet.

Information reaches us that General Butler has been
superseded at New Orleans by General Banks. The wis-
1 Just what this suggestion referred to does not appear.

210 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [DEC. 29

dom of this change I question, and so told the President,
who called on me one day last week and discussed matters
generally. I have not a very exalted opinion of the military
qualities of either. Butler has shown ability as a police
magistrate both at Baltimore and New Orleans, and in
each, but particularly at the latter place, has had a pecul-
iar community to govern. The Navy captured the place
and turned it over to his keeping. The President agreed
with me that Butler had shown skill in discharging his civil
duties, and said he had in view for Butler the command of
the valley movement in the Mississippi. Likely he has this
in view, but whether Halleck will acquiesce is more ques-
tionable. I have reason to believe that Seward has effected
this change, and that he has been prompted by the for-
eigners to do it. Outside the State and War Departments,
I apprehend no one was consulted. I certainly was not, and
therefore could not apprize any of our naval officers, who
are cooperating with the army and by courtesy and right
should have been informed. Banks has some ready qual-
ities for civil administration and, if not employed hi the
field or active military operations, will be likely to acquit
himself respectably as a provisional or military governor.
He has not the energy, power, ability of Butler, nor,
though of loose and fluctuating principles, will he be so
reckless and unscrupulous. The officer in command in that
quarter must necessarily hold a taut rein.

December 31, Wednesday. We had an early and special
Cabinet-meeting, convened at 10 A.M. The subject was
the Proclamation of to-morrow to emancipate the slaves
in the Rebel States. Seward proposed two amendments,
— one including mine, and one enjoining upon, instead of
appealing to, those emancipated, to forbear from tumult.
Blair had, like Seward and myself, proposed the omission
of a part of a sentence and made other suggestions which I
thought improvements. Chase made some good criticisms
and proposed a felicitous closing sentence. The President

1862] THE SPIRIT OF PARTY 211

took the suggestions, written in order, and said he would
complete the document.

I met General Burnside on the portico of the White
House this A.M. He was about entering his carriage, but
waited my coming. Says he is here a witness in Fitz John
Porter's case.

The year closes less favorably than I had hoped and
expected, yet some progress has been made. It is not to be
denied, however, that the national ailment seems more
chronic. The disease is deep-seated. Energetic measures
are necessary, and I hope we may have them. None of us
appear to do enough, and yet I am surprised that we have
done so much. We have had some misfortunes, and a lurk-
ing malevolence exists towards us among nations, that
could not have been anticipated. Worse than this, the
envenomed, relentless, and unpatriotic spirit of party
paralyzes and weakens the hand of the Government and
country.

The Emancipation Proclamation — The Battle of Murfreesborough — Loss
• of the Monitor — Criticisms of the Navy Department — Halleck's
Deficiencies — The Employment of the Contrabands — John Covode's
Gubernatorial Aspirations — The Pernicious Party Spirit — McCler-
nand and Vicksburg — The Court Martial on Fitz John Porter — The
New London Navy Yard Question — Confederate Letters — Fitz John
Porter's Conviction — A Call from F. A. Conkling — The Gauge of
the Pacific Railroad — Hooker placed in command of the Army of the
Potomac — An Estimate of Farragut — "Weed is Seward, and Seward
is Weed" — Governor Morgan elected Senator from New York — Re-
ported Pressure for Mediation on the Part of the French Government
— Proposed Attack on Charleston — Chase's Bank Bill — The Senate
rejects the Reappointment of Collector Howard — Irregular Acts of the
President — Scene between Scott, McClellan, and Seward.

January 1, 1863, Thursday. The New Year opens with
a bright and brilliant day. Exchanged congratulations at
the Executive Mansion with the President and colleagues,
at eleven this morning. The usual formalities. Officers of
the Army and Navy came in at half-past eleven. I left
before twelve.

The Emancipation Proclamation is published in this
evening's Star. This is a broad step, and will be a land-
mark in history. The immediate effect will not be all
its friends anticipate or its opponents apprehend. Pass-
ing events are steadily accomplishing what is here pro-
claimed.

The character of the country is in many respects under-
going a transformation. This must be obvious to all, and
I am content to await the results of passing events, deep
as they may plough their furrows in our once happy land.
This great upheaval which is shaking our civil fabric was
perhaps necessary to overthrow and subdue the mass of
wrong and error which no trivial measure could eradicate.
The seed which is being sown will germinate and bear

1863] BATTLE OF MURFREESBOROUGH 213

fruit, and tares and weeds will also spring up under the
new dispensation.

Blair mentioned at my house a few evenings since that
General McClellan assumed command of the Army of the
Potomac last September without orders; that, finding
military affairs in a disordered and confused condition, he
sought an interview with the President, Stanton, and Hal-
leek respectively, and also called to see him (Blair), but he
was absent; that he then called his staff and left, but met
me, to whom alone he communicated whither he was going
and his purpose. This, Blair tells me, is the statement made
by McClellan to Governor Dennison, who has been stopping
with Blair. I well remember meeting him at that time, but
my understanding has been that McC. received command
of the Army by order of the President on recommendation
of Halleck.

January 3, Saturday. We have, yesterday and to-day,
broken accounts of a great fight for three days — and not
yet terminated — at Murfreesborough, Tennessee. All
statements say we have the best, that we shall beat the
Rebels, that we have pierced their centre, that we are driv-
ing them through M., etc. I hope to hear we have done in-
stead of we " shall ' ' do. None of our army fights have been
finished, but are drawn battles, — worrying, exhausting,
but never completed. Of Rosecrans I have thought better
and hope a good account of his work, but the best some-
times fail, and he may not be best.

A word by telegraph that the Monitor has foundered
and over twenty of her crew, including some officers, are
lost. The fate of this vessel affects me in other respects.
She is a primary representative of a class identified with my
administration of the Navy. Her novel construction and
qualities I adopted and she was built amidst obloquy
and ridicule. Such a change hi the character of a fighting
vessel few naval men, or any Secretary under then- influ-
ence, would have taken the responsibility of adopting. But

214 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 3

Admiral Smith and finally all the Board which I appointed
seconded my views, and were willing, Davis somewhat
reluctantly, to recommend the experiment if I would
assume the risk and responsibility. Her success with the
Merrimac directly after she went into commission re-
lieved me of odium and anxiety, and men who were pre-
paring to ridicule were left to admire.

When Bushnell of New Haven brought me the first
model and plan, I was favorably impressed. I was then in
Hartford, proposing to remove my family, but sent him at
once to Washington, folio whig myself within a day or two.
Understanding that Ericsson, the inventor, was sensitive
in consequence of supposed slight and neglect by the Navy
Department or this Government some years ago, I made it
a point to speak to Admiral Smith, Chairman of the Board,
and specially request that he should be treated tenderly,
and opportunity given him for full and deliberate hearing.
I found Admiral Smith well disposed. The plan was
adopted, and the test of her fighting and resisting power
was by an arrangement between Admiral Smith and my-
self, without communication with any other, that she
should, when completed, go at once up Elizabeth River to
Norfolk Navy Yard, and destroy the Merrimac while in
the dry dock, and the dock itself. Had she been completed
within the contract time, one hundred days, this purpose
would have been accomplished, but there was delay and
disappointment, and her prowess was exhibited in a con-
flict with her huge antagonist under much more formidable
circumstances. Her career since the tune she first entered
Hampton Roads is public history, but her origin, and
everything in relation to her, from the inception, have
been since her success designedly misrepresented.

Admiral Smith beyond any other person is deserving of
credit, if credit be due any one connected with the Navy
Department for this vessel. Had she been a failure, he,
more than any one but the Secretary, would have been
blamed, and [he] was fully aware that he would have to

1863] THE LOSS OF THE MONITOR 215

share with me the odium and the responsibility. Let him,
therefore, have the credit which is justly his.

January 5, Monday. Commander Bankhead arrived
this morning and brings particulars of the loss of the
Monitor. Its weakness was hi herself, where we had
apprehended, and not in an antagonist. This has been
in some degree remedied hi the new boats we are now
constructing.

For months I have been berated and abused because I
had not more vessels of the Monitor class under contract.
Her success with the Merrimac when she was under the
trial as an experiment made men wild, and they censured
me for not having built a fleet when she was constructed.
Now that she is lost, the same persons will be likely to assail
me for expending money on such a craft.

There is a set of factious fools who think it is wise to be
censorious, and it is almost as amusing as it is vexatious to
hear and read the remarks of these Solomons. One or two
of these officious blockheads make themselves conspicuous
in the New York Chamber of Commerce, and none more
so than Mr. Charles H. Marshall, who attempts to show
off his nautical knowledge by constantly attacking and
slandering the Secretary of the Navy. Marshall was
formerly a shipmaster and it was his often expressed
opinion that no man should be Secretary of the Navy who
has not had command of, and the sailing of, a ship. Like
many others as simple if not as egotistical, he would have
the Secretary who administers the department a sailor and
for the same reasons he should be an engineer, naval con-
structor, etc. On every occasion of disaster, no matter
from what cause, this man Marshall imputes it to the fact
that the Secretary of the Navy has never commanded a
ship, and he never admits that any credit is due the Navy
Department for intelligent and correct administration, or
the Secretary of the Navy for any success of any kind,
whether of a squadron or single ship, because he is not and

216 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 5

never was a sea-captain. Marshall has had his prejudices
sharpened by others and particularly by Moses H. Grin-
nell, who thinks a shipping merchant would make a good
Secretary of the Navy. Both are disappointed men, and
each wants to be at the head of the Navy Department.

Thus far the British pirate named Alabama sailing
under Rebel colors has escaped capture. As a consequence
there are marvelous accounts of her wonderful speed, and
equally marvelous ones of the want of speed of our
cruisers. Of course there is no controverting these fables;
she will be a myth, a "skimmer of the seas," till taken, and
our own vessels, of better speed and power, will be slan-
dered by the Marshalls and Grinnells as destitute of all
speed. There are men of better sense in the Chamber of
Commerce, but one of these has been an extensive ship-
owner, the other a shipmaster; both are good and well-
meaning men, have been successful business men, but
are egotistical and vainly weak. Neither is competent to
administer the Navy Department.

The loss of the Monitor and the report of Admiral Lee
and others of the draft of water at the inlet is unfavor-
able for a naval attack on the battery at Cape Fear, and
the army object to move on Wilmington except in con-
junction with the Navy. It is best, therefore, to push on
to Charleston and strengthen Du Pont. The War De-
partment promised to send forward to South Carolina an
additional military force of ten thousand under General
Hunter. Halleck is heavy-headed; wants sagacity, readi-
ness, courage, and heart. I am not an admirer of the man.
He may have some talent as a writer and critic; in all
military matters he seems destitute of resources, skill, or
capacity. He is more tardy and irresolute than McClellan
and is deficient in the higher qualities which the latter
possessed.

We have further cheering news from Tennessee of the
success of Rosecrans at Murfreesborough; also hopeful
news from Vicksburg. I do not see that the least credit is

1863] HALLECK AND McCLERNAND 217

due to Halleck in either of these cases, unless for not em-
barrassing the officers in command.

It was arranged and directed by the President that
General McClernand should command the forces which
were to cooperate with the Navy at the opening of the
navigation of the Mississippi and the capture of Vicksburg.
But McClernand has scarcely been heard of. He is not
of the Regular Army, and is no favorite, I perceive, with
Halleck, though the President entertains a good opinion of
him. Blair alluded two or three weeks since to the fact that
McClernand was crowded aside; said there was a combina-
tion to prevent his having that command. The President
started from his chair when the remark was made and said
it should not be so. Stanton declared it was not so, that he
and Halleck had arranged the matter that day. The
President looked surprised and said he supposed it had
been done long ago.

January 6, Tuesday. Got off dispatches this morning
ordering the ironclads south to strengthen Du Pont in
his attack on Charleston, which he intends to take, — then
Savannah, if not too long delayed, when the ironclads must
go around to Pensacola.

Wilkes is not doing as much as we expected. I fear he
has more zeal for and finds it more profitable to capture
blockade-runners than to hunt for the Alabama. Lord
Lyons is preferring complaints against him for want of
courtesy, when he is really flinging on him British insults.
There is not much love lost between him and John Bull.
If Seward would square up firmly we could make Bull
behave better.

January 8, Thursday. Had a singular letter to-day from
Chase, requesting that vessels with custom-house clearance
might be allowed to pass the blockade. The arrangement
is in accordance with an understanding which he has with
the Secretary of War. Replied that I was prepared to give

218 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 8

no such instructions until the blockade was raised or
modified.

January 9, Friday. On my way to Cabinet-meeting this
A.M. met Covode and Judge Lewis of Pennsylvania. The
two had just left the President and presented me with a
card from him to the effect that Covode had investigated
the case of Chambers, Navy Agent at Philadelphia, and
that if I saw no objection he should be removed. Told
them I was going to the President and the subject should
have attention. When I mentioned the subject, the Pre-
sident wished me to look into the case and see that all
was right. He had not, he said, examined it, but passed it
over to me, who he knew would.

The final accounts of the result at Murfreesborough are
favorable. Rosecrans has done himself honor and the
country service. From Vicksburg the intelligence is less
satisfactory. There appears to have been good fighting but
without results. A desperate stand will be made by the
Rebels to hold this place. It is important to them to pre-
vent the free navigation of the Mississippi; it is as import-
ant to us that it should be unobstructed. They wish to
have communication with Texas; we want to cut it off.
Had the army seconded Farragut and the Navy months
ago, Vicksburg would have been in our possession. Halleck
was good for nothing then, nor is he now.

January 10, Saturday. The President sent for Stanton
and myself; wished us to consult and do what we could for
the employment of the contrabands, and as the Rebels
threatened to kill all caught with arms in their hands, to
employ them where they would not be liable to be cap-
tured. On the ships he thought they were well cared for,
and suggested to Stanton that they could perform garrison
duty at Memphis, Columbus, and other places and let the
soldiers go on more active service.

Covode called at my house this evening and wanted the

1863] PERNICIOUS PARTY SPIRIT 219

President's card. Said he was likely to get into difficulty
and wished his name not to be used in the matter of remov-
ing the Navy Agent which he had urged. Would himself
see Chambers and advise him what to do. He expects,
he says, to be candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania.
Covode is shrewd but illiterate, a match and more than
a match for men of higher culture, reputation, and acquire-
ments; but I hardly think his gubernatorial expectations
will be realized, though they sometimes take strange
material for Governor in Pennsylvania.

The great problem which is being solved in these days
seems to be scarcely realized by our public, and really great,
men. It is sad to witness in this period of calamity, when
the nation is struggling for existence, and the cause of good
government and civil liberty is at stake, the spirit of party
overpowering patriotism. The Governors in several of the
States have presented then* messages during the week.
Tod of Ohio exhibits a manly, wholesome, and vigorous
tone, others also do well, but the Jesuitical and heartless
insincerity of Seymour of New York is devoid of true
patriotism, weak in statesmanship, and a discredit to the
position he occupies. Unhallowed partisan and personal
aspirations are moving springs with him. That such a
man, at such a time, should have been elected to such
a place does no credit to popular intelligence or to public
virtue. When Seward, himself, I think, rightly disposed,
acquiesced in the debased partisanship of his friend Weed,
who in spite wanted Wadsworth, the gallant and patriotic
citizen, defeated, he committed a fatal error.

In the insurgent States patriotism seems extinguished,
the flag and country are hated. There is great suffering on
the part of the people from all the direful calamities which
war can bring, yet there is no evidence of returning sense
or affection for that union which conferred upon them
happiness and prosperity. Greater calamities, greater
suffering, must be endured.

220 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 10

Some things have taken place which will undoubtedly
for a time exasperate the Southern mind, for they will
affect Southern society, habits, labor, and pursuits. For
a period emancipation will aggravate existing differences,
and a full generation will be necessary to effect and com-
plete the change which has been commenced.

January 12, Monday. Accounts from Vicksburg are
unfavorable and vague. I fear there has been mismanage-
ment, but we must wait official reports. It is said that
Sherman has been superseded by McClernand. I know
not how this is. At the commencement of this campaign,
as early as last September, it was understood that McCler-
nand was to have command of the army which was to go
down the river and cooperate with our naval commander,
Porter. The President had confidence in him, and desig-
nated the appointment, which was acceptable to Porter,
who had a particular dislike of West-Pointers. For this I
cared but little, because it was confessedly without know-
ledge of the officers individually and their merits, a close
and a sweeping condemnation of all, — partly, I think,
because he did not know them, and feared he should be
compelled to play a subordinate part with them, while
with a civilian general he would have superiority.

For three months, while Porter has been organizing the
Squadron, nothing has been heard of McClernand until
since the attack on Vicksburg, and now it is merely to
tell us he has abandoned the place and withdrawn his
forces.

The rumor of the capture of the Harriet Lane with the
little garrison at Galveston is confirmed. I am grieved and
depressed, not so much for the loss of the Harriet Lane as
from a conviction that there has been want of good man-
agement. It is about three months since we took Galves-
ton, and yet a garrison of only three hundred men was
there when the Rebel army approached the place. Some
one is blamable for this neglect.

1863] FITZ JOHN PORTER'S CASE 221

The court martial on Fitz John Porter closed last Satur-
day, and the rumor is that he was at once unanimously
acquitted. Of the facts I know nothing. I have read none
of the evidence. Shall be glad if he is blameless and it shall
so appear. My impressions were that while he and some
others were not disloyal, as charged, they did not support
and sustain the general in command, Pope, in a great crisis
as they should have done; that they performed their duty
to the letter of the law, perhaps, but not with alacrity and
zeal; that while they did not wish the country to suffer
a reverse, it would not grieve them if Pope did. In all this
I may be doing certain officers injustice. They were, how-
ever, the impressions made upon me at the time when
disaster was impending and our soldiers were giving their
blood and their lives to the country. I am no admirer of
Pope, who has the reputation among those who know him
of being untruthful and wholly unreliable, a braggart and
blusterer. Wrong may be to some extent done him, but
there is some cause for what is said of him. He was instru-
mental in bringing Halleck here, and Halleck gave him the
army in return. Both came from the West, and, aided by
Stanton and Chase, Pope was placed in command over
generals who were his superiors in age, experience, and
qualifications. This was as much, to say the least, to hu-
miliate McClellan as to serve the country. Pope preceded
Halleck here, but it was the same influence that initiated
the two. It is not difficult to see who is the cause of their
being here to supplant McClellan, whose tardy inaction
here and on the Peninsula disheartened the nation. Fitz
John Porter was one of the generals who had great faith in
McClellan, who sympathized with him hi good and evil
fortune, but who was destitute of faith in Pope, as were
nearly all his associates, who each, like their commander,
felt wronged, almost insulted, by the exaltation of an
officer from the Western Department, for whom they had
not high regard, placed over them. The change of com-
manders could not inspire him with confidence and zeal,

222 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 12

but if he permitted it to impair his efficiency he is inex-
cusable.

January 13, Tuesday. Received this A.M. from Admiral
Du Pont an intercepted mail captured off Charleston.
Reed Saunders, who had the mail in charge, threw it
overboard, as he supposed, but the master of the vessel,
once a volunteer acting master in our service whom I had
dismissed for drunkenness, practiced a deception, and
Saunders threw over something else than the mail, which
the master secreted, retained, and delivered, and thereby
saved his bacon. The mail was not forwarded to its
destination, as Seward directed it should be, but opened.
Numerous and important dispatches from Mallory, Mem-
minger, Benjamin,1 etc., etc., disclose important facts.
Took some of the more interesting to Cabinet council.

Was waited upon by a large committee composed mostly
of old friends and associates sent here by Connecticut to
procure the location of a navy yard at New London. Mr.
Speaker Carter was chairman and chief spokesman;
wanted a navy yard at New London for defensive pur-
poses, for the benefit to be derived from a large establish-
ment located in the State; but little had been expended in
Connecticut by the Federal Government; thought it a duty
to look out for our own State; if the Union should be bro-
ken up, it would be well to have such an establishment as I
had proposed in our own limits, etc. Assured the commit-
tee if Congress decided to establish a navy yard at New
London I should not oppose but would heartily cooperate
to make it what was wanted and what it should be. That
the small yard at Philadelphia was totally insufficient, and
if, in removing it, Congress should decide to go to New
London instead of remaining on the Delaware, I should
submit to the decision, but I could not, in honesty, sincer-
ity, and as an American citizen acting for all, recommend

1 Heads respectively of the Navy, Treasury, and State Departments in
the Confederate Government.

1863] CONFEDERATE LETTERS 223

it. That I had never supposed that the true interest of the
country would be promoted by such a transfer; that, much
as I loved my native State, I could not forget I was acting
for the whole country and for no one locality. That League
Island on the Delaware possessed some peculiar advan-
tages that belonged to no other navy yard nor to New
London; that it had been tendered, a free gift, by the city
of Philadelphia as a substitute for the present contracted
wharfage in the city; that I had conscientiously advised
its acceptance, and I could not do otherwise than to still
act in accordance with my convictions of what I deemed
best for the whole country by continuing to recommend
its acceptance, whatever might be determined in regard
to a navy yard at New London, which was an altogether
different matter.

January 15, Thursday. Have been interested for the last
two or three days in reading, when I had time, letters that
were taken from the intercepted mail. Most of them are
from intelligent writers in the best circles at Richmond. In
these communications, freely written in friendly confidence,
there [crops] out a latent feeling of hope for peace and
restoration of once happier days. There is distress and
deprivation; the spirit of hate engendered by strife is there,
but no happiness nor inward satisfaction over the desola-
tion which active hostilities have caused. Strange that so
many intelligent beings should be so madly influenced.

A number of Senatorial elections have recently taken
place. Cameron has not succeeded even by corruption, and
it is well he did not. I felt relieved when I heard he was
defeated, though I did not rejoice in the success of his
opponent, whose sympathies are reputed to be with the
Secessionists.

January 16, Friday. Little of interest in the Cabinet.
Chase, who has been absent a week, was present; Stanton
did not attend. No navy or army matters discussed. Chase

224 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. ie

says the New-Yorkers are generally coming into his finan-
cial views, that all in Philadelphia approve them; thinks
they should be made a party test. No one responded to
this, — an indication that they were not prepared to have
him set up a standard of financial, political, or party ortho-
doxy for them.

A flurry in the Senate to-day over a letter from General
Meigs, who had been coarsely assailed a day or two since
by Wilkinson of Minnesota. The Senatorial dignity was
ruffled by the manly rebuke of the soldier. There is an
impotent and ridiculous attempt at ^elf-sufficient and pre-
suming airs, an exhibition of lame and insolent arrogance,
on the part of many Senators towards men who are, to say
the least, their equals in every good quality. Not long
since J. P. Hale undertook to vent his personal spite in the
Senate on Admiral Smith, who regards the public interest
more than the wordy, personal, and selfish schemes of the
New Hampshire Senator. The dignity of the Senator was
bruised by the old sailor's blunt honesty, who demanded
a committee with power and an investigation to whitewash
the Senator or blackwash the Admiral.

January 19, Monday. Sent a letter to the two naval
committees on the subject of filling vacancies in the Naval
School. Members of Congress are disposed to evade all
responsibility, and yet to carp at and criticize those of us
who under imperious public necessity are compelled to act.
The school should be full now if ever. I propose to fill it.
The Members individually with few exceptions urge it. I
ask them to give me at least the expression of their official,
Senatorial opinion, but they shrink.

Received a telegraphic dispatch from Admiral Porter
via Cairo of the capture of Dunnington and force at
Arkansas Post. It is dated the llth of January, — a long
and protracted transit.

Baldwin of the Vanderbilt came up to-day from Hamp-
ton Roads, where he arrived yesterday from an unsuccess-

1863] FITZ JOHN PORTER'S CONVICTION 225

ful cruise for the Alabama, his vessel having been detained
by Wilkes, which defeated the Department's plan.

There are rumors of the movement of the army at Fal-
mouth. Incipient steps have doubtless been taken, but the
storm has retarded operations.

January 21, Wednesday. The furious storm of last night
and to-day fills us with apprehensions for the two iron-
clads, Nahant and Weehawken. It is hoped they put in to
the Breakwater.

Wrote Seward, who makes inquiry respecting the con-
struction of vessels for the Japanese, advising that the
Government should have nothing to do with them, that
Pruyn, the commissioner, ought not to commit or ha any
way implicate the Government.

January 22, Thursday. There is a rumor that Fitz John
Porter, whose trial of over forty days has interested the
public, is found guilty and has been cashiered. A different
result was reported at the close of the trial a fortnight since.
It was then said he was unanimously acquitted. I did not
give implicit credit to that rumor, though I read none of
the testimony; but my impressions and observation and all
that I heard at the War Department in relation to Porter
and other generals in the day and time of their occurrence
for which he was arraigned were such I could not believe
him wholly guiltless. The finding and punishment are
severe, but I apprehend not entirely undeserved. I do not,
however, impute to him disloyalty or treachery, but he was
one of a mortified clique or combination who were vexed
and dissatisfied, not without cause perhaps, that an inferior
officer for whom they had not high regard should have been
brought from a distant department and placed over them,
their plans and operations broken up, and the commander
whom they respected and to whom they were attached
superseded and virtually disgraced. But if the country
was made to suffer by this mortified partisan combination,

226 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 22

it was a crime which should not go unrebuked or unpun-
ished. Porter may not have been the chief or only sinner,
though the victim in this combination.

It was not a wise or judicious movement to place Pope
at the head of the army last summer. If I am not mistaken
those who participated in it now think so. An intrigue
against McClellan brought him and Halleck here. Perhaps
under no circumstances was Pope equal to the command
given him, but I thought then and still believe he was not
faithfully and fairly sustained by Porter and his associ-
ates. McClellan and most of his generals were vexed and
irritated. They had some cause for dissatisfaction, but
not to the injury of the country. Fitz John Porter, the
intimate of McClellan, entered with all the ardor of a parti-
san and a clansman into the feelings and wrongs of his
commander. He and the set to which he belonged did not,
I thought at the time, wish Pope to acquire great glory;
their zeal for victory was weak when he commanded, and
the battle was lost. To some extent the results at the sec-
ond Bull Run fight are attributable to the bad conduct of
the generals. It has been evident the soldiers of the Army
of the Potomac were not enthusiastic for Pope, — that
they did not like him. This is true, but who chilled them?
Who encouraged their dislike?

The Weehawken has arrived at Hampton Roads, having
rode out the gale without making a port. No man but John
Rodgers would have pushed on his vessel in that terrific
storm. The Nahant, a better vessel, sought the Break-
water, as did some of our best wooden steamers.

General Burnside was to have made a forward move-
ment, but the storm prevented. There are rumors that the
army is much demoralized, that the soldiers do not give
their confidence to Burnside, doubt his military capacity,
and that some of the generals are cool. There is, I think,
some truth and some exaggeration in all these reports.

January 23, Friday. As I anticipated, continued and

1863] A CALL FROM F. A. CONKLING 227

increasing abuses and much illicit traffic are going on under
the army permits issued by General Dix to pass the block-
ade. It will be difficult to stop the abuse, now that it has
commenced.

I have sent to Congress a communication with a view to
getting an expression of opinion on the subject of League
Island for naval purposes.

By request of Senator Foot of the Naval Committee,
prepared a bill in relation to midshipmen and sent it with
a letter.

January 24, Saturday. Had a telegram at midnight from
Admiral Porter of captures on White River.

Senator Foot yesterday resigned his seat on the Naval
Committee. Some disagreement with Hale, the chairman,
who plays the part of a harlequin as well as a demagogue, —
is, I am told, a constant marplot and very contentious in
the Committee, does nothing to assist but much to embar-
rass and counteract the Department. Grimes also asked to
be excused for the same reason as Foot; does not conceal
his dislike and detestation of Hale. The Senate did right
in refusing to excuse him.

F. A. Conkling, 1 who, the President says, is "a mighty
onhandy man," called to give me a lecture and instructions
relative to the appointment of midshipmen. Said Congress
had the right to nominate and it was the duty of the Secre-
tary to appoint. He could not tell me where Congress got
that right, or the right to locate them in districts. Was
compelled to admit that Congress could not dictate or nom-
inate who should be judges of the Supreme Court, or say
from what circuit or State the President should select them,
but after a little controversy he acknowledged the cases
were analogous. Forgetting his first starting-point, he
wanted to know by what authority the Secretary of the
Navy appointed midshipmen. I referred him to the Con-
stitution and the laws, which I pointed out. Told him the
1 A Representative from New York, brother of Roscoe Conkling.

DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 24

President by and with the consent and approval of the
Senate could make appointments, but Congress could by
law confer or vest inferior appointments in the courts
of law, heads of Departments, or the President alone; that
Congress had, by law, vested the inferior appointment of
midshipmen in the Secretary of the Navy, and I had, under
that law, made appointments and should continue to do
so. After tumbling over the statutes for sometime, he found
himself unable to controvert my position or to answer me,
and left, apparently with a "flea in his ear." No man ever
came upon me more dogmatically, or left more humble.

In answer to Senator Fessenden, who is pushed forward
by Preble to urge his restoration, I replied that in my opin-
ion the tune had not yet arrived, but, having made known
my views, I should leave the subject with the Senate,
claiming no infallibility for myself. F. expresses a willing-
ness to take upon himself any responsibility, but did not
wish to act in opposition to me, who, he said, had some, but
not many, unscrupulous assailants who were anxious to
get him in collision with me. He complimented my ad-
ministration of the Department, which he had honestly
sustained because he honestly approved it, and had been
annoyed with the mischievous manoeuvres of the Chairman
of the Naval Committee, which, however, were well under-
stood hi the Senate and did me no harm. Preble's note
seeking restoration was surly and crusty. I suggested that
on his own account he had better form a different one.
Fessenden said he would consult any one I might name.
Told him Davis or Smith were pretty good in such matters.
F. laughed and said Smith wrote the note.

A California committee was on Tuesday before the Cab-
inet relative to the gauge of the Pacific Railroad. They
gave each their views, — every one, I believe, in favor of
the five-feet gauge. When they left, the President proposed
a vote without discussion, — not that it should be conclu-
sive but as an expression of the unbiased opinion of each. I
was, for the present at least, for four eight and one half,

1863] HOOKER SUCCEEDS BURNSIDE 229

chiefly for the reason that a change could be made from the
wide to the narrow at less expense than the reverse; the
aggregate cost will be millions less; that usage, custom,
practical experience, knowledge proved the superiority of
that gauge if they had proved anything, etc., etc. I believe
the majority were for that gauge.

The Chronicle contains the argument of Judge- Advocate
Holt in Fitz John Porter's case. It seems to have been
made after the finding of the Court instead of before, and
is sent out with it as if in defense of the decision. The pro-
ceeding is singular and will be likely to cause censure. There
is much of partisanship on both sides of Porter's case. I
have abstained from being mixed up in it, and have not had
the time, nor am I called upon, to read the voluminous
proceedings and comments. If the conviction is correct,
the punishment is hardly adequate to, or commensurate
with, the offense. I have thought Porter not alone in fault.
More than one appeared to me culpable for the disasters
of that period.

There is a change of commander of the Army of the
Potomac. Burnside relinquishes to Hooker. I hope the
change may be beneficial, but have apprehensions. The
President asked me about the time of the Second Battle of
Bull Run, when Pope was to leave and McClellan was out
of favor: "Who can take command of this army? Who is
there among all these generals? " The address to me was un-
expected, and without much consideration I named Hooker.
The President looked approvingly, but said, "I think as
much as you or any other man of Hooker, but — I fear he
gets excited," looking around as he spoke. Blair, who was
present, said he is too great a friend of John Barleycorn. I
have mingled but little in the social or convivial gatherings
of the military men, have attended fewer of the parades
than any member of the Cabinet, and have known less of
their habits. What I had seen and observed of Hooker had
impressed me favorably, but our interviews had been
chiefly business-wise and in the matter of duty, but there

230 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JAN. 24

was a promptness, frankness, and intelligence about him
that compared favorably with some others. I remarked,
"If his habits are bad, if he ever permits himself to get
intoxicated, he ought not to be trusted with such a com-
mand," and withdrew my nomination. From what I have
since heard, I fear his habits are not such as to commend
him, that at least he indulges in the free use of whiskey,
gets excited, and is fond of play. This is the result of my
inquiries, and, with this reputation, I am surprised at his
selection, though, aside from the infirmities alluded to, he
doubtless has good points as an officer.

January 28, Wednesday. Word comes that the Oreto
has escaped from Mobile and destroyed some vessels. Our
information is vague and indefinite, but I doubt not it is
hi the main true.

Get as yet no official report of the disaster at Galveston.
Farragut has prompt, energetic, excellent qualities, but no
fondness for written details or self -laudation ; does but one
thing at a time, but does that strong and well; is better
fitted to lead an expedition through danger and difficulty
than to command an extensive blockade; is a good officer
in a great emergency, will more willingly take great risks
in order to obtain great results than any officer in high
position in either Navy or Army, and, unlike most of them,
prefers that others should tell the story of his well-doing
rather than relate it himself.

Thurlow Weed retires from the Evening Journal. Is this
an actual or pretended retirement? I always distrust him.
He is strong and cunning; has a vigorous but not an ingen-
uous mind. Being a lifelong partisan, he cannot abandon
party even for the country's welfare, though he may strive
to have them assimilate. It grieved him that so many of
his old party opponents should have been invited to the
Cabinet and identified with the Administration. The Pre-
sident quietly laughs at Weed's intrigues to exclude Chase
and myself. This was in the interest of Seward, his alter ego.

1863] IDENTITY OF WEED AND SEWARD 231

I remember that Seward on one occasion remarked in Cab-
inet, "Weed is Seward, and Seward is Weed; each approves
what the other says and does." It was not a pleasant
remark to some of us, and Chase said he did not recognize
the identity; while he would yield a point as a matter of
favor to Mr. Seward, he would not to Weed. His ostensible
reason for abandoning the field of active politics at this
time and leaving the Journal is because he cannot act
with his friends and support the Administration. There
is intrigue, insincerity, and scheming in all this. I have
no confidence in him, and he doubtless knows it. The
organization of the New York Legislature has been finally
accomplished. If Weed does not go for Seward for the
Senate, — which is at the bottom of this movement, — he
will prop Morgan. King, their best man, is to be sacrificed.
I do not think Weed is moving for the Senatorship for
himself, yet it is so charged. He has professedly left his
old friends, but it is to carry as many as possible with him
into a new combination, where he and Seward will have
Dix, whom they have captured and whom they are using
while D. supposes they are earnest for him.

January 30, Friday. But little at the Cabinet. Chase
is quite dejected, and manifested some rather suppressed
irritation towards Blair and Seward as he sat beside me.
Neither of them saw it; I was glad they did not.

Blair says Fitz John Porter is disliked by the army with
the exception of McClellan, but is his special confidant.
The President seemed to know this, but the disaffection
as stated by Blair was more general than he supposed.

February 3, Tuesday. The I. P. Smith,1 a purchased
steamer of eleven guns, is reported captured in Stono
River. We have information also that the blockaders have
captured the Princess Royal with a valuable cargo, that
was attempting to get into Charleston.

1 This was the gunboat Isaac Smith, captured January 30. Her name
was incorrectly reported.

232 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 3

The naval contractors are becoming clamorous for ad-
vanced prices in consequence of the depreciation of money.
I have been expecting this. Cheapening money will be dear
to the Government. Have warned Chase of it. It is only
the beginning of evil.

The question of making an example by shooting a de-
serter was before the Cabinet. A case, considered a strong
one, of a young man named Bud of Albany was presented.
It did not strike me as so aggravated a case as some others,
but the necessity of an example to check a rapidly increas-
ing evil was unanimously assented to. The propriety of
inflicting high penalty on some more conspicuous offender
than a poor private soldier was suggested.

February 4, Wednesday. Governor E. D. Morgan was
yesterday elected Senator in place of Preston King. If
the latter was not to be returned, Morgan was probably the
best of the competitors. He will make a useful Senator if
he can persistently carry out his honest convictions, but
I know of no one who can, just at this tune, make good
the place of King. He has been cheated and deceived. The
country sustains a loss in his retirement. He is honest,
faithful, unselfish, and earnestly patriotic.

We have the whole world agog with an account of an
onset on our fleet before Charleston. The Mercedita is
reported to have been surprised and sunk, and other vessels
damaged. But the great hullabaloo is over a report that the
whole blockading fleet ran away, — the foreign consuls at
Charleston went out and could see none of the vessels, — and
the blockade is by the Rebels declared raised. Seward called
on me in great trepidation with these tidings. Told him
most of the stuff was unworthy of a moment's considera-
tion. Not unlikely the Mercedita may have been surprised
and sunk, as she is of light draft and was probably close in.
If there had been other vessels captured or sunk, we should
have had their names. It looked to me as if the budget was
made up for the European market by the foreign consuls,

EDWIN D. MORGAN

1863] SEWARD AND THE BLOCKADE 233

who are in fact Rebel agents, and I asked why their ex-
equaturs were not annulled.

The New York papers have sensation headings over the
Charleston news, and the Tribune has a ridiculous article
about blockade, more wild, if possible, than Seward.

February 5, Thursday. Seward sent me this morning a
scary dispatch which he proposed to give each of the foreign
ministers, in relation to the blockade at Galveston, which
he, unwisely, improperly, and without knowledge of the
facts, admits has been raised, but which he informs them
will be again immediately enforced. I was exceedingly
annoyed that he should propose to issue such a document
under any circumstances, and especially without consulta-
tion. It is one of those unfortunate assumptions, pregnant
with error, in which he sometimes indulges. I toned and
softened his paper down in several places, but told the
clerk to give Mr. Seward my compliments and say to him
I totally objected to his sending out such a paper.

February 6, Friday. Nothing of special importance at the
Cabinet. Seward was absent, and I therefore called on
him respecting his circular dispatch concerning the block-
ade at Galveston. His chief clerk, Mr. Hunter, was coy and
shy. Neither he nor Mr. Seward were certain it had been
sent. Some dispatches had not been sent. Seward said he
had made all the alterations, but the clerk had not done his
errand properly, did not tell him I objected, etc., etc. The
Department seemed in confusion. Hunter watched Seward
closely and could recollect only what Seward recollected.
When I touched on the principles involved, I found Seward
inexcusably ignorant of the subject of blockade. He ad-
mitted he had not looked into the books, had not studied
the subject, had relied on Hunter. Hunter said he had very
little knowledge and no practical experience on these mat-
ters except what took place during the Mexican blockade.
Made Seward send for Wheaton; read to him a few pass-

234 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 6

ages. He seemed perplexed, but thought his circular dis-
patch as modified could do little harm. I am apprehensive
that he has, in his ostentatious, self-assuming way, com-
mitted himself in conversation, and knows not how to get
out of the difficulty. He says Fox told him the blockade
was raised at Galveston. It is one of those cases where the
Secretary of State has written a hasty letter without proper
inquiry or knowledge of facts, and my fears are that he has
made unwarranted admissions. After firing off his gun, he
learns his mistake, — has "gone off half-cocked."

February 7, Saturday. Two or three Members of the
House have had an opportunity to spend their wrath on
me in relation to appointment of midshipmen. Calvert is
quite angry on two or three matters and takes this oppor-
tunity to vent his spite. Washburne of Illinois, who has the
reputation of being the "meanest man in the House," is
sore under my reply to his inquiry concerning the "vessel
Varuna"; others but little better than Washburne were
abusive.

February 9, Monday. A special messenger from Admiral
Du Pont with dispatches came to my house early this morn-
ing before I was awake, and would deliver them into no
hand but my own. I received them at the door of my cham-
ber. They relate to the late flurry at Charleston. The
Mercedita was neither captured nor sunk, nor was any ves-
sel of the Squadron. The Mercedita and Keystone State
were injured in their steam-chests, and went to Port Royal
for repairs. All the noise about raising the blockade was
mere trash of the Rebels South and their sympathizers
North. Dr. Bacon, the bearer of the dispatches, came to
Philadelphia in the prize Princess Royal, captured running
the blockade. Abuse will cease for a day, perhaps, under
this intelligence. Am surprised at the ignorance which
prevails in regard to the principles of blockade, which the
late trouble has exposed.

1863] FRANCE PRESSING FOR MEDIATION 235

February 10, Tuesday. Presented Colonel Hawley's
name to the President for Brigadier-General with expres-
sions of my regard. Was kindly received but no assurance
given. Informed the President I should put Preble's case
in his hands to be disposed of.

The nomination of Mark Howard for Collector of the
Hartford District has been suspended in the Senate. How-
ard is a very faithful, competent, and excellent man for the
office, but he and Senator Dixon, neighbors and formerly
intimate friends, have latterly had some differences. Dixon
takes advantage of his position as Senator to stab Howard
in secret session, where H. can have no opportunity for self-
defense. Senator Sumner, whom I met this evening, says
Dixon came to him and asked, if a personal enemy, who
abused, slandered, and defied him were before the Senate,
would he vote for him. Sumner replied, No. Senator Doo-
little admits he was in like manner approached; says it was
embarrassing, for there is an implied understanding — a
courtesy among Senators — that they will yield to the
personal appeals of a Senator in appointments to office in
his own town. I asked if it was possible that the Senate
prostituted itself to gratify private animosities, — made
itself a party to the personal quarrels of one of its members
and gave him the means to wreak his vengeance on a
worthy person without cause or justification? Doolittle
attempted no defense; evidently did not like the attitude
in which he was placed.

Thurlow Weed is in town. He has been sent for, but my
informant knows not for what purpose. It is, I learn, to
consult in regard to a scheme of Seward to influence the
New Hampshire and Connecticut elections.

Some days since, Seward handed me a dispatch as I en-
tered the President's office on Cabinet day, from Mr. Day-
ton at Paris, stating the French Government was pressing
friendly mediation. I handed it back after reading, with
the remark that it was wholly inadmissible. Seward made
no reply, but handed the dispatch to others to read as they

236 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 10

came in. There was, I think, a response similar to mine
from each. When I heard that Seward's factotum, Weed,
had been called here I thought at once of Dayton's dispatch
and schemes of adjustment. Nous verrons.

[In the lower House of Congress] after a violent attack
byCalvert, Washburne, and a few others [on the subject of
appointment of midshipmen], I was sustained by a vote
of two to one, to the great chagrin of the clique, who,
I am told, did not conceal their vexation.

February 14, Saturday. The New York Tribune of yester-
day has an allusion to correspondence between Seward and
myself relative to the British- African Slave Treaty, which
indicates a purpose to get us by the ears.

February 16, Monday. General Foster was here yester-
day, Sunday. Has let out the proposed attack on Charles-
ton. This indicates what I have lately feared, — that
Du Pont shrinks, dreads, the conflict he has sought, yet is
unwilling that any other should undertake it, is afraid
the reputation of Du Pont will suffer. This jeopardizes the
whole, — makes a botched thing of it. I am disappointed,
but not wholly surprised. A mandate he will obey, but I
cannot well give it, for there are preliminaries and contin-
gencies which would influence his movements and of which
he must judge. The President desires Fox to go down to
Charleston with General Foster, and came with Fox to see
me. Told him it was a time when the active force of the
Department was most wanted, it being near the close of
the session of Congress, when every variety of call was
made and delays to answer are inadmissible, and some
important bills were to be acted upon and engineered
through; nevertheless, if it was indispensable, he must go,
but the very fact that Fox was sent on such an errand as
proposed would touch Du Pont's pride, which is great, and
do perhaps more harm than good. The President compre-
hended my views, and it was thought best that Fox should

1863] PROPOSED ATTACK ON CHARLESTON 237

not go, but Foster was informed of our ideas, — that the
Navy could move independent of the army, and pass Sum-
ter, not stop to batter it. Once in the rear of the fort and
having the town under the guns of the ironclads, the mili-
tary in the forts and on James Island would be compelled
to come to terms. All is clear and well enough but Du Pont
should have such a force as to inspire confidence in himself
and men in order to insure a favorable result. Will and de-
termination are necessary to success. While it is right that
he should be circumspect and vigilant, I deplore the signs
of misgiving and doubt which have recently come over him,
— his shirking policy, getting in with the army, making
approaches, etc. It is not what we have talked of, not what
we expected of him; is not like the firm and impetuous but
sagacious and resolute Farragut.

February 17, Tuesday. The President read to the Cabi-
net a correspondence between himself and Fernando Wood.
The latter wrote the President on the 8th of December last
that he had good reason to believe the South desired a
restoration of the Union, etc. The President replied on the
12th of December that he had no confidence in the impres-
sion, but that he would receive kindly any proposition.
Wood's letter was confidential; the President made his so.
All was well enough, perhaps, in form and manner if such a
correspondence was to take place. Wood is a Representa-
tive and his letter was brought to the President by Mayor
Opdyke.1 Mayor Opdyke and ex-Mayor Wood are on
opposite extremes of parties, — so opposite that each is, if
not antagonistic, not very friendly inclined to the President.
Wood now telegraphs the President that the time has
arrived when the correspondence should be published. It
is a piece of political machinery intended for certain party
purposes.

Chase says that Howard and Trumbull of the Senate
were dissatisfied with their vote in favor of his bank bill,

1 George Opdyke, Mayor of New York.

238 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 17

which they had given under the impression it was an Ad-
ministration measure, but they had since understood that
Usher and myself were opposed to it. I told him that my
general views were better known to him than them, that
I had no concealment on the subject; I had, however, no
recollection of ever exchanging a word with either of those
Senators concerning his measures; that I had given his
financial questions little or no attention, had never read
his bill, had but a general conception of his scheme; that, so
far as I was informed, it was not in conformity with my old
notions, as he well knew, for I had freely communicated
with him early, though I had not been consulted recently
and matters had taken such a shape I was glad I had not
been, and that the whole subject had been committed
to him and Congress. I had neither time nor inclination to
study new theories, was wedded to old doctrines and settled
principles. Usher said he had electioneered for the measure
with sundry Congressmen, whom he named. I told him
I had not with any one and did not intend to.

February 18, Wednesday. Have a long dispatch from
Admiral Porter relative to operations on the Mississippi,
a cut at the Delta between Helena and the Yazoo on the
east, and at Lake Providence into Tensas on the west.

February 19, Thursday. A special Cabinet-meeting. The
President desired a consultation as to the expediency of an
extra session of the Senate. Chase favored. Seward op-
posed. No very decided opinion expressed by the others.
I was disinclined to it.

The President has been invited to preside at a meeting
for religious Christian purposes on Sunday evening. Chase
favored it. All the others opposed it but Usher, who had
a lingering, hesitating, half-favorable inclination to favor
it. Has been probably talked with and committed to some
extent; so with Chase.

The President on Tuesday expressed a wish that Captain

1863] DAHLGREN AND THE PRESIDENT 239

Dahlgren should be made an admiral, and I presented
to-day both his and Davis's names.1

I wrote Senator Dixon a note, remonstrating against his
misuse of power by opposing in secret session the appoint-
ment and confirmation of Howard as Collector; that it
was not only wrong, officially, for he was not clothed with
authority to revenge private grievances, but it would close
the door to any reconciliation, and make lifelong enmities
between those who were neighbors and should be friends;
that he admitted, and every one knew, Howard was a good
and correct officer. All, it seems, was unavailing, for I hear
the Senate has failed to confirm the nomination. An in-
excusable and unjustifiable act on the part of the Senate,
a wrong to the country, a gross wrong and outrage on an
American citizen of character and worth who is discharging
his duty with fidelity, the peer of the Senators who are
guilty of this prostitution of honor and trust. This act and
this practice of the Senate are as repugnant to good govern-
ment and as degrading as anything in the corrupt days of
Roman history, or the rotten aristocracy of modern Europe.

February 22, Sunday. A severe snowstorm. Did not
venture abroad. Had a call from Dahlgren, who is very
grateful that he is named for admiral. Told him to thank
the President, who had made it a specialty; that I did
not advise it. He called with reference to a written promise
the President had given one Dillon for $150,000 provided
a newly invented gunpowder should prove effective. I
warned Dahlgren that these irregular proceedings would
involve himself and others in difficulty; that the President
had no authority for it ; that there was no appropriation in
our Department from which this sum could be paid; that
he ought certainly to know, and the President should
understand, that we could not divert funds from their legit-
imate appropriation. I cautioned him, as I have had occa-

1 Charles Henry Davis, who had defeated the Confederate fleet off Fort
Pillow, and captured Memphis.

240 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 22

sion to do repeatedly, against encouraging the President
in these well-intentioned but irregular proceedings. He as-
sures me he does restrain the President as far as respect will
permit, but his " restraints" are impotent, valueless. He is
no check on the President, who has a propensity to engage
in matters of this kind, and is liable to be constantly im-
posed upon by sharpers and adventurers. Finding the
heads of Departments opposed to these schemes, the Pre-
sident goes often behind them, as in this instance; and
subordinates, flattered by his notice, encourage him. In
this instance, Dahlgren says it is the President's act, that
he is responsible, that there is his written promise, that it
is not my act nor his (D.'s).

Something was said to me some days since in regard to
the great secret of this man Dillon, but I gave it no atten-
tion, did not like the manner, etc. So it was, I apprehend,
with the War Department; and then Dillon went to the
President with his secret, which I apprehend is no secret.

February 23, Monday. General Halleck informs me there
is a rumor via Richmond that the steamer Queen of the
West has been captured. He doubts its truth. I fear it
may be so.

February 24, Tuesday. At the Cabinet-meeting the Pre-
sident expressed uneasiness at the rumor which he had just
heard that the Queen of the West was captured. Told him
what I heard yesterday from General Halleck. Stanton
said he wholly discredited the story, but went and got the
dispatches. On reading them, my apprehensions were in-
creased. The President called on me later in the day, and we
both came to the conclusion that the boat was lost to us.

February 25, Wednesday. Had a brief call from General
McClellan this P.M. He looks in good health, but is evi-
dently uncomfortable in mind. Our conversation was gen-
eral, — of the little progress made, the censoriousness of

1863 SEWARD AND GENERAL SGOTT 241

the public, of the dissatisfaction towards both of us, etc.,
etc. The letter of General Scott, of the 4th of October,
1861, complaining of his disrespect and wanting obedience,
is just brought out.

I well remember an interview between these two officers
about the period that letter was written, the President,
myself, and two or three others being present. It was in
General Scott's rooms opposite the War Office. In the
course of conversation, which related to military opera-
tions, a question arose as to the number of troops there
were in and about Washington. Cameron could not
answer the question; McClellan did not; General Scott
said no reports were made to him; the President was
disturbed. At this moment Seward stated the several
commands, — how many regiments had reported in a few
days, and the aggregate at the tune of the whole force.
The statement was made from a small paper, and, appeal-
ing to McClellan, that officer replied that the statement
approximated the truth. General Scott's countenance
showed great displeasure. "This," said the veteran war-
rior, "is a remarkable state of things. I am in command
of the armies of the United States, but have been wholly
unable to get any reports, any statement of the actual
forces, but here is the Secretary of State, a civilian, for
whom I have great respect but who is not a military man
nor conversant with military affairs, though his abilities
are great, but this civilian is possessed of facts which are
withheld from me. Military reports are made, not to these
Headquarters but to the State Department. Am I, Mr.
President, to apply to the Secretary of State for the
necessary military information to discharge my duties?"

Mr. Seward explained that he had got his information
by vigilance and attention, keeping account of the daily
arrival of regiments, etc., etc. There was a grim smile on
the old soldier. " And you, without report, probably ascer-
tained where each regiment was ordered. Your labors and
industry, Mr. Secretary of State, I know are very arduous,

242 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [FEB. 25

but I did not before know the whole of them. If you in that
way can get accurate information, the Rebels can also,
though I cannot."

Cameron here broke in, half hi earnest and half -ironical,
and said we all knew that Seward was meddlesome, inter-
fering in all the Departments with what was none of his
business. He thought we had better go to our duties. It
was a pleasant way of breaking up an unpleasant interview,
and we rose to leave. McClellan was near the open door,
and General Scott addressed him by name. "You," said
the aged hero, "were called here by my advice. The times
require vigilance and activity. I am not active and never
shall be again. When I proposed that you should come
here to aid, not supersede, me, you had my friendship and
confidence. You still have my confidence."

I had, hi the early stages of the War, disapproved of
the policy of General Scott, which was purely defensive,
— non-intercourse with the insurgents, shut them out from
the world by blockade and military frontier lines, but not
to invade then- territory. The anaconda policy was, I then
thought and still think, unwise for the country. The policy
of General McClellan has not been essentially different, but
he was called here with the assent it not by the recom-
mendation of General Scott. It was evident from'what tran-
spired at the interview here mentioned that Mr. Seward,
who had been in close intimacy with the veteran com-
mander at first, had transferred his intimacy to the junior
general, and the former felt it, — saw that he was becoming
neglected, — and his pride was wounded.

That Seward kept himself well informed in the way he
stated, I think was true, and he likely had his information
confirmed by McClellan, with whom he almost daily
compared notes and of whom he made inquiries. But
McClellan is by nature reticent, — in many respects a good
quality. Seward has great industry and an inquiring mind,
and loves to possess himself of everything that transpires.
Has an unfortunate inclination to run to subordinates for

1863] SEWARD'S INQUIRING MIND 243

information. Has in Meigs a willing assistant, and others
who think it a compliment to be consulted by the Secretary
of State, and are ready to impart to him all they know of
the doings and intentions of their superiors. He has by his
practice encouraged the President to do likewise and get at
facts indiscreetly; but the President does this because he
feels a delicacy in intruding, especially in business hours,
on the heads of Departments. S. has no such delicacy, but
a craving desire to be familiar with the transactions of each
Department.

VII

Closing Hours of Congress — A Call from Senator Dixon — Proposed Issue
of Letters of Marque — Delay in the Attack on Charleston — Impending
War with England — Conversations with Sumner about the Letters of
Marque — Conversation with the President on the Subject of Letters
of Marque and the Attitude of England — Talk with Seward on the Re-
lation of the Navy Department to the Letters of Marque — The First
Application for Letters of Marque — The Expected Attack on Charleston
— News of Repulse at Charleston — The Peterhoff's Mails — Com-
mander Rhind and the Ironclads at Charleston — The Elletts and the
Ram Fleet — Du Font's Failure at^Charleston — The {President takes
a Hand in the Peterhoff Contention — Blockade-Runners on the Rio
Grande — Du Font's Vanity and Weakness — Sumner's Conversation
with Lord Lyons on the Peterhoff Matter.

March 5, Thursday. Went on the evening of the 3d inst.
to the Capitol. Spent most of the tune until eleven o'clock
in the President's room. It is my first visit to the Capitol
since the session commenced. Was for half an hour on the
floor of the House. Thirty-four years ago spent the night
of the 3d of March on the floor of the Representatives'
Chamber. It was in the old Representatives' Hall. Andrew
Stevenson was Speaker. I first saw Henry Clay that night.
He came from the President's room to the House about
ten. It was to him the scene of old triumphs, and friends
crowded around him.

I subsequently went into the Senate Chamber, a much
larger but less pleasant room than the old one, which I first
visited in the last days of the second Adams. If the present
room is larger, the Senators seemed smaller. My first im-
pressions were doubtless more reverential than those of
later times.

The deportment of the Members in both houses was calm
and in favorable contrast with what I have ever seen of the
closing hours of any session, and I have witnessed many.
There was nothing boisterous, and but little that was fac-
tious. It was nearly midnight when we left. On the morn-

1863] CLOSING HOURS OF CONGRESS 245

ing of the 4th I was at the Capitol, from ten till twelve. All
passed off harmoniously.

The recent dispatches of Consul Morse at London, and
information from other sources, render it necessary meas-
ures should be taken to prevent the Rebels from getting
a considerable naval force afloat.

March 6, Friday. Appointments considered yesterday
and to-day. Generally conceded that Field of California
was the man for the Supreme Court. The Court of Claims
seems a peace court. The Court for the District is more
important, and unfortunately the hearts and sympathies
of the present judges are with the Rebels.

March 7, Saturday night. The week has been one of
steady, incessant employment. I feel I have been over-
tasked and am much exhausted. Must have rest.

Two rather important bills were got, I may say smug-
gled, through Congress, affecting the Navy Department,
which I never saw. One of them, relating to an Advisory
Board, was brought to the President for approval on the
4th of March, which he handed to me. On a hasty perusal
I requested him not to sign it until it could have a more
thorough examination. We sent for Grimes to make in-
quiry concerning it. He said the bill had never been dis-
cussed; he did not approve of it; that he had expected it
would be killed in the House. The President passed it
to me for criticism and farther examination, and return to
him with my views. The other bill relates to matters of
prize, and must have been got through surreptitiously. It
is crude and objectionable in several respects.

Sedgwick, Chairman of the Naval Committee in the
House, has been active in getting through a bill for
the codification of the naval laws, and expects to per-
form the service of codification. All in the Department
and the officers generally desire him to perform the service,
but there are objections in my mind to his selection, which

246 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MARCH 7

I should urge, were it not that the President has another
candidate, a gentleman who has no knowledge of naval
affairs or naval or admiralty law, but who, qualified or not,
wants a place.

March 9, Monday. Had a call from Senator Dixon. Is
depressed and unhappy. Regrets that he opposed the con-
firmation of Howard. Says if the subject was to be gone
over again his course would be different. I did not attempt
to soften or excuse his conduct, but told him I was sorry
he did not listen to my suggestions. He proposed several
names for the place. I had no other candidate than my old
friend James G. Bolles, and he, though naming two or three
others, fell in with it.

March 10, Tuesday. I saw last evening a communication
from the State Department inclosing several pages of reg-
ulations for letters of marque. The subject was to-day be-
fore the Cabinet, and there is a stronger disposition for the
policy than I expected. I told the President I had given
the proposed regulations but a cursory examination. The
subject was therefore postponed to our Friday meeting,
with an understanding that I should in the mean tune
examine them and report if they were objectionable. On
looking over the sections, I find they are a transcript of the
laws of 1812 and 1813, which the Secretary of State has
embodied in a series of regulations which he proposes to
issue. The old laws of half a century ago have expired. It
is not pretended they have vitality. But the Secretary
of State legislates by regulations. I am not favorably
impressed with the law or the regulations, nor with the idea
of sending out privateers against a couple of piratical cruis-
ers, even if there are private parties fools enough to go on
that hunt, which he says there are, but I doubt. The law
undertakes to delegate legislative power to the President,
which is in itself wrong. But the subject is, I fear, a fore-
gone conclusion. Both Seward and Chase favor it, and the

1863] LETTERS OF MARQUE PROPOSED 247

commercial community is greatly exasperated against the
robbers. If the subject goes forward, S. will turn the whole
labor and responsibility over to the Navy Department.

March 12, Thursday. Had a letter from Chief Engineer
Stimers last night. Says the attack on Charleston will be
delayed ; suggests it will be made the first week in April. It
made me nervous and restless through the night; got but
little sleep. The delay, hesitation, uncertainty in the Army
of the Potomac over again. Du Pont is getting as prudent
as McClellan; is very careful; all dash, energy, and force
are softened under the great responsibility. He has a re-
putation to preserve instead of one to make.

Stimers arrived this morning and read to me the minutes
of a council held on board the Wabash. The army officers
were present, and it is plain they were a drawback on naval
operations. Talk of beginning the attack on Charleston
by an assault on the sand-batteries at the mouth of the
harbor instead of running past them. Of obstructions and
torpedos little is known, but great apprehensions are enter-
tained. Stimers is sent up to get more ironclads and an-
other raft. The President came in, and the whole subject
was recounted. His views and mine are alike. To delay for
the objects stated till April will be to postpone to May.
Expressed ourselves very decidedly, and told Stimers to
hurry back.

Talked over the subject of Rebel privateers building in
England. Said to the President and Mr. Seward I thought
England should be frankly informed that our countrymen
would not be restrained from active operations if Great
Britain persisted in making war on our commerce under
Confederate colors.

March 17. Returned last evening from strictly confi-
dential visit to New York.

Some discussion in Cabinet-meeting to-day on letters
of marque. Seward and Chase are both strong advocates of

248 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MARCH 17

the measure. Am surprised that Chase should favor it, for
he must be sensible of the consequences. He has, I think,
committed himself somewhat hastily to some of the in-
dignant but inconsiderate men in the shipping interest who
are sufferers. Seward has no knowledge on the subject, nor
any conception of the effect of letting loose these depre-
dators under government sanction. There is such a general
feeling against the English, who are conniving with and
aiding the Rebels, that privateering is becoming popular
with the Administration and country. Statesmen who
should check and restrain the excited, erring popular cur-
rent are carried along with it. I suggested some doubts of
the expediency of the proposed proceedings, and the prin-
ciples involved. In the first place I queried whether Con-
gress could depute legislative power to the Executive, as
was assumed. I asked Seward if he had any money to pay
the promised bounties, and if he was of opinion there could
be fines and criminal punishment inflicted by Executive
regulations merely. Seward said he had no money; knew
not whether there was any appropriation from which funds
could be taken; if not, he must pledge the Government.
This I opposed, and no one sustained Seward or expressed
an opinion on the subject. As regarded penal inflictions,
fines, criminal punishment by regulation he had no doubt
whatever, should not hesitate in the least. I could admit
no such power on the part of the Executive. My doubts
and suggestions, I perceived, set others thinking. Chase
became silent.

These notions hi regard to privateers and letters of
marque, though crude, erroneous, and fraught with evil,
have been maturing for some time, and I do not mistake
in placing much of the mischief to the State Department,
which would be irresponsible for Navy transgressions. The
Times of New York and the Chronicle of this city and pa-
pers of that particular phase of partyism, which never [act]
without prompting from a certain quarter, have been writ-
ing up the matter and getting the public mind excited. The

1863] DELAY IN ATTACK ON CHARLESTON 249

Chronicle pronounces the privateers to be a volunteer navy
like volunteer forces on land. The Times mixes up letters
of marque with the Navy Department, which it blames for
delaying to issue the necessary authority, innocently un-
aware that it is a subject pertaining to that Department of
the Government whose head it would never intentionally
injure.

Conflicting accounts concerning Farragut's command on
the lower Mississippi. The Rebel accounts state he passed
Port Hudson with his vessel, the others being driven back,
with the exception of the steamer Mississippi, which all say
was grounded and blown up. Our account represents that
all the fleet passed up except the Mississippi.

The accounts from Porter, above Vicksburg, are not
satisfactory. He is fertile in expedients, some of which are
costly without adequate results. His dispatches are full of
verbosity of promises, and the mail which brings them also
brings ludicrous letters and caricatures to Heap, a clerk
who is his brother-in-law, filled with laughable and bur-
lesque accounts of amusing and ridiculous proceedings.
These may be excusable as a means of amusement to keep
up his spirits and those of his men, but I should be glad
to witness, or hear of something more substantial and of
energies employed in what is really useful. Porter has
capabilities and I am expecting much of him, but he is by
no means an Admiral Foote.

The progress of the squadron and troops at Charleston
is slow and unsatisfactory. I apprehend the defenses are
being strengthened much faster than the assailants. Du
Pont has attacked Fort McAllister and satisfied himself
that the turret vessels are strong and capable of great
endurance, but at the same tune he doubtless made the
Rebels aware of these facts.

March 31. For a fortnight I have been ill and really
unfit for duty, yet have been absent from the Department
but a single day, the only day I have lost in Washington

250 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MARCH 31

since March 4, 1861. But for the illness of Mr. Faxon, Chief
Clerk, I should have abstained a day or two from labor.
Fatigued and exhausted, I have not felt able to jot down
current events from day to day.

With some effort, though with indifferent health, I have
drawn up a communication to Mr. Seward on the subject
of letters of marque. But after the council to-day he read a
dispatch from Mr. Adams, communicating two letters from
Earl Russell, which are insolent, contemptuous, and mean
aggression if not war. It is pretty evident that a devastat-
ing and villainous war is to be waged on our commerce by
English capital and English men under the Rebel flag with
the connivance of the English Government, which will, and
is intended to, sweep our commerce from the ocean. Only
by a decided, firm, and resolute tone can the country be
rescued, and I am by no means certain that will be sufficient.
We are in no condition for a foreign war. Torn by dissen-
sions, an exhausting civil war on our hands, we have a
gloomy prospect, but a righteous cause that will ultimately
succeed. God alone knows through what trials, darkness,
and suffering we are to pass. There is a disinclination to
look these troubles which threaten us boldly in the face. I
felt oppressed, as did the others. A long vista of direful ca-
lamities opens before us. Mr. Seward is earnest to get out
privateers to catch the Alabama and the blockade-runners.
The President thinks they should try that policy. Chase
has lately favored it. I have no faith hi it as against the
Rebels, who have no commerce to be injured, but if we
are to have a conflict with England, letters of marque
and every means in our power must be put in requisition
against that faithless nation. I have, therefore, doubts
about sending the letter which I have prepared.

Earl Russell gives us to understand the English Govern-
ment do not intend to interpose to prevent the Rebels from
building, buying, and sending out from England cruisers,
semi-pirates, to prey upon our commerce. In plain lan-
guage, English capital is to be employed hi destroying our

1863] IMPENDING WAR WITH ENGLAND 251

shipping interests. If we are silent and submissive, they
will succeed, and we shall waken to our condition when our
vessels and merchant seamen are gone.

The condition of affairs opens avast field. Should a com-
mercial war commence, it will affect the whole world. The
police of the seas will be broken up, and the peaceful inter-
course of nations destroyed. Those governments and peo-
ples that have encouraged and are fostering our dissensions
will themselves reap the bitter fruits of their malicious
intrigues. In this great conflict, thus wickedly begun, there
will be likely to ensue an uprising of the nations that will
shatter existing governments and overthrow the aristo-
cracies and dynasties not only of England but of Europe.

I close my book and this month of March with sad and
painful forebodings. The conduct and attitude of Great
Britain, if persisted in, foreshadow years of desolation, of
dissolution, of suffering and blood.

Should April open, as we hope, with success at Charles-
ton and Vicksburg, there will be a change in the deport-
ment and conduct of England. Her arrogance and subtle
aggression will be checked by our successes, and by that
alone. She has no magnanimity, no sense of honor or of
right. She is cowardly, treacherous, and mean, and hates
and fears our strength. In that alone is our security.

April 2. Had a call last evening and again to-day from
Senator Sumner. Our conversation was chiefly on our for-
eign relations, the unfortunate condition of public affairs,
the inexcusable attitude of England, and the question of
letters of marque. On the latter subject he is much dissatis-
fied with Mr. Seward. He informs me that he was opposed
to the passage of the law at the late session, and is, I am
glad to see, quite sensitive on the sub j ect. I thought the law
well enough as a precautionary measure, a warning to the
mischievous spirits abroad, an authorization to the Pre-
sident in case of necessity, and especially as a weapon to
coerce England into propriety. The power granted was ex-

252 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 2

traordinary and to be used with discretion, but Mr. Seward,
having obtained the authority, is disposed to exercise it.
The merchants having been loud and profuse in their com-
plaints and promises, he has taken it for granted that they
would at once avail themselves of the law, and make a rush
in a random search for a couple of lean and hungry wolves
that are abroad, which would be difficult to catch and value-
less when caught. I have questioned whether he could be-
guile merchants into such an investment, and he begins to
feel uneasy that none have come forward as he expected.

In a letter which I commenced some days since and fin-
ished Saturday night, I put upon paper some of the sugges-
tions, views, and doubts I have from time to time expressed
in our discussions. This letter I gave out to be copied, and
it was'on my table for signature when I returned yesterday
from Cabinet council. The English news was such that I
laid it aside unsigned, and it was lying on the table when
Sunnier came in. He stated, among other things, he had
been to the State Department and that Seward had given
him the substance of the last dispatches. He asked if I had
seen them. I answered that I had, and was so disgusted
with them that I had laid by a letter which I had prepared
in opposition to the current feeling which prevailed on the
subject of letters of marque. He wished to read it, and
after doing so complimented the letter with emphasis,
and begged I would sign and send it.

[The letter referred to above was signed and sent with
date of March 31. It read as follows:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
31 Mar., 1863.

SIR,

When discussing the regulations concerning "Letters of
Marque," &c a few days since, I made certain suggestions, and
you invited me to communicate any views I might entertain,
in writing.

I have felt some delicacy, I may say disinclination, to take any
active part in this matter, because I have from the beginning of
our difficulties discouraged the policy of privateering in such a

1863] THE LETTERS OF MARQUE 253

war as this we are now waging. The rebels have no commercial
marine to entice and stimulate private enterprise and capital in
such undertakings, provided the policy were desirable. We,
however, have a commerce that invites the cupidity, zeal and
spirit of adventure, which, once commenced, will be difficult to
regulate or suppress. A few privateers let loose among our
shipping, like wolves among sheep, would make sad havoc, as the
Alabama and the Florida bear witness.

It is proposed to encourage private enterprize to embark in
undertaking to capture the two wolves or privateers that are
abroad devastating the seas, and it is said, in addition to the
wolves they may be authorized to catch blockade runners. The
inducement, I apprehend, will not meet a favorable response.
There may be vessels fitted out to capture unarmed prizes, but not
of sufficient force to meet and overcome the Alabama; if not, the
great end and purpose of the scheme will fail of accomplishment.

To clothe private armed vessels with governmental power and
authority, including the belligerent right of search, will be likely
to beget trouble, and the tendency must unavoidably be to abuse.
Clothed with these powers reckless men will be likely to involve
the Government in difficulty, and it was in apprehension of that
fact, and to avoid it, I encountered much obloquy and reproach
at the beginning of the rebellion, and labored to institute a less
objectionable policy.

Propositions for privateers, for yacht squadrons, for naval
brigades, volunteer navy, &c., &c. were, with the best intentions
in most instances, pressed upon the Dep't, regardless of the con-
sequences that might follow from these rude schemes of private
warfare. It was to relieve us of the necessity of going into these
schemes of private adventure, that the " Act to provide for the
temporary increase of the Navy," approved July 24, 1861, was
so framed as to give authority to take vessels into the Naval
service and appoint officers for them, temporarily, to any extent
which the President may deem expedient. Under other laws,
seamen may be enlisted and their wages fixed by executive au-
thority; and the officers and men so taken temporarily into the
Naval service are subject to the laws for the government of
the Navy. An "Act for the better government of the Navy,"
approved July 17, 1862, grants prize money to " any armed vessel
in the service of the United States," in the same manner as to
vessels of the Navy.

254 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 2

These laws, therefore, seem, and were intended to provide all
the advantages of letters of marque, and yet prevent in a great
measure the abuses liable to spring from them. Private armed
vessels, adopted temporarily into the Naval service, would be
more certainly and immediately under the control of the govern-
ment, than if acting only under a general responsibility to law.

It will be necessary to establish strict rules for the government
of private armed vessels, as to some extent they will be likely to
be officered and manned by persons of rude notions and free hab-
its. Congress after authorizing Letters of Marque in the War of
1812, adopted the necessary legislation for the vessels bearing
them, by the Act of June 26th of that year. This act has not been
revived. The recent "Act concerning letters of marque" &c.
&c. authorizes the President to "make all needful rules and reg-
ulations for the government and conduct of private armed ves-
sels, furnished with letters of marque." In pursuance of this au-
thorization, the " regulations " have been prepared, embracing the
provisions of the statute enacted during the War of 1812. These
regulations establish, as the statute did, a penal code. They im-
pose fines and assume to authorize punishments, including even
capital punishment.

As suggested in our interview, I question the validity of such
proceedings. Can Congress delegate this power of penal legis-
lation to the President? and if to the President, why may it not
to any branch of the Executive?

If it can be granted for this special purpose — the government
of private armed vessels — why not for any other purpose? And
if it can delegate the power of penal legislation, why could it not
delegate any other power, or powers, to the President, to Com-
missioners, or even to a Committee of its own body, to sit during
the recess? Why could it not delegate to the Secretary of the
Treasury to legislate respecting imports and foreign trade, or to
the Post-Master General full power of legislation respecting
post offices and post routes?

The power of imposing penalties and inflicting punishments
is the essence of legislative power, for it is the penalty of trans-
gression that gives force to law. These regulations also establish
rewards as well as penalties. They provide that a large bounty
shall be paid to private armed vessels in certain cases. But no
fund is appropriated for the purpose by the Act, nor has any pro-
vision elsewhere been made for it. Can Congress delegate to the

1863] THE LETTERS OF MARQUE 255

President the power to appropriate the public moneys, or to take
them without specific appropriation, or pledge the public faith at
his discretion for an indefinite amount?

As I have already said, I have doubts in these particulars.
They are expressed with some reluctance, because in the uneasy
condition of the public mind, growing out of the lawless de-
predations of the semi-piratical cruisers that are abroad, I am
unwilling to interpose anything which may be construed into an
obstacle, to repress public indignation, which is so justly excited.
I did not regret that Congress enacted a law authorizing letters
of marque; because I verily believe that, with it, England can be
made to prevent her mercenary citizens from making war on our
commerce under a flag that has no recognized nationality. If the
police of the sea is to be surrendered, and rovers built by English
capital and manned by Englishmen are to be let loose to plunder
our commerce, let England understand that her ships will suffer,
and her commerce also be annoyed and injured by private armed
ships. With her distant and dependent colonies, no nation has
greater cause to oppose maritime robbery and plunder, such as
is being inflicted on us by Englishmen and English capital, than
Great Britain.

The West Indies are, notoriously, harbors of refuge for the
corsairs that are plundering our merchants, as well as for the in-
famous and demoralizing business of running our blockade, to
encourage the insurgents who are waging war on our government.
Of these ports, those of England are the worst, and a vast amount
of English capital is engaged in illicit traffic, and her people and
authorities exhibit sympathy for, and afford aid to, the insurgents
and their abettors, and corresponding opposition to this Govern-
ment.

The English ship-yards are filled with vessels built and build-
ing for the rebel service, and if measures are not taken to pre-
vent, these will soon swarm the seas to capture, condemn and
destroy American property, without a port into which they can
send their captures for adjudication. Enjoying greater advan-
tages than the corsairs and sea-rovers that once infested the
ocean, because protected, harbored, & sheltered by governments
in alliance with, and professedly friendly to us, while ordinary
pirates are outlaws, this species of lawless outrage cannot be
permitted to go on.

England should be warned that we cannot permit this indirect

256 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 2

war to continue with impunity — that it will provoke and justify
retaliation, and that if her people and government make war
upon our commerce, by sending abroad rovers with no nationality,
to prey upon the property of our citizens, it will be impossible to
restrain our people from retaliatory measures.

I am, respectfully,
Your Obdt. Servt.

GIDEON WELLES,

TT TIT TT a Secty. of Navy.

HON. WM. H. SEWABD,

Secty. of State.

Informed Admiral Foote that the Secretary of State de-
sired he should go to New York in the service of the State
Department, on the subject of letters of marque. He ex-
pressed his readiness to obey orders, but asked the object
of detailing him. I gave him an outline of proceedings and
what appeared to be the purpose of Mr. Seward, which was
not very clear, or could not be plainly stated. No doubt he
believes it will give importance to the Secretary of State
to have a naval officer of the standing of Foote attached to
the State Department and acting under its orders.

The President called at my house this evening, chiefly to
see the letter which I had prepared concerning letters of
marque. Senator Sumner had gone directly from the Navy
Department to him, and so made known his gratification
at my views and the manner in which I had stated them
that the curiosity of the President was excited and he de-
sired to read the letter. I informed him that the last thing
I did before leaving the Department was to sign and send it
to the Secretary of State; that I perhaps should not have
done it, though, as he (the President) was aware, I had dif-
fered with him and others on this subject and looked upon
it as a dangerous step, but since reading the last English
dispatches, I was less opposed to the measure than I had
been.

The opportunity being favorable and he disposed to con-
verse and apparently interested in my remarks, I took oc-
casion to enlarge upon the topic more fully than I had done

1863] A TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT 257

in our Cabinet discussions. I started out with the proposi-
tion that to issue letters of marque would in all probability
involve us in a war with England. [I said] that I had so
viewed this question from the beginning, though he and
Mr. Seward had not; that I was not prepared to deny that
it might not be best for us to move promptly with that ob-
ject in view, though it had not yet been urged or stated;
but that if we were to resort to letters of marque we should
do it understandingly and with all the consequences before
us. The idea that private parties would send out armed
ships to capture the Alabama and one, possibly two, other
rovers of the Rebels was too absurd to be thought of for
a moment. If privateers were fitted out for any purpose
it would be to capture neutral vessels intended to run the
blockade or supposed to be in that service. It was not dif-
ficult for us to foresee that such a power in private hands
would degenerate into an abuse for which this Government
would be held responsible. The Rebels have no commerce
to invite private enterprise. So far as the Rebels were con-
cerned, therefore, I had been opposed to committing the
Government to the measure. But the disclosures recently
made had given a different aspect to the question. There
was little doubt the British Government and British capital
were encouraging the rebellion; that that Government
intended to interpose no obstacle to prevent the sending
out of privateers from British ports to depredate upon our
commerce; that these privateers, though sailing under the
Confederate flag, would be the property of British mer-
chants; that the rich plunder would repay the lawless Eng-
lish adventurer, knowing he had the sanction of his Govern-
ment; that this combination of British capital with Rebel
malignity and desperation would despoil our commerce and
drive it from the seas. Our countrymen would not quietly
submit to these wrongs and outrages, and allow English-
men to make war upon us hi disguise under the Rebel flag.
We ought, therefore, to have an immediate and distinct
understanding with the English Government. It should be

258 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 2

informed in terms that could not be mistaken or misunder-
stood that if this policy was persisted in we should in self-
defense be under the necessity of resorting to reprisals. In
this view the law which authorized letters of marque had
appeared to me proper, and might be made useful as a men-
ace and admonition to England; and I repeated what I had
said to the Secretary of State in reply to a remark of his
that we must make more extensive naval operations against
the Rebels by issuing letters of marque to annoy them, —
that letters of marque, instead of annoying them, destitute
as they were of commerce, would aid them, for that step
would involve war with England. If the Secretary of State
would be less yielding and more decisive in asserting our
rights with that power, it would, I thought, be better for the
country.

I then opened on the subject generally. England is tak-
ing advantage of our misfortunes and would press upon us
just as far as we would bear to be pressed. She rejoiced in
our dissensions and desired the dismemberment of the
Union. With this rebellion on our hands we were in no
condition for a war with her, and it was because we were
in this condition that she was arrogant and presuming. A
higher and more decisive tone towards her will secure a dif-
ferent policy on her part. A war with England would be a
serious calamity to us, but scarcely less serious to her. She
cannot afford a maritime conflict with us, even in our trou-
bles, nor will she. We can live within ourselves if worse
comes to worse. Our territory is compact, facing both
oceans, and in latitudes which furnish us in abundance with-
out foreign aid all the necessaries and most of the luxuries
of life; but England has a colonial system which was once
her strength, but is her weakness in these days and with
such a people as our countrymen to contend with. Her
colonies are scattered over the globe. We could, with our
public and private armed ships, interrupt and destroy her
communication with her dependencies, her colonies, on
which she is as dependent for prosperity as they on her.

1863) THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND 259

I was therefore in favor of meeting her face to face, asking
only what is right but submitting to nothing that is wrong.

If the late dispatches are to be taken as the policy she
intends to pursue, it means war, and if war is to come it
looks to me as of a magnitude greater than the world has
ever experienced, — as if it would eventuate in the upheaval
of nations, the overthrow of governments and dynasties.
The sympathies of the mass of mankind would be with us
rather than with the decaying dynasties and the old effete
governments. Not unlikely the conflict thus commenced
would kindle the torch of civil war throughout Christen-
dom, and even nations beyond. I desired no such conflict
in my day, and therefore hoped and believed the policy and
tone of England might be modified, but it would require
energy, resolution, and a firm determination on our part to
effect it.

The President listened, for I did most of the talking, as
he evidently wished, and showed much interest and accord
in what I said. He assented consequently to most that I
uttered and controverted nothing. It was evident I sug-
gested some ideas that had not before occurred to him, and
I am not without hope that the tone of our foreign affairs,
particularly with England, may be different.

The President spoke, as he always has done with me,
doubtingly of Porter's schemes on the Mississippi, or
rather the side movements to the Yazoo on the east and
Red River on the west. Said the long delay of Du Pont,
his constant call foj more ships, more ironclads, was like
McClellan calling for more regiments. Thought the two
men were alike, and said he was prepared for a repulse at
Charleston.

April 3, Friday. Had some side talk with Seward at the
Cabinet-meeting, on letters of marque. He persists in the
policy, but I think begins to have some misgivings. Insists
on having a naval officer assigned him, on whom he can
devolve the labor. I requested him to employ some of his

260 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APKIL 3

own Department force or a civilian in whom he had con-
fidence; told him the subject belonged exclusively to the
State Department; the Secretary of State had it in charge
in the War of 1812 by law, and I desired the Navy should
not now be blended with the proceeding. He admitted
his object in asking for a naval officer was to be relieved of
responsibility and details. The truth is, he has pressed for-
ward this measure without knowledge, or examination, or
practical experience, but has vague indefinite notions that
privateers may be efficient against the Rebels, that they
will constitute a force appendant to his Department, that
there will be many of them, and that he will derive credit
from then* exploits. If his scheme fails, and a naval officer
has charge of that part of his duties, the Navy and Navy
Department will bear the censure. Foote, whom he most
desires should be detailed, adroitly declines the honor of
being attached to the State Department in this work, and
has recommended Admiral Davis, who is acceptable and
willing to take the position which Foote declines.

Seward tells me he already has an application from re-
sponsible parties who want a letter of marque, and assures
me there will be a flood of applications, but I am still
incredulous. Our merchants will not spend their money hi
the idle scheme of attempting to spear sharks for wool.
In the case of this first application Seward wishes me, as
he is not yet prepared and the parties are ready, to take
the case as I have suggested might be done under the Act
of July, 1861 ; says it will only be temporary.

Late in the day Davis came to me from the State Depart-
ment with the papers hi this case. I find they are not
unknown to me. One Sybert, a Prussian, I believe, by birth
but a citizen of South Carolina, wants to go privateering.
He called on me some days ago for papers, and I sent
him to the State Department. I warned Davis to beware
of adventurers, and expressed my want of confidence in
the man and the movement, though Seward declared the
parties were responsible.

1863] AN APPLICATION FOR LETTERS 261

April 4, Saturday. Had a message from the President,
who wished to see me and also Assistant Secretary Fox.
Found the matter in hand to be the Prussian adventurer
Sybert, who was anxious his vessel should be taken into the
naval service. The President said Seward was extremely
anxious this should be done and had sent Sybert to him. I
inquired if he had seen Sybert. He replied that he had and
that the man was now in the audience room. He learned
from Seward and Sybert that he (Sybert) had a vessel of
one hundred tons into which he would put a screw, if
authorized, would go on blockade, and would do more than
the whole squadron of naval vessels. I asked the President
if he gave credit to the promises of this man, whom Mr.
Seward had sent to me as coming from responsible parties,
though I knew none of them, had seen or heard of none but
this adventurer himself. [I told him] that he had first
applied to me and I would not trust or be troubled with
him after a slight examination, but that I had sent him to
Seward, who was then pushing forward his regulations for
letters of marque, to which he knew I was opposed ; and the
result was Mr. Seward wanted me to take his first case, and
had asked that the Assistant Secretary, Fox, should be
present with Sybert. After a little further conversation, the
President, instead of sending Sybert back to Seward, said
he would turn him over to the Navy Department to be dis-
posed of. This ends Mr. Seward's first application, and
probably it will be the last. Knowing my views, he had
gone to the President with his prote'ge', and knowing my
views but in the hope he might have some encouragement
from Fox, had requested the President to consult with Fox
as well as myself. I know not that he requested me to be
excluded on account of my opposition, but he requested
that the Assistant Secretary should be consulted. And Fox
assures me he has never swerved from my views on this
subject. It is a specimen of Seward's management.

April 6, Monday. Great interest is felt in the result of

262 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 6

the Connecticut election, one of the most animated and
exciting elections ever known. Issues broad and distinct.
Thousands will vote for Seymour under the discipline and
delusion of party who have not the remotest thought of
being disloyal.

Senator Sumner called upon me this P.M. and gave a
curious narrative concerning my letter to Seward on the
subject of letters of marque, and of the difficulty the Presi-
dent had in getting it. When finally obtained, he informed
and called in Sumner, and the two sat down and the Pre-
sident deliberately read it aloud. They then criticized it
carefully, and when they were through, Sumner says the
President spoke complimentarily of the letter and very
complimentarily of me.

Rumors are current and thick respecting Charleston, but
they are all conjectural. A movement against the place is
expected about these days, but there has not been time to
hear of it. I have great anxiety and great apprehension.
Operations have gone on slowly and reluctantly.

The report of the "Committee on the Conduct of the
War " is to-day published. This method of supervising mil-
itary operations by legislative committee is of more than
questionable utility. Little good can be expected of these
partisan supervisors of the Government at any time. They
are partisan and made up of persons not very competent
to form correct and intelligent opinions of Army or Navy
operations, or administrative purposes. In this instance,
I think, from a slight look into a few pages, there is more
truth from them than usual in these cases.

April 7, Tuesday. The result of the election in Con-
necticut yesterday is gratifying. Buckingham is reflected
Governor by three thousand majority.

The President has not returned from the Rappahan-
nock. There was consequently no Cabinet-meeting.

Consul Dudley at Liverpool writes that he is instituting
legal proceedings in the English courts against some of the

1863] EXPECTED ATTACK ON CHARLESTON 263

vessels which the Rebels, aided by English capital, are fitting
out, but meets with discouragement or has no encourage-
ment in unexpected quarters. Wrote Mr. Seward that the
zeal of Dudley should be commended, and unless very de-
cided measures are taken, and strong representations made,
we shall be involved in difficulty. John Bull must under-
stand that whilst we deprecate war, we don't fear him and
shall not passively submit to outrage and aggression. A
loan of fifteen million dollars has recently been made to the
Rebels by English capitalists, which would never have been
consummated had the English officials disapproved. With
these means, which the Englishmen will ultimately lose,
the Rebels can purchase vessels, ordnance, munitions, and
prolong the war. Mercenary England will be benefited if
our commerce is destroyed, and our country be weakened
and exhausted. Sumner thinks the alliance with slavery
will be so unpopular with the English people as to restrain
the Government, but confesses he begins to have fearful
misgivings.

April 8, Wednesday. An oppressive and anxious feeling
in relation to movements at Charleston. It has been
expected an attack would be made the first week in April.
We hear nothing. The Rebel authorities permit their
papers to publish nothing, nor will they allow the flag of
truce to bring us their papers. This intensifies the desire
to learn something of proceedings.

I have a telegram from the President this evening at
"Headquarters near Falmouth," stating that he had a
Richmond paper exchanged by the picket or scouts, and
he sends me all it contains relative to operations at Charles-
ton. Our ironclads have appeared off the bar, and the day
of trial approaches.

Great results are depending on the conflicts which are
taking place in these early April days. I bear up with, I
believe, a fair share of composure. As regards the Navy,
we have furnished Du Pont the best material of men and

264 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRILS

ships that were ever placed under the command of any offi-
cer on this continent and, as regards officers, unequalled any-
where or at any time. Of course I have confidence he will
be successful, yet so much depends on the result I am not
without apprehensions. Eventuate as it may, the struggle
will probably be severe and bloody. That we shall lose
some vessels and some gallant fellows in getting possession
of the Rebel city I have no doubt. As John Rodgers says,
"somebody must be hurt."

April 9, Thursday. A yearning, craving desire for tidings
from Charleston, but the day has passed without a word.
They send us from the front that there is great repose
and quiet in the Rebel camp, which is a favorable indica-
tion, for when they have successes there is immense cheer-
ing. Again I have a dispatch from the President at Head-
quarters this evening. He has a Richmond paper of to-day
and sends me the contents. The ironclads have crossed the
bar. The paper speaks with assurance, yet there are fore-
bodings of what is to be apprehended. Says Charleston
will be a Saragossa.

A desperate stand will be made at Charleston, and their
defenses are formidable. Delay has given them time and
warning, and they have unproved them. They know also
that there is no city so culpable, or against which there is
such intense animosity. We shall not get the place, if we
get it at all on this first trial, without great sacrifice. There
are fifty-two steamers for the work and the most formida-
ble ironclad force that ever went into battle. These great
and long-delayed preparations weigh heavily upon me. As
a general thing, such immense expeditions are failures.
Providence delights to humble man and prostrate his
strength. For months my confidence has not increased,
and now that the conflict is upon us, my disquietude is
greater still. I have hope and trust in Du Pont, in the glo-
rious band of officers that are with him, and in the iron
bulwarks we have furnished as well as in a righteous cause.

1863] RUMORS FROM CHARLESTON 265

The President, who has often a sort of intuitive sagacity,
has spoken discouragingly of operations at Charleston dur-
ing the whole season. Du Font's dispatches and movements
have not inspired him with faith; they remind him, he says,
of McClellan. Fox, who has more naval knowledge and ex-
perience and who is better informed of Charleston and its
approaches, which he has visited, and the capabilities and
efficiency of our officers and ships, entertains not a doubt
of success. His reliant confidence and undoubted assur-
ance, have encouraged and sustained me when doubtful. I
do not believe the monitors impregnable, as he does, under
the concentrated fire and immense weight of metal that can
be thrown upon them, but it can hardly be otherwise than
that some, probably that most of them, will pass Sumter.
What man can do, our brave fellows will accomplish, but
impossibilities cannot be overcome. We must wait pa-
tiently but not without hope.

April 10, Friday. The President has not yet returned.
The Cabinet did not convene to-day. Affairs look uncom-
fortable in North Carolina. The army there needs rein-
forcing, and had we Charleston we would send more
vessels into those waters.

Neither the War Department nor army men entertain
an idea that the Rebels have withdrawn any of their forces
from the Rappahannock to go into North Carolina, but I
have apprehensions that such may be the case. From what
quarter but that can they have collected the large force
that is now pressing Foster?

We have more definite yet not wholly reliable rumors
from Charleston. A contest took place on the afternoon of
the 7th, Tuesday, of three hours, from two till five. Two of
our vessels are reported injured, — the Keokuk, said to be
sunk on Morris Island, and the Ironsides, disabled. Neither
is a turret vessel. On the whole, this account, if not what
we wish, is not very discouraging. The movement I judged
to have been merely a reconnoissance, to feel and pioneer

266 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 10

the way for the grand attack. Fox persists that the iron-
clads are invulnerable. I shall not be surprised if some are
damaged, perhaps disabled. In fact, I have supposed that
some of them would probably be sunk, and shall be satis-
fied if we lose several and get Charleston. I hope we shall
not lose them and fail to get the city.

April 11, Saturday. The President returned from Head-
quarters of the Army and sent for me this A.M. Seward,
Chase, Stanton, and Halleck were present, and Fox came
in also. He gave particulars so far as he had collected them,
not differing essentially from ours.

An army dispatch received this P.M. from Fortress Mon-
roe says the Flambeau has arrived in Hampton Roads
from Charleston; that our vessels experienced a repulse;
some of the monitors were injured. The information is as
confused and indefinite as the Rebel statements. Tele-
graphed to Admiral Lee to send the Flambeau to Washing-
ton. Let us have the dispatches.

Seward is in great trouble about the mail of the Peter-
hoff, a captured blockade-runner. Wants the mail given
up. Says the instructions which he prepared insured the
inviolability and security of the mails. I told him he had
no authority to prepare such instructions, that the law
was paramount, and that anything which he proposed in
opposition to and disregarding the law was not observed.

He called at my house this evening with a letter from
Lord Lyons inclosing dispatches from Archibald, English
Consul at New York. Wanted me to send, and order the
mail to be immediately given up and sent forward. I de-
clined. Told him the mail was properly and legally in the
custody of the court and beyond Executive control; as-
sured him there would be no serious damage from delay if
the mail was finally surrendered, but I was inclined to be-
lieve the sensitiveness of both Lord Lyons and Archibald
had its origin in the fact that the mail contained matter

1863] REPULSE AT CHARLESTON 267

which would condemn the vessel. "But," said Seward,
"mails are sacred; they are an institution." I replied that
would do for peace but not for war; that he was clothed with
no authority to concede the surrender of the mail; that by
both statute and international law they must go to the
court; that if his arrangement, of which I knew nothing,
meant anything, the most that could be conceded or negoti-
ated would be to mails on regular recognized neutral pack-
ets and not to blockade-runners and irregular vessels with
contraband like the Peterhoff . He dwelt on an arrangement
entered into between himself and the British Legation, and
the difficulty which would follow a breach on our part. I
inquired if he had any authority to make an arrangement
that was in conflict with the express provisions of the stat-
utes, — whether it was a treaty arrangement confirmed by
the Senate. Told him the law and the courts must govern
in this matter. The Secretary of State and the Executive
were powerless. We could not interfere.

April 12, Sunday. An intense and anxious feeling on all
hands respecting Charleston. Went early to the Depart-
ment. About 11 A.M. a dispatch from the Navy Yard that
the Flambeau had not arrived. The President and Stanton
came in a little after noon and waited half an hour, but
it was then reported the Flambeau was not yet in sight.
I came home much dejected. Between 2 and 3 P.M.
Commander Rhind of the Keokuk, Upshur, and Lieuten-
ant Forrest called at my house with dispatches from Du
Pont. They were not very full or satisfactory, — contained
no details. He has no idea of taking Charleston by the
Navy. In this I am not disappointed. He has been coming
to that conclusion for months, though he has not said so.
The result of this demonstration, though not a success, is
not conclusive. The monitor vessels have proved their
resisting power, and, but for the submarine obstructions,
would have passed the forts and gone to the wharves of
Charleston. This in itself is a great achievement.

268 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 12

Went to the Executive Mansion. Read the dispatches
to and had full conversation with the President. Sumner
came in and participated.

Rhind, an impulsive but brave and rash man, has lost all
confidence in armored vessels. When he took command of
the Keokuk his confidence was unbounded. His repulse
and the loss of his vessel have entirely changed his views.
It was, I apprehend, because of this change and his new
appointment to armored vessels that he was sent forward
with dispatches. He has, I see, been tutored. Thinks
wooden vessels with great speed would do as well as iron-
clads. I agreed that speed was valuable, but the monitors
were formidable. In this great fight the accounts speak of
but a single man killed and some ten or twelve wounded.
What wooden or unarmored vessels could have come out
of such a fight with so few disasters. No serious injury
happened to the flagship, the Ironsides, which, from some
accident, did not get into the fight. We had expected Du
Pont and the ironclads would pass Sumter and the forts
and receive their fire, but not stop to encounter them.

Du Pont has been allowed to decide for himself in regard
to proceedings, has selected, and had, the best officers and
vessels in the service, and his force is in every respect
picked and chosen. Perhaps I have erred in not giving him
orders. Possibly the fact that he was assured all was con-
fided to him depressed and oppressed him with the respons-
ibility, and has prevented him from telling me freely and
without reserve his doubts, apprehensions. I have for some
tune felt that he wanted the confidence that is essential to
success. His constant call for more ironclads — for aid —
has been a trial. He has been long, very long, getting ready,
and finally seems to have come to a standstill, so far as I
can learn from Rhind, who is, if not stampeded, disgusted,
demoralized, and wholly upset. It is not fear, for he has
courage, — to daring, to rashness, — and his zeal, tempera-
ment, and ardor are by nature enthusiastic. But these qual-
ities are gone. Why Du Pont should have sent him home to

1863] THE PETERHOFFS MAILS 269

howl, or with a howl, I do not exactly understand. If it
was to strengthen faith in himself and impair faith in the
monitors the selection was well made. Rhind had too much
confidence in his vessel before entering the harbor, and
has too little in any vessel now.

April 13, Monday. Wrote Seward a letter on the subject
of captured mails, growing out of the prize Peterhoff. On
the 18th of August last I prepared a set of instructions
embracing the mails, on which Seward had unwittingly got
committed. The President requested that this should be
done in conformity with certain arrangements which Sew-
ard had made with the foreign ministers. I objected that
the instructions which Mr. Seward had prepared in consul-
tation with the foreigners were unjust to ourselves and con-
trary to usage and to law, but to get clear of the difficulty
they were so far modified as to not directly violate the stat-
utes, though there remained something invidious towards
naval officers which I did not like. The budget of conces-
sions was, indeed, wholly against ourselves, and the coven-
ants were made without any accurate knowledge on the
part of the Secretary of State when they were given of what
he was yielding. But the whole, in the shape in which the
instructions were finally put, passed off very well. Ultim-
ately, however, the circular containing among other mat-
ters these instructions by some instrumentality got into the
papers, and the concessions were, even after they were cut
down, so great that the Englishmen complimented the Sec-
retary of State for his liberal views. The incense was so
pleasant that Mr. Seward on the 30th of October wrote me
a supercilious letter stating it was expedient our naval of-
ficers should forward the mails captured on blockade-run-
ners, etc., to their destination as speedily as possible, with-
out their being searched or opened. The tone and manner
of the letter were supercilious and offensive, the concession
disreputable and unwarrantable, the surrender of our indis-
putable rights disgraceful, and the whole thing unstates-

270 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 13

manlike and illegal, unjust to the Navy and the country,
and discourteous to the Secretary of the Navy and the
President, who had not been consulted. I said to Mr.
Seward at the time, last November, that the circular of the
18th of August had gone far enough, and was yielding more
than was authorized, except by legislation or treaty. He
said his object was to keep the peace, to soothe and calm
the English and French for a few weeks.

Lord Lyons now writes very adroitly that the seizure of
the Peterhoff mails was in violation of the order of our Gov-
ernment as " communicated to the Secretary of the Navy
on the 31st of October." He makes no claim for surrender
by right, or usage, or the law of nations, but it was by the
order of our Government to the Secretary of the Navy. No
such order was ever given by the Government. None could
be given but by law of Congress. The Secretary of the Navy
does not receive orders from the Secretary of State, and
though I doubt not Mr. Seward in an excitable and inflated
moment promised and penned his absurd note, which he
called an order when conversing with them, — gave it to
them as such, — yet I never deemed it of sufficient conse-
quence to even answer or notice further than in a conversa-
tion to tell him it was illegal.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
13 April, 1863.

SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com-
munication of the llth inst., enclosing a note of Lord Lyons and
correspondence relative to the mail of the Peterhoff.

His Lordship complains that the Peterhoff's mails were dealt
with, "both at Key West and at New York in a manner which is
not in accordance with the views of the Government of the United
States, as stated in your letter to the Secretary of the Navy, of the
31st Oct. last."

Acting Rear Admiral Bailey, an extract from whose letter is
enclosed, in the correspondence transmitted on the 14th ulto. , gave
Her Majesty's Consul at Key West an authenticated copy of the
law of the United States, and of the instructions based thereon,

1864] THE PETERHOFFS MAILS 271

on the subject of papers which strictly belong to the captured
vessels and the mails.

By special direction of the President, unusual courtesy and
concession were made to neutrals in the instructions of the 18th
August last to Naval Officers, who themselves were restricted
and prohibited from examining or breaking the seals of the mail
bags, parcels, &c. which they might find on board of captured
vessels, under any pretext, but were authorized at their discre-
tion to deliver them to the Consul, commanding naval officer, or
the legation of the foreign government to be opened, upon the
understanding that whatever is contraband, or important as
evidence concerning the character of a captured vessel, will be
remitted to the prize court, &c.

On the 31st of October last, I had the honor to receive from you
a note suggesting the expediency of instructing naval officers
that, in case of capture of merchant vessels suspected or found
to be vessels of insurgents, or contraband, the public mails of
every friendly or neutral power, duly certified or authenticated
as such, shall not be searched or opened, but be put as speedily
as may be convenient on the way to their designated destination.
As I did not concur in the propriety or "expediency" of issuing
instructions so manifestly in conflict with all usage and practice,
and the law itself, and so detrimental to the legal rights of cap-
tors, who would thereby be frequently deprived of the best, if not
the only, evidence that would insure condemnation of the cap-
tured vessel, no action was taken on the suggestions of the letter
of the 31st October, as Lord Lyons seems erroneously to have
supposed.

In the only brief conversation that I ever remember to have
had with you, I expressed my opinion that we had in the instruc-
tions of the 18th of August gone to the utmost justifiable limit on
this subject. The idea that our Naval officers should be com-
pelled to forward the mails found on board the vessels of the insur-
gents— that foreign officials would have the sanction of this gov-
ernment in confiding their mails to blockade runners and vessels
contraband, and that without judicial or other investigation, the
officers of our service should hasten such mails, without examina-
tion, to their destination, was so repugnant to my own convic-
tions that I came to the conclusion it was only a passing sugges-
tion, and the subject was therefore dropped. Until the receipt of

272 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 13

your note of Saturday, I was not aware that Lord Lyons was
cognizant such a note had been written.

Acting Rear Admiral Bailey has acted strictly in accordance
with the law and his instructions in the matter of the Peterhoff s
mail.

The dispatch of Lord Lyons is herewith returned.

I am, respectfully,

Your Obd't Serv't,

GIDEON WELLES,

Secty. of Navy.
HON. WM. H. SE-WAKD,
Secty. of State.

April 14, Tuesday.

• •••••••••^

Little of interest to-day at council.

The War Department, which early in the War claimed
that the armed force on the Western rivers should be
subject to military control, became involved in difficulty.
Naval officers, naval guns, naval men, and naval discipline
were wanted and so far as could be done were given, but
Congress merely ordered that the armed vessels should be
transferred to the Navy. This law had given offense to
the War Department, and when the transfer was made, the
"ram fleet," as it was called, was withheld. This was, as I
said to Stanton, in disregard of the law and would be likely
to lead to difficulty, for, while there might be cooperation,
there could not be separate commands without conflict.

The ram fleet was commanded by the family of Ellett,
brave, venturous, intelligent engineers, not always discreet
or wise, but with many daring and excellent qualities.
They had under them a set of courageous and picked men,
furnished by the military, styled the Marine Brigade, and
did some dashing service, but refused to come under naval
orders, or to recognize the Admiral in command of the Mis-
sissippi Squadron. The result was, as I anticipated might
be the case, an arrest and suspension of Brigadier-General
H. W. Ellett from the command of the ram fleet.

1863] THE ELLETTS AND THE RAM FLEET 273

Stanton is very laudatory of the Elletts, and violent in
his denunciations of Porter, whom he ridicules as a "gas
bag and fussy fellow, blowing his own trumpet and steal-
ing credit which belongs to others." There is some truth in
what he says of the Elletts and also of Porter, but the latter
with all his verbosity has courage and energy as well as the
Elletts.

April 15, Wednesday. No full reports yet from Du Pont.
Am pained, grieved, distressed by what I hear; and that
I hear from him so little. We learn that after all our outlay
and great preparations, giving him about all our force and
a large portion of the best officers, he intends making no
farther effort, but will abandon the plan and all attempts
to take it. A fight of thirty minutes and the loss of one
man, which he witnessed, satisfies the Admiral.

The Ironsides, the flagship, was suspiciously remote from
the fight, yet sufficiently near to convince the Admiral
he had better leave the harbor. Down to the day of
the conflict I had faith in him and his ability, though
grieved at his delays. When here last fall, expressly to con-
sult and concert measures for the capture of Charleston, he
was as earnest and determined as any of us, did not waver
a moment, and would not listen to a suggestion of Dahlgren
as an assistant.

April 16, Thursday. Received a singular letter from
Seward respecting the mail of the Peterhoff, undertaking
to set aside law, usage, principle, established and always
recognized rights, under the pretense that it will not do to
introduce new questions on the belligerent right of search.
He has, inconsiderately and in an ostentatious attempt to
put off upon the English Legation a show of power and au-
thority which he does not possess and cannot exercise, in-
volved himself in difficulty, conceded away the rights of his
country without authority, without law, without a treaty,
without equivalent; and to sustain this novel and extraor-

274 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 16

dinary proceeding he artfully talks about new questions in
the belligerent right of search. The President has been be-
guiled by ex-parte representations and misrepresentations
to indorse "approved " on Se ward's little contrivance. But
this question cannot be so disposed of. The President may
be induced to order the mail to be given up, but the law
is higher than an Executive order, and the judiciary has
a duty to perform. The mail is in the custody of the court.

April 17, Friday. No reports from Charleston. Am in
hopes that side issues and by-play on the Mississippi are
about over and that there will be some concentrated action.
Porter should go below Vicksburg and not remain above,
thereby detaining Farragut, who is below, from great and
responsible duties at New Orleans and on the Gulf. The
weak and sensitive feeling of being outranked and made
subordinate in command should never influence an officer
in such an emergency. Porter has great vanity and great
jealousy but knows his duty, and I am surprised he does
not perform it. Wrote him a fortnight since a letter which
he cannot misunderstand, and which will not, I hope,
wound his pride.

But little was before the Cabinet, which of late can
hardly be called a council. Each Department conducts and
manages its own affairs, informing the President to the ex-
tent it pleases. Seward encourages this state of things. He
has less active duties than others, and watches and waits
on the President daily, and gathers from him the doings
of his associates and often influences indirectly and not
always advantageously their measures and movements,
while he communicates very little, especially of that which
he does not wish them to know.

Blah- walked over with me from the White House to the
Navy Department, and I showed him the correspondence
which had taken place respecting captured mails. Under-
standing Seward thoroughly, as he does, he detected the sly
management by which Seward first got himself in difficulty

1863] THE PETERHOFF'S MAILS 275

and is now striving to get out of it. My course he pro-
nounced correct, and he declared that the President must
not be entrapped into any false step to extricate Seward,
who, he says, is the least of a statesman and knows less of
public law and of administrative duties than any man who
ever held a seat in the Cabinet. This is a strong statement,
but not so overstated as would be generally supposed. I
have been surprised to find him so unpractical, so erratic,
so little acquainted with the books, — he has told me more
than once that he never opened them, that he was too old
to study. He has, with all his bustle and activity, but little
application; relies on Hunter and his clerk, Smith, perhaps
Gushing also, to sustain him and hunt up his authorities;
commits himself, as in the case of the mails, without know-
ing what he is about.

April 18, Saturday. Went to the President and read to
him my letter of this date to Mr. Seward, on the subject of
the Peterhoff mail. I have done this that the President may
have both sides of the question, and understand what is
being done with his " approval," without consultation with
me and the members of the Cabinet in council. The Secre-
tary of State, for reasons best known to himself, if he has
any reason for his action, has advised with no one in a novel
and extraordinary proceeding on his part, where he has
made concessions by which our rights and interests have
been given up and the law disregarded. When confronted,
he, instead of entering upon investigation himself or con-
sulting with others, has gone privately to the President,
stated his own case, and got the President committed to
his unauthorized acts. I therefore prepared my letter of
this date, and before sending it to Mr. Seward, I deemed it
best that the President should know its contents. He was
surprised and very much interested; took the letter and re-
read it; said the subject involved questions which he did
not understand, that his object was to "keep the peace,"
for we could not afford to take upon ourselves a war with

276 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL is

England and France, which was threatened if we stopped
their mails; and concluded by requesting me to send my
letter to Seward, who would bring the subject to his
attention for further action. My object was gained. The
President has ''approved," without knowledge, on the
representation of Seward.

April 19, Sunday. Several letters from Du Pont on
unimportant matters, but no detailed reports of the fight
from himself or officers. Advised with Fox and thought
best for him to go to New York and see Admiral Gregory
and Captain Rowan with a view to more effective action
if necessary. Nothing certain when we shall hear from
Du Pont. In the mean tune it is important to prepare for
an emergency.

April 20, Monday. Received Admiral Du Pont's detailed
report with those of his officers. The document is not such
as I should have expected from him a short tune ago, but
matters of late prevent me from feeling any real disappoint-
ment. Fox went last night to New York in anticipation of
such a report. The tone and views of the sub-reports have
the ring, or want of ring, of the Admiral in command. Dis-
couragement when there should be encouragement. A pall
is thrown over all. Nothing has been done, and it is the
recommendation of all, from the Admiral down, that no
effort be made to do anything. [Du Pont] has got his sub-
ordinates to sustain him in a proceeding that his sense of
right tells him is wrong.

I am by no means confident that we are acting wisely
in expending so much strength and effort on Charleston,
a place of no strategic importance, but it is lamentable to
witness the tone, language, absence of vitality and vigor,
and want of zeal among so many of the best officers of the
service. I cannot be mistaken as to the source and cause.
A magnetic power in the head, which should have inspired
and stimulated them, is wanting; they have been discour-

1863] DU FONT'S FAILURE 277

aged instead of being encouraged, depressed not strength-
ened.

April 21, Tuesday. Have another dispatch from Du
Pont in answer to one I sent him on the llth enjoining
upon him to continue to menace Charleston, that the Rebel
troops on that station might be detained for the present to
defend the place. In some respects this dispatch is not
worthy of Du Pont. He says he never advised the attack
and complains of a telegram from the President more than
of the dispatch from the Department. If he never advised
the attack, he certainly never discouraged it, and, until
since that attack, I had supposed no man in the country
was more earnest on the subject than he. How have I been
thus mistaken? It has been his great study for many
months, the subject of his visit, of his conversation, his
correspondence. When Du Pont was here last fall, Dahl-
gren sought, as a special favor, the privilege of taking com-
mand, under Du Pont, of the attack on Charleston, — to
lead in the assault. But it was denied, for the reason that
Du Pont claimed the right to perform this great work in
which the whole country took so deep an interest. His cor-
respondence since has been of this tenor, wanting more
ironclads and reinforcements. Once there were indications
of faltering last winter, and I promptly told him it was not
required of him to go forward against his judgment. No
doubtful expression has since been heard. His third dis-
patch since the battle brings me the first intelligence he has
thought proper to communicate of an adverse character.

Only some light matters came before the Cabinet. Chase
and Blair were absent. The President requested Seward
and myself to remain. As soon as the others left, he said
his object was to get the right of the question in relation to
the seizure of foreign mails. There had evidently been an
interview between him and Seward since I read my letter
to him on Saturday, and he had also seen Seward 's reply.
But he was not satisfied. The subject was novel to him.

278 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 21

Mr. Seward began by stating some of the embarrass-
ments of the present peculiar contest in which we were
engaged, — the unfriendly feeling of foreign governments,
the difficulty of preventing England and France from tak-
ing part with the Rebels. He dwelt at length on the subject
of mail communications and mails generally, the changes
which had taken place during the last fifty years; spoke
of the affair of the Trent, a mail packet, of the necessity of
keeping on the best terms we could with England. Said
his arrangement with Mr. Stuart, who was in charge of
the British Legation, had ^een made with the approval
of the President, though he had not communicated that
fact to me, etc., etc.

I stated that this whole subject belonged to the courts,
which had, by law, the possession of the mail; that I knew
of no right which he or even the Executive had to interfere;
that I had not regarded the note of the 31st of October
as more than a mere suggestion, without examination or
consideration, for there had been no Cabinet consultation;
that it was an abandonment of our rights and an entire
subversion of the policy of our own and of all other gov-
ernments, which I had not supposed any one who had
looked into the matter would seriously attempt to set aside
without consultation with the proper Department and
advisement, indeed, with the whole Cabinet ; that had there
been such consultation the subject would, I was convinced,
have gone no farther, for it was in conflict with our stated
law and the law of nations; that this arrangement, as the
Secretary of State called it, was a sort of post-treaty, by
which our rights were surrendered without an equivalent,
a treaty which he was not in my opinion authorized to
make.

Mr. Seward said he considered the arrangement recipro-
cal, and if it was not expressed in words or by interchange,
it was to be inferred to be the policy of England, for she
would not require of us what she would not give.

I declined to discuss the question of what might be

1863] THE PETERHOFF'S MAILS 279

inferred would be the future policy of England on a subject
where she had been strenuous beyond any other govern-
ment. I would not trust her generosity in any respect. I
had no faith that she would give beyond what was stipu-
lated in legible characters, nor did I believe she would, by
any arrangement her Charge might make, consent to aban-
don the principle recognized among nations and which she
had always maintained. If this arrangement or treaty was
reciprocal, it should be so stated, recorded, and universally
understood. So important a change ought not and could
not be made except by legislation or treaty; and if by
treaty, the Senate must confirm it; if by legislation, the
parliamentary bodies of both countries. There had been
no such legislation, no such treaty, and I could not admit
that any one Department, or the President even, could
assume to make such a change.

The President thought that perhaps the Executive had
some rights on this subject, but was not certain what they
were, what the practice had been, what was the law, na-
tional or international. The Trent case he did not consider
analogous in several respects. I had said in reply to Seward
that the Trent was not a blockade-runner, but a regular
mail packet, had a semi-official character, with a govern-
ment officer on board in charge of the mails. The President
said he wished to know the usage, — whether the public
official seals or mail-bags of a neutral power were ever
violated. Seward said certainly not. I maintained that the
question had never been raised in regard to a captured legal
prize — not a doubt expressed — and the very fact that
Stuart had applied to him for mail exemption was evidence
that he so understood the subject. Where was the necessity
of this arrangement, or treaty, if that were not the usage?
The case was plain. Our only present difficulty grew out of
the unfortunate letter of the 31st of October, — the more un-
fortunate from the fact that it had been communicated to
the British Government as the policy of our Government,
while never, by any word or letter have they ever admitted

280 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 21

it was their policy. It is not the policy of our Government,
nor is it the law of our country. Our naval commanders
know of no such policy, no such usage, no such law; they
have never been so instructed, nor have our district attor-
neys. The President, although he had affixed his name to
the word " approved" in Seward's late letter, and although
he neither admitted nor controverted the statement that
the letter of the 31st of October was with his knowledge
and approval, was a good deal " obf usticated " in regard to
the merits of the question, and the proceedings of Seward,
who appeared to be greatly alarmed lest we should offend
England, but was nevertheless unwilling to commit himself
without farther examination. He said, after frankly de-
claring his ignorance and that he had no recollection of the
question until recently called to his notice, that he would
address us interrogatories. Mr. Seward declared, under
some excitement and alarm, there was not time; that Lord
Lyons was importunate in his demands, claiming that the
arrangement should be fulfilled in good faith. I replied
that Lord Lyons, nor the British Government, had no claim
whatever except the concession made by him (Seward) in
his letter of the 31st of October, while there was no conces-
sion or equivalent from England.

The two letters of Seward and myself which brought
about this interview, of the 18th and 20th instant respect-
ively, are as follows: —

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

18 April, 1863.

SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your note of the 15th inst.
in reference to the mails of the "Peterhoff" which are in posses-
sion of the prize court in New York. I am not aware that this
Department has raised any "new questions or pretensions under
the belligerent right of search," in the case of the mails of the
" Peterhoff. " Had there been ground for such an imputation, it
could hardly, on an occasion to which so much importance has
been given, have escaped the observation of Lord Lyons. He,
however, advances no such charge, directly or by implication,

1863] THE PETERHOFFS MAILS 281

and founds the demand made by him exclusively on the conces-
sion which he, apparently through some knowledge of the details
of your letter to me of the 31st October, had been erroneously led
to believe was made by this Government, in instructions given to
the commanders of its vessels of war.

The true question in the present case is, whether the adminis-
tration of the law shall be suffered to take its ordinary course, or
whether the Court established to administer the law, and which
has certainly been in existence long enough to know its powers
and duties, shall be arrested in the discharge of its functions by
an order of the Executive, issued on the demand of a foreign gov-
ernment, which exhibits no evidence, and in fact makes no charge
that law or usage has been violated on our part.

If the "Peterhoff" was captured and sent to the Prize Court
without any reasonable grounds for such a proceeding, then un-
doubtedly the opening of the mails, if it takes place, may have
been an illegal act, — but in my judgment, not otherwise. If it
is to be assumed that the capture was wrongful, not only the
mails but the vessel and cargo should at once be surrendered.

It may be an "unfavorable time to raise new questions or pre-
tensions," but it is certainly no time to renounce any right or to
unsettle any long and well established principles and usage. Such
a surrender would be a confession of weakness which even if it
existed, it would be "inexpedient and injurious" to make known
to our enemies. If the case be one of doubt, it will be time enough
to yield when the doubt is dispelled, and we are found to have
been in the wrong. We may then yield and make amends.

I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question of genu-
ine or spurious and simulated mails; but will merely suggest that
if what pretends to be a mail is to be considered, in all cases,
prima fade sacred, and exempt from examination, it will here-
after be found exceedingly difficult, in practice, to distinguish
the spurious from the genuine, nor indeed would there be any
necessity for the fabrication of a spurious mail.

In the meantime I cannot but hold that the Prize Court is law-
fully in possession of the mail bag in question and that the Court
itself is the proper authority to adjudge and determine what dis-
position shall be made of it. I propose to avoid all new questions
by leaving the whole matter to this ancient method of adjust-
ment, established by the consent of nations, and it was in order to
avoid innovations, as well as to maintain our national rights and

282 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 21

the legal rights of the captors, that the suggestions contained in
your note of the 31st October were not adopted by this Depart-
ment.

I am, respectfully,
Your Obdt. Serv't,

GIDEON WELLES,

HON. WM. H. SEWARD, Secty. of Navy.

Secty. of State.

DEP'T. OP STATE, 20th April, 1863.
HON. G. WELLES, &c.

SIR: In reply to your note of the 18th inst. on the subject of
the mails of the "Peterhoff," it seems proper for me to say that
when the question of detaining the public mails found on board
of vessels visited and searched by the blockading forces of the U.
States, was presented to this Department last year, I took the
instructions of the President thereupon. Not only the note which
I addressed to you on the 8th day of August last, but also the note
which I addressed to you on the 31st of October last, concerning
this question, was written with the approval and under the direc-
tion of the President. The views therein expressed were then
communicated to the British Government by authority of the
President, as denning the course of proceedings which would be
pursued when such cases should occur thereafter. On receiving
your note of the 13th inst., intimating a view of the policy to be
pursued differing from what had thus been determined by the
President on the 31st of October last, I submitted to him that
note together with all the previous correspondence bearing upon
the subject, together with the act of Congress to which you have
called my attention. I then asked his instructions in the case of
the mails of the Peterhoff. The note which I addressed to you on
the 15th was the result of these instructions, and having been
read and approved by him, it was transmitted to you by his di-
rection. I was also directed to communicate the contents thereof
to the Dist. Attorney of the U. S. for the Southern District of
New York, and also to announce to Lord Lyons, for the informa-
tion of the British Government, that the mails of the " Peterhoff "
would be forwarded to their destination. I was also directed by
the President to make some special representations to the British
Government on the general subject of the mails of neutrals,which
are now in preparation.

I need hardly say that no part of my note of the 15th instant

1863] TRADE ON THE RIO GRANDE 283

was intended or was understood by me as imputing to you the
having raised or being disposed to raise new questions. What was
said on that subject, was said by way of showing that a course of
proceedings different from what I was recommending, would in-
volve, on the part of this Government, the raising of a question
which had been waived by it in my correspondence with the
British Government in October last.

I have the honor to be &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWABD.

April 22, Wednesday. Admiral Bailey writes — and I
have similar information from other sources — that an
immense trade has sprung up on the Rio Grande; that
there are at this time from one hundred and eighty to two
hundred vessels off the mouth of that river, when before
the War there were but six to eight at any one time. Os-
tensibly the trade is with the little city of Matamoras, but
it is notoriously a Rebel traffic. Goods are received and
cotton exported by this route under our own as well as for-
eign flags. I have suggested in one or two conversations
with Mr. Seward that it was a favorable opportunity to es-
tablish some principle of international law relative to the
rights and obligations of adjoining countries having a mu-
tual highway, as the United States and Mexico have in the
Rio Grande; that we should require Mexico to prevent this
illicit traffic, or that they should permit us to prevent it;
but Seward is not disposed to grapple the question, is afraid
it will compromise us with the French, says Mexico is fee-
ble, dislikes to make exactions of her, etc., etc. I yesterday
wrote the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of
War in regard to this illicit trade. Our own countrymen
should not have ready clearances and facilities for this traf-
fic, and it may be necessary to establish frontier military
posts to prevent it. Perhaps my letters may cause the sub-
ject to be taken up in the Cabinet, and lead the Govern-
ment to adopt some preventive measure; if not, the
blockade will be evaded and rendered ineffectual. The
Peterhoff with its mail and contraband cargo was one of

284 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 22

a regular line of English steamers, established to evade the
blockade by way of Matamoras.

Received the President's letter and interrogatories con-
cerning the mail. The evening papers state that the mail of
the Peterhoff has been given up by District Attorney Dela-
field Smith, who applied to the court under direction of the
Secretary of State, "approved" by the President. It is a
great error, which has its origin in the meddlesome dis-
position and loose and inconsiderate action of Mr. Seward,
who has meddlesomely committed himself. Having in a
weak moment conceded away an incontestable national
right, he has sought to extricate himself, not by retracing
his steps, but by involving the President, who confides in
him and over whom he has, at times, an unfortunate influ-
ence. The interference with the judiciary, which has ad-
miralty jurisdiction, is improper, and the President is one
of the very last men who would himself intrude on the rights
or prerogatives of any other Department of the Govern-
ment, one of the last also to yield a national right. In this
instance, and often, he has deferred his better sense and
judgment to what he thinks the superior knowledge of the
Secretary of State, who has had greater experience, has been
Senator and Governor of the great State of New York,
and is a lawyer and politician of repute and standing. But
while Mr. Seward has talents and genius, he has not the
profound knowledge nor the solid sense, correct views, and
unswerving right intentions of the President, who would
never have committed the egregious indiscretion, mistake,
of writing such a letter, and making such a concession as
the letter of the 31st of October; or, if he could have com-
mitted such an error, or serious error of any kind, he would
not have hesitated a moment to retrace his steps and cor-
rect it ; but that is the difference between Abrabam Lincoln
and William H. Seward.

I have set Watkins1 and Eames2 to ransack the books.

1 A clerk in the Navy Department.

* Charles Eames, a well-known admiralty lawyer of Washington.

1863] THE PETERHOFF'S MAILS 285

Upton1 must help them. I want the authorities that I may
respond to the President. Though his sympathies are en-
listed for Seward, who is in difficulty, and I have no doubt
he will strive to relieve him and shield the State Depart-
ment, we must, however, have law, usage, right respected
and maintained. The mail of the Peterhoff is given up,
but that is not law, and the law must be sustained if the
Secretary of State is humiliated.

The Philadelphians are fearful the acceptance of League
Island will not be consummated, and have written me. I
have replied that there is a courtesy and respect due to
Congress which I cannot disregard.

April 23, Thursday. Favorable, though not very import-
ant, news from lower Virginia and North Carolina.

My letter of the 2d and telegram of the 15th to Porter
have been effective. The steamers have run past Vicks-
burg, and I hope we may soon have something favorable
from that quarter.

Senator Sumner called this P.M. to talk over the matter
of the Peterhoff mail. Says he has been examining the case,
that he fully indorses my views. Seward, he avers, knows
nothing of international law and is wanting in common
sense, treats grave questions lightly and without compre-
hending their importance and bearings. He calls my at-
tention to the opinion of Attorney-General Wirt as to the
rights of the judiciary.

April 24, Friday. Little of importance at the Cabinet-
meeting. Seward left early. He seemed uneasy, and I
thought was apprehensive I might bring up the subject of
the Peterhoff mails. It suits him better to have interviews
with the President alone than with a full Cabinet, espe-
cially on points where he knows himself wrong. I did not
feel particularly anxious that the subject should be intro-

1 Francis H. Upton, counsel for the captors of the Peterhoff and in
other prize cases during the War.

286 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 24

duced to-day, for I am not fully prepared with my reply,
though busily occupied on the subject-matter, giving it
every moment I can spare from pressing current business.

April 27, Monday. Finished and gave to the President
my letter on the subject of mails on captured vessels. It has
occupied almost every moment of my time for a week,
aided by Eames, Watkins, and Upton, and by suggestions
from Sumner, who has entered earnestly into the subject.

The President was alone when I called on him with the
document, which looked formidable, filling thirty-one
pages of foolscap. He was pleased and interested, not at
all discouraged by my paper; said he should read every
word of it, that he wanted to understand the question, etc.
He told me Seward had sent in his answer this morning,
but it was in some respects not satisfactory, particularly
as regarded the Adela. He had sent for Hunter, who,
however, did not understand readily the case, or what was
wanted.

April 28, Tuesday. Nothing at Cabinet, Seward and
Chase absent. The President engaged in selecting provost-
marshals.

Sumner called this evening at the Department. Was
much discomfited with an interview which he had last
evening with the President. The latter was just filing a
paper as Sumner went in. After a few moments Sumner
took two slips from his pocket, — one cut from the Boston
Transcript, the other from the Chicago Tribune, each taking
strong ground against surrendering the Peterhoff mail.
The President, after reading them, opened the paper he had
just filed and read to Sumner his letter addressed to the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy. He told
Sumner he had received the replies and just concluded
reading mine. After some comments on them he said to
Sumner, "I will not show these papers to you now; perhaps
I never shall." A conversation then took place which

CHARLES SUMNER

1863] THE PETERHOFF'S MAILS 287

greatly mortified and chagrined Sumner, who declares the
President is very ignorant or very deceptive. The President,
he says, is horrified, or appeared to be, with the idea of
a war with England, which he assumed depended on this
question. He was confident we should have war with Eng-
land if we presumed to open their mail bags, or break their
seals or locks. They would not submit to it, and we were
in no condition to plunge into a foreign war on a subject
of so little importance in comparison with the terrible con-
sequences which must follow our act. Of this idea of a' war
with England, Sumner could not dispossess him by argu-
ment, or by showing its absurdity. Whether it was real or
affected ignorance, Sumner was not satisfied.

I have no doubts of the President's sincerity, and so told
Sumner. But he has been imposed upon, humbugged, by a
man in whom he confides. His confidence has been abused ;
he does not — frankly confesses he does not — compre-
hend the principles involved nor the question itself. Sew-
ard does not intend he shall comprehend it. While at-
tempting to look into it, the Secretary of State is daily, and
almost hourly, wailing in his ears the calamities of a war
with England which he is striving to prevent. The Presi-
dent is thus led away from the real question, and will prob-
ably decide it, not on its merits, but on this false issue,
raised by the man who is the author of the difficulty.

April 29, Wednesday. The atmosphere is thick with
rumors of army movements. Hooker is reported to have
crossed the river. Not unlikely a portion of his force has
done so, and all may. That there may be a battle immin-
ent is not improbable. I shall not be surprised, however,
if only smart skirmishes take place.

Admiral Lee writes me that in his opinion there is no
such force in Suffolk as Dix and others represent. General
Dix, like most of our generals, cries aloud for gunboats and
naval protection, but is not inclined to be grateful, or even
just to his defenders.

288 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [APRIL 30

April 30, Thursday. To-day has been designated for a
National Fast. I listened to a patriotic Christian discourse
from my pastor, Mr. Pine.

Had a long, studied, complaining letter from Admiral
Du Pont, of some twenty pages, in explanation and refuta-
tion of a letter hi the Baltimore American, which criticizes
and censures his conduct at Charleston. The dispatch is
no credit to Du Pont, who could be better employed. He is
evidently thinking much more of Du Pont than of the ser-
vice or the country. I fear he can be no longer useful in his
present command, and am mortified and vexed that I did
not earlier detect his vanity and weakness. They have lost
us the opportunity to take Charleston, which a man of
more daring energy and who had not a distinguished name
to nurse and take care of would have unproved. All Du
Pont's letters since the 8th show that he had no heart, no
confidence, no zeal hi his work; that he went into the fight
with a predetermined conviction it would not be a success.
He is prejudiced against the monitor class of vessels, and
would attribute his failure to them, but it is evident he has
no taste for rough, close fighting.

Senator Stunner called on me this P.M. in relation to the
coast defense of Massachusetts. I received a letter from
Governor Andrew this A.M. on the same subject. The
President had also been to see me hi regard to it.

After disposing of that question, Sumner related an inter-
esting conversation which he had last evening with Lord
Lyons at Tassara's, the Spanish Minister. I was an hour
or two at Tassara's party, hi the early part of the evening,
and observed S. and Lord L. hi earnest conversation. Sum-
ner says their whole talk was on the subject of the mails
on captured vessels. He opened the subject by regretting
that hi the peculiar condition of our affairs, Lord Lyons
should have made a demand that could not be yielded
without national dishonor; said that the question was one
of judicature rather than diplomacy. Lord Lyons dis-
avowed ever having made a demand; said he was cautious

1863] SUMMER'S TALK WITH LORD LYONS 289

and careful in all his transactions with Mr. Seward, that he
made it a point to reduce all matters with Seward of a pub-
lic nature to writing, that he had done so hi regard to the
mail of the Peterhoff, and studiously avoided any demand.
He authorized Sumner, who is Chairman of Foreign Rela-
tions, to see all his letters hi relation to the mails, etc., etc.
To-day Sumner saw the President and repeated to him
this conversation, Lord Lyons having authorized him to do
so. The President, he says, seemed astounded, and after
some general conversation on the subject, said in his
emphatic way, "I shall have to cut this knot."

VIII

Conversation with Attorney-General Bates on the Captured Mails — John
Laird's Statement in Parliament — Waiting for News from Hooker —
Rumors of the Battle of Chancellorsville — Disappointment at the News
— Stonewall Jackson's Death — Recall of Wilkes from the West India
Squadron — Earl Russell's Speech on American Affairs — Sumner's
Talk with Seward about Mr. Adams and the Secretary of Legation at
London — Conversation with the President on the Subject of Cap-
tured Mails — Du Font's Charges against Chief Engineer Stimers —
Du Pont before Charleston — His Shortcomings and the Question of
superseding him — Deplorable Conditions in the South — Foote suc-
ceeds Du Pont in Command of the South Atlantic Squadron — Dahlgren
declines to be Second in Command.

May 1, Friday. After Cabinet-meeting walked over with
Attorney-General Bates to his office. Had a very full talk
with him concerning the question of captured mails, — the
jurisdiction of the courts, the law, and usage, and rights
of the Government. He is unqualifiedly with me in my
views and principles, — the law and our rights. He dwelt
with some feeling on the courtesy which ought to exist be-
tween the several Departments and was by them gener-
ally observed. Although cautious and guarded in his re-
marks, he did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the con-
duct of the Secretary of State hi writing to attorneys and
marshals, and assuming to instruct and direct them hi their
official duties which were assigned to and required by law
to be done by the Attorney-General.

We are getting vague rumors of army operations, but
nothing intelligible or reliable.

May 2, Saturday. Thick rumors concerning the Army of
the Potomac, — little, however, from official sources. I
abstain from going to the War Department more than is
necessary or consulting operators at the telegraph, for

1863] LAIRD AND THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 291

there is a hazy uncertainty there. This indefiniteness, and
the manner attending it, is a pretty certain indication that
the information received is not particularly gratifying.
Whether Hooker refuses to communicate, and prevents
others from communicating, I know not. Other members
of the Cabinet, like myself, are, I find, disinclined to visit
the War Department under the circumstances.

A very singular declaration by John Laird, Member of
Parliament and one of the builders of the pirate Alabama,
has been shown. Laird said in Parliament, in reply to
Thomas Baring, that the Navy Department had applied
to him to build vessels. It is wholly untrue, a sheer fabrica-
tion. But John Laird writes to Howard of New York, that
he (Howard) had said something to him (Laird) about
building vessels for the Government. Howard, I judge, was
Laird's agent or broker to procure, if possible, contracts
for him or his firm, but did [not] succeed. The truth is, our
own shipbuilders, in consequence of the suspension of
work in private yards early in the war, were clamorous for
contracts, and the competition was such that we would
have had terrible indignation upon us had we gone abroad
for vessels, which I never thought of doing.

May 4, Monday. Great uneasiness and uncertainty
prevail in regard to army movements. I think the War
Department is really poorly advised of operations. I could
learn nothing from them yesterday or to-day. Such infor-
mation as I have is picked up from correspondents and news-
gatherers, and from naval officers who arrive from below.

I this P.M. met the President at the War Department.
He said he had a feverish anxiety to get facts; was con-
stantly up and down, for nothing reliable came from the
front. There is an impression, which is very general, that
our army has been successful, but that there has been great
slaughter and that still fiercer and more terrible fights are
impending.

I am not satisfied. If we have success, the tidings would

292 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 4

come to us in volumes. We may not be beaten. Stoneman1
with 13,000 cavalry and six days' supply has cut his way
into the enemy's country, but we know not his fate, farther
than we hear nothing from him or of him. If overwhelmed,
we should know it from the Rebels. There are rumors
that the Rebels again reoccupy the intrenchments on the
heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, but the rumor is
traceable to no reliable source.

May 5, Tuesday. But little of importance at the Cabinet.
The President read a brief telegram which he got last even-
ing from General Hooker, to whom, getting nothing from
the War Department, he had applied direct to ascertain
whether the Rebels were in possession of the works on the
heights of Fredericksburg. Hooker replied he believed it
was true, but if so it was of no importance. This reply com-
municates nothing of operations, but the tone and whole
thing — even its brevity — inspire right feelings. It is
strange, however, that no reliable intelligence reaches us
from the army of what it is doing, or not doing. This fact
itself forebodes no good.

Sumner came in this afternoon and read to me from two
or three documents — one the late speech of the Solicitor
of the Treasury in the British Parliament on the matter of
prize and prize courts — which are particularly favorable
to our views in the Peterhoff case. From this we got on to
the absorbing topic of the army under Hooker. Sumner
is hopeful, and if he did not inspire me with his confidence,
I was made glad by his faith. The President came in while
we were discussing the subject, and, as is his way, at once
earnestly participated. His suggestions and inferences
struck me as probable, hopeful, nothing more. Like the
rest of us, he wants facts; without them we have only sur-

1 General George Stoneman was conducting an extensive cavalry
operation intended to cut off Lee's army after its expected defeat. The
unlooked-for discomfiture of the Federal forces placed Stoneman in
considerable danger, but he succeeded in rejoining Hooker's main army on
May 1st.

1863] RUMORS OF DEFEAT 293

mises and surmises indicate doubt, uncertainty. He is not
informed of occurrences as he should be, but is in the dark,
with no official data, which confirms me in the belief that
the War Department is in ignorance, for they would not
withhold favorable intelligence from him, yet it is strange,
very strange. In the absence of news the President strives
to feel encouraged and to inspire others, but I can perceive
he has doubts and misgivings, though he does not express
them. Like my own, perhaps, his fears are the result
of absence of facts, rather than from any information
received.

May 6, Wednesday. We have news, via Richmond, that
Stoneman has destroyed bridges and torn up rails on the
Richmond road, thus cutting off communication between
that city and the Rebel army. Simultaneously with this
intelligence, there is a rumor that Hooker has recrossed the
river and is at Falmouth. I went to the War Department
about noon to ascertain the facts, but Stanton said he had
no such intelligence nor did he believe it. I told him I had
nothing definite or very authentic, — that he certainly
ought to be better posted than I could be, — but I had seen
a brief telegram from young Dahlgren, who is on Hooker's
staff, dated this A.M., " Headquarters near Falmouth —
All right." This to me was pretty significant of the fact
that Hooker and his army had recrossed. Stanton was a
little disconcerted. He said Hooker had as yet no definite
plan; his headquarters are not far from Falmouth. Of
course nothing farther was to be said, yet I was by no means
satisfied with his remarks or manner.

An hour later Sumner came into my room, and raising
both hands exclaimed, "Lost, lost, all is lost!" I asked
what he meant. He said Hooker and his army had been de-
feated and driven back to this side of the Rappahannock.
Sumner came direct from the President, who, he said, was
extremely dejected. I told him I had been apprehensive
that disaster had occurred, but when I asked under what

294 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 6

circumstances'this reverse had taken place, he could give
me no particulars.

I went soon after to the War Department. Seward was
sitting with Stanton, as when I left him two or three hours
before.* I asked Stanton if he knew where Hooker was. He
answered, curtly, "No." I looked at him sharply, and I
have no doubt with incredulity, for he, after a moment's
pause, said, " He is on this side of the river, but I know not
where." "Well," said I, "he is near his old quarters, and
I wish to know if Stoneman is with him, or if he or you
know anything of that force." Stanton said he had no in-
formation in regard to that force, and it was one of the
most unpleasant things of the whole affair that Hooker
should have abandoned Stoneman.

Last night and to-day we have had a violent rainstorm
from the northeast. Fox and Edgar, my son, left this A.M.
for Falmouth. The President, uneasy, uncomfortable, and
dissatisfied with the meagre information and its gloomy
aspect, went himself this evening to the army with Gen-
eral Halleck.

May 7, Thursday. Our people, though shocked and very
much disappointed, are in better tone and temper than I
feared they would be. The press had wrought the public
mind to high expectation by predicting certain success,
which all wished to believe. I have not been confident,
though I had hopes. Hooker has not been tried in so high
and responsible a position. He is gallant and efficient as
commander of a division, but I am apprehensive not equal
to that of General-in-Chief. I have not, however, sufficient
data for a correct and intelligent opinion. A portion of his
plan seems to have been well devised, and his crossing the
river well executed. It is not clear that his position at
Chancellorsville was well selected, and he seems not to have
been prepared for Stonewall Jackson's favorite plan of at-
tack. Our men fought well, though it seems not one half of
them were engaged. I do not learn why Stoneman was left,

1863] BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 295

or why Hooker recrossed the river without hearing from
him, or why he recrossed at all.

It is not explained why Sedgwick and his command were
left single-handed to fight against greatly superior numbers
— the whole army of Lee in fact — on Monday, when
Hooker with all his forces was unemployed only three miles
distant. There are, indeed, many matters which require
explanation.

May 8, Friday. A telegraph dispatch this morning from
Admiral Porter states he has possession of Grand Gulf.
The news was highly gratifying to the President, who had
not heard of it until I met him at the Cabinet-meeting.

Several of our navy and army officers arrived this day
from Richmond, having left that place on Tuesday to be
exchanged. They all say that Richmond might have been
captured by Stoneman's cavalry, or by a single regiment,
the city had been so thoroughly drained of all its male pop-
ulation to reinforce Lee, and so wholly unprepared were
they for a raid that but little resistance could have been
made. Stoneman and his force have done gallant service,
but we regret they did not dash into Richmond and cap-
ture Davis and the Rebel Administration.

Commander Drayton came to see me to-day. He is one
of Du Font's intimates, a man of excellent sense and heart,
but is impressed with Du Font's opinions and feelings.
All of Du Font's set — those whom he has called around
him — are schooled and trained, and have become his
partisans, defer to his views, and adopt his sentiments.
It is his policy, and of course theirs, to decry the monitors
as if that would justify or exonerate Du Pont from any
remissness or error. I told Drayton it was not necessary to
condemn the monitors for the failure to capture Charles-
ton, nor did it appear to me wise to do so, or to make any
deficiencies in those vessels prominent in the official re-
ports which were to be published. It seems an effort to
impute blame somewhere, or [as] if blame existed and an

296 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAYS

excuse or justification was necessary, of which the public
and the whole world should be at once informed. If the
monitors are weak in any part, there was no necessity for
us to proclaim that weakness to our enemies ; if they needed
improvements, the Government could make them. Allud-
ing to Du Font's long dispatch refuting, explaining, and
deprecating the criticism in a Baltimore paper, I told him
I was sorry to see such an expenditure of time, talent, and
paper by the commander of the Squadron and his subordi-
nates. Drayton expressed his regret at the over-sensitive-
ness of Du Pont, but said it was his nature, and this mor-
bid infirmity was aggravated by his long continuance on
shipboard. It is the opinion of Drayton that Charleston
cannot be taken by the Navy and that the Navy can do
but little towards it. He says the monitors, though slow,
would have passed the batteries and reached the wharves
of Charleston but for submerged obstructions.

May 11, Monday. The President sent a note to my
house early this morning, requesting me to call at the
Executive Mansion on my way to the Department. When
there he took from a drawer two dispatches written by
the Secretary of State to Lord Lyons, in relation to prize
captures. As they had reference to naval matters, he
wished my views in regard to them and the subject-matter
generally. I told him these dispatches were not particu-
larly objectionable, but that Mr. Seward in these matters
seemed not to have a correct apprehension of the duties
and rights of the Executive and other Departments of the
Government. There were, however, in this correspond-
ence allusions to violations of international law and of
instructions which were within his province, and which
it might be well to correct; but as a general thing it
would be better that the Secretary of State and the Ex-
ecutive should not, unless necessary, interfere in these
matters, but leave them where they properly and legally
belonged, with the judiciary. [I said] that Lord Lyons

1863] STONEWALL JACKSON'S DEATH 297

would present these demands or claims as long as the
Executive would give them consideration, — acquiesced,
responded, and assumed to grant relief, — but that it was
wholly improper, and would, besides being irregular, cause
him and also the State and Navy Departments great
labor which does not belong to either. The President said
he could see I was right, but that in this instance, perhaps,
it would be best, if I did not seriously object, that these
dispatches should go on; but he wished me to see them.
When I got to the Department, I found a letter from
Mr. Seward, inclosing one from Lord Lyons stating that
complaint had been made to his Government that passen-
gers on the Peterhoff had been imprisoned and detained,
and were entitled to damages. As the opportunity was
a good one, I improved it to communicate to him in writing,
what I have repeatedly done in conversation, that in the
present state of the proceedings there should be no inter-
ference on his part, that these are matters for adjudica-
tion by the courts rather than for diplomacy or Executive
action, and until the judicial power is exhausted, it is not
advisable for the Departments to interfere, etc. The letter
was not finished in season to be copied to-day, but I will
get it to him to-morrow, I hope in season for him to read
before getting off his dispatches.

May 12, Tuesday. We have information that Stonewall
Jackson, one of the best generals in the Rebel, and, in some
respects, perhaps in either, service, is dead. One cannot
but lament the death of such a man, in such a cause too.
He was fanatically earnest, and a Christian but bigoted
soldier.

A Mr. Prentiss has presented a long document to the
President for the relief of certain parties who owned the
John Gilpin, a vessel loaded with cotton, and captured and
condemned as good prize. There has been a good deal of
outside engineering in this case. Chase thought if the
parties were loyal it was a hard case. I said all such losses

298 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 12

were hard, and asked whether it was hardest for the
wealthy, loyal owners, who undertook to run the blockade
with their cotton, or the brave and loyal sailors who made
the capture and were by law entitled to the avails, to be
deprived. I requested him to say which of these parties
should be the losers. He did not answer. I added this was
another of those cases that belonged to the courts exclus-
ively, with which the Executive ought not to interfere.
All finally acquiesced in this view.

This case has once before been pressed upon the Presi-
dent. Senator Foot of Vermont appeared with Mr. Prentiss,
and the President then sent for me to ascertain its merits.
I believe I fully satisfied him at that time, but his sym-
pathies have again been appealed to by one side.

Mr. Seward came to my house last evening and read
a confidential dispatch from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons,
relative to threatened difficulties with England and the
unpleasant condition of affairs between the two countries.
He asked if anything could be done with Wilkes, whom he
has hitherto favored, but against whom the Englishmen,
without any sufficient cause, are highly incensed. I told
him he might be transferred to the Pacific, which is as
honorable but a less active command; that he had favored
Wilkes, who was not one of the most comfortable officers
for the Navy Department. I was free to say, however,
I had seen nothing in his conduct thus far, in his present
command, towards the English deserving of censure, and
that the irritation and prejudice against him were un-
worthy, yet under the peculiar condition of things, it would
perhaps be well to make this concession. I read to him an
extract from a confidential letter of J. M. Forbes, now in
England, a most earnest and sincere Union man, urging
that W. should be withdrawn, and quoting the private
remarks of Mr. Cobden to that effect. I had read the same
extract to the President last Friday evening, Mr. Sumner
being present. He (Sumner) remarked it was singular,
but that he had called on the President to read to him

1863] RECALL OF WILKES 299

a letter which he had just received from the Duke of
Argyle, in which he advised that very change. This letter
Sumner has since read to me. It is replete with good
sense and good feeling.

I have to-day taken preliminary steps to transfer Wilkes
and to give Bell command in the West Indies. It will not
surprise me if this, besides angering Wilkes, gives public
discontent. His strange course in taking Slidell and Mason
from the Trent was popular, and is remembered with
gratitude by the people, who are not aware his work was
but half done, and that, by not bringing in the Trent as
prize, he put himself and the country in the wrong. Sew-
ard at first approved the course of Wilkes in capturing
Slidell and Mason, and added to my embarrassment in so
disposing of the question as not to create discontent by
rebuking Wilkes for what the country approved. But
when, under British menace, Seward changed his position,
he took my position, and the country gave him great credit
for what was really my act and the undoubted law of the
case. My letter congratulating Wilkes on the capture of
the Rebel enemies was particularly guarded and warned
him and naval officers against a similar offense. The letter
was acceptable to all parties, — the Administration, the
country, and even Wilkes was contented.

It is best under the circumstances that Wilkes should
be withdrawn from the West Indies, where he was sent
by Seward's special request, unless, as he says, we are ready
for a war with England. I sometimes think that is not the
worst alternative, she behaves so badly.

May 13, Wednesday. The last arrival from England brings
Earl Russell's speech on American affairs. Its tone and
views are less offensive than some things we have had, and
manifest a dawning realization of what must follow if
England persists in her unfriendly policy. In his speech,
Earl R., in some remarks relative to the opinions of the
law officers of the Crown on the subject of mails captured

300 DIARY. OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 13

on blockade-runners, adroitly quotes the letter of Seward
to me on the 31st of October, and announces that to be
the policy of the United States Government, and the regu-
lation which governs our naval officers. It is not the Eng-
lish policy, nor a regulation which they adopt, reciprocate,
or respect, but the tame, flat concession of the Secretary of
State, made without authority or law. The statement
of Earl R. is not correct. No such orders as he represents
have issued from the Navy Department. Not a naval
officer or district attorney has ever been instructed to
surrender the mails as stated, nor is there a court in the
United States which would regard such instructions, if
given, as good law. It is nothing more nor less than an
attempted abandonment, an ignominious surrender, of our
undoubted legal rights by a Secretary of State who knew
not what he was about. The President may, under the
influence of Mr. Seward, commit himself to this inconsider-
ate and illegal proceeding and direct such instructions to
be issued, but if so, the act shall be his, not mine, and he
will find it an unhappy error.

But Seward has been complimented in Parliament for
giving away to our worst enemy his country's rights, —
for an impertinent and improper intermeddling, or at-
tempt to intermeddle, with and direct the action of Jan-
other Department, and the incense which he has received
will tickle his vanity.

Sumner tells me of a queer interview he had with Sew-
ard. The first part of the conversation was harmonious
and related chiefly to the shrewd and cautious policy and
management of the British Ministry, who carefully re-
ferred all complex questions to the law officers of Her
Majesty's Government. It might have been a hintfto
Seward to be more prudent and considerate, and to take
legal advice instead of pushing on, wordy and slovenly,
as is sometimes done. Allusion was made to Mr. Adams
and his unfortunate letter to Zerman.1 Our Minister,

1 Zerman was a Mexican in partnership with Howell, an American.

1863] MR. ADAMS AS MINISTER 301

Mr. Adams, was spoken of as too reserved and retiring
for his own and the general good. Sumner said, in justi-
fication and by way of excuse for him, that it would be
pleasanter and happier for him if he had a Secretary of
Legation whose deportment, manner, and social position
were different, — if he were more affable and courteous,
in short more of a gentleman, — for he could in that case
make up for some of Mr. A.'s deficiencies. At this point
Seward flew into a passion, and, in a high key, told Sum-
ner he knew nothing of political (meaning party) claims
and services, and accused him of a design to cut the throat
of Charley Wilson, the Secretary of Legation at London.
Sumner wholly disclaimed any such design or any per-
sonal knowledge of the man, but said he had been in-
formed, and had no doubt of the fact, that it was the daily
practice of Wilson to go to Morley's, seat himself in a
conspicuous place, throw his legs upon the table, and, in
coarse language, abuse England and the English. What-
ever might be our grievances and wrong, this, Sumner
thought, was not a happy method of correcting them, nor
would such conduct on the part of the second officer of the
Legation bring about kinder feelings or a better state of
things, whereas a true gentleman could by suavity and
dignity in such a position win respect, strengthen his prin-
cipal, and benefit the country. These remarks only made
Seward more violent, and louder in his declarations that
Charley Wilson was a clever fellow and should be sus-
tained.

I read to Attorney-General Bates the letters and papers
in relation to mails on captured vessels, of which he had
some previous knowledge. He complimented my letters
and argument, and said my position was impregnable and
the Secretary of State wholly and utterly wrong.

The firm fitted out a vessel to trade with Matamoras. Mr. Adams,"being
satisfied of their good faith, gave them assurances of immunity from
interference on the part of the United States Navy, and this discrimination
against Englishmen engaged ostensibly in the same trade, was sharply
criticized in the British Parliament.

302 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY is

Mr. Seward sent me to-day a letter from Lord Lyons
concerning the Mont Blanc and the Dolphin, and wished
me to name some person at Key West to arbitrate on the
former case, the vessel having been restored and the par-
ties wanting damages. I named Admiral Bailey for this
naval duty, but took occasion to reiterate views I have
heretofore expressed, and especially in my letter yester-
day that these matters belonged to the courts and not to
the Departments.

Hear of no new move by Hooker. I am apprehensive
our loss in killed and prisoners was much greater in the late
battle than has been supposed.

May 14, Thursday. I wrote, two or three weeks since,
a letter to Admiral Du Pont of affairs at Charleston and
his reports, but have delayed sending it, partly in hopes
I should have something suggestive and encouraging,
partly because Fox requested me to wait, in the belief
we should have additional information. Du Pont is mor-
bidly sensitive, and to vindicate himself wants to publish
every defect and weakness of the ironclads and to dis-
parage them, regardless of its effect in inspiring the Rebels
to resist them, and impairing the confidence of our own
men in their invulnerability. I have tried to be kind and
frank in my letter, but shall very likely give offense.

Had a little conversation to-day with Chase and Bates
on two or three matters, but the principal subject was
Earl Russell's speech.

May 15, Friday. The President called on me this morn-
ing with the basis of a dispatch which Lord Lyons pro-
posed to send home. He had submitted it to Mr. Seward,
who handed it to the President, and he brought it to me.
The President read it to me, and when he concluded, I
remarked the whole question of the mails belonged pro-
perly to the courts and I thought unless we proposed some
new treaty arrangement it would be best the subject

1863] THE CAPTURED MAILS 303

should continue with the courts as law and usage directed.
"But," he inquired, "have the courts ever opened the
mails of a neutral government?" I replied, "Always,
when the captured vessels on which mails were found were
considered good prize." "Why, then," said he, "do you
not furnish me with the fact? It is what I want, but you
furnish me with no report that any neutral has ever been
searched." I said I was not aware that the right had ever
been questioned. The courts made no reports to me
whether they opened or did not open mail. The courts
are independent of the Departments, to which they are
not amenable. In the mails was often the best and only
evidence that could insure condemnation. [I said] that
I should as soon have expected an inquiry whether evi-
dence was taken, witnesses sworn, and the cargoes exam-
ined as whether mails were examined. "But if mails ever
are examined," said he, "the fact must be known and re-
corded. What vessels," he asked, "have we captured,
where we have examined the mails?" "All, doubtless,
that have had mails on board," I replied. Probably most
of them were not intrusted with mails. "What," asked he,
"was the first vessel taken? " " I do not recollect the name,
a small blockade-runner, I think; I presume she had no
mail. If she had, I have no doubt the court searched it
and examined all letters and papers." He was extremely
anxious to ascertain if I recollected, or knew that any cap-
tured mail had been searched. I told him I remembered
no specific mention, doubted if the courts ever reported
to the Navy Department. Foreign governments, knowing
of the blockade, would not be likely to make up mails for
the ports blockaded. The Peterhoff had a mail ostensibly
for Matamoras, which was her destination, but with a
cargo and mails which we knew were intended for the
Rebels, though the proof might be difficult since the mail
had been given up. I sent for Watkins, who has charge of
prize matters, to know if there was any record or mention
of mails in any of the papers sent the Navy Department,

304 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 15

but he could not call to mind anything conclusive. Some
mention was made of mails or dispatches in the mail on
board the Bermuda, which we captured, but it was inci-
dental. Perhaps the facts might be got from the district
attorneys, though he thought, as I did, that but few regu-
lar mails were given to blockade-runners. The President
said he would frame a letter to the district attorneys, and
in the afternoon he brought in a form to be sent to the
attorneys in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.

Read Chase the principal points in the Peterhoff case.
He approved of my views, concurred in them fully, and
said there was no getting around them.

May 16, Saturday. Saw Seward this morning respecting
Wilkes. After talking over the subject, he said he cared
nothing about Wilkes, that if he was removed he would be
made a martyr, and both he (S.) and myself would be
blamed and abused by the people, who knew not the cause
that influenced and governed us. He then for the first
time alluded to the removal of Butler, which he said was
a necessity to appease France. Nevertheless France was
not satisfied, yet Butler's removal had occasioned great
discontent and called down much censure. If I could stand
the recall of Wilkes, he thought he could. I answered him
that any abuse of me in the discharge of my duty and when
I knew I was right would never influence my course. In
this case I could better stand his recall than the responsi-
bility of sending him into the Pacific, where he would have
great power and be the representative of the Government;
for he is erratic, impulsive, opinionated, somewhat arbi-
trary towards his subordinates, and is always disinclined
to obey orders which he receives if they do not comport
with his own notions. His special mission, in his present
command, had been to capture the Alabama. In this he
had totally failed, while zealous to catch blockade-runners
and get prize money. Had he not been in the West Indies,
we might have captured her, but he had seized the Vander-

1863] COBDEN AND BRIGHT 305

bilt, which had specific orders and destination and gone
off with her prize-hunting, thereby defeating our plans.
Seward wished me to detach him because he had not taken
the Alabama and give that as the reason. I care to assign
no reasons, — none but the true ones, and it is not
politic to state them.

When I was about leaving, Seward asked as a favor that
I would address him a proposition that the matter of the
Mont Blanc should be left to Admiral Bailey alone. The
whole pecuniary interest involved did not, he said, exceed
six or eight hundred dollars, and it would greatly relieve
him at a pinch, if I would do him this favor, and harm no
one, for the vessel had been seized sleeping at anchor
within a mile of the Cays, and was retained by the court.
I asked what he had to do with it anyway. He gave me
no satisfactory answer, but went into the trouble he had
in keeping the Englishmen quiet and his present difficul-
ties. All of which, I take it, means he has loosely commit-
ted himself, meddled with what was none of his business,
made inconsiderate promises to Lord Lyons, and wishes
me, who have had nothing to do with it, but have objected
to the whole proceeding, to now propose that Admiral
Bailey shall be sole referee. This will enable him to cover
up his own error and leave it to be inferred that I have
prompted it, as B. is a naval officer.

May 18, Monday. Sumner called this evening and read
to me a letter he had received from Mr. Cobden and also
one from Mr. Bright, — both in good tone and of right
feeling. These two men are statesmen and patriots in
the true sense of the word, such as do honor to England
and give vigor to the Government. They and Sumner
have done much to preserve the peace of the two coun-
tries.

Senator Doolittle came to see me to-day. Has faith, he
says, but fears that General Hooker has no religious faith,
laments the infirmities of that officer, and attributes our

306 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY is

late misfortune to the want of godliness in the commanding
general.

May 19, Tuesday. The case of Vallandigham, recently
arrested by General Burnside, tried by court martial, con-
victed of something, and sentenced to Fort Warren, was
before the Cabinet. It was an error on the part of Burn-
side. All regretted the arrest, but, having been made,
every one wished he had been sent over the lines to the
Rebels with whom he sympathizes. Until the subject is
legitimately before us, and there is a necessity to act,
there is no disposition to meddle with the case.

The New York Tribune of to-day has a communication
on the Peterhoff mail question. It is neither so good nor
so bad as it might have been. Am sorry to see it just at
this tune, and uncertain as to the author. Faxon names
one of the correspondents of the Tribune, but while he may
have forwarded the article he could not have written it.

Governor Sprague and Miss Kate Chase called this
evening. I have been skeptical as to a match, but this
means something. She is beautiful, or, more properly per-
haps, interesting and impressive. He is rich and holds the
position of Senator. Few young men have such advan-
tages as he, and Miss Kate has talents and ambition suf-
ficient for both.

I wrote and sent to Senator Sumner a denial of John
Laird's statement in the British House of Commons.
When he asserted that the Secretary of the American
Navy, or the agent of the Secretary, applied to him to
build vessels, or a vessel, he asserted what is not true,
what he knows to be untrue. He is, in my opinion, a
mercenary hypocrite without principle or honesty, as his
words and works both show.

May 20, Wednesday. Admiral Lee has been here for two
or three days consulting in regard to Wilmington. The
blockade of Cape Fear is difficult and gives infinite trou-

1863] DU PONT AND STIMERS 307

ble, but the War Department has manifested no desire
to relieve us and prevent that means of Rebel communica-
tion. To-day we had a long conference. Lee has seen Gen-
eral Totten, and the conclusion is that the army must
capture the place, assisted by the Navy, which will cover
the landing. The practice of relying upon the Navy to do
the principal fighting when forts or batteries are to be
taken has had a bad effect in some respects and is vitiat-
ing the army.

Admiral Du Pont sends forward charges against Chief
Engineer Stimers, who, on his passage from Charleston to
New York after the late demonstration, expressed an
opinion that Sumter might have been passed or taken.
Du Pont requested Stimers to be sent to Port Royal for
trial. Every officer under Du Pont has expressed a dif-
ferent opinion from Stimers and they would constitute the
court. It is a strange request, and it would be quite as
strange were I to comply with it. I would not trust
Stimers, or any one whom Du Pont wished to make a vic-
tim, in his power. If not a little deranged, D. is a shrewd
and selfish man. I think he is morbidly diseased. Dray-
ton expresses this opinion. His conduct and influence
have been unfortunate in many respects on his subordi-
nates. Instead of sending Stimers to Port Royal to be sac-
rificed, I will order a court_of inquiry at New York, where
the facts may be elicited without prejudice or partiality.
The alleged offense hardly justifies an inquiry in form, but
nothing less will satisfy Du Pont, who wants a victim.
More than this, he wants to lay his failure at Charleston
on the ironclads, and with such a court as he would organ-
ize, and such witnesses as he has already trained, he would
procure both Stimers and vessels to be condemned. It
would be best for the ends of truth and justice to have an
inquiry away from all partisanship, and from all unfair
influences and management.

May 21, Thursday. Had an early call from the Pre-

308 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 21

sident, who brought a communication from Tassara to
Seward, complaining of violation of neutral rights by a
small pilot-boat, having a gun mounted amidships and
believed to be an American vessel, which was annoying
Spanish and other neutral vessels off the coast of Cuba.
The President expressed doubts whether it was one of our
vessels, but I told him I was inclined to believe it was,
and that I had last week written Mr. Seward concerning
the same craft in answer to Lord Lyons, who complained
of outrage on the British schooner Dream, but I had also
written Admiral Bailey on the subject. I read my letter
to the President. He spoke of an unpleasant rumor con-
cerning Grant, but on canvassing the subject we con-
cluded it must be groundless, originating probably in the
fact that he does not retain but has evacuated Jackson,
after destroying the enemy's stores.

It is pretty evident that Senator John P. Hale, Chair-
man of the Naval Committee of the Senate, is occupying
his time in the vacation in preparing for an attack on the
Navy Department. He has a scheme for a tract of land
with many angles, belonging to a friend, which land he
has procured from Congress authority for the Secretary
to purchase, but the Secretary does not want the land
in that shape. It is a "job," and the object of this special
legislative permission to buy, palpable. Hale called on
me, and has written me, and I am given to understand,
if I do not enter into his scheme, — make this purchase,
— I am to encounter continued and persistent opposition
from him.

Hale has also sent me a letter of eight closely written
pages, full of disinterested, patriotic, and devoted loyalty,
protesting against my detailing Commodore Van Brunt
to be one of a board on a requisition from the War Depart-
ment for a naval officer. Van Brunt has committed no
wrong, is accused of none, but Hale does n't like him.
I replied in half a page. I will not waste time on a man
like Hale.

1863] DU PONT BEFORE CHARLESTON 309

May 22, Friday. Information is received that Grant has
beaten Pemberton after a hard fight of nine hours. It is
said to have taken place on the 15th inst.

Had an interview with Admiral Lardner, who goes out
to take charge of the West India Squadron. He is prudent,
but, I fear, not so efficient as the duty assigned him re-
quires. Wilkes has accomplished but little, has interfered
with and defeated some Navy plans, but has not committed
the indiscretions towards neutrals which I feared he would,
and of which he is charged.

May 23, Saturday. Met the President, Stanton, and
Halleck at the War Department. Fox was with me.
Neither Du Pont nor General Hunter has answered the
President's dispatch to them a month since. Halleck does
not favor an attack on Charleston unless by the Navy. The
army will second, so far as it can. Fox, who commanded
the first military expedition to Sumter, is for a renewed
attack, and wants the Navy to take the brunt. Stanton
wants the matter prosecuted. I have very little confidence
in success under the present admiral. It is evident that Du
Pont is against doing anything, — that he is demoralizing
others, and doing no good in that direction. If anything is
to be done, we must have a new commander. Du Pont
has talents and capability, but we are to have the benefit
of neither at Charleston. The old army infirmity of this
war, dilatory action, affects Du Pont. Commendation and
encouragement, instead of stimulating him, have raised
the mountain of difficulty higher daily. He is nursing
Du Pont, whose fame he fears may suffer, and has sought
sympathy by imparting his fears and doubts to his sub-
ordinates, until all are impressed with his apprehensions.
The capture of Charleston by such a chief is an impos-
sibility, whatever may be accomplished by another. This
being the case, I have doubts of renewing the attack
immediately, notwithstanding the zeal of Stanton and
Fox. I certainly would not without some change of officers.

310 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 23

Having no faith, the commander can accomplish no work.
In the struggle of war, there must sometimes be risks to
accomplish results, but it is clear we can expect no great
risks from Du Pont at Charleston. The difficulties increase
daily [as] his imagination dwells on the subject. Under any
circumstances we shall be likely to have trouble with him.
He has remarkable address, is courtly, the head of a formid-
able clique, the most formidable in the Navy, loves intrigue,
is Jesuitical, and I have reason to believe is not always
frank and sincere. It was finally concluded to delay pro-
ceedings until the arrival of General Gillmore, who should
be put in possession of our views.

Sumner brought me this P.M. a report in manuscript of
the case of the Peterhoff mail. I have read it and notice
that the attorney, Delafield Smith, takes the opportunity
to say, I doubt not at whose suggestion, that there is no
report that the public mails have ever been opened and
examined. He does not say there is any report they were
not, or that there is any report whatever on the subject.
All letters and papers deemed necessary are always ex-
amined. Upton well said in reply to Smith that the ques-
tion had never been raised. Much time was spent in arguing
this point respecting the mails. It was reported to Seward,
and that point was seized upon, and the question raised,
which led the President to call on me for a record of a case
where public mails had been searched. Seward's man,
Delafield Smith, having learned through Archibald, the
British Consul, that the Secretary of State had given up
our undoubted right to search the mails, set up the petti-
fogging pretense that there was no report that captured
mails ever had been examined, which Judge Betts did not
regard, and Upton correctly said the point had never been
raised. The court never asked permission of the Executive
to try a prize case; there is no report that they ever asked
or did not ask; the right was no more questioned than the
right to search the mails.

1863] DU FONT'S SHORTCOMINGS 311

May 24, Sunday. We have had gratifying intelligence
from the Southwest for several days past, particularly in
the vicinity of Vicksburg. It is pretty certain that Grant
will capture the place, and it is hoped Pemberton's army
also. There is a rumor that the stars and stripes wave
over Vicksburg, but the telegraph-wires are broken and
communication interrupted.

May 25, Monday. Received a long dispatch from Ad-
miral Porter at Haines Bluff, Yazoo River, giving details
of successful fights and operations for several preceding
days in that vicinity.

Am anxious in relation to the South Atlantic Squadron
and feel daily the necessity of selecting a new commander.
Du Pont is determined Charleston shall not be captured
by the Navy, and that the Navy shall not attempt it;
thinks it dangerous for the vessels to remain in Charleston
Harbor, and prefers to occupy his palace ship, the Wabash,
at Port Royal to roughing it in a smaller vessel off the port.
His prize money would doubtless be greater without any
risk. All officers under him are becoming affected by his
feelings, adopt his tone, think inactivity best, — that the
ironclads are mere batteries, not naval vessels, and that
outside blockade is the true and only policy. Du Pont
feels that he is strong in the Navy, strong in Congress, and
strong in the country, and not without reason. There is
not a more accomplished or shrewder gentleman in the
service. Since Barren and others left, no officer has gath-
ered a formidable clique in the Navy. He has studied with
some effect to create one for himself, and has in his per-
sonal interest a number of excellent officers who I had
hoped would not be inveigled. Good officers have warned
me against him as a shrewd intriguer, but I have hoped to
get along with him, for I valued his general intelligence,
critical abilities, and advice. But I perceive that in all
things he never forgets Du Pont. His success at Port
Royal has made him feel that he is indispensable to the

312 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 25

service. The modern changes in naval warfare and in naval
vessels are repugnant to him; and to the turret vessels he
has a declared aversion. He has been active in schemes to
retire officers; he is now at work to retire ironclads and
impair confidence in them. As yet he professes respect and
high regard for me personally, but he is not an admirer of
the President, and has got greatly out with Fox, who has
been his too partial friend. An attack is, however, to be
made on the Department by opposing its policy and con-
demning its vessels. This will raise a party to attack and
a party to defend. The monitors are to be pronounced fail-
ures, and the Department, which introduced, adopted, and
patronized them, is to be held responsible, and not Du
Pont, for the abortive attempt to reach Charleston. Dray-
ton, who is his best friend, says to me in confidence that
Du Pont has been too long confined on shipboard, that his
system, mentally and physically, is affected, and I have no
doubt thinks, but does not say, he ought to be relieved for
his own good as well as that of the service. Du Pont is
proud and will not willingly relinquish his command, al-
though he has in a half-defiant way said if his course was
not approved I must find another.

I look upon it, however, as a fixed fact that he will leave
that squadron, but he is a favorite and I am at a loss as to
his successor. Farragut, if not employed elsewhere, would
be the man, and the country would accept the change with
favor. The age and standing of D. D. Porter would be
deemed objectionable by many, yet he has some good points
for that duty. Foote would be a good man for the place in
many respects, but he is somewhat overshadowed by Du
Pont, with whom he has been associated and to whom he
greatly defers. Dahlgren earnestly wants the position, and
is the choice of the President, but there would be general
discontent were he selected. Older officers who have had
vastly greater sea service would feel aggrieved at the selec-
tion of Dahlgren and find ready sympathizers among the
juniors. I have thought of Admiral Gregory, whom I was

1863] A FUGITIVE SLAVE CASE 313

originally inclined to designate as commander of the Gulf
Blockading Squadron at the beginning of the war, but was
overpersuaded by Paulding to take Mervine. A mistake
but a lesson. It taught me not to yield my deliberate con-
victions hi appointments and matters of this kind to the
mere advice and opinion of another without a reason. Both
Fox and Foote indorse Gregory. His age is against him for
such active service, and would give the partisans of Du
Pont opportunity to cavil.

May 26, Tuesday. Much of the tune at the Cabinet-
meeting was consumed in endeavoring to make it appear
that one Cuniston, tried and condemned as a spy, was not
exactly a spy, and that he might be let off. I did not parti-
cipate in the discussion. It appeared to me, from the state-
ment on all hands and from the finding of the court, that
he was clearly and beyond question a spy, and I should
have said so, had my opinion been asked, but I did not care
to volunteer, unsolicited and without a thorough knowledge
of all the facts, to argue away the life of a fellow being.

There was a sharp controversy between Chase and Blair
on the subject of the Fugitive Slave Law, as attempted to
be executed on one Hall here in the district. Both were
earnest, Blair for executing the law, Chase for permitting
the man to enter the service of the United States instead of
being remanded into slavery. The President said this was
one of those questions that always embarrassed him. It
reminded him of a man in Illinois who was in debt and
terribly annoyed by a pressing creditor, until finally the
debtor assumed to be crazy whenever the creditor broached
the subject. "I," said the President, "have on more than
one occasion, hi this room, when beset by extremists on
this question, been compelled to appear to be very mad. I
think," he continued, "none of you will ever dispose of this
subject without getting mad."

I am by no means certain that it is wise or best to
commence immediate operations upon Charleston. It is

314 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 26

a much more difficult task now than it was before the late
undertaking. Our own men have less confidence, while our
opponents have much more. The place has no strategic im-
portance, yet there is not another place our anxious coun-
trymen would so rejoice to see taken as this original seat of
the great wickedness that has befallen our country. The
moral effect of its capture would be great.

May 27, Wednesday. No decisive news from Vicksburg.
The public mind is uneasy at the delay, yet I am glad to
see blame attaches to no one because the place was not
taken at once. There have been strange evidences of an
unreasonable people on many occasions during the War.
Had Halleck shown half the earnestness and ability of Far-
ragut, we should have had Vicksburg in our possession a
year ago.

Admiral Foote handed me a letter from Thomas Turner,
in command of the Ironsides off Charleston. Turner anti-
cipates the withdrawal of Du Pont from the command, and
thinks Foote or Dahlgren will succeed him. Is willing to
continue under Foote, but not under D., who is his junior
and has been promoted for his scientific attainments, and
not for nautical experience or ability. These views are nat-
ural and proper enough to an old naval and social compan-
ion. But he proceeds to comment on the ironclads; speaks
of the " miserable monitors," though he admits they are ad-
mirably adapted for harbor defense; is astonished the De-
partment should build so many; says it is to fill the pockets
of the speculators. These are Du Font's tactics. If true,
the Secretary is a knave, or a blockhead the tool of knaves,
and so of others connected with the Department. But the
fact is, Tom Turner is a simple dupe, and merely echoes
the insinuations of another, who moulds him at pleasure
and is demoralizing that entire command.

Had some talk with Admiral Foote respecting Charles-
ton. He believes the place may be taken, but does not
express himself with confidence. Has great respect for Du

1863] HARCOURT'S WARNING TO ENGLAND 315

Pont, who, I fear, will exercise a bad influence upon him,
should he be given the command. Admiral Gregory is too
old and has some ailments. I have great faith in the old
man, but the country would not forgive me the experiment,
were he selected and to fail. There would be bitter oppo-
sition to Dahlgren from some good officers as well as the
Tom Turners, were he given the squadron. Could he and
Foote act together, it would be the best arrangement I
could make.

May 28, Thursday. I this morning got hold of the pam-
phlet of Sir Vernon Harcourt, " Historicus, " and am de-
lighted to find a coincidence of views between him and my-
self on the subject of mails captured on vessels running the
blockade, or carrying contraband. He warns his country-
men that "the danger is not that Americans will concede too
little but that Great Britain may accept too much." This is
a mortifying, humiliating fact, the more so from its truth.
Mr. Seward is not aware of what he is doing, and the in-
justice and dishonor he is inflicting on his country by his
concession. It is lamentable that the President is misled
in these matters, for Mr. Seward is tampering and trifling
with national rights. I have no doubt he acted inconsider-
ately and ignorantly of any wrong in the first instance
when he took upon himself to make these extraordinary
and disgraceful concessions, but, having become involved
in error, he has studied, not to enlighten himself and serve
the country, but to impose upon and mislead the President
in order to extricate himself.

Dahlgren to-day broached the subject of operations
against Charleston. He speaks of it earnestly and energet-
ically. Were it not so that his assignment to that com-
mand would cause dissatisfaction, I would, as the Presi-
dent strongly favors him, let him show his ability as an offi-
cer in his legitimate professional duty. He would enter
upon the work intelligently and with a determination to be
successful. Whether he has the skill, power, and ability of

316 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 28

a first-rate naval commander is yet to be tested. He has
the zeal, pride, and ambition, but there are other qualities
in which he may be deficient.

Brown of the wrecked Indianola and Fontaine of the
burnt Mississippi, each called on me to-day. They were
both captured last February, have been exchanged, and
arrived to-day from Richmond. Their accounts corre-
spond with each other and with what we have previously
heard in regard to the deplorable state of things in the
Rebel region. Poor beef three times a week and corn bread
daily were dealt to them. The white male population was
all away. The railroads are in a wretched condition, the
running-stock worse than the roads.

May 29, Friday. We have accounts of farther and exten-
sive depredations by the Alabama. These depredations
were near the Line, where the Department, in anticipa-
tion of her appearance, had ordered the Vanderbilt. She
was specially ordered to Fernando de Noronha, whither
the Alabama was expected to go, — where she did go, and
where she would have been captured, had instructions been
obeyed, and not interfered with. But Admiral Wilkes,
having fallen in with that vessel and finding her a commo-
dious ship with extensive and comfortable accommoda-
tions, deliberately annexed her to his squadron and de-
tained her in the West Indies as his flagship, hunting
prizes, too long for the service on which she was specially
sent. I, of course, shall be abused for the escape of the Ala-
bama and her destruction of property by those who know
nothing of the misconduct of Wilkes. The propriety of re-
calling that officer is more apparent than ever. He has
accomplished nothing, but has sadly interrupted and de-
feated the plans of the Department. The country, ignor-
ant of these facts and faults, will disapprove his removal,
and assail the Department for the mischief of the Alabama,
whereas, had he been earlier removed, the latter would not
have happened.

1863] FOOTE SUCCEEDS DU PONT 317

I this morning sent for Admiral Foote and had a free and
full talk with him in regard to the command of the South
Atlantic Squadron. I am satisfied he would be pleased
with the position, and really desired it when he knew Du
Pont was to be relieved. I then introduced him to General
Gillmore, and with the charts and maps before us took a
rapid survey of the harbor and plan of operations. Before
doing this, I said to Foote that I thought it would be well
for the country, the service, and himself, were Admiral
Dahlgren associated with him. He expressed the pleasure
it would give him, but doubted if D. would consent to
serve as second.

I requested Mr. Fox to call on D. and inform him that
I had given Foote the squadron, that I should be glad to
have him embark with Foote, and take an active part
against Charleston. If he responded favorably, I wished
him to come with Fox to the conference. Fox returned
with an answer that not only was D. unwilling to go as
second, but that he wished to decline entirely, unless he
could have command of both naval and land forces. This
precludes farther thought of him. I regret it for his own
sake. It is one of the errors of a lifetime. He has not seen
the sea service he ought for his rank, and there is a feeling
towards him, on account of his advancement, among naval
men which he had now an opportunity to remove. No one
questions his abilities as a skillful and scientific ordnance
officer, but some of his best friends in his profession doubt
his capability as a naval officer on such duty as is here pro-
posed. It is doubtful if he ever will have another so good
an opportunity.

Foote says he will himself see D., and has a conviction
that he can induce him to go with him. I doubt it. Dahl-
gren is very proud and aspiring, and will injure himself and
his professional standing in consequence. With undoubted
talents of a certain kind he has intense selfishness, and I am
sorry to see him on this occasion, as I have seen him on
others, regardless of the feelings and rights of officers of

318 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [MAY 29

greater experience, who have seen vastly more sea service
and who possess high naval qualities and undoubted merit.
In a matter of duty, such as this, he shows what is charged
upon him, — that he is less devoted to the country than to
himself, that he never acts on any principle of self-sacrifice.
While friendly to him, as I have shown on repeated occa-
sions, I am friendly to others also, and must respect their
feelings and protect their rights.

May 30, Saturday. I am surprised at the loose and im-
proper management of General Dix in regard to the block-
ade and traffic in the Rebel region. Admiral Lee has sent
me, yesterday and to-day, some strange permits for trade
signed by Dix, wholly unauthorized and which cannot in
sincerity and good faith be allowed.

May 31, Sunday. Captain Simpson, who has been se-
lected by Admiral Foote as his Fleet Captain and special
confidant, arrived to-day from Newport. Both he and F.
were waiting for me, and met me at the church door as
I came from morning service, and accompanied me to my
house. We had some general talk in regard to propositions
and duties. Foote desires to leave this evening for the
North and Simpson goes with him.

Admiral Lardner called this afternoon. Came on from
Philadelphia for instructions and final orders. He will sail
on Tuesday hi the Ticonderoga to take command of the
West India Squadron. I am to encounter the resentment
of Wilkes and Du Pont at the same time. They are not
friends, but may suppress mutual dislike in a mutual as-
sault on me. Wilkes does not disappoint me, but Du Pont
does. The former is the least dangerous, though the most
rash and violent.

The Arrest of Vallandigham and the Case of the Chicago Times — The
Removal of Wilkes — Count Gurowski on Welles's Appointment to the
Cabinet — General Milroy at Winchester — The President and the
Cabinet kept in Ignorance of Army Movements — Lack of Confidence
in Hooker — Alarm at Rumors of Confederate Advance into Pennsyl-
vania — The President calls for 100,000 Volunteers — The President's
Opinion of "Orpheus C. Kerr" — Illness of Admiral Foote — The Sec-
retary of State and the Matamoras Situation — Sumner's Opinion of
Hooker — Appointment of Dahlgren to the South Atlantic Squadron
in Foote's Place — The French Tobacco in Richmond — Estimate of
Dahlgren — The Monitors and the Fifteen-Inch Guns — Founding of
the .Army and Navy Gazette — Congratulations to Commodore Rodgers
on the Capture of the Fingal — The President betrays Doubts of Hooker

— Blair on the Presidential Aspirations of Chase and McClellan —
Death of Admiral Foote — His Lifelong Friendship with Welles —
Needless Alarm for the Safety of New York — Meade succeeds Hooker

— Rumors of Confederate Raids near Washington — Lee's Advance
into Pennsylvania.

June 1, Monday. Gave the President this A.M. a list of
applicants for appointment to the Naval Academy. A great
crowd was in attendance; I therefore left the list for him
to examine and deferred action until another interview.

Gave Admiral Lardner written instructions at some
length, and had a pretty full conversation in regard to his
duties. He is discreet, prudent, perhaps over-cautious, and
I fear may want energy and force, but until he is tested I
will not pass judgment.

June 2, Tuesday. Chase, Blair, Bates, and myself were
at the Cabinet-meeting. Seward was absent, but his son
was present. So also was Judge Otto, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior. Stanton, though absent, sent no represent-
ative. He condemns the practice of allowing assistants to
be present in Cabinet council, a practice which was intro-
duced by Seward, and says he will never submit or discuss

320 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 2

any important question, when an assistant is present. I
think this is the general feeling and the practice of all.

There was some discussion of affairs at Vicksburg. The
importance of capturing that stronghold and opening the
navigation of the river is appreciated by all, and confidence
is expressed in Grant, but it seems that not enough was do-
ing. The President said Halleck declares he can furnish no
additional troops. As yet I have seen nothing to admire in
the military management of General Halleck, whose mind
is heavy and, if employed at all, is apparently engaged on
something else than the public matter in hand. At this
time when the resources of the nation should be called out
and activity pervade all military operations, he sits back
in his chair, doing comparatively nothing. It worries the
President, yet he relies upon Halleck and apparently no
one else in the War Department. No one more fully real-
izes the magnitude of the occasion, and the vast conse-
quences involved, than the President; he wishes all to be
done that can be done, but yet in army operations will not
move or do except by the consent of the dull, stolid, inef-
ficient, and incompetent General-in-Chief.

Stanton does not attend one half of the Cabinet-meet-
ings. When he comes, he communicates little of import-
ance. Not unfrequently he has a private conference with
the President in the corner of the room, or with Seward in
the library. Chase, Blair, and Bates have each expressed
their mortification and chagrin that things were so con-
ducted. To-day, as we came away, Blair joined me, and
said he knew not what we were coming to; that he had
tried to have things different.

June 3, Wednesday. Wrote Du Pont that Foote would
relieve him. I think he anticipates it and perhaps wants it
to take place. He makes no suggestions, gives no advice,
presents no opinion, says he will obey orders. He is evi-
dently uneasy, — it appears to me as much dissatisfied
with himself as any one. Everything shows he is a disap-

1863] THE ARREST OF VALLANDIGHAM 321

pointed man, afflicted with his own infirmities. I perceive
he is preparing for a controversy with the Department, —
laying out the ground, getting his officers committed, —
and he has besides strong friends in Congress and else-
where. He has been well and kindly treated by the De-
partment. I have the name and blame of favoring him by
some of the best officers, and have borne with his aberra-
tions passively.

The arrest of Vallandigham and the order to suppress
the circulation of the Chicago Times in his military dis-
trict issued by General Burnside have created much feel-
ing. It should not be otherwise. The proceedings were
arbitrary and injudicious. It gives bad men the right of
questions, an advantage of which they avail themselves.
Good men, who wish to support the Administration, find it
difficult to defend these acts. They are Burnside's, un-
prompted, I think, by any member of the Administration,
and yet the responsibility is here unless they are dis-
avowed and B. called to an account, which cannot be done.
The President — and I think every member of the Cabi-
net— regrets what has been done, but as to the measures
which should now be taken there are probably differences.

The constitutional rights of the parties injured are un-
doubtedly infringed upon. It is claimed, however, that
the Constitution, laws, and authorities are assailed with a
view to their destruction by the Rebels, with whom V. and
the Chicago Times are in sympathy and concert. The
efforts of the Rebels are directed to the overthrow of the
government, and V. and his associates unite with them in
waging war against the constituted authorities. Should
the government, and those who are called to legally ad-
minister it, be sustained, or should those who are striving
to destroy both? There are many important and difficult
problems to solve, growing out of the present condition of
affairs. Where is the constitutional right to interdict trade
between citizens, to blockade the ports, to seize private
property, to dispossess and occupy the houses of the in-

322 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNES

habitants, etc., etc.? In peaceful times there would be no
right to do these things; it may be said there would be
no necessity. Unfortunately the peaceful operations of the
Constitution have been interrupted, obstructed, and are
still obstructed. A state of war exists ; violent and forcible
measures are resorted to in order to resist and destroy the
government, which have begotten violent and forcible
measures to vindicate and restore its peaceful operation.
Vallandigham and the Chicago Times claim all the bene-
fits, guarantees, and protection of the government which
they are assisting the Rebels to destroy. Without the
courage and manliness to go over to the public enemy,
to whom they give, so far as they dare, aid and comfort,
they remain here to promote discontent and disaffection.
While I have no sympathy for those who are, in their
hearts, as unprincipled traitors as Jefferson Davis, I lament
that our military officers should, without absolute neces-
sity, disregard those great principles on which our govern-
ment and institutions rest.

June 4, Thursday. Only a sense of duty would have led
me to relieve Du Pont and Wilkes. With D. my relations
have been kind and pleasant, on my part confiding. Lat-
terly he has disappointed me, and given indication that my
confidence was not returned. Wilkes is a different man and
of an entirely different temperament. Du Pont is pleasant
in manner and one of the most popular officers in the Navy;
Wilkes is arbitrary and one of the most unpopular. There
are exceptions in both cases. Du Pont is scrupulous to
obey orders; Wilkes often disregards and recklessly breaks
them. The Governments of Great Britain, Denmark,
Mexico, and Spain have each complained of Wilkes, but,
except in the case of Denmark, it appears to me without
much cause, and even in the case of Denmark the cause
was aggravated. There was some mismanagement in the
Mexican case that might not stand close scrutiny. As
regards the rights of neutrals, he has so far as I yet know,

1863] THE REMOVAL OF WILKES 323

deported himself correctly, and better than I feared so far
as England is concerned, after the affair of the Trent and
with his intense animosity towards that government. His
position has doubtless been cause of jealousy and irritation
on the part of Great Britain, and in that respect his selec-
tion from the beginning had its troubles. He has accom-
plished less than I expected; has been constantly grumbling
and complaining, which was expected; has captured a few
blockade-runners, but not an armed cruiser, which was his
special duty, and has probably defeated the well-devised
plan of the Navy Department to take the Alabama. At the
last advices most of his squadron was concentrated at St.
Thomas, including the Vanderbilt, which should then have
been on the equator, by specific orders. To-day Mrs.
Wilkes, with whom we have been sociable, and I might
almost say intimate, writes Mrs. Welles a note asking if
any change has been made in the command of the West
India Squadron. This note was on my table as I came out
from breakfast. The answer of Mrs. Welles was, I suppose,
not sufficiently definite, for I received a note with similar
inquiries in the midst of pressing duties, and the messenger
was directed to await an answer. I frankly informed her
of the change. Alienation and probably anger will follow,
but I could not do differently, though this necessary
official act will, not unlikely, be resented as a personal
wrong.

June 5, Friday. The President read to-day a paper
which he had prepared in reply to Erastus Corning and
others. It has vigor and ability and with some corrections
will be a strong paper.

June 6, Saturday. Am unhappy over our affairs. The
Army of the Potomac is doing but little; I do not learn that
much is expected or intended. The failure at Chancellors-
ville has never been satisfactorily explained. Perhaps it
cannot be. Some of the officers say if there had been no

324 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 6

whiskey in the army after crossing the Rappahannock we
should have had complete success. But the President and
Halleck are silent on this subject.

How far Halleck is sustaining Grant at Vicksburg I do
not learn. He seems heavy and uncertain in regard to
matters there. A further failure at V. will find no justifica-
tion. To-day he talks of withdrawing a portion of the small
force at Port Royal. I am not, however, as anxious as some
for an immediate demonstration on Charleston. There are,
I think, strong reasons for deferring action for a time, un-
less the army is confident of success by approaches on
Morris Island. Halleck is confident the place can be so
taken. But while he expresses this belief, he is not earnest
in carrying it into effect. He has suddenly broken out with
zeal for Vicksburg, and is ready to withdraw most of the
small force at Port Royal and send it to the Mississippi.
Before they could reach Grant, the fate of Vicksburg will
be decided. If such a movement is necessary now, it was
weeks ago, while we were in consultation for army work
in South Carolina and Georgia.

Halleck inspires no zeal in the army or among OUT sol-
diers. Stanton is actually hated by many officers, and is
more intimate with certain extreme partisans in Congress
— the Committee on the Conduct of War and others —
than with the Executive Administration and military men.
The Irish element is dissatisfied with the service, and there
is an unconquerable prejudice on the part of many whites
against black soldiers. But all our increased military
strength now comes from the negroes. Partyism is stronger
with many in the Free States than patriotism. Every
coward and niggardly miser opposes the War. The former
from fear, lest he should be drafted; the latter to avoid
taxes.

The examination at the Naval School has closed, and the
practice ship, the Macedonian, sails to-day. The report
of the board is highly commendatory of the school. I have,
amidst multiplied duties, tried to make the school useful,

1863] THE WEEKLY BAND CONCERTS 325

and have met with opposition and obstruction when I
should have had support.

June 8, Monday. Wrote Secretary of State on the sub-
ject of the complaints of the Danish Government against
Wilkes, who is charged with abusing hospitality at St.
Thomas. Made the best statement I could without cen-
suring Wilkes, who is coming home, partly from these
causes.

Have a letter from Foote, who is not ready to relieve Du
Pont. Speaks of bad health and disability. It must be
real, for whatever his regard for, or tenderness to D., Foote
promptly obeys orders.

Spoke to the President regarding weekly performances of
the Marine Band. It has been customary for them to play
in the public grounds south of the Mansion once a week in
summer, for many years. Last year it was intermitted,
because Mrs. Lincoln objected in consequence of the death
of her son. There was grumbling and discontent, and there
will be more this year if the public are denied the privilege
for private reasons. The public will not sympathize in sor-
rows which are obtrusive and assigned as a reason for de-
priving them of enjoyments to which they have been
accustomed, and it is a mistake to persist in it. When I in-
troduced the subject to-day, the President said Mrs. L.
would not consent, certainly not until after the 4th of
July. I stated the case pretty frankly, although the sub-
ject is delicate, and suggested that the band could play
in Lafayette Square. Seward and Usher, who were present,
advised that course. The President told me to do what I
thought best.

Count Adam Gurowski, who is splenetic and querulous,
a strange mixture of good and evil, always growling and
discontented, who loves to say harsh things and speak
good of but few, seldom makes right estimates and correct
discrimination of character, but means to be truthful if not
just, tells me my selection for the Cabinet was acquiesced

326 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNES

in by the radical circle to which he belongs because they
felt confident my influence with the President would be
good, and that I would be a safeguard against the schem-
ing and plotting of Weed and Seward, whose intrigues they
understood and watched. When I came here, just preced-
ing the inauguration in 1861, I first met this Polish exile,
and was amused and interested in him, though I could not
be intimate with one of his rough, coarse, ardent, and vio-
lent partisan temperament. His associates were then
Greeley, D. D. Field, Opdyke, and men of that phase of
party. I have no doubt that what he says is true of his
associates, colored to some extent by his intense preju-
dices. He was for a year or two in the State Department
as a clerk under Seward, and does not conceal that he was
really a spy upon him, or, as he says, watched him. He
says that when Seward became aware that the radicals
relied upon me as a friend to check the loose notions and
ultraism of the State Department, he (S.) went to work
with the President to destroy my influence; that by per-
sisting he so far succeeded as to induce the President to go
against me on some important measures, where his opinion
leaned to mine; that in this way, Seward had intrenched
himself. There is doubtless some truth — probably some
error — in the Count's story. I give the outlines. Eames,
with whom he is intimate, has told me these things before.
The Count makes him his confidant.

June 9, Tuesday. Admiral Foote arrived this A.M. Is
ardent and earnest for his new duties. Is fully possessed of
my views. Left this evening for New York. Will sail next
Monday. In the mean time, Du Pont must hold on. Had
a carefully prepared and characteristic letter from Du
Pont, inclosing one from the commanders of the ironclads,
which he has prompted and secured. This is for the future,
and to make a record for himself.

June 10, Wednesday. Rumors of a cavalry fight in Cul-

1863] INTERFERING CONGRESSMEN 327

peper. The President and Stanton have gone to Falmouth.
Nothing definite from Vicksburg. Am not favorably im-
pressed with what I hear of the fight on the Rappahan-
nock.

The accounts of piratical depredations disturb me. My
views, instructions, and arrangements to capture the Ala-
bama, which would have prevented these depredations,
have failed through the misconduct of Wilkes. The Rebel
cruisers are now beginning to arm their prizes and find
adventurers to man them. Our neutral friends will be
likely to find the police of the seas in a bad way.

June 11, Thursday. The President informs me that he
did not go to Falmouth, but merely to Fort Lyon near
Alexandria.

June 12, Friday. The interference of Members of Con-
gress in the petty appointments and employment of labor-
ers in the navy yards is annoying and pernicious. The
public interest is not regarded by the Members, but they
crowd partisan favorites for mechanical positions in place
of good mechanics and workmen, and when I refuse to
entertain their propositions, they take offense. I can't
help it if they do. I will not prostitute my trust to their
schemes and selfish personal partisanship.

June 13, Saturday. We had music from the Marine Band
to-day in Lafayette Square. The people are greatly
pleased. Had word just after five this P.M. that three vessels
were yesterday captured by a pirate craft off Cape Henry
and burnt. Sent Fox at once with orders to telegraph to
New York and Philadelphia, etc., for every vessel in condi-
tion to proceed to sea without delay in search of this wolf
that is prowling so near us. If necessary the Tuscarora
must sail forthwith and not wait for Admiral Foote.

June 14, Sunday. Farther reports of depredations. Got

328 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 14

off vessels last night from New York and Hampton Roads.
Sent to Boston for Montgomery to cruise off Nantucket.

Scary rumors abroad of army operations and a threat-
ened movement of Lee upon Pennsylvania. No doubt
there has been a change. I fear our friends are in diffi-
culties. Went to the War Department this evening. Found
the President and General Halleck with Secretary of War
in the room of the telegraphic operator. Stanton was un-
easy, said it would be better to go into another room. The
President and myself went into the Secretary's office; the
other two remained. The President said quietly to me he
was feeling very bad; that he found Milroy and his com-
mand were captured, or would be. He (Milroy) has writ-
ten that he can hold out five days, but at the end of five
days he will be in no better condition, for he can't be re-
lieved. "It is," said the President, " Harper's Ferry over
again."

I inquired why Milroy did not fall back, — if he had not
been apprised by Hooker, or from here, what Lee was
doing, etc. I added, if Lee's army was moving, Hooker
would take advantage and sever his forces, perhaps take
his rear guard. The President said it would seem so, but
that our folks appeared to know but little how things are,
and showed no evidence that they ever availed themselves
of any advantage.

How fully the President is informed, and whether he is
made acquainted with the actual state of things is uncer-
tain. He depends on the War Department, which, I think,
is not informed and is in confusion. From neither of the
others did I get a word. Stanton came once or twice into
the room, where we were, in a fussy way. Halleck did not
move from his chair where he sat with his cigar, the door
being open between the two rooms. From some expres-
sions which were dropped from H., I suspect poor Milroy
is to be made the scapegoat, and blamed for the stupid
blunders, neglects, and mistakes of those who should have
warned and advised him.

1863] LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN HOOKER 329

I do not learn that any members of the Cabinet are
informed of army movements. The President is kept in
ignorance and defers to the General-in-Chief, though not
pleased that he is not fully advised of matters as they
occur. There is a modest distrust of himself, of which ad-
vantage is taken. For a week, movements have been going
on of which he has known none, or very few, of the details.

I came away from the War Department painfully im-
pressed. After recent events, Hooker cannot have the con-
fidence which is essential to success, and all-important to
the commander in the field. Halleck does not grow upon
me as a military man of power and strength; has little apti-
tude, skill, or active energy. In this state of things, the able
Rebel general is moving a powerful army, and has no one to
confront him on whose ability and power the country relies.
There was confidence in McClellan's ability to organize, to
defend, and to repel, though he was worthless in attack, but
there is no such feeling towards Hooker. He has not grown
in public estimation since placed in command. If he is in-
temperate, as is reported, God help us! The President, who
was the first person to intimate this failing to me, has a per-
sonal liking for Hooker, and clings to him when others give
way.

The letter to Erastus Corning and others is published
and well received.

June 15, Monday. Met Blair at the depot. Told him of
the conversation I had last evening with the President and
the appearance of things at the War Department. It af-
fected him greatly. He has never had confidence in either
Stanton, Halleck, or Hooker. He fairly groaned that the
President should continue to trust them and defer to them,
when the magnitude of the questions is considered.
" Strange, strange," he exclaimed, "that the President,
who has sterling ability, should give himself over so com-
pletely to Stanton and Seward."

Something of a panic pervades the city. Singular

330 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 15

rumors reach us of Rebel advances into Maryland. It is
said they have reached Hagerstown, and some of them
have penetrated as far as Chambersburg in Pennsylvania.
These reports are doubtless exaggerations, but I can get
nothing satisfactory from the War Department of the
Rebel movements, or of our own. There is trouble, con-
fusion, uncertainty, where there should be calm intel-
ligence.

I have a panic telegraph from Governor Curtin, who is
excitable and easily alarmed, entreating that guns and gun-
ners may be sent from the navy yard at Philadelphia to
Harrisburg without delay. We have not a gunner that we
can spare. Commodore Stribling can spare men, tempo-
rarily, from the navy yard.

I went again, at a late hour, to the War Department, but
could get no facts or intelligence from the Secretary, who
either does not know or dislikes to disclose the position and
condition of the army. He did not know that the Rebels
had reached Hagerstown; did not know but some of them
had; quite as likely to be in Philadelphia as Harrisburg.
Ridiculed Curtin's fears. Thought it would be well, how-
ever, to send such guns and men as could be spared to
allay his apprehension. I could not get a word concerning
General Milroy and his command, — whether safe or cap-
tured, retreating or maintaining his position. All was vague,
opaque, thick darkness. I really think Stanton is no better
posted than myself, and from what Stanton says am afraid
Hooker does not comprehend Lee's intentions nor know
how to counteract them. Halleck has no activity; never
exhibits sagacity or foresight, though he can record and
criticize the past. It looks to me as if Lee was putting
forth his whole energy and force in one great and desperate
struggle which shall be decisive; that he means to strike
a blow that will be severely felt, and of serious conse-
quences, and thus bring the War to a close. But all is con-
jecture.

1863] 100,000 VOLUNTEERS CALLED FOR 331

June 16, Tuesday. We hear this morning that Milroy has
cut his way through the Rebels and arrived at Harper's
Ferry, where he joins Tyler. I cannot learn from the War
Department how early Milroy was warned from here that
the Rebels were approaching him and that it would be
necessary for him to fall back. Halleck scolds and swears
about him as a stupid, worthless fellow. This seems his
way to escape censure himself and cover his stupidity in
higher position.

The President yesterday issued a proclamation calling
for 100,000 volunteers to be raised in Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia. This call is
made from outside pressure, and intelligence received
chiefly from Pennsylvania and not from the War Depart-
ment or Headquarters. Tom A. Scott, late Assistant Sec-
retary of War, came on expressly from Pennsylvania, sent
by Curtin, and initiated the proceeding.

Halleck sits, and smokes, and swears, and scratches
his arm and [indecipherable], but exhibits little military
capacity or intelligence; is obfusticated, muddy, uncertain,
stupid as to what is doing or to be done.

Neither Seward nor Stanton nor Blair nor Usher was
at the Cabinet-meeting. The two last are not in Washing-
ton. At such a time all should be here and the meeting
full and frequent for general consultation and general pur-
poses.

Scarcely a word on army movements. Chase attempted
to make inquiries; asked whether a demonstration could
not be made on Richmond, but the President gave it no
countenance. No suggestions ever come from Halleck.

Young Ulric Dahlgren, who is on Hooker's staff, came in
to-day. He is intelligent and gallant. I asked where the
army was. He says between Fairfax and Centerville, or
most of it was there; that Lee and the Rebel army are on
the opposite side of the mountain, fronting Hooker. He
knows little or nothing of the reported Rebel advances into
Pennsylvania, and thinks Hooker does not know it. This

332 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE ie

is extraordinary, but it accounts for the confusion and be-
wilderment at the War Office.

June 17, Wednesday. Had a telegram at ten last night
from Mr. Felton, President of the Philadelphia & Balti-
more Railroad, requesting that a gunboat might be sent
to Havre de Grace to protect the Company's ferryboat
and property. Says he has information that the Rebels
intend going down the river to seize it.

I went forthwith to the War Department to ascertain
whether there was really any such alarming necessity, for
it seemed to me, from all I had been able to learn, that it
was a panic invocation. Found the President and Stanton
at the War Department, jubilant over intelligence just
received that no Rebels had reached Carlisle, as had been
reported, and it was believed they had not even entered
Pennsylvania. Stanton threw off his reserve, and sneered
and laughed at Felton's call for a gunboat. Soon a mes-
senger came in from General Schenck, who declares no
Rebels have crossed the Potomac, that the stragglers and
baggage-trains of Milroy had run away in affright, and
squads of them, on different parallel roads, had alarmed
each other, and each fled in terror with all speed to Harris-
burg. This alone was asserted to be the basis of the great
panic which had alarmed Pennsylvania and the country.

The President was relieved and in excellent spirits.
Stanton was apparently feeling well, but I could not assure
myself he was wholly relieved of the load which had been
hanging upon him. The special messenger brought a letter
to Stanton, which he read, but was evidently unwilling to
communicate its contents, even to the President, who asked
about it. Stanton wrote a few lines, which he gave to the
officer, who left. General Meigs came in about this time,
and I was sorry to hear Stanton communicate an exag-
gerated account of Milroy's disaster, who, he said, had not
seen a fight or even an enemy. Meigs indignantly denied
the statement, and said Milroy himself had communicated

1863] ORPHEUS C. KERR 333

the fact that he had fought a battle and escaped. While he
(Meigs) did not consider Milroy a great general, or a man
of very great ability, he believed him to be truthful and
brave, and if General Schenck's messenger said there had
been no fight he disbelieved him. Stanton insisted that
was what the officer (whom I think he called Payson) said.
I told him I did not so understand the officer. The subject
was then dropped; but the conversation gave me uneasi-
ness. Why should the Secretary of War wish to misrepre-
sent and belittle Milroy? Why exaggerate the false rumor
and try to give currency to, if he did not originate, the
false statement that there was no fight and a panic flight?
The President was in excellent humor. He said this
flight would be a capital joke for Orpheus C. Kerr to get
hold of. He could give scope to his imagination over the
terror of broken squads of panic-stricken teamsters, fright-
ened at each other and alarming all Pennsylvania. Meigs,
with great simplicity, inquired who this person (Orpheus
C. Kerr) was. "Why," said the President, "have you not
read those papers? They are in two volumes; any one who
has not read them must be a heathen." He said he had
enjoyed them greatly, except when they attempted to play
their wit on him, which did not strike him as very success-
ful, but rather disgusted him. "Now the hits that are
given to you, Mr. Welles, or to Chase, I can enjoy, but I
dare say they may have disgusted you while I was laugh-
ing at them. So vice versa as regards myself." He then
spoke of a poem by this Orpheus C. Kerr which mytholog-
ically described McClellan as a monkey fighting a serpent
representing the Rebellion, but the joke was the monkey
continually called for "more tail," "more tail," which
Jupiter gave him, etc., etc.

June 18, Thursday. I find that Fox, whom I authorized to
telegraph to the Commandant of the Yards the other night
to get off immediately vessels after the pirate Tacony,
amplified the order, and that a very large number of ves-

334 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE is

sels are being chartered or pressed into the service. While
it was necessary to have some, there is such a thing as
overdoing, but the order having gone out in my name, I
could not contest it.

Have information that Admiral Foote is quite ill at the
Astor House, New York. He came on from New Haven to
New York, expecting to take the Tuscarora on Monday
for Port Royal, but that vessel had been dispatched after
the pirate Tacony. This disappointment, the excitement,
over-exertion, and domestic anxiety and affliction have
probably had an effect on his sensitive and nervous mind.
He told me with some emotion, when last here, that his
wife's health was such it would detain him a few days to
make certain indispensable arrangements, for their parting
would be final, she could not be expected to live till he
returned.

Wrote Seward that the condition of affairs on the Rio
Grande and at Matamoras was unsatisfactory. We have
had several conversations on the subject, in which I have
tried to convince him of the injury done by the unrestricted
trade and communication on that river, and to persuade
him that he could make his mark and do a great public
service by procuring to be established a principle in regard
to the right of adjoining nations, like the United States
and Mexico, and the occupancy of a mutual highway like
the Rio Grande, with the necessary authority to enforce
a blockade, — questions that have never yet been decided
and settled among nations. Our blockade is rendered in
a great degree ineffective because we cannot shut off traffic
and mail facilities, or exclude commercial and postal inter-
course with the Rebels via the Rio Grande. An immense
commerce has suddenly sprung up, nominally with Mata-
moras, but actually with Texas and the whole Southwest,
nay, with the entire Rebel region, for letters are inter-
changed between Richmond and England by that route.

There are one or two hundred vessels off the mouth of
the Rio Grande, where there were never more than six or

1863] ILLNESS OF ADMIRAL FOOTE 335

eight before the War, nor will there be more than a dozen
when the War is over. English merchant adventurers are
establishing regular lines with Matamoras, of which the
Peterhoff was one, carrying supplies and mails to the
Rebels and receiving cotton in return. Unfortunately, Mr.
Seward has given encouragement to them, by conceding
the sanctity of captured mails, which, with the evidence
which would insure condemnation, are to be forwarded
unopened to their destination. In no respect, way, or man-
ner does the Secretary of State furnish a correction by
assisting or proposing a principle to be recognized by na-
tions, or by any arrangement with Mexico, or France, or
both.

June 19, Friday. The illness of Admiral Foote is serious,
I fear fatal. Our first intelligence this morning made his
case almost hopeless; later in the day we have a telegraph
that he is more comfortable.

Chase informs me that he has just returned from a visit
to Hooker's headquarters, at or near Fairfax Court-House.
The troops, he says, are in good spirits and excellent con-
dition, as is Hooker himself. He commends Hooker as in
every respect all that we could wish. His (Chase's) tone
towards Halleck is much altered since our last conversa-
tion. All of which is encouraging. But Chase's estimate
and judgment of men fluctuates as he has intercourse with
them and they are friendly and communicative or other-
wise.

June 20, Saturday. Tidings from New York to-day are
sad respecting Admiral Foote. I fear he cannot recover
and that his hours upon earth are few. His death will be a
great loss to the country, a greater one in this emergency
to me than to any other out of his own family. Individual
sorrows and bereavements and personal friendship are not
to weigh in matters of national concernment, but I cannot
forget that "we were boys together,7' and that in later and

336 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 20

recent years we have mutually sustained each other. I
need him and the prestige of his name in the place to which
he has been ordered.

I have sent Dr. Whelan, an old and intimate friend and
shipmate of Foote, who thoroughly understands his phys-
ical system and peculiarities, — has been his daily com-
panion for years in different climes, — to New York. His
presence, even, will be cheering and pleasant to Foote.

Sumner's opinion and estimate of men does not agree
with Chase's. Sumner expresses an absolute want of con-
fidence in Hooker; says he knows him to be a blasphemous
wretch; that after crossing the Rappahannock and reach-
ing Centerville, Hooker exultingly exclaimed, "The enemy
is in my power, and God Almighty cannot deprive me of
them." I have heard before of this, but not so direct and
positive. The sudden paralysis that followed, when the
army in the midst of a successful career was suddenly
checked and commenced its retreat, has never been ex-
plained. Whiskey is said by Sumner to have done the work.
The President said if Hooker had been killed by the shot
which knocked over the pillar that stunned him, we should
have been successful.

June 21, Sunday. I have three telegrams from Dr.
Whelan to-day, all of the same tenor. The last, at 4 P.M.,
says Admiral Foote continues much the same, — insen-
sible and slowly sinking. Dahlgren, who left New York
yesterday, says the case is hopeless, that Foote told him
it was the last of this world and he was prepared for the
event.

We have pretty authentic reports of a protracted fight
at Aldie. The War Department is not communicative,
and I apprehend for the reason that it is not better ad-
vised than the rest of us, as yet. A train of ambulances
passed this evening, going, I doubt not, for the wounded.

The Richmond papers speak of the capture of the
steamer Fingal by our ironclads. This is important, and

1863] DAHLGREN SUCCEEDS FOOTE 337

I am inclined to credit it. John Rodgers has written his
family that he was in Nassau Sound, having been ordered
there to watch the Fingal. The Richmond report corre-
sponds with this, and states she was captured after a fight
of thirty minutes with the monitors.

I had to-day a full and unreserved talk with Dahlgren.
Told him it was now evident Foote could not go on the
service to which he was ordered, — at all events, if he sur-
vived, not for the present; I should therefore designate him
to relieve Du Pont. This would, to some extent, involve the
selection of a new staff, for it was not likely that Foote's
confidants were his confidants. [I remarked] that not un-
likely some of the elder officers who had seen great sea
service would feel disinclined to remain on the station
under him; that in giving him this command I was con-
sulting the wishes of the President; that to supersede Du
Pont, under any circumstances, involved some risk and
responsibility to both the Department and the recipient;
that he could not be unaware his promotion had caused
some discontent, and that it would not be lessened by this
command. If any of his seniors in past tunes desired to be
transferred, they must be permitted to do so, without
prejudice.

I stated that this appointment was a specialty, im-
posed upon the Department by Admiral Foote's affliction
when on his way to assume these duties; that this inter-
ruption made prompt action necessary; that he had sought
the privilege of leading in the assault on Sumter under
Du Pont; that I had proposed him as an assistant and sec-
ond to Foote; that he was to go for a particular purpose,
and his absence from the Bureau would therefore be tem-
porary. In the mean time, Commander Wise, the assist-
ant who had been associated with him, could take charge
of and go forward with the ordnance duties as well as, and
perhaps better than, any one else. To all this he assented,
but expressed a strong wish that a new appointment might
be made, and he entirely relieved from the Bureau. I

338 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 21

replied that I could not for a moment think of relieving
him of charge of the ordnance, nor ought he to ask, or be
willing, to relinquish it; that was his place, to which he had
been educated and for which he had aptitude, and it was
my wish he should retain his position as Chief of the
Ordnance Bureau during my connection with the Depart-
ment.

As related to any demonstration on Charleston, should
any be made, he was to consider himself clothed with full
powers, and to prescribe details, communicating at all
times and without reserve to the Department; to let me
have not only all the good news but any bad news, and to
tell me frankly at any time of embarrassments, change of
views, or difficulties of any kind.

June 22, Monday. The rumors yesterday of a fight near
Aldie are fully confirmed, but as yet no definite informa-
tion. It is not always pleasant to go to the War Depart-
ment to have news verified, even if they have the facts.
Often there is unaccountable, and I think inexcusable,
want of correct information at Army Headquarters ; if there
is a reverse, or if there is want of information in relation to
rumors that reach us, there is always prevarication and
sometimes a sullen reserve. Generally I have found Stan-
ton affable and communicative when alone, but not always,
especially if there has been disaster or unpleasant news.
Halleck is worse. There has never been intimacy between
him and me; probably there never will be. I have not
called over to-day, for those who have, and are entitled to
know what was doing, have been unsuccessful or met with
an unpleasant rebuff.

June 23, Tuesday. Seward called this morning and had
quite a story to tell of foreign affairs and the successes that
have attended his management. For a time, he says, mat-
ters looked a little threatening with France, but Count
Mercier tells him all is now right, — we can do, on certain

1863] FRENCH TOBACCO IN RICHMOND 339

points which have been controverted, pretty much as we
please.

All this was a prelude to a proposition, the object of
which was to make excellent friends of the French, who
have ten thousand hogsheads of tobacco in Richmond
which they declare was purchased before the Rebellion,
and which they cannot get out by reason of the blockade.
This tobacco was being heavily taxed by the Rebels, and
what the French Government now wants, and what he
very much wanted, was an arrangement by which this
French tobacco might be got from Richmond. It would be
such a capital thing, and the favor would be so highly
appreciated by the French, that they would become our
very good friends.

I informed Mr. Seward it was a plain case and easily dis-
posed of. We had only to lift the blockade and the French
tobacco and everybody else's tobacco would leave Rich-
mond. I did not see how this favor could be granted to the
French Government and denied to other governments, and
if extended to foreigners, our own citizens, many of whom
had large amounts of property in the Rebel region, could
not be interdicted from its exportation. In plain words
the blockade must be maintained in good faith or be aban-
doned. I was not aware that we were under any special ob-
ligation to the French Government; I would not purchase
or bribe, and I was opposed to favoritism as a principle in
government. He said his idea was that a distinction might
be made in this, — that the tobacco belonged to the Gov-
ernment, and therefore was an isolated case which could
not be claimed as a precedent, and furthermore it was
bought and paid for before the blockade was established.
I told him the principle was the same with governments as
with individuals; that the Belgian and others had made
haste to remove their tobacco within the time limited when
the blockade was declared; that their sympathies were with
us, they had no faith in the Rebel movement, but it was
different with the French Government. It did not pain or

340 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 23

grieve me that they were taxed and heavy losers by the
Rebels, and the rules of blockade ought not in my opinion
to be relaxed for their benefit.

Mr. Seward was, I saw, discomfited, and he no doubt
thinks me impolitic, unpractical, and too unyielding and
severe to successfully administer the Government. I on the
other hand deem it a misfortune that at a period like this
there should be any disposition to temporize and indulge
in expedients of a questionable character or loose and
inconsiderate practices. "What we have most to fear/' said
Sir Vernon Harcourt, "is not that America will yield too
little, but that we shall accept too much." It was not, nor
will it be, my conduct that prompts this humiliating char-
acterizing of the American Government. No improper con-
cessions will be made by me to France or her Minister.

Neither Seward nor Stanton was at the Cabinet-meet-
ing. Mr. Bates has left for Missouri. The President was
with General Hooker at the War Department when we
met, but soon came in. His countenance was sad and care-
worn, and impressed me painfully. Nothing of special
interest was submitted. The accustomed rumor in regard
to impending military operations continues.

Chase, who evidently was not aware that General
Hooker was in Washington until I mentioned it, seemed
surprised and left abruptly. I tried to inspire a little cheer-
fulness and pleasant feeling by alluding to the capture of
the Fingal. For a few moments there was animation and
interest, but when the facts were out and the story told
there was no new topic and the bright feelings subsided.
Believing the President desired to be with General Hooker,
who has come in suddenly and unexpectedly and for some
as yet undisclosed reason, I withdrew. Blair left with me.
He is much dispirited and dejected. We had ten or fifteen
minutes' talk as we came away. He laments that the
President does not advise more with all his Cabinet, depre-
cates the bad influence of Seward, and Chase, and Stanton,
Halleck, and Hooker.

1863] ESTIMATE OF DAHLGREN 341

Had two interviews with Dahlgren to-day in regard to
his duties as successor of Du Pont in command of the
South Atlantic Squadron. Enjoined upon him to let me at
no time remain ignorant of his views if they underwent any
change, or should be different in any respect from mine or
the policy proposed. Told him there must be frankness
and absolute sincerity between us in the discharge of his
official duties, — no reserve though we might differ. I
must know, truthfully, what he was doing, what he pro-
posed doing, and have his frank and honest opinions at all
tunes. He concurs, and I trust there will be no misunder-
standing.

My intercourse and relations with Dahlgren have been
individually satisfactory. The partiality of the President
has sometimes embarrassed me and given D. promotion
and prominence which may prove a misfortune in the end.
It has gamed him no friends in the profession, for the of-
ficers feel and know he has attained naval honors without
naval claims or experience. He has intelligence and abil-
ity without question; his nautical qualities are disputed;
his skill, capacity, courage, daring, sagacity, and compre-
hensiveness in a high command are to be tested. He is in-
tensely ambitious, and, I fear, too selfish. He has the
heroism which proceeds from pride and would lead him to
danger and to death, but whether he has the innate, unself-
ish courage of the genuine sailor and soldier remains to be
seen. I think him exact and a good disciplinarian, and the
President regards him with special favor. In periods of
trying difficulties here, from the beginning of the Rebellion,
he has never failed me. He would, I know, gallantly sus-
tain his chief anywhere and make a good second in com-
mand, such as I wished to make him when I proposed that
he should be associated with Foote. As a bureau officer he
is capable and intelligent, but he shuns and evades re-
sponsibility. This may be his infirmity in his new position.

The official reports of the capture of the Fingal, alias
Atlanta, are very gratifying and confirm our estimate of

342 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 23

the value of the monitor class of vessels and the fifteen-
inch guns. The Department, and I, as its head, have been
much abused for both. Ericsson, the inventor of the
monitor or turret vessels, wanted a twenty-inch gun. His
theory is impregnability in a vessel and immense calibre
for his guns, which shall be irresistible. Dahlgren would
not himself consent to take the responsibility of more
than a thirteen-inch gun. Fox and Admiral Smith favored
a fifteen-inch, which the Department adopted, though with
some hesitation, without the approval of D., the Ord-
nance Officer, who, however, did not remonstrate against
it, but went forward under orders, the responsibility
being with me and not on him.

June 24, Wednesday. Admiral Foote still lingers, but
there is no hope of his recovery. Dahlgren took leave this
morning for the South Atlantic Squadron. I admonished
him that his detachment from the Bureau was only tem-
porary and for a special purpose, and wished him a pros-
perous and successful time.

No definite or satisfactory information in regard to
military movements. If it were clear that the Secretary of
War and General-in-Chief knew and were directing mili-
tary movements intelligently, it would be a relief; but they
communicate nothing and really appear to have little or
nothing to communicate. What at any time surprises us,
surprises them. There is no cordiality between them and
Hooker, not an identity of views and action, such as should
exist between the general in command in the field and the
Headquarters and Department, separated only a few miles.
The consequence is an unhappy and painful anxiety and
uncertainty, the more distressing to those of us who should
know and are measurably responsible, because we ought to
be acquainted with the facts. Were we not in that posi-
tion, we should be more at ease.

None of our vessels have succeeded in capturing the
Rebel pirate Tacony, which has committed great ravages

1863] THE ARMY AND NAVY GAZETTE 343

along the coast, although I have sent out over twenty ves-
sels in search. Had she been promptly taken, I should have
been blamed for such a needless and expensive waste of
strength; now I shall be censured for not doing more.

June 25, Thursday. A special messenger from Mr. Fel-
ton, President of the Philadelphia & Baltimore Railroad,
called on me this morning before breakfast, with a request
I would send a gunboat to Havre de Grace to protect the
ferryboat, railroad property, and public travel. He says
Rebels are in the vicinity in disguise, concerting measures
for mischief. The War Department and military author-
ities, who should know, are not informed on these matters,
and I must exercise my own judgment. There is sensitive-
ness in the public mind, and security is sought sometimes
unnecessarily, but my conviction is there may be cause for
apprehension in this instance. I have therefore ordered a
gunboat from the Potomac Flotilla to the point indicated
and notified Mr. Felton.

Word is sent me by a credible person who left Hagers-
town last evening that Ewell and Longstreet with their
divisions passed through that place yesterday to invade
Pennsylvania with sixty thousand men. The number is
probably exaggerated, but I am inclined to believe there
may be half that number, perhaps more. Where in the
mean time is General Hooker and our army? I get nothing
satisfactory from Headquarters or Stanton.

The President to-day approved my placing the Bureau
of Equipment and Recruiting in temporary charge of
Commander Smith, and the Ordnance Bureau in charge of
Commander Wise.

Mr. Stanton called on me this morning and stated he had
made an arrangement with John C. Rives to publish a
military journal which he proposed to call the Army and
Navy Gazette. He wished it to embrace both branches of the
service unless I objected. The entire expense, over and
above the receipts, whatever they may be, should be borne

344 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [JUNE 25

by the War Department. I told him I of course could make
no objection to the name, and if the orders, reports, official
papers, and current news were regularly and correctly
published there would be some conveniences attending it.
The proposition was, however, novel to me, and I knew of
no law to warrant it or of any appropriation to defray the
expense. I should therefore decline any pecuniary, official,
or personal responsibility, or any connection with it. He
assured me he did not expect or wish me to incur any part
of the expense or responsibility.

June 26, Friday. The conduct and course of Admiral
Du Pont leaves no doubt on my mind that he intends to
occupy a position antagonistic to the Department. Fox,
who has been his special friend, is of the same opinion. He
suggested to me yesterday that the capture of the Fingal
presented to me a good opportunity to give Rodgers credit,
and in turning the subject over, we both concluded that the
letter might be so framed as to detach him, and perhaps
others whom the Admiral has sought to attach to and make
part of his clique. Fox caught the points earnestly and
brought me his ideas in the rough

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